JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the Award dated 21.7.1994 passed by Additional Judge, Mhow to the Court of District Judge, Indore in Reference Case No. 331 of 1988. The appeal is barred by time and is not accompanied by requisite application for condoantion of delay. Shri Gupta prayed for time to file application which prayer is rejected. The Appellants-State of Madhya Pradesh are aggrieved by the Award passed by the Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Challenge is made against the enhancement in this appeal under section 54. But the appeal, as stated in Memorandum of Appeal itself, is barred by 134 days. It is averred in the Memorandum that time is consumed in procuring requisite sanction from Law Department. It is indeed strange to find mention in the Memo that application for condonation of delay will be filed at subsequent stage. Manifestly, this approach is repugnant to procedural law. Order XLI Rule 3-A (1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, inserted by C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, illumines the point and position and is extracted below : "(1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2) If the Court sees no reason to reject the application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice thereof shall be issued to the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the case may be." The appeal is not accompanied by requisite application and affidavit setting forth the facts of reliance. In fact, there is yet no such application, no proper particular in proof of sufficiency of cause to justify condonation of delay extending to 134 days i.e. about 4 1/2 months and no supporting affidavit of concerning authority. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent. Expiration of period of limitation results in accrual of valuable right in favour of successful party and this right is not liable to be light heartedly disturbed. Extension of time cannot be claimed or conferred mechanically. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent. Expiration of period of limitation results in accrual of valuable right in favour of successful party and this right is not liable to be light heartedly disturbed. Extension of time cannot be claimed or conferred mechanically. Discretionary jurisdiction has to be on sound judicial principles. Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes Case (1770) 4 Burr 2528 stated in classic terms that discretion means sound discretion guided by law and governed by rules, not by humour. State cannot claim preferential treatment in such matters. Negligence, not deligence, is vividly visible. In 1965 JLJ 597 (Chhotelal Keshavram v. M.A. Razzaque), it is noted that:- "In regard to this, it is sufficient to say that the matter of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act is discretionary. When the petitioner failed to offer any explanation as to why he was not able to file the revision petitions on any day between 22nd to 30th March, 1964, it cannot be said that in refusing to condone the delay the Industrial Court took an erroneous view of law, and acted arbitrarily without exercising judicial discretion." Absent proper proof of sufficient cause, I should say monosyllabic 'no' to the half hearted prayer for condonation of delay and permit this matter to rest in peace. After all, this is not the way to approach the Court of appeal. Even Court- fee was not paid while presenting the time barred appeal but was submitted later without seeking permission or extension from the Court. In the result, I dismiss this appeal as hopelessly time barred with no cause for condonation of delay.