JUDGMENT Venkataraman, J. - The appellant is aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court staying the proceedings in Suit O.S. 290/86 filed by him under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act ('the Act' for short). 2. The plaintiff-appellant has filed a suit for dissolution of a firm which was constituted under a Partnership Deed dated 5.2.1980 which was subsequently amended on 19.6.1980. That firm is an unregistered firm. The respondent-defendant on putting his appearance filed an application under Section 34 of the Act seeking stay of the proceedings of the suit on the ground that clause 13 of the Partnership Deed provides for referring all disputes between the partners for arbitration and that he is ready and willing to do all things necessary for proper conduct of the arbitration as per the agreement. The appellant opposed that application on the grounds that as the firm was not registered the application was barred under Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act and that in any event in view of the serious allegations of fraud made by him this was not a fit case where the court should exercise its discretion and stay further proceedings in the suit. The Trial Court has negatived both, the contentions taken by the appellant and has stayed further proceedings in the suit. 3. There is no dispute about the fact that clause 13 of the Partnership Deed provides for arbitration in respect of disputes which may arise between the partners. Clause 13 reads as hereunder : "Any dispute or difference of opinion which may arise between the partners of their agents touching the partnership to the partners, then every such dispute shall be referred to the arbitration, as appointed then and there." 4. The plaintiff has filed the suit for dissolution merely on the ground that the defendant is not giving him proper accounts and not allowing him to participate in the firm's business and that he has given some false account to tax authorities and that it is now not possible for him to continue as a partner. It was not contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the above Arbitration Clause is not applicable for the disputes which have arisen between the partners. The Arbitration Clause is quite wide enough to apply to all types of differences or disputes between the partners. 5. Mr. It was not contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the above Arbitration Clause is not applicable for the disputes which have arisen between the partners. The Arbitration Clause is quite wide enough to apply to all types of differences or disputes between the partners. 5. Mr. Nanjundaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant, mainly contended that as the firm is unregistered, the application filed under Section 34 of the Act is barred in view of the provisions of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. He strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. ( AIR 1964 SC 1882 ), to contend that the expression "other proceedings" appearing in Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act would include even proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and as such there is a bar for entertaining such an application under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 6. In Jagdish Chandra (supra) case, the Supreme Court has held that the expression "other proceedings" should be given its full meaning untrammelled by the words" a claim of set-off" and that the bar under Sections 69(1) and (2) would apply to any proceedings to enforce a right arising from the contract. It has also been held that the proceeding under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act is a proceeding to enforce a right arising from the contract. 7. The question whether the bar under Section 69 would be applicable for a proceeding under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act for dissolution of the firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm was considered by this court in Vittala Kamath v. M/s. Krishna Motor Service (ILR, 1994 Kar. 473), in that decision the principle laid down in Jugdish Chandra's case has been considered. It has been pointed out in that decision that in Jagdish Chandra's case (supra), the matter to be referred for Arbitration was neither for dissolution of the firm nor for rendering accounts of the dissolved firm and that as such that decision would not be applicable where the proceedings initiated under the Act are for the dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of a dissolved firm. This court has held that the bar under Section 69 would not apply even to proceedings under Section 20 of the Act for the dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of a dissolved firm. 8. Supreme Court in Premalatha & another v. M/s. Ishar Dass Chaman Lal and other ( AIR 1995 SC 714 ), had held as hereunder : "Section 69 prohibits enforcement of rights in respect of unregistered firm. Sub-section (3)(a) carves out three exceptions to Sub-sections (1)(a) of Section 69 and also to the main part of Sub-sections (3) of Section 69, namely (1) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of firm; (2) for accounts of the dissolved firm; and (3) any right power to realise the property of the dissolved firm. The right 'to sue' for the dissolution of the firm must, of necessity, be interpreted clause for resolution of the disputes relating or dissolved firm or for rendition of accounts or any right or power to realise the property of the dissolved firm. A suit filed under Section 20 of Arbitration Act is, therefore, maintainable to work out the rights given to the parties under clause (a) to Sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. When a suit for rendering accounts and for realisation of the property of the dissolved firm prorata is permissible by an exception carved out by Sub-section (3)(a) to Section 69, there can be no prohibition to invoke arbitration clause under the deed of partnership, agreed to by and between the parties to invoke Section 20 of the Arbitration Act." 9. It is because of the exemption from the embargo granted in the case of a suit for dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of the dissolved firm, the plaintiff has been able to file the suit seeking that relief. The decisions referred to above make it clear that if there is an Arbitration Clause then even though the firm is not registered a party can enforce his right to seek arbitration under the contract by initiating proceedings under the Arbitration Act for the purpose of dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of the dissolved firm. The decisions referred to above make it clear that if there is an Arbitration Clause then even though the firm is not registered a party can enforce his right to seek arbitration under the contract by initiating proceedings under the Arbitration Act for the purpose of dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of the dissolved firm. If a party, in spite of the Arbitration Clause in the Agreement, chooses to file a suit for dissolution of the firm it would be illogical to say that the other party cannot exercise his right under the Arbitration Clause in the Agreement. 10. Mr. Nanjundaswamy while trying to distinguish the decision of this court in Vittal Kamath case and the decision of the Supreme Court in Premalatha's (supra) pointed out that in those cases proceedings under the Arbitration Act for referring the dispute with regard to the dissolution of the firm or for rendering of accounts of the dissolved firm to Arbitration had been initiated and that the court found that those proceedings would come within the exception contained in Section 69(3), whereas, an application under Section 34 cannot be said to be a proceeding for the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm. He, therefore, contended that the proceeding under Section 34 would be barred under Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. 11. The learned Counsel for the respondent Mr. Jaya Vittal Kolar contended that an application under Section 34, of the Act cannot be considered to be a proceeding, that the bar under Section 69 would come into play only when proceedings are instituted to enforce a right arising out of the contract that there is no bar for a defence being taken to defeat a suit and that an application under Section 34 in which only the stay of proceedings is sought would not be a proceeding to enforce a right under the contract. According to him the stay of proceedings initiated by the plaintiff is granted not in enforcement of the right under the contract but in exercise of the statutory provisions. He also pointed out that under Section 34 the grant of stay is discretionary. He relied on certain authorities in support of his contention. 12. According to him the stay of proceedings initiated by the plaintiff is granted not in enforcement of the right under the contract but in exercise of the statutory provisions. He also pointed out that under Section 34 the grant of stay is discretionary. He relied on certain authorities in support of his contention. 12. The relevant provisions of Section 69 read as hereunder : "69(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the Firm. (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. (3) The provisions of Sub-sections (1) & (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect : (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for account of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) *** *** *** (4) *** *** *** Clause 3 of Section 69 makes provisions of Clauses 1 and 2 applicable to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract. A reading of Clauses 1 to 3 would clearly indicate that what is sought to be prohibited is the institution of a suit or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract or claiming set-off. A claim of set-off is also in the nature of a suit. A reading of Clauses 1 to 3 would clearly indicate that what is sought to be prohibited is the institution of a suit or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract or claiming set-off. A claim of set-off is also in the nature of a suit. In Jagadish Chandra's case (supra) in para 7 the Supreme Court while analysing Section 69 has pointed out that section thinks in terms of (a) suits and (b) claims of set-off which are in a sense of the nature of suits and (c) of other proceedings, that the section first provides for exclusion of suits in sub-sections (1) and (2), that then it says that the same ban applies to a claim of set-off and other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract. Next it excludes the ban in respect of right to sue (a) for the dissolution of a firm, (b) for accounts of a dissolved firm, and (c) for the realisation of a property of a dissolved firm. Thus in order to attract the bar under Section 69 there must be institution of a suit or proceeding to enforce a right arising from the contract. An application under Section 34 of the Act is filed only to bring to the notice of the court the existence of an Arbitration Agreement and to seek stay of further proceedings in the suit instituted by the other party. It cannot be said that proceedings are initiated by making an application under Section 34 of the Act to enforce the right arising from the contract. It is only when an application under Section 8 or 20 of the Act is filed seeking reference to arbitration by virtue of the Arbitration Clause in the contract it could be said that proceedings are initiated to enforce a right under the contract. As such the bar under Section 69 cannot apply to an application under Section 34 of the Act. 13. As such the bar under Section 69 cannot apply to an application under Section 34 of the Act. 13. In Kothapalli Kanuparthi Subrayya and another v. Nichenametla Subbarayadu and others (AIR 1937 Madras 730), it has been held that the effect of sub-section (3) of Section 69 is that the prohibition against a suit by the member of an unregistered firm or by an unregistered firm against the third party to enforce a contract is extended to other proceedings which have for their purpose the enforcement of a right arising under the contract between the parties to the proceedings. In that case it was held that an application for raising attachment of property belonging to the partnership in a suit filed against one partner is not a proceeding to enforce right which depends upon any contract between the petitioner and the plaintiff. 14. In Ajit Kumar Maity v. Narendra Nath Jana and others (AIR 1955 Calcutta 224), it has been held that a party can be said to be seeking to enforce a right only if he is seeking some relief from the court and when no relief is being sought from the court it cannot be said that he is trying to enforce a right. In that case it was held that the bar under Section 69 does not apply to defence taken in the written statement. 15. The question whether the bar under Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act would apply to an application under Section 34 of the Act arose directly for consideration in Partabmull Rameshwar v. Fulchand Kanahivalal & Co. ( AIR 1964 Cal. 452 ). The Calcutta High Court has held that an application under Section 34 of the Act cannot be described as a proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, because a right to stay does not arise from the contract but from a statutory provisions. 16. If we consider the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act and the provisions of Section 34 of the Act it would be clear that filing an application under Section 34 of the Act does not amount to initiating proceedings to enforce a right under the contract and that it is only a request to the court to exercise its statutory powers under Section 34 of the Act of staying further proceedings in the suit initiated by the other party. As such an application under Section 34 of the Act filed by a partner of an unregistered firm would not be barred by the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 17. Mr. Nanjundaswamy contended that the plaintiff had made serious allegations of fraud against the defendant and that as such it is not desirable to refer the dispute to Arbitration. Generally the person against whom the fraud is alleged has an option to have the matter decided by the Civil Court to vindicate his conduct in a regular trial in the Civil Court and a party making the allegations of fraud does not have that option unless the circumstances of the case are such that the court thinks that it is not proper to force the parties to seek Arbitration. In the present case actually there are no specific allegations of fraud in the plaint. The main allegations made by the plaintiff are that the defendant misused the confidence reposed in him by the plaintiff, that he has not kept correct account of the business, that plaintiff has no access to the accounts, that the defendant has violated Rules and Regulations governing the business resulting in heavy penalties being levied, that the defendant has submitted some false and untrue reports to the Income Tax Department, that he has been showing loss in business, though there could not have been such loss and that defendant has made secret profits and amassed wealth. The Trial Court, taking into consideration the nature of the allegations made by the plaintiff, has opined that the allegations are not of such a nature as to refuse the stay in the light of the agreement between the parties for referring their disputes for Arbitration. I do not think that the exercise of the discretion by the lower court is unreasonable calling for interference by this court. 18. Lastly the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as the plaintiff is seeking dissolution of the firm the matter should not have been stayed under Section 34 of the Act and in support of this contention he relied on the decision in Ganesh Chandra Dey and another v. Kamal Kumar Agarwala ( AIR 1971 Cal. 317 ). 18. Lastly the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that as the plaintiff is seeking dissolution of the firm the matter should not have been stayed under Section 34 of the Act and in support of this contention he relied on the decision in Ganesh Chandra Dey and another v. Kamal Kumar Agarwala ( AIR 1971 Cal. 317 ). That was a case where the dissolution had been sought under Sections 44(f) and (g) of the Partnership Act on the grounds that it is just and equitable to dissolve the partnership. The Court on the facts of the case was of the opinion that was a fit case where the court should exercise its discretion under Section 34 of the Act and proceed to decide the suit. It has also been held that from language of Sections 44(f) and (g) it appears that the court alone has jurisdiction to dissolve a partnership under the said sub-section. However, the court has further observed that it is quite possible that the parties may agree to have the question of dissolution under Sections 44(f) and (g) also decided by the Arbitration and that however, in that case such intention cannot be spelt out from the Arbitration Clause. 19. In the present case in the plaint the plaintiff has not sought for dissolution of the firm on the ground that it is just and equitable to dissolve the partnership. The plaintiff has sought for dissolution on the grounds that the defendent has committed breach of faith and confidence in the conduct of the business and in causing loss to that plaintiff and acting against his interest, and that the plaintiff has issued a notice of dissolution. The plaintiff's has suit is based under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 44 of the Partnership Act. As such the decision of the Calcutta High Court is not applicable to the present case. 20. For the above reasons I find that there are no good grounds to interfere with the impugned order. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. *-*-*-*-*