JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment (Annexure-30) dated 31.5.1994 passed by the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short 'the Tribunal'), whereby while allowing the appeals filed by respondents No. 1 to 17, the learned Tribunal has quashed the impugned seniority lists dated 16.9.1987 and 22.12.1990 and has directed the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur (respondent No. 19) to redetermine the seniority of respondents No. 1 to 17 under Rule 15(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnel) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1969') by giving them the benefit of the substantive services with effect from 1.3.1974 and to place them above the Commercial Taxes Inspector Gr.II who were appointed after 1.3.1974 with all consequential benefits. It was further directed that if any subsequent orders have been issued in regard to seniority or other service matters on the basis of impugned seniority lists they be revised accordingly and the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department (respondent No. 19) was also directed to apply the same principle to all the similarly situated persons who were absorbed in Commercial Taxes Department from the Land and Building Taxes Department from the post of Inspector Gr.II alongwith respondents No. 1 to 17 so as to avoid further litigation. It was also directed that while carrying out the above directions, the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department shall follow the principle laid down in Rule 15(3) of 1969 Rules i.e. inter se seniority of the all surplus employees in the Land and Building Taxes Department on their appointment on the absorbed post in Commercial Taxes Department shall not be disturbed and where previously such mistake was committed that should be rectified while refixing the seniority of such surplus personnel. A time limit of four months from the date to this order was fixed of carry out the above directions. 2. It may be stated here that against this very judgment, some writ petitions were filed at Jaipur Bench and a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. A.P. Ravani, Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Y.R. Meena, J. dismissed those writ petitions vide its order dated 31.3.1995 (See D.B. Civil Writ Petitions (Defect) Nos. 20/95, 266/95,265/95, 267/95, 268/95, 269/95, 270/95, 271/95, 272/95, 273/95, 274/95, 275/95, 276/95, 277/95, 375/95, 376/95 and 377/95). 3. A.P. Ravani, Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Y.R. Meena, J. dismissed those writ petitions vide its order dated 31.3.1995 (See D.B. Civil Writ Petitions (Defect) Nos. 20/95, 266/95,265/95, 267/95, 268/95, 269/95, 270/95, 271/95, 272/95, 273/95, 274/95, 275/95, 276/95, 277/95, 375/95, 376/95 and 377/95). 3. The facts, necessary to be noticed, for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are : that petitioners No. 1 to 10 were selected as Inspectors Gr. II by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in the year 1977 and were appointed as Inspectors Gr. II vide order Annexure-2 dated 19.12.1977. It may be stated here that presently, the petitioners No. 1 to 7 are holding the posts of Assistant Commercial Taxes Officers and petitioners No. 8 to 10 are working as Commercial Taxes Inspectors. These petitioners were confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II vide order (Annexure-3) dated 5.5.1982. According to the petitioners, a seniority list of Commercial Taxes Inspectors was issued on 30.11.1984 and in that list, the names of the petitioners were found mentioned at serial numbers 91, 93, 95, 98, 112, 118, 122, 131 and 142 respectively and the names of respondents No. 1 to 17 were not mentioned in that seniority list. Thereafter, another seniority list was published on 16.9.1987 showing the position as on 1.1.1986 and in that list, the names of the petitioners were shown at serial numbers 92, 94, 96, 99, 114, 120, 124, 133, 134 and 145 respectively whereas the names of respondents No. 1 to 17 were shown at serial numbers 213 to 231 respectively. It is alleged that the final seniority list was published on 22.12.1990 and in that list, the names of the petitioners were shown at serial numbers 58, 60, 62, 63, 80, 86, 91, 99, 100 and 111 respectively whereas the names of respondents No. 1 to 17 were shown at serial numbers 193 to 211 respectively. According to the petitioners, another seniority lists Annexures-7 and 8 dated 16.2.1993 and 19.5.1993 were also published and in those lists, there was no change regarding seniority position of the petitioners and respondents. Thus, it has been contended that the petitioners have always been shown senior to the respondents. 4. According to the petitioners, another seniority lists Annexures-7 and 8 dated 16.2.1993 and 19.5.1993 were also published and in those lists, there was no change regarding seniority position of the petitioners and respondents. Thus, it has been contended that the petitioners have always been shown senior to the respondents. 4. The case of the petitioners is that respondents No. 1 to 17 were appointed as Inspector Trainees in the newly created Department of the Land and Building Taxes vide order dated 17.8.1973 on an stipend of Rs. 150/- per month. According to the petitioners, for filling up these posts of Inspector Trainees, an advertisement Annexure-9 was issued and that was only restricted to unemployed persons. After selection and successful training, the respondents No. 1 to 17 alongwith others were appointed as Land and Building Taxes Inspectors vide order dated 1.3.1974 on temporary basis. Their appointment order (Annexure-11) dated 1.3.1974 clearly indicates that respondents No. 1 to 17 have been appointed on probation. However, this order showing them on probation was corrected vide order Annexure-12 dated 4.5.1976. It is alleged that at that time, permanent posts were not available in the Land and Building Taxes Department. Thus, according to the petitioners, the nature of appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 was of temporary/ad hoc nature. 5. It has been contended that the respondents were confirmed on the posts of Inspectors Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department with effect from 27.2.1981 vide order dated 27.2.1981. According to the petitioners the State Govt. sanctioned permanent posts of Inspectors Gr. II in the Land and Building Taxes Department on 27.2.1981 and so, respondents No. 1 to 17 were confirmed with effect from 27.2.1981. 6. It has been further contended that vide order Annexure-15, the respondents No. 1 to 17 were declared surplus in the Land and Building Taxes Department because the posts were abolished by the State Govt. and respondents No. 1 to 17 were relieved from Land and Building Taxes Department. The respondents No. 1,2, 5, 6 and 8 to 17 were absorbed in the Co-operative Department as Inspectors Gr.II and respondents No. 3, 4 and 7 were absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department vide order Annexure 1-17 dated 17.6.1982. They have been absorbed under the Rules of 1969. 7. The respondents No. 1,2, 5, 6 and 8 to 17 were absorbed in the Co-operative Department as Inspectors Gr.II and respondents No. 3, 4 and 7 were absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department vide order Annexure 1-17 dated 17.6.1982. They have been absorbed under the Rules of 1969. 7. It has also been contended that 14 Inspectors who were earlier absorbed in the Co-operative Department moved a representation to the State Govt. that they be re-absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department and they were re- absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department vide orders Annexures 19 to 22 dated 17.8.1982, 28.1.1983, 4.3.1983 and 10.5.1983 respectively. Against this re-absorption, a representation was submitted by the Association of Commercial Taxes Inspectors and the office bearers of the Association were assured by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department that absorption of these surplus employees will not affect the seniority of already permanent Commercial Taxes Inspectors. The Commissioner, Commercial Taxes has already issued orders that these absorbed employees from other departments will rank junior to them. The copies of these orders are Annexures-24, 25 and 26 respectively. According to the petitioners, the respondents No. 1 to 17 did not lodge any protest, rather accepted this condition and continued in Commercial Taxes Department because they wanted to remain in this Department.According to the petitioners, even as per Rule 15 of the Rules of 1969, surplus personnel are to be placed enblock junior to existing permanent employees of the Department. They have submitted that the petitioners are direct recruits of 1977 whereas respondents No. 1 to 17 were confirmed with effect from 27.2.1981 and, therefore, respondents No. 1 to 17 were to rank junior to all Inspectors appointed prior to 27.2.1981. 8. It will be relevant to mention here that the petitioners were confirmed on the post of Inspectors Gr. II in the Commercial Taxes Department vide order Annexure-3 dated 5.5.1982 whereas respondents No. 1 to 17 were confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 27.2.1981. Be that as it may, the seniority lists dated 16.9.1987 and 22.12.1990 were challenged by respondents No. 1 to 17 before the learned Tribunal, where the matter was hotly contested. However, the matter came to be decided by the learned Tribunal vide its judgment (Annexure-30) dated 31.5.1994 as aforesaid. 9. Be that as it may, the seniority lists dated 16.9.1987 and 22.12.1990 were challenged by respondents No. 1 to 17 before the learned Tribunal, where the matter was hotly contested. However, the matter came to be decided by the learned Tribunal vide its judgment (Annexure-30) dated 31.5.1994 as aforesaid. 9. Aggrieved against this impugned judgment (Annexure-30) of the learned Tribunal, number of affected persons filed number of writ petitions at Jaipur Bench and those writ petitions came to be disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. A.P. Ravani, Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Y.R. Meena, J. vide its judgment dated 31.3.1995. The learned Division Bench of this Court also followed the Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhanwarlal Malakar v. State of Rajasthan (1990(1) RLR 570) and ultimately dismissed those writ petitions. 10. The petitioners have also filed this writ petition challenging the impugned judgment (Annexure-30) of the learned Tribunal. 11. We have heard Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. M.S. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 14 (Caveator) and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 12. The contention of the petitioners is that vide order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974, the respondents No. 1 to 17 were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II on probation. According to them, the word 'probation' used in their appointment order Annexure-11 was deleted vide order Annexure-12 dated 4.5.1976 and, therefore, the appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 was purely temporary. They have submitted that the Land and Building Taxes Department itself was temporary and the posts were also temporary and there were no Rules for selection. The posts of Inspectors Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department were made permanent only in the year 1981 and, therefore, the substantive appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 shall be treated with effect from 27.2.1981, when these posts were made permanent. It was, therefore, submitted that respondents No. 1 to 17 cannot be treated as senior to the petitioners because the petitioners were regularly appointed in the year 1977, against clear-cut permanent vacancies, after the due selection. 13. It may be stated here that it has not been denied by the petitioners that selection of respondents No. 1 to 17 was also regular. 13. It may be stated here that it has not been denied by the petitioners that selection of respondents No. 1 to 17 was also regular. It has not been disputed that in pursuance of an advertisement, respondents No. 1 to 17 appeared and cleared the written examination and they were interviewed by the members of the Selection Committee and then, they were appointed as Inspectors Trainees and after successful completion of their training, they were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department. It is true that at that time, there were no Rules for selection and respondents No. 1 to 17 were selected as per the Notifications/Circulars issued by the State Govt. Thus, for all practical purposes, the selection of respondents No. 1 to 17 was regular selection because they faced written examinations and interviews etc. and after selection, they were put to some training and after clearance of that training, they were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II on probation vide order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974. This order came to be revoked in the year 1976 because incumbents can be appointed on probation against the permanent posts and as no permanent post was available, the word 'Probation' occurring in order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974 was deleted. 14. It has been contended by Mr. M.S. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 14 that simply because permanent posts were not available with the Department, it cannot be said that appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 was not substantive. According to him, substantive appointment can be made against a temporary post. He has submitted that it may be that the Department itself was temporary and posts were also temporary but the fact that in pursuance of the advertisement issued by the Land and Building Taxes Department, respondents No. 1 to 17 appeared and cleared the written examination and were interviewed by the members of the Selection Committee and then they were put on training and after clearance of that training, they were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II vide order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974, it cannot be said that appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 was not regular. 15. In support of his contention, Mr. 15. In support of his contention, Mr. Singhvi has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. M.J. Siddiqui ( AIR 1980 SC 1098 ) wherein it has been held that where the selection has been made in a regular way and not merely on an ad hoc basis then those appointments will be treated as substantive appointments to temporary posts. 16. Mr. M.S. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 14 further placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1981 SC 41 ) wherein it has been held that substantive appointment to a service against a temporary post also makes the person a member of the service. It has been further held that a cadre post can be permanent or temporary and if an engineer was appointed substantively to a temporary or permanent post, he becomes a member of the service. The touchstone then is the substantive capacity of the appointment. Their lordships have also held that while temporary and permanent posts have great relevancy in regard to the career of Govt. servants, keeping posts temporary for long, sometimes by annual renewals for several years, and denying the claims of the incumbents on the score that their posts are temporary makes no sense and strikes as arbitrary, especially when both temporary and permanent appointees are functionally identified. If in the normal course, a post is temporary in the real sense and the appointee knows that his tenure cannot exceed the post in longevity, there cannot be anything unfair or capricious in clothing him with no rights. In that case, it has been also observed by their lordships that if the appointment is to a post and the capacity in which the appointment is made is of indefinite duration, if the tests prescribed have been taken and passed if probation has been prescribed and has been approved, one may well say that the post was held by the incumbent in a substantive capacity. 17. 17. Reliance was also placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India ( AIR 1991 SC 284 ), wherein it has been held that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rules, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. Where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and is made as a stop gap arrangement, the period of officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for reckoning seniority. The appointment to a post must be according to rules and not by way of ad hoc or stop gap arrangement made due to administrative exigencies. If the initial appointment thus made was de hors the rules, the entire length of service cannot be counted for seniority. In other words, the appointee would become a member of the service in the substantive capacity from the date of his appointment only if the appointment was made according to rules and seniority would be counted only from that date. 18. In the case on hand, as stated above, in pursuance of an advertisement, respondents No. 1 to 17 appeared and cleared the written examination and thereafter, they faced interviews and then training and after clearing that training, they were appointed on probation. Thus, it was a regular selection and the appointments of respondents No. 1 to 17 continued indefinitely and their posts were ultimately made permanent in the year 1981 and, therefore, the seniority of respondents No. 1 to 17 will be reckoned from the date of their regular appointment i.e. with effect from 1.3.1974. It cannot be otherwise, because they were not appointed on ad hoc or temporary basis. This is what has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Bhanwarlal Malakar's case (supra). It may be stated here that facts of Bhanwarlal Malakar's case are almost similar to the facts of the case in hand. In that case, it has been held that the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department in substantive capacity with effect from 1.3.1974 when he was appointed on probation. 19. It may be stated here that facts of Bhanwarlal Malakar's case are almost similar to the facts of the case in hand. In that case, it has been held that the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department in substantive capacity with effect from 1.3.1974 when he was appointed on probation. 19. We may state here that against the Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhanwarlal Malakar's case (supra), a Special Leave Petition was filed before their lordships of the Supreme Court and that too has been rejected. In that Special Leave Petition, it was contended before their lordship of the Supreme Court that the word 'Probation' mentioned in the appointment order dated 1.3.1974 was later on deleted but still, the Special Leave Petition was rejected. A review petition was also filed and that too has been rejected and this decision has become final and conclusive so far as the substantive character of the service of Inspectors Gr.II of Land and Building Taxes Department, who were appointed on 1.3.1974 are concerned. Thus, we hold that respondents No. 1 to 17 alongwith all others who were appointed with them vide order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974 as Inspectors Gr.II in the Land and Building Taxes Department were appointed in substantive capacity with effect from 1.3.1974. No other view is possible and this is what has been held by the learned Tribunal as also another Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition (Def.) Nos. 20/95 alongwith 16 other writ petitions decided on 31.3.1995. 20. It has been contended by Mr.Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that there can be no officiation against any post unless there is a substantive post in existence. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kedar Nath Sharma v. U.O.I. and others (1988(1) RLR 714). In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Dy. S.P. by direct recruitment. He joined on 9.12.1966. His appointment was temporary and was subject to Rules to be framed in future. A question cropped up for consideration before this Court whether the petitioner can claim confirmation with effect from 9.12.1969 treating him as having been appointed on probation w.e.f. 9.12.1966. In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Dy. S.P. by direct recruitment. He joined on 9.12.1966. His appointment was temporary and was subject to Rules to be framed in future. A question cropped up for consideration before this Court whether the petitioner can claim confirmation with effect from 9.12.1969 treating him as having been appointed on probation w.e.f. 9.12.1966. It was held that probation period could not commence prior to 1.4.1969 i.e. date on which permanent posts were created and prior to that, the appointment of petitioner was mere ad hoc arrangement not conferring any right on him since there were no substantive posts against which he could be appointed in that capacity. The facts of that case are totally distinguishable with the facts of the present case and hence, that authority is of no avail to the petitioners. 21. Mr. M.R. Singhvi next drew our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad v. H.D.M. Tripathi 1993(2) SCT 180(SC) : (1993(1) SLR 15). In that case, the members of the petitioner Parishad were appointed as untrained Assistant Teachers and they were treated as regular Assistant Teachers on getting requisite certificate of training and were given proper scale of pay and seniority only after that date. In that case, the contention that this benefit be extended to them from the date of their initial appointment was repelled. As stated above, in this case, initially respondents No. 1 to 17 were appointed as Inspectors Trainees vide order dated 17.8.1973 and after completion of due process of selection, they were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II vide order Annexure-11 dated 1.3.1974. Thus, this decision too has no application to the facts of the present case. 22. Mr. M.R. Singhvi next drew our attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Excise Commissioner v. V. Shreekanta (1993 Supp(3) SCC 53). In that case, the respondent was initially appointed on ad hoc basis and thereafter, he became eligible for appointment only under a new set of rules. He was appointed thereunder temporarily with prospective effect and was placed on probation. In those facts, it was held that seniority would be counted not from the date of the initial ad hoc appointment but from the date of the subsequent appointment or regularisation under the said rules. He was appointed thereunder temporarily with prospective effect and was placed on probation. In those facts, it was held that seniority would be counted not from the date of the initial ad hoc appointment but from the date of the subsequent appointment or regularisation under the said rules. As stated above, in this case, respondents No. 1 to 17 were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 1.3.1974 after they appeared and cleared the written examination, interviews and training etc. and hence, their selection was regular. Thus, this authority has no application to the facts of the present case. 23. Reliance was also placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Masood Akhtar Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1990 SCC (L&S) 580). In that case also, the petitioners were initially appointed for six months on stop gap emergency and they were allowed to continue beyond the period of six months and later regularly selected by PSC. In those facts, it was held that their seniority shall be counted not from the date of their initial stop gap appointment but from the date of their regular selection under Rules. This is not a case of stop gap appointment and therefore, this authority too has no application to the facts of the present case. 24. As stated above, this matter stands concluded by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhanwarlal Malakar's case (supra) and this is what has been followed by another Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 31.3.1995 and, therefore, the conclusion that respondent Nos. 1 to 17 were appointed on substantive basis with effect from 1.3.1974 does not call for any interference by this Court. 25. It has been next contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that respondents No. 1 to 17 were initially appointed by the Land & Building Taxes Department and they were not recruited by the Commercial Taxes Department under the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service (General Branch) Rules, 1975. Thus, prior to their absorption in Commercial Taxes Department, they were not members of the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service. 26. Thus, prior to their absorption in Commercial Taxes Department, they were not members of the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service. 26. Rule 2(g) of the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service (General Branch) Rules, 1975 deals with 'Member of the Service' and it lays down that 'Member of the Service' means a person appointed in a Substantive capacity to a post in the Service under the provisions of these Rules or the rules or orders repealed by Rule 37 and includes a probationer. Rule 2(j) defines 'substantive appointment' and it reads as under : "R.2(j) : "Substantive Appointment" means an appointment made under the provisions of these Rules to a substantive vacancy after due selection by any of the methods of recruitment prescribed under these Rules and includes an appointment on probation or as a probationer followed by confirmation on the completion of the probationary period. NOTE : 'Due Selection by any method of recruitment prescribed under these Rules' will include recruitment either on initial constitution of Service or in accordance with the provisions of any rules promulgated under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India except urgent temporary appointment." Rule 27 of the aforesaid Rules relates to the 'Seniority' of the members of the Service. It governs the seniority of the members of the Service who have been directly recruited or who have joined the Service on account of integration of the Service. Thus, Rule 27 will not govern this case because respondents No. 1 to 17 were not directly recruited to the Service. As stated above, respondents No. 1 to 17 were directly recruited as Inspectors Gr.II in Land and Building Taxes Department in substantive capacity with effect from 1.3.1974 and later on, they were declared surplus in Land and Building Taxes Department and therefore, their services shall be governed by Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnel) Rules, 1969 (for short 'the Rules of 1969'). 27. Rule2 of the Rules of 1969 deals with 'scope and applicability'. It starts with a non-obstante clause. 27. Rule2 of the Rules of 1969 deals with 'scope and applicability'. It starts with a non-obstante clause. It reads as under : "Rule2 Scope and Applicability.:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any service rules or orders for the time being in force regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the various services or posts in connection with the affairs of the State, surplus personnel shall be eligible for recruitment and appointment by absorption to such service or posts in accordance with these rules subject to the availability of vacant posts : Provided that:- (i) nothing contained in these Rules shall apply to posts encadred in the All India Services, the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, the Rajasthan Judicial Service, the Rajasthan Secretariat Service, the Rajasthan Administrative Service, the Rajasthan Police Service, the Rajasthan Accounts Service and the Rajasthan Tehsildar Service; (ii) nothing contained in these rules shall apply to persons holding posts of Statisticians in the Directorate of Economics and Industrial Survey prior to the abolition of that department and subsequently absorbed as Statistical Assistants in the Directorate of Economics and Statistics on their having been rendered surplus and thereafter being adjudged suitable for appointment to the service under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Statistical Subordinate Service Rules, 1971." Thus, it is clear that services of respondents No. 1 to 17 shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of 1969. We have already held that respondents No. 1 to 17 were substantively appointed in the Land and Building Taxes Department as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 1.3.1974 and when they were declared surplus, they were confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 27.2.1981 whereas the petitioners were confirmed with effect from 5.5.1982 and, therefore, respondents No. 1 to 17 were required to be absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department as per the procedure prescribed in Rule 7 of the Rules of 1969, which specifically provides that such persons shall be appointed substantively on permanent posts. Thus, respondents No. 1 to 17 were required to be absorbed substantively on permanent posts at the time they were declared surplus on 26.4.1982 because they were already confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 27.2.1981. Rule 7 of the Rules of 1969 further lays down that if the post is not clearly vacant or if lien thereon is held by another person, the Govt. Rule 7 of the Rules of 1969 further lays down that if the post is not clearly vacant or if lien thereon is held by another person, the Govt. on being moved by the appointing authority shall create a supernumerary post for providing lien thereon to the absorbed employee. 28. Rule 15 of the Rules of 1969 deals with seniority of such absorbed personnel and it lays down that the seniority of a surplus employee appointed substantively to a permanent post in the service or cadre in which he is absorbed shall be determined by the appointing authority concerned by placing him below the junior-most permanent employee of the new service or department who has a longer period of continuous substantive service on the post compared to the continuous substantive service of the surplus employee on equivalent or higher post. The seniority of surplus employee who is absorbed on a higher post on officiating basis shall be determined only in respect of his permanent post. Proviso (1) Rule 15 further lays down that the seniority of the surplus employee whose length of continuous service in substantive or officiating capacity or in both such capacities is lesser than the length of continuous service in substantive or officiating capacity or in both such capacities of the junior most permanent employee of the service or cadre of the New Department in which such surplus employee has been absorbed, shall be determined by placing the surplus employee immediately below the said junior most permanent employee in the service or cadre or the department in which the surplus employee has been absorbed. Proviso (2) to Rule 15 of the Rules further lays down that inter-se seniority of the surplus employees absorbed in a department/service/cadre or unit under an Appointing Authority and the employees of the service/cadre of the New department, for promotion to higher post in the service or cadre in which he has been absorbed shall be determined according to the date of continued officiation in a class or category of post concerned or an equivalent or higher post provided such officiation was not of the fortuitous nature or ad hoc or an urgent temporary appointment, notwithstanding their year or substantive appointment or date of confirmation or the length of continuous substantive service in the different cadre post or service. 29. 29. Thus, it is clear from Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 1969 that the seniority of a surplus employee appointed substantively to a permanent post in the service or cadre in which he is absorbed shall be determined by the appointing authority concerned by placing him below the junior most permanent employee of the new service or department, who has a longer period of continuous substantive service on the post compared to the continuous substantive service of the surplus employee on equivalent or higher post. As stated above, respondents No. 1 to 17 were appointed as Inspectors Gr.II substantively with effect from 1.3.1974 whereas the petitioners were substantively appointed as Inspectors Gr.II on 19.12.1977. Moreover, respondents No. 1 to 17 were confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II on 27.2.1981 whereas the petitioners were confirmed as Inspectors Gr.II with effect from 5.5.1982. Thus, the substantive appointment of respondents No. 1 to 17 was earlier than the petitioners and even respondents No. 1 to 17 were confirmed prior to the petitioners and, therefore, if respondents No. 1 to 17 have been placed senior to the petitioners then the decision of the learned Tribunal, which has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble A.P. Ravani, Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Y.R. Meena, J. cannot be challenged on any score and the decision of the learned Tribunal deserves to be sustained. 30. We may state here that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble A.P. Ravani, Actg.C.J. (as he then was) and Hon'ble Y.R. Meena, J. dated 31.3.1995 cannot be set at naught on the ground that certain points which have been raised in this writ petition were not raised in those writ petitions. 30. We may state here that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble A.P. Ravani, Actg.C.J. (as he then was) and Hon'ble Y.R. Meena, J. dated 31.3.1995 cannot be set at naught on the ground that certain points which have been raised in this writ petition were not raised in those writ petitions. When the impugned order of the learned Tribunal has become final on account of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in respect of similarly situated persons, that decision cannot be allowed to be set at naught by other persons because it is a judgment in rem whereby the judgment of the learned Tribunal has been upheld and when that has been upheld, that results in granting a particular seniority to respondents No. 1 to 17 and that seniority cannot be set at naught every time by the employees borne on the cadre of the services of Commercial Taxes Department, who choose to challenge it. 31. In Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. ( 1980(3) SCC 719 ), it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court that it is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned. 32. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India 1993(3) SCT 137(SC) : ( AIR 1990 SC 334 ) , have held that a decision on an abstract question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right cannot operate as res judicata. Nor also can a decision on the question of jurisdiction be res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding. But if the question of law is related to the fact in issue, an erroneous decision on such a question of law may operate as res judicata between the parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding, if the cause of action is the same. But if the question of law is related to the fact in issue, an erroneous decision on such a question of law may operate as res judicata between the parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding, if the cause of action is the same. In this case, the question of seniority of Inspectors Gr.II substantively appointed in Land & Building Taxes Department and later, on being declared surplus and, absorbed in Commercial Taxes Department is at issue and that question stands concluded by the decision of the learned Tribunal, which decision when challenged has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court. Thus, once the decision of the learned Tribunal has become final, it is binding on all the parties. The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 33. It is well settled that in order to decide whether a decision in an earlier litigation operates as res judicata, the Court must look at the nature of the litigation, what were the issues raised therein and what was actually decided in it. In the case on hand, what was at issue was the particular seniority assigned to respondents No. 1 to 17 as against the petitioners and many others similarly situated, who were directly recruited to the Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service in the year 1977 is valid or not. All these pleas which were raised in this writ petition were also raised before the learned Tribunal and they have been dealt with by the learned Tribunal in detail and have been answered by the learned Tribunal and that decision has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble A.P. Ravani, Acting C.J. (as he then was) and Hon'ble Y.R. Meena, J. vide its judgment dated 31.3.1995 and, therefore, that decision cannot be set at naught simply because some persons who did not join that litigation have now chosen to challenge that decision. As against the same judgment, two different decisions cannot be rendered and if that is done, that will be a mockery of justice. Thus, to this extent, such an argument cannot be allowed to stand. 34. Mr. As against the same judgment, two different decisions cannot be rendered and if that is done, that will be a mockery of justice. Thus, to this extent, such an argument cannot be allowed to stand. 34. Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners next drew our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Madho Das v. Mukand Ram ( AIR 1955 SC 481 ). That was a decision in which the Privy Council had construed a certain document namely a Will, though the decision was not binding on a person not a party to that litigation, yet the decision operated as a judicial precedent. The facts of that case are totally distinguishable with the facts of the present case and hence, that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 35. It has been lastly contended by Mr. M.R. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that respondents No. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 to 17 were earlier absorbed in the Cooperative Department but on their representation, they were again re-absorbed in the Commercial Taxes Department, which is not permissible under the Rules. 36. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Singhvi, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 14 contends that such a re-absorption is possible as per the provisions of Rule 7(4) of the Rules of 1969. Rule 7(4) of the Rules of 1969 provides that surplus personnel who were absorbed on lower posts or on equated posts may be re-absorbed on equivalent posts or on the same posts from which they were declared surplus, provided they have not been confirmed on such posts, if the Absorption Committee is satisfied that hardship had been caused to them by their absorption on the lower posts or on equated posts due to non-availability of vacancies at the time of their first absorption. Initially, the respondents No. 1, 2, 5 and 8 to 17 were absorbed in the Cooperative Department and the remaining surplus Inspectors were absorbed in Commercial Taxes Department and, therefore, they moved a representation to the General Administration Department of the Govt. Initially, the respondents No. 1, 2, 5 and 8 to 17 were absorbed in the Cooperative Department and the remaining surplus Inspectors were absorbed in Commercial Taxes Department and, therefore, they moved a representation to the General Administration Department of the Govt. of Rajasthan that certain Inspectors have been absorbed in Commercial Taxes Department on the policy of pick and choose and the left out persons have been absorbed in Cooperative Department and some of them have been sent to the Excise Department without assigning any reasons. Regarding this, an appeal was also filed by respondent No. 2 before the learned Tribunal and in that appeal, certain observations were made by the learned Tribunal that pick and choose policy is wrong. The administrative authorities are expected to act fairly and reasonably even in administrative matters as has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993(3) SCT 537(SC) : 1993(3) SCC 259 . In view of these observations made by the learned Tribunal, a writ petition was filed on behalf of the State and during the pendency of that writ petition, the State Govt. chose to amend its act and passed an order re-absorbing respondents No. 1, 2, 5 and 8 to 17 in the Commercial Taxes Department. As stated above, such a re- absorption is provided in Rule 7(4) of the Rules of 1969. In these circumstances, the argument of Mr. M.R. Singhvi, that re-absorption is not possible cannot be sustained.In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, we are firmly of the view that this writ petition has no force and it is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******