Judgment R.M.Prasad, J. 1. The present writ application is directed against the orders of the consolidation authorities, who are respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 rejecting the claim of the petitioner that the land in dispute in a public graveyard of the Muslims of the locality and allowing the claim of respondent Nos. 7 and 8 over the said lands. The last order was passed by the Joint Director of Consolidation in revision No. 1252 A/82 (annexure-4) affirming the order of the Assistant Director of Consolidation, who affirmed the order of the Consolidation Officer in a consolidation proceeding. 2. In short, the relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner claims that the land in question has been a public graveyard, recorded as Parti Kadeem for the last seventy years. On the other hand, the claim of respondent Nos. 7 and 8 is that they are settles from the original Zamindar Zulfikar Ali and have been coming in possession of the land in dispute. 3. It appears that in the year 1971 Wane dispute arose with respect to the land in question between the petitioner and respondent Nos. 7 and 8 which gave rise to filing of the Title Suit No. 1/73 by the petitioner for declaration of title. The petitioner lost in the said suit and preferred Title Appeal No. 20/15 of 1973. During the pendency of the appeal the consolidation proceeding was initiated and, as per the provisions contained in Sec. 4C of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said proceeding was held to be abated by an order dated 13.3.1978. The consolidation authorities while disposing of the consolidation proceeding, took into account the decree passed in the mid suit against this petitioner and accordingly rejected his claim. 4. The said proceeding was held to be abated by an order dated 13.3.1978. The consolidation authorities while disposing of the consolidation proceeding, took into account the decree passed in the mid suit against this petitioner and accordingly rejected his claim. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned orders are vitiated on account of consideration of the aforementioned decree passed by the Civil Court against him, inasmuch as by now it is well settled that in a case where an appeal has been preferred against the preliminary decree, then under Sec. 4C of the Act, not only the appeal but the entire suit will abate and thus, a decree passed in the suit cannot be locked into by the consolidation authorities while exercising powers under the Act, The Supreme Court in the case of Mookhand and Ors. V/s. Dy. Director Consolidation and Ors. reported in -- as held as follows: There is, thus, a distinction between a case in which an appeal is filed against a preliminary decree and a case in which a preliminary decree is not appealed against and its correctness is not assailed. If, therefore, a notification under Sec. 4 of the Act is issued in a case where an appeal against the preliminary decree was not pending, the latter, viz. The preliminary decree, will remain unaffected and will not abate but if the preliminary decree had been assailed in appeal, and the appeal is pending on the date of notification, the latter, namely, the notification will have the effect of abating the entire suit/proceedings including the preliminary decree passed therein. On the country, if an appeal is filed against the final decree without there being any appeal against the preliminary decree and the preliminary decree becomes unassailable on account of Sec. 97, G.P.C. the notification under Sec. 4 would abate the proceedings relating to the final decree without in any way touching, impairing or affecting the preliminary decree. The reason, to report, is obvious. Once a preliminary decree is passed, the proceeding so far as declaration of rights on interest in the land are concerned, come to an end. Those rights are to be worked out by the final decree. The reason, to report, is obvious. Once a preliminary decree is passed, the proceeding so far as declaration of rights on interest in the land are concerned, come to an end. Those rights are to be worked out by the final decree. In a case, therefore, where a preliminary decree has already been passed and only the proceedings relating to the preparation of final decree are pending in any Court, either at the original stage or at the appellate or revisional stage, it cannot be said that proceedings "relating the declaration or determination of rights in the land within the meaning of Sec. 5(2) of the Act are pending. 5. In the present case, the title suit was filed by the petitioner for declaration of title over the land in question and the same was dismissed and against the said decision of the Civil Court the petitioner preferred appeal. While the said appeal was pending notification under Sec. 3 of the Act was issued. Thus, it has rightly been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mool Chand and others (supra) the aforesaid notification will have the effect of abating the entire suit/proceedings the preliminary decree passed by the Civil Court, which was under appeal in the aforementioned Title Appeal. In such circumstances, the decree will be of no consequence in order to decide the respective claim of the parties in the consolidation proceedings. 6. From perusal of paragraph 4 of the impugned order of the Joint Director, Consolidation contained in annexure-4 it is evident that his entire decision is leased on the findings of the Civil Court in Title Appeal No. 1/7 of 1973-75 and in any view of the matter, it cannot at least be said that the decree passed in the said suit has not been taken into account by the Joint Director of Consolidation in passing the impugned order. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be sustained and it is accordingly quashed. However, in the fact and circumstances aforementioned the matter requires a fresh consideration by the Revisional Authority and hence, it is Remitted back to him for the said purpose. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raised several other questions also assailing the impugned order. However, in the fact and circumstances aforementioned the matter requires a fresh consideration by the Revisional Authority and hence, it is Remitted back to him for the said purpose. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner raised several other questions also assailing the impugned order. In my opinion, as the matter has been remitted back to the revisional Authority under Sec. 35 of the Act, who has very wide power, other questions raised by the petitioner can also be raised before the Revisional Authority which, if raised, shall be considered by him. 8. The writ-application allowed with the aforementioned directions.