Judgment :- Originally H.C.P. No. 791/1995 came up for hearing before this court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that there is another H.P.C. No. 588 of 1995 which is similar to the present is also pending before this court. The learned counsel requested that both the petitions were taken up together since detenu is the same and she was detained under Act 14 of 1982. As per the direction of the Honourable the Chief Justice dated 17-7-1995, both petitions viz., H.C.P. 588 of 1995 and 791 of 1995 were posted before this court for disposal. 2. H.C.P. No. 791/95 was filed by one Rajendran. This Rajendran is the brother of the detenu Nagammal. So also H.C.P. No. 588 of 1995 was filed by one Masilamani who is also stated to be the brother of the said Nagammal. The said Nagammal was detained under Order passed in C3. D.O. 197 of 1994 dated 13-8-1994 user Tamil Nadu Act 14/82 as Bootlegger by the District Collector and District Magistrate, North Arcot Ambedkar District at Vellore. 3. When these petitions came up for hearing, the learned counsel pleaded for a parole since the detenu gave birth to a child while she was in the prison, on 28-3-1995. The birth of the child took place at Government Hospital, Vellore where she was admitted on 17-2-1995 and she was discharged on 30-3-1995. According to the petitioner she is anemic and weak and she could not provide proper milk to her child. It was also submitted that there is no adequate facilities in the prison cell to maintain her child. According to the learned counsel, detenu was kept in inhumane condition and hence parole was required to her to save her child. A representation was made for parole on 14-4-1995 to the respondent but the parole was refused. In such circumstance, counsel for the petitioner requested this court to direct the respondent to grant parole to the detenu. At the same time the petitioner also prayed for set the detenu at liberty on the above said grounds. 4. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. We directed the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to put this proposal to the Government for a favourable order. At the same time the petitioner also prayed for set the detenu at liberty on the above said grounds. 4. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. We directed the learned Additional Public Prosecutor to put this proposal to the Government for a favourable order. After consulting the Government, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor produced the order dated 26-7-1995 wherein the detenu was permitted to go on parole for a period of 18 days from 27-7-1995 to 13-8-1995. After this order was passed, the detenu was released to go on parole on 27-7-1995 at 7.00 p.m. Thereafter she again returned back to the prison on 28-7-1995 stating that she does not want to avail of the parole. According to the petitioner, the detenu does not want to avail the parole order because only 13 days are left to complete the period of detention, and therefore, she would like to complete the period and go out of the prison once for all. 5. Finally when these petitions were heard on merits, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners pressed into service only one ground viz. that the detaining authority had not applied his mind to the likelihood or imminent possibility of detenu getting released on bail or the case being over in her favour. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 SCC(Crl) 354, in the case of Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of Delhi. The learned counsel further placed reliance upon a recent decision of this court reported in 1995 1 Mad LW (Crl) 65, in the case of Srinivasan v. The District Magistrate and Collector, Tiruvannamalai Sambuvarayar District Tiruvannamalai, rendered by this court in order to support the above said contentions, learned counsel further pointed out that the decision reported in 1995 1 Mad LW (Crl) 65, cited supra, was also followed by this court in a subsequent decision reported in 1995 1 Mad LW (Crl) 149, in the case of Vinayagam v. The District Magistrate and Collector of N. A. Ambedkar District, Vellore. 6. 6. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Noor Salman Makani v. Union of India, submitted that what is stated in para 5 of the detention order would be sufficient to comply with the requirements as per the decision of the Supreme Court cited supra. According to the learned counsel, it is not necessary that the detaining authority should state that there is likelihood or imminent possibility of the detenu getting released on bail or the case being over in her favour she would again indulge in the prejudicial activities against the State. Therefore, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor if the words 'likelihood or imminent possibility of the detenu getting released on bail' were absent that would not render the detention order nugatory on the ground that the detaining authority had not applied his mind. 7. We have heard both the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. In the detention order dated 13-8-1994 in para 5 it is stated as under :- "I am aware that Smt. Nagammal is in remand and there is possibility that she may come out on bail for the offences under S. 4(1)(i) Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act and S. 328, I.P.C. by filing bail application in the court. If she comes out on bail, she will indulge in further activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing her from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and therefore, I am of the view that there is a compelling necessity to detain her with a view to preventing her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. However, I am satisfied that the activities of Smt. Nagammal warrant her detention under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982" * . 8. No doubt in the said order the words likelihood or imminent possibility of the detenu getting released on bail or the case being over in her favour does not find a place. This would go to show that the detaining authority has not applied his mind as per the decision of this court rendered in 1995 1 Mad LW (Cri) 65, cited supra. This would go to show that the detaining authority has not applied his mind as per the decision of this court rendered in 1995 1 Mad LW (Cri) 65, cited supra. It is significant to note that in the decision rendered by this court in 1995 1 Mad LW 65, cited supra, this court considered the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in 1994 SCC(Crl) 354, in the case of Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of Delhi and the decision in the case of Noor Salman Makani v. Union of India. It is only after perusing the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions, this court in 1995 1 Mad LW (Crl) 65, came to the above said conclusion. 9. According to the facts arisen in the present case, no bail petition was filed by the detenu so far. Now the detention period to be served is short of hardly 6 or 7 day. The fact also remains that the detenu gave birth to a child during the detention period and she is anxious to look after her child by providing proper food. It was also represented that she lost her husband and there is no possibility in the near future to indulge in such activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Considering all these factual aspects, especially the technical flaw found in the detention order as pointed out by this court in the decision reported in 1995 1 Mad LW (Crl) 65, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case for releasing the detenu forthwith. 10. Accordingly, this H.C.P. No. 588 of 1995 is allowed and the impugned order of detention is set aside and the detenu is set at liberty forthwith unless she is required for any other case. 11. Since the impugned detention order is set aside in H.C.P. No. 588 of 1995, H.C.P. No. 791 of 1995 does not survive for consideration and therefore, it is dismissed.