Judgment : In O.A. No.541 of 1995, the applicant-plaintiff contends briefly as follows. The applicant has filed the suit for declaration that the sale deed in favour of the fourth defendant executed by the defendants 1 and 2 in respect of the suit property is null and void in view of the pre-emptive right for the plaintiff as per the partition deed dated 23. 1983. The plaintiff has also prayed for declaration that she is entitled to purchase the above property and delivery of vacant possession. The plaintiff has also sought for a permanent injunction restraining the fourth defendant from making any alterations, additions etc., in the suit property. The plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 and their father effected a partition on 28. 1983 under a deed in which it was made clear that if any one of the brothers want to sell the property allotted to them, they should give first preference to the other members of the family. The third respondent wanted to sell the property and issued a notice requesting the applicant to buy the property if he is interested. Since the applicant was not able to buy the property, he sold the same. The first respondent without due information to the others has sold the property to the fourth respondent on 12. 1995. In view of the pre-emptive clause in the partition deed, the sale in favour of the fourth respondent is null and void. The applicant is prepared to pay the market price for the property. The applicant is ready to deposit the entire money to the credit of the suit. Respondents 1, 2 and 4 have acted collusively in order to defeat the rights of the applicant. The fourth respondent is now trying to make alterations and additions to the property. If he is allowed to do so irreparable loss and damage will be caused to the applicant. Hence, the application. 2. Interim injunction restraining the respondents from making any alteration in the suit property alone was granted when this application was moved along with the suit. 3. The fourth respondent has filed an application for vacating the interim injunction, in A. No.2798 of 1995 contending as follows: The application is to blackmail the fourth respondent. The allegation that the sale deed is null and void is not correct. 3. The fourth respondent has filed an application for vacating the interim injunction, in A. No.2798 of 1995 contending as follows: The application is to blackmail the fourth respondent. The allegation that the sale deed is null and void is not correct. The first respondent sold the property after due intimation to the plaintiff and the allegation that without intimation, the sale was effected is not correct. The first respondent along with his son is entitled to alienate the property subject to pre-emptive right of the plaintiff as well as the third defendant. The sale by him is therefore valid. The plaintiff was not interested in purchasing the rear portion which was allotted to Ulaganathan. The applicant and his other brothers are not interested in purchasing the property. The plaintiff has not given consent in writing and abandoned his pre-emptive right. Ulaganathan sold the property in the rear side in the year 1990. Defendants 1 and 2 sold the front portion after negotiating with the fourth respondent. After the sale was registered, the plaintiff had sent a letter to the defendants 1 and 2 with a copy to the fourth respondent. The claim made by him is illegal. The defendants 1 and 2 sold the property in favour of the fourth respondent and the allegation that the pre-emptive right of the applicant is not considered is without merits. The fourth respondent has made alterations in the old building with full knowledge of the plaintiff. He has not raised any objection. The present application is due to the improvements made by the fourth respondent in the property to take the benefit of the improvements. The applicant is not entitled to continue the injunction and it has to be vacated. 4. The applicant/ plaintiff has filed the suit for declaration that the sale deed executed by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fourth defendant on 12. 1995 is null and void in view of the pre-emptive rights of the plaintiff as per partition deed dated 23. 1983 among the members of the family consisting of himself and his brothers and father. O. A. No.545 of 1995 is for interim injunction restraining the respondents from making any alterations or additions or dealing with the property by way of sale, lease etc. 1983 among the members of the family consisting of himself and his brothers and father. O. A. No.545 of 1995 is for interim injunction restraining the respondents from making any alterations or additions or dealing with the property by way of sale, lease etc. The learned Judge sitting in the vacation court, after hearing the applicant, has granted interim injunction, restraining the respondents from making any alterations in the suit property. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant-plaintiff has drawn the attention of this Court to the clause in the partition deed effected between the father and his three sons including the plaintiff and the first defendant, which is to the effect that in case, any of the parties to the partition deed desires to sell the property due to financial crisis or for the purpose of purchasing some other property, they should offer the same for sale to anyone of the parties to the partition deed who is prepared to purchase the same for the market price and he should not sell the same to third parties. After bringing this clause to the notice of this Court, the learned Advocate appearing for the applicant would argue that the first defendant who is his brother, has not offered the share allotted to him in the partition deed being purchased by the other parties to the partition deed and had sold the same in favour of the fourth defendant and therefore the petitioner has come forward with the suit and if in the meanwhile, the fourth defendant makes any alterations or modifications in the structure of the property, the rights of the plaintiff would be affected and therefore injunction already granted should be made absolute. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would on the other hand argue that the partition deed has conveyed the property allotted to each of the parties to the said document to be enjoyed absolutely without any hindrence by others in their own right and the pre-emptive clause has been incorporated in the document only with the object that a third party should not be permitted to have a right in the property when the others are willing to purchase the property and that does not mean that the sale deed executed by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fourth defendant is void even assuming that the first defendant has not offered the share allotted to him being purchased by the plaintiff. He would also argue that when one of his brothers viz., Ulaganathan wanted to sell the property which was allotted to his share, he gave a notice to the others, viz., plaintiff and himself and none of them were prepared to purchase the share of Ulaganathan and therefore Ulaganathan had sold his share. According to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, since the parties to the partition deed are brothers and they have amicably effected a partition in respect of their share in the joint family properties, the first defendant has orally informed his intention to sell his share in the propertyto the other members and since the others are not willing to purchase his share, the first defendant had sold his share to the fourth defendant. In view of the relationship between the parties, and the amicable way in which they have effected partition of their joint family properties, I am convinced that this contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that there is no necessity for issuing any notice by one of the brothers to the other intimating his intention to sell his share cannot be said to be an unreasonable one. After all, plaintiff, first defendant and Ulaganathan are all brothers and living amicably in the shares allotted to them. Therefore, the absence of any notice by the first defendant to the plaintiff that he intends to sell his share cannot give room for inference that the plaintiff was not aware of the proposed sale. After all, plaintiff, first defendant and Ulaganathan are all brothers and living amicably in the shares allotted to them. Therefore, the absence of any notice by the first defendant to the plaintiff that he intends to sell his share cannot give room for inference that the plaintiff was not aware of the proposed sale. This is further fortified by the fact that Ulaganathan, the other brother of the plaintiff and the first defendant has affixed his signature as an attestor to the sale deed in favour of the fourth defendant. This fact would show that Ulaganathan was aware of the execution of the sale deed. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the proposed sale in favour of the fourth defendant was not brought to the notice of the plaintiff even before the execution of the sale deed. Within a week of the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff has sent a letter with a copy marked to the fourth defendant stating that he came to know that the first defendant is negotiating with the fourth defendant for sale of his share. If the plaintiff was not aware of the sale, as he wants to make an impression in his letter dated 22. 1995, it is not known how he has mentioned the name of the fourth defendant in the notice and marked a copy to him. Mentioning the fourth defendant in the notice dated 22. 1995 and the fact of marking a copy to the fourth defendant would reveal that the plaintiff was aware of the proposed sale and execution of the sale by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fourth defendant. At this juncture, it will not be out of context to observe that when he received a registered notice from Ulaganathan, regarding his intention to sell the property, the plaintiff has not even chosen to send a reply. These facts would indicate that the plaintiff was aware of the proposed sale by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fourth defendant and expressed his inability or unwillingness to purchase the property from defendants 1 and 2 and has chosen to issue the notice with some oblique motive. 5. These facts would indicate that the plaintiff was aware of the proposed sale by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the fourth defendant and expressed his inability or unwillingness to purchase the property from defendants 1 and 2 and has chosen to issue the notice with some oblique motive. 5. It has been held in the decision reported in Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 838, as follows: “The right of pre-emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This right is called the primary or inherent right. The pre-emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. It is a right of substitution but not or re-purchase i.e., the pre-emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee. It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold. Preference being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place.” In the decision reported in Radhakrishnan v. Sridhar, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1368, it has been held as follows: “There are no equities in favour of a pre-emptor, whose sole object is to disturb a valid transaction by virtue of the rights created in him by statute. To defeat the law of preemption by any legitimate means in not fraud on the part of either the vendor or the vendee and a person is entitled to steer clear of the law of pre-emption by all lawful means. Moreover, the right of pre-emption is a weak right and is not looked upon with favour with courts and therefore the courts cannot go out of their way to help the pre-emptor.” 6. Moreover, the right of pre-emption is a weak right and is not looked upon with favour with courts and therefore the courts cannot go out of their way to help the pre-emptor.” 6. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the right of preemption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold, this being the primary or inherent right and that the pre-emptor has a secondary or a remedial right to follow the things sold. In the decision reported in Hirendra Nath v. Rajendra, A.I.R. 1974 Gau. 43, it is held as follows: “Where a co-sharer had executed a registered partnership deed whereby he agreed not to sell part of the joint land that fell to his share under the deed without first offering it to co-sharer, purchaser of such property for consideration cannot be deprived by either co-sharer by pre-empting that property as envisaged by the deed.” In the present case also, there is a registered partition deed in which the co-sharers have agreed not to sell the share allotted to them without first offering it to the other co-sharer. Purchaser of the share of the first defendant for consideration is the fourth defendant herein. He cannot be deprived by the other co-sharer viz., the plaintiff by preempting that property as envisaged by the deed. That indicates that the plaintiff has no prima facie case. When there is no prima facie case, injunction cannot be granted. Making the interim injunction absolute would only deprive the fourth defendant, who is the purchaser of the property, his right to enjoy the property purchased by him as he pleases and therefore, the balance of convenience also cannot be said to be in favour of the plaintiff. Relative hardship which the fourth defendant would suffer if the injunction is made absolute would certainly outweigh the benefit the plaintiff will get if the injunction granted is made absolute. Therefore, I am of opinion that the applicant in O.A. No.541 of 1995 is not entitled to an order of interim injunction already granted be made absolute. 7. In the result, O.A. No.541 of 1995 is dismissed and Appln. No.2798 of 1995 is allowed vacating the interim injunction already granted on 5. 1995.