Honble SINGHAL, J. – This second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 9.2.95 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 2 Alwar where by the order & decree passed by the Addl.Civil Judge was reversed. In this secound appeal learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following two legal questions, namely– (I) that withdrawal of the belated payment of rent amounts to waiver in view of the statement given by the plaintiff, and (II) that the provisions of Sec. 13(5) are directory and not mandatory. Arguments of the counsel for the parties have been heard. (2) A suit for eviction was filed on 6.3.76 by the plaintiff. The rent was determi- ned on 24.8.76. In respect of month of January, 1978 the rent was deposited late by 17 days and accordingly an application was made by the plaintiff on 6.2.79 to strike off the defence. The issues with regard to personal bonafide necessity was withdrawn by the plaintiff and the issue regarding nuisance was decided in favour of the tenant and the dispute raised with regard to default in making the payment of rent for the month of January 1978. The suit was dismissed on 6.9.84 in respect of the above issue on the basis that the plaintiff has stated in his statement that the withdrawal of the money was not to condone the default of the defendant and subsequently said that it was for condoning the said default and on that basis the trial court came to the conclusion that withdrawal of the money deposited by the defendant by the landlord amounts to waiver in view of the said statement. It may be observed that an application for condonation of delay was made in the Court but no order was passed thereon. The appellate court came to the conclusion that there are certain discrepancies in the application and no order for condonation of delay was passed by the court. The statement given by the plaintiff cannot be consi- dered to mean that he has condoned the delay. The fact that the application was made on 6.2 79 and that the suit is continuing since 1976 proves that the intention was not to waive the default by the plaintiff. (3) I have considered over the matter. The statement given by the plaintiff cannot be consi- dered to mean that he has condoned the delay. The fact that the application was made on 6.2 79 and that the suit is continuing since 1976 proves that the intention was not to waive the default by the plaintiff. (3) I have considered over the matter. The plaintiff in his statement has said that his intention was not to waive the default and then said that it was to waive the default and at that time he was confused and therefore such a statement cannot be taken either way. The conclusion which has been arrived at by the first appellate court therefore appears to be in accordance with law. (4) It is further submitted that if there is default it should be deliberate or wilful and for that purpose reliance has been placed on the decision given by this court in the case of Bhagwan Das V.Moorti Mandir Ganeshiji Dhanroopji (1), wherein it was observed that the court should come to the conclusion that the default in complying with the order passed by it under Sec. 13(3) was wilful and contumacious. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Santosh Mehta V.Om Prakash (2) wherein it was observed that failure to pay the rent coupled with defiance of gross negligence on the part of tenant must exist. It may be observed that this point was not raised either before the trial court or before the first appellate court and therefore it cannot be considered now. It may require the evidence whether default was deliberate or wilful, or simply raising this plea at this stage cannot be allowed. It has been submitted that if there is delay only of one month it should be condoned. Reliance has been placed on the case of Prahlad Kumar and Anr. V. Babulal (3), wherein this court observed that discretion should be exercised by the trial court for condoning the delay, rather than strking off the defence. No general rule can be laid down on this proposition that in every case where there is default in making the payment of rent for one month it has always to be condoned. V. Babulal (3), wherein this court observed that discretion should be exercised by the trial court for condoning the delay, rather than strking off the defence. No general rule can be laid down on this proposition that in every case where there is default in making the payment of rent for one month it has always to be condoned. It is a matter of discretion and if discretion has not been exercised in favour of the tenant then it was for the tenant to plead it before the first appellate court or even before the trial court as to what was the reason for condoning the delay. For the purpose of raising this argument it has to be established as to whether there were sufficient reasons and for that purpose the evidence has to come on record. The appellate court has examined this issue and found that the application and affidavits submitted are contradictory. The fact of death of mother-in-law on 27.1.1978 was admitted, but it was found that the cutting in the dates shows that the affidavit cannot be relied upon. In other words the first appellate court has come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable cause for condoning the delay and in such a situation I do not consider that it is proper for this court to interfere. (5) In Manju Chowdhary V. Dulal Kumar Chandra (4) it was observed by the Apex Court that there is a duty cast on the court to strike out the defence of there is a failure if the tenant to deposit arrears of rent within 15 days. In this case the default was of about 5 days only . (6) Last contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the provisions of Sec. 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 are directory and not mandatory as has been held by a full Bench of this Court in the case of Vishandas V.Savitri Devi. (5). So far as this question is concerned, I do not feel that it comes out of the present appeal or was raised either before the trial court or first appellate court. Even if it is considered that it is a pure question of law , it has no relevance to the controversy involved in the present appeal. (5). So far as this question is concerned, I do not feel that it comes out of the present appeal or was raised either before the trial court or first appellate court. Even if it is considered that it is a pure question of law , it has no relevance to the controversy involved in the present appeal. The dispute was only with regard to the point whether the withdrawal of money by the plaintiff amounted to waiver. On this point since it has been held that it does not amount to waiver, the question whether the provisions are directory or mandatory was of no consequence. (7) Consequently the appeal has no froce. It is hereby dismissed .