JUDGMENT The appellant was tried for an offence under Section 307, I.P.C. by the learned Additional Judge, Special Court, Bhatinda in connection with the injuries inflicted upon Hardev Singh on 21st September, 1984. The learned Special Judge convicted the appellant for an offence under Section 326, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo rigourous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo regorous imprisonment for three months. Out of the fine, the injured was directed to be paid Rs.200/- as compensation. 2. Through this appeal under Section 14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 the appellant has challenged his conviction and sentence. 3. Mr. M.S. Gujral, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently argued that since the FIR on the own showing of the prosecution had been lodged after an inordinate delay of 10 days, the very basis of the prosecution case had been rendered doubtful. Learned counsel submitted that according to the prosecution case, the occurrence had taken place on 21st September, 1984 at about 7.30 a.m. and the injured had been immediately removed to the hospital by his uncle from where rukka Ex. PD was sent by the doctor to the police station informing them about the arrival of the injured at the hospital but the First Information Report was recorded only on 1st October, 1984 at 6.30 p.m. and that the explanation for the delay is not satisfactory. 4. According to the material available on the record, the injured had been declared fit to make to a statement on 22nd September, 1984. The Investigating Officer, PW-6. Head Constable Hansa Singh, admitted in his statement that he had met the injured at the hospital and had enquired from him about the assailants and the occurrence but the injured refused to disclose anything to him on the plea that the respectables of the village were trying to have the matter compromised and he did not wish to initiate action against anybody. None of the respectable of the village have, however, been examined at the trial to support the version of the injured that any efforts to compromise the matter were being made by them. None of the respectable of the village have, however, been examined at the trial to support the version of the injured that any efforts to compromise the matter were being made by them. Except the ipse dixit of the injured and the I. O. therefore there is no material available on the record to substantiate the explanation for the First Information Report being lodged to belatedly. We also find that the injured, at the very first opportunity also did not disclose the name of his assailants to the medical officer at the hospital and only disclosed to him that he had received the injury during a fight. Surely, at the point of time, when he had been removed to the hospital in an injured condition soon after the receipt of the injury, he would not have been aware of any compromise talks. His failure to disclose the name of his assailant, therefore, renders the prosecution case doubtful. The prosecution has hopelessly failed to offer any explanation, much less a satisfactory explanation, for the inordinate delay in lodging of the First Information Report. This delay also affects the credibility of the injured and it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of Hardev Singh PW without looking for any independent corroboration, which in this case is not at all available. The medical evidence cannot lend any support to the unreliable testimony of Hardev Singh PW. The evidence of PW 5, brother of the injured, who claimed to be an eye-witness also suffers from the same infirmities from which the evidence of PW 4 suffers. PW5 has also not explained as to why he could not lodge the report at the police station at the earliest opportunity. PW 5 also did not accompany the injured to the hospital, which is rather an usual conduct considering that he is the brother of the appellant. The evidence of PW 5 has not impressed us and he does not appear to be a witness of truth. The prosecution has failed to successfully establish the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. In our opinion, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and giving him the benefit of the doubt, we set aside his conviction and sentence and allow this appeal. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal allowed. For Citation: AIR 1995 SC 2449