JUDGMENT (1.) N. L. Ganguly, J. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction of the petitioner-tenant from house No, 328/2, Premganj, Sirpir Bazar, Jhansi in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Jhansi. It was said that the rate of rent for the premises was Rs. 120 per month and the tenant-petitioner has failed to pay the arrears of rent since 1-4-83. Notice of demand and termination of tenancy dated 26-7-87 was said to have been served on 28-7-86 by refusal, hence suit upto the date of filing of the plaint and damages @ 20 per day was claimed. The Judge, Small Causes Court dismissed the suit by his judgment and decree dated 15-1-92. (2.) BEFORE the trial court, the petitioner filed his written statement and pleaded that he is not tenant of the accommodation instead his wife Smt. Janki Devi is the tenant paying rent @ Rs. 30 per month. It is said that she had been paying the rent to the respondent-landlord regularly but no receipt was given. Since the landlord had declined to give receipt for the rent received, the rent of the accommodation was deposited under Section 30 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 in the Munsif Court. The petitioner's wife Smt. Janki Devi had sent a notice also to the landlord dated 28-4-86 in the reply sent by the landlord to the notice sent by the petitioner's wife Smt. Janki Devi, landlord had not claimed any arrears of rent or stated anything about the termination of the tenancy by affixation of the notice. According to the pleadings of the petitioner, it was specifically denied that neither he had taken the house on rent nor he ever executed any rent deed in favour of the respondent - landlord. The rent deed set up by the landlord was said to be fictitious. In the alleged rent deed, it was pointed out that the tenancy had commenced on 16-1-1981, whereas in the plaint it was said to be a monthly tenancy. The suit was contested on number of other grounds namely, that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the suit was not competent, liable to be dismissed. It was also pleaded that suit was not competent in view of Section 23 of the Small Causes Court Act. The suit was contested on number of other grounds namely, that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the suit was not competent, liable to be dismissed. It was also pleaded that suit was not competent in view of Section 23 of the Small Causes Court Act. (3.) AFTER framing of several issues, the trial court recorded evidence of the witnesses of the parties. (4.) SO far issue about the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant was considered by the trial court, after appreciation of evidence and perusing the documentary evidence, expert evidence, the trial court found as a fact that the alleged rent deed said to be executed by the petitioner was not proved to be a rent deed executed by the petitioner in favour of the land lord, and evidence of a witness in the said rent deed as attesting witness namely, of Bablu Ram was found to be wrong and fictitious. The petitioner had set up his case from the very beginning and had denied the signatures or execution of any rent deed. The landlord had not examined the main witness of the rent deed nor it has been proved to be duly executed by the petitioner. The perusal of the judgment of the trial court shows that the trial court after examining the oral and documentary evidence petitioner was held to be not the tenant of the accommodation instead it was found that Smt. Janki Devi was the tenant of the accommodation in question. (5.) THE other question involved in the case was whether on the date when the original notice of termination of tenancy was issued, whether it was actually served to the tenant was not proved. It was also found that the service of notice on 28-7-86 by refusal was not believeable and no presumption of Section 114 of Evidence Act or Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, should be raised in favour of the landlord. THE trial court found as a fact that on 28-7-86 when it is said that the notice was not accepted and refused, it was found by the trial court that on 28-7-86, the petitioner was at Kanpur and there was no occasion or possibility for the respondent to have approached the petitioner for serving the notice which is said to have been refused. After these findings, the trial court was satisfied that since the petitioner was not present at Jhansi, there was no question of refusal to accept the notice. THE suit was, thus, dismissed by the trial court. (6.) A revision under Section 25 was filed before the District Judge, Jhansi which was transferred to the Court of IV Addl. District Judge, Jhansi, who heard the revision, reversed the judgment of the J. S. C. C., decreed the suit, directed that the arrears of rent @ Rs. 120 per month be recovered from the petitioner. The suit was accordingly decreed. The lower revisional court after hearing the arguments of the respondent, was of the view that the trial court have exceeded his jurisdiction and have wrongly found that the defendant petitioner was not the tenant, but petitioner's wife was the tenant. The lower revisional court further reversed the finding of the trial court so far the evidence of the handwriting expert adduced in the case was re-appreciated by the lower revisional court and the findings recorded by the trial court after appreciation of evidence was reversed. The lower revisional court was of the view that the trial court was wrong in getting the opinion of the hand writing expert by invoking the powers under Order XVI Rule 14, C. P. C. The lower revisional court also was of the view that in case the Court of its own accord sent for some evidence, that cannot be said to be illegal or invalid. So far the finding about the rent-deed dated 16-1-81 adduced by the landlord-respondent is concerned, which was not accepted by the trial court, the trial court and the lower revisional court were of the view that since it was not prayed in the trial court, the trial court was wrong in getting the evidence from the handwriting expert for arriving at a decision about the due execution of the deed was whether by the petitioner or by the petitioner's wife. (7.) SINCE the lower revisional court reversed the findings of fact by the trial court for reasonings recorded by him, the revision was allowed, the suit was decreed for arrears of rent, hence the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. (8.) THE learned counsel for the parties made oral submissions and have also filed written arguments, which are on record. (8.) THE learned counsel for the parties made oral submissions and have also filed written arguments, which are on record. The main argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the lower revisional court committed a manifest error of law in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court while exercising power under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. He placed reliance number of decisions namely, 1981 ARC (Vol. 1) 545 Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, where the Division Bench of our Court relying on the decision of AIR 1969 SC 1344 - Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udabdas Firm, had observed that while exercising the powers of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, the guidelines in the Supreme Court Judgment (supra) has to be borne in mind. It further observed that if the revisional court finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding and that would be a case where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence. In such a case, the court would be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence would be all one way and no assessment of evidence required. The court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law i. e. the validity of the notice is raised, it would be sufficient for decision of the case. Specifically, it was held by the Division Bench that the Court exercising powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine a finding on a particular issue of fact. It should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact. (9.) SINGLE Judge decision reported in 1992 (Vol. 1) ARC 52, Ramesh Chand Rana v. Smt. Shanti Devi and others. (10.) ALSO followed the decision of the Division Bench (supra), The Single Judge decision reported in 1989 (Vol. I) ARC 488, Gut am Mohd. v. VIII A. D. J., Meerut and others. (9.) SINGLE Judge decision reported in 1992 (Vol. 1) ARC 52, Ramesh Chand Rana v. Smt. Shanti Devi and others. (10.) ALSO followed the decision of the Division Bench (supra), The Single Judge decision reported in 1989 (Vol. I) ARC 488, Gut am Mohd. v. VIII A. D. J., Meerut and others. The observations of the Court that the findings regarding the relationship between the parties recorded by the trial court on appraisal evidence is purely a finding of fact. Decision reported in 1986 (Vol 1) ARC 367, Akhtar All Khan v. District Judge, Saharanpur and others, the learned Single Judge of our Court was pleased to hold that when finding recorded after ignoring of some evidence on record, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the trial court, was not based on any evidence. If some evidence was left out to be considered, the lower revisional court would not get an absolute right to re-appreciate evidence itself and in such circumstances, this Court was pleased to remand the case back to the trial court for decision in the light of the observations of the High Court. (11.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also cited AIR 1987 SC 1982 , Har Govind Das K. Joshi and others v. Collector of Customs and others. This authority has no bearing of relevance for the decision of the present writ petition. (12.) THE question for consideration before this Court is whether the trial court was deciding the case on appreciation of evidence and material evidence was ignored by him for giving an opportunity to the trial court again to reappreciate evidence in the light of the observations of this court. THE learned counsel for the respondent has not pointed out any such material evidence, which may be said to have been ignored by the trial court while arriving at a finding on a question of fact. THE trial court has found that there was no relationship between the landlord and the petitioner as the landlord and tenant. THE rent- deed set up was not proved. It was also found that the expert evidence recorded by the trial court was against the landlord. THE trial court has found that there was no relationship between the landlord and the petitioner as the landlord and tenant. THE rent- deed set up was not proved. It was also found that the expert evidence recorded by the trial court was against the landlord. Thus, the argument before the lower revisional court that the expert evidence was not legally called for as it had been done by the trial court and provision of Order XIV, Rule 2, C. P. C. was not applicable. It is correct that in proceedings before the Judge Small Cause Court, the entire procedure as prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable, as such but the principles of law are applicable and the decision of the trial court cannot be brushed aside only on such technical pleas. The trial court's finding that notice for arrears of rent and ejectment was not served to the petitioner on which date the petitioner was in service at Kanpur. This fact examined by the trial court and after appreciation of evidence, the finding was recorded. The said finding was not open to challenge before the lower revisional court. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on 1980 ARC 287, Prabha Shanker Gupta v. II Add I. District Judge, Ballia, and 1983 ARC 849. Smt. Bachchi Den and another v. Its Addl. District Judge and another. In Prabha Shanker’s case, the learned Single Judge was pleased to observe that the findings of fact recorded by the trial court are not to be reversed on technical grounds, so that reassessment of evidence may be possible and in Smt. Bachai Devi's case, it was also held that once refusal of notice, as pleaded by the plaintiff, is rebutted by the defend in after appearing in the court saying that he did not refuse the notice, the presumption is rebutted, burden to establish service of notice shift from the petitioner by producing the postal overseer. These cases have been cited by the learned counsel to emphasise on the submission that the revisional court acted illegally and tried to find out technical mistakes for creating an excuse for interfering with the findings. These cases have been cited by the learned counsel to emphasise on the submission that the revisional court acted illegally and tried to find out technical mistakes for creating an excuse for interfering with the findings. The findings of the trial Court by appreciation of evidence of Smt. Padma Devi as D. W. 3 that Smt. Janki Devi, wife of the petitioner had taken the house on rent which fact was appreciated by the trial court was a pure question of fact, not open to reassess in revision. Once a finding is recorded by the trial court that Smt. Janki Devi was the tenant who had taken the house on rent, absence of notice to Smt. Jank Devi for claim of arrears of rent and ejectment, the suit as framed was patently bad in law and the trial courts judgment and decree was perfectly correct and legal. (13.) THE learned counsel for the landlord-respondent has also filed a written arguments besides the oral submissions advanced by him. THE learned counsel for the respondents Sri A. N. Bhargava has placed reliance on a decision reported in 1988 (Vol. II) ARC 155, Sheo Kumar Sharma v. VIII Addl. District Judge, Meerut. THE relevant paragraphs pointed out were Paras 13 and 14, where the question was about the reversing of findings about the bonafide need recorded by the trial court on extraneous considerations. THE learned Single Judge was of the view that if the findings of the trial court was on consideration of extraneous considerations, that it waived the trial court, such a finding was no finding of fact, could be interfered with in the revision. This judgment is of no assistance for the decision in the present writ petition. THE learned counsel for the respondents have not replied to the guidelines or cited any other case law in rebuttal to the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. THE main emphasis in the written arguments submitted by the learned counsel is that an order was passed in the writ petition on 13-10-93 by which this Court was pleased to pass an interim direction staying the eviction of the petitioner conditionally, provided that within 1 1/2 month from the said date, the petitioner deposits the entire decretal amount, cost etc. before the court below. Any amount already deposited would be taken into account and adjusted. before the court below. Any amount already deposited would be taken into account and adjusted. THE amount so deposited shall be paid to the landlady without security. THE future rent was to be deposited every month at the rate fixed by the revisional court. In case of default of either of the conditions, the stay order was to stand automatically vacated. (14.) AN application for modification of the interim order was moved which was directed to be listed before the Court on 23-1-93. It was thereafter not listed and again listed on 7-2-93. The said application was directed to be presented before this Bench. On the said date, this Bench was pleased to direct to list the case in the next week. The case was listed on 3-3-93 but was not taken up. Therefore, on the several dates, it was listed but it was not taken up. On 27-3-94 an application was filed before the application court in the rent control matter who was pleased to extend the interim stay order, till further orders of the court but on the application of the opposite parties that order, dated 25-7-94 was recalled on 28-8-94 and the matter was directed to be listed before me as the matter was heard partly by me. Therefore, on the application of the petitioner, an interim order was passed on 24-2-95 by the court directing that eviction of the petitioner was to remain stayed pro vided Rs. 10,000 was deposited within one month from 24-2-95. In case of default, the respondents were free to execute a decree for execution. The case was directed to be listed as part heard. The matter when came for final hearing as the parties have already exchanged affidavits. The learned counsel for the parties addressed the court orally as well as submitted their written arguments. The learned counsel for the respondents have mainly relied on the fact that the petitioner had not complied with the interim directions issued by this court and the rent was not deposited. Thus, on account of the default in compliance of the interim order, the petitioner forfeited all his rights. He cannot seek any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Photostat copy of the tender showing the amount of deposit of Rs. 10,000 has been filed. Thus, on account of the default in compliance of the interim order, the petitioner forfeited all his rights. He cannot seek any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Photostat copy of the tender showing the amount of deposit of Rs. 10,000 has been filed. The learned counsel for the respondents since submit that the petitioner is no more entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, I am of the view that earlier interim order which was passed by this Court was conditional and it was open for the respondents in case the petitioner had failed to com ply with the directions of this Court to execute the decree of the court below. It appears that in spite of the default in depositing the rent earlier, the decree of the court below was not put in execution and the petitioner still continues to be in possession as his wife was the tenant in the accommodation in question. If I examine this aspect from another angle that the petitioner has failed to comply with the interim directions of this court, that would mean that the interim protection during the pendency of the writ petition would not be available to him. That would not mean that the writ petition itself would stand dismissed. Neither there was an order in the writ petition that writ petition itself would stand dismissed. The words used were that interim order shall stand automatically vacated. Thus, it is clear that this court without deciding the case finally on merit, is of the conclusion that the judgment and order of the lower revisional court is patently illegal and unwarranted, the relief is not to be refused merely on the ground that the petitioner had failed to comply with the interim direction of this Court. Thus, the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents deserve to be rejected that no relief can be given to the petitioner since the interim conditions were not complied with by him. (15.) SO far after consideration of the case law involved in the case, I am of the view that the judgment of the revisional court is liable to be quashed in toto. It cannot be said that the judgment of the trial court was in any manner defective for non-consideration of any evidence on record. (15.) SO far after consideration of the case law involved in the case, I am of the view that the judgment of the revisional court is liable to be quashed in toto. It cannot be said that the judgment of the trial court was in any manner defective for non-consideration of any evidence on record. The findings recorded by the trial court were based on pure appreciation of evidence that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, notice of arrears of rent and ejectment was not served to the petitioner nor he wag competent to receive the notice, the petitioner's wife was not given any notice nor she was party to the suit. Thus, this is not a case to which the matter may be remanded to the trial court for decision afresh. The judgment of the lower revisional court deserves to be quashed and the judgment of the trial court is liable to be affirmed. Since the petitioner is not the tenant in the light, the suit was dismissed by the trial court, the petitioner cannot be held responsible personally to pay the decretal amount as passed by the lower revisional court. The amount deposited by the petitioner in compliance of the orders of the High Court is to be returned to the petitioner within a period of three months from today. However, it shall be open for the land lord-respondent if so advised, may seek remedy for recovery of rent, arrears of rent, ejectment etc. according to law, afresh after giving due notice to the legal tenant. (16.) THE petition is allowed with costs, as indicated above. Petition allowed.