Judgment B.L.Yadav, J. 1. This is a defendants Second Appeal preferred under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 3.4.1989 rendered by the 1st Additional District Judge, Patna for declaration that the Katra described in Schedule-A of the plaint. Holding No.25-A (old) and 29 (new) is a wakf property and for recovery of possession. 2. The plaintiff-respondents case was that Plot nos. 1240 and 1241 area 2 bighas 1 katha is known as Jamal Shah Ka Takia containing mosque, burial ground etc. and the same is a wakf property under the management of one Ghashi Mian, the Mutwalli of the Committee, who had appointed Khakhnoo Sah to keep the mosque and graveyard clean and was allotted katra for his residence. Thereafter Md. Hussain was appointed Mutwalli, who permitted Khakhnoo Sah to continue. Khakhnoo Shah died and defendant-appellant was not the wife of the deceased and she made an application for construction of the house over the land which was objected by Md. Hussain. That application was rejected as defendant was not the wife of Khakhnoo Sah. She had no right to live in the Katra. The plaintiff is entitled to evict her. Consequently, the present suit was filed. 3. Defendants appellants contested the suit denying the averments made that it was a wakf property or there was any such wakf committee, Jamal Sah was the ancestor of Khakhnoo Sah and after him it was the property of Alimen Bibi and defendants are her heirs. The grave of Jamal Sah has been dug on a portion of tne land. Neither Ghashi Mian was Mutwalli, nor Md. Hussain was Secretary and it was wrong that Khakhnoo Sah was appointed as servant, rather he was in possession in his own right and after his death, his wife Alimen Bibi and consequently her heirs are in possession. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the appeal which has been allowed by the impugned decree. Consequently, the defendants-appellants preferred the present Second Appeal. 5. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the appeal which has been allowed by the impugned decree. Consequently, the defendants-appellants preferred the present Second Appeal. 5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that it was not a wakf property, nor there was any dedication proved for the existence of the wakf, rather the land in dispute was a private property of the defendants and the decree of the lower appellate court is based in complete disregard of the material evidence on record. The points involved are substantial question of law. Reliance was placed on Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai V/s. Mohd. Hanifs, 1976(3) S.C.R. 721 , Mst. Mundaria and others V/s. Rai Shyam Sundar Prasad and others (A.I.R 1963 Patna 98). 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants and urged that the land in dispute was a wakf property by user. It was also shown to be a wakf property in the report of the Commissioner under section 4(3) of the Wakf Act, 1954 (for short the Act) and the Wakf was also registered with the Board of Wakfs under section 25 of the Act and the property in suit, a mosque etc. was shown in the register of the wakfs under section 26 of the Act. It has never been the private property of the defendants-appellants. Entire evidence on record has been considered. No material evidence has been ignored. Findings recorded by the lower appellate court are findings of fact based on appraisal of entire evidence on record. The substantial questions of law are not involved in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on Mohammad Shah V/s. Fasihuddin Ansari and others (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 713). 7. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the substantial questions for consideration are as to whether the property in dispute was a wakf property, and whether the material evidence on record has been over-looked by the tower appellate court, and whether the findings recorded by the lower appellate court are findings of fact and whether under the circumstances of the case the suit could be decreed? 8. 8. As regards the first point as to whether the property in suit was a wakf property, normally the Wakf connotes the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any property for any purpose recognised by Mahomedan Law as religious, pious and charitable. As a matter of fact it owes its origin to a rule, laid down by the Prophet of Islam, and the expression Wakf literally means the dedication of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the utilisation of the profits for the benefits of needy human being. To put it differently the moment dedication to a pious or charitable purpose is proved, the ownership of wakife (one who creates wakf) is extinguished and vests in the Almighty. The wakife may nominate as meritorious object as the recipient of the benefit. But later on creation of Wakf by immemorial user was also one of the recognised modes. In the instant case it is the last mode how the wakf was created or came in existence. 9. Section 188 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law (Nineteenth Edition) is as follows: "Wakf by immemorial userIf land has been used from time immemorial for a religious purpose, e.g., for a mosque, or a burial ground or for the maintenance of a Mosque, then the land is by user wakf although there is no evidence of an express dedication (Vide Mazar Husain V/s. Adiya Saran, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 42)". Even though it is evident that there may not be evidence of dedication by an individual but never-the-less if property is of the nature of public wakf and has been used from time immemorial for religious purposes and there is a Mosque, Imambara and public burial ground used by the common public having faith in Islam, in that event it must be taken as one unit and is wakf by user. 10. The lower appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record in detail inasmuch as Khesera Nos. 1240 and 1241 were shown as burial ground. Particularly Plot no. 1241 has been shown as Kabargah. From time immemorial the land in dispute was used by the public for religious purpose. There was a mosque and close to it there was a Kabargah. 1240 and 1241 were shown as burial ground. Particularly Plot no. 1241 has been shown as Kabargah. From time immemorial the land in dispute was used by the public for religious purpose. There was a mosque and close to it there was a Kabargah. There was sufficient evidence indicating that the land in dispute was Karbala, Imambara and Tajia of Moharram starts from here and ends here after taking the round to the specified places. There have been receipts (22 series) indicating that these receipts pertaining to religious functions like Muharram and Chehallum, were granted in 1922 and it was in respect of Jamal Sah Ka Takia, the land was entered as such in old records. The entire oral evidence led by the parties have been considered in para-9 of the lower appellate court judgment. The Lower appellate court has also considered as to whether only the dead persons of the family of the defendants have been buried in the land in dispute or other members of mahomedan community other than defendants family were also buried. Inference has been drawn after considering the entire evidence that the dead bodies of entire community of mahomedans residing there were buried and not only the dead persons of the family of the defendants. It has been inferred that from the time immemorial the land in dispute has been used as wakf. These findings are findings of fact. 11. In Mohammad Shah V/s. Fasihuddin Ansari and others, AIR 1956 S.C. 713 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, it has been held by the Apex Court that even though a wakf normally required express dedication, but in some situation if the property has been used from time immemorial for a religious purpose recognised by Islam, in that event it is Wakf. What requires emphasis is that a Wakf by user has got statutory basis. 12. Ex abundanti cautela the definition of Wakf", as given in the Act, is set out. "Section 3(1) Wakf means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam [or any other person] of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable, and includesa Wakf by user." The aforesaid definition makes it manifest that the legislature was conscious in using the expression "means", which connotes illustrative and restrictive. The expression "includes" is employed by the legislature which normally could not have been included in the definition. It is inclusive and exhaustive, In my opinion, in a progressive society like ours, it would be reasonable to confine the intention of the legislation to the meaning attributed to the words used in the definition clause. But at the same time it must be assumed that the legislature was also conscious of the enlarged meaning. For that purpose the expression includes has also been used. By expression includes a wakf by user has also been included in the fold of Wakf. In view of this, if certain properties or the religious things like Mosque, Imambara, public burial ground and the place from which Tajia starts and comes to end have been used by public since time immemorial, it shall become a Walk property. 13 Md. Mundaria and others V/s. Rai Shyam Sundar Prasad and others (AIR 1963 Patna 98) (supra), was a case where it was held by this Court that non- muslim can also create Mosque for any purpose which is religious under the Mahomedan Law. But the object of Wakf must be lawful according to the religious creed of the maker of the wakf. It was further held that Imambara normally is not an object of public wakf but the evidence may be led and may be shown by the person who asserts (plaintiff-respondent in this case) that the Imambara in question was meant for public purpose and for making out a case for customary right or a right by prescription, there must be satisfactory evidence to show that the enjoyment of the right was not by leave of the owner of the land. In the instant case it has been satisfactorily proved by the plaintiff-respondent that the objects indicated have been used to be wakf property. The evidence has been discussed and relied upon by the lower appellate court. The principles indicated are salutary but no assistance can be drawn by the defendants-appellants. 14. Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai V/s. Mohd. In the instant case it has been satisfactorily proved by the plaintiff-respondent that the objects indicated have been used to be wakf property. The evidence has been discussed and relied upon by the lower appellate court. The principles indicated are salutary but no assistance can be drawn by the defendants-appellants. 14. Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai V/s. Mohd. Hanifs, [ (1976) 3 S.C.R. 721 ] (supra) was a case where Mosque was built by the ancestors of the respondent and thereafter certain additional constructions which form adjuncts to the mosque were added but these adjuncts were used by way of a gift to the mosque and the adjacent land was used as grave yard for the muslims of the village. Thereafter certain shops were also constructed on a part of land reserved for the grave yard, in that situation it was held that burial ground, dargah and mosque and these adjucts were all wakf property dedicated by the Wakif. In the present case it has correctly been held by the lower appellate court that Mosque, Imambara, burial ground etc. were used as public wakf property by user from time immemorial. No assistance by that case to the present appellants can be drawn. 15. In my opinion, the findings of the lower appellate court have been arrived at in respect of the public wakf by user after appreciating and weighing the entire evidence, oral and documentary on record. No important evidence has been over-looked. The findings are substantially findings of fact. The questions raised cannot be said to be the substantial question of law involved under section 100 of the Code. In the alternative even if it is substantial question of law, it has correctly been decided. The expression substantial question of law involved means that it must be involved and must have been incorrectly decided only then interference can be made in Second Appeal. 16. In view of the premises aforesaid, I dont find any merit in the present Second Appeal which fails and the same is dismissed without any order as to costs.