U. L. BHATT C. J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED 2 to 7 (respondents 2 to 7) were tried for offences punishable under sections 147, 450 and 323 I. P. C. and the first respondent (first accused) was tried for offences punishable under Sections 307 and 148 I. P. C. The Sessions Court acquitted them. The de-facto complainant (PW 5) has filed revision. State has filed appeal against acquittal. De-facto complainant PW 5 and the accused have today tiled a petition setting out that they have settled the dispute and praying for confirming the acquittal and for grant of permission for compounding the offences. Offences under Sections 147, 148, 450 and 307 I. P. C. are non-compoundable and the question of Court granting permission to compound does not arise. Learned Counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on a decision of the learned Single Judge reported in Natthu Khan v. State of M. P. , where relying on the decision in Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, learned Single Judge accorded permission to compound offence under Section 326 I. P. C. holding that offence under Section 307 I. P. C. has not been made out. ( 2 ) IN Mahesh Chandts case, the Supreme Court as a matter of fact accorded permission to compound offence punishable under Section 307 I. P. C. The fact that the Supreme Court has done so is no reason to hold that the High Court has jurisdiction to do so. Supreme Court may have plenary jurisdiction to pass such orders as are deemed fit in the interest of justice. ( 3 ) THE Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, considered the powers of the Supreme Court under Art. 142 of the Constitution in the face of limitation on the power of terminating pending proceedings under Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr. P. C. It is observed in paragraph 43 as follows: we agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Art. 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings aro concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 Cr. P. C. or an of them put together. The power under Art. 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. P. C. or an of them put together. The power under Art. 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facro, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Art. 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statute of the authority or the Court on which conferment of powers limited in some appropriate way is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Art. 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Art. 142 and in assessing the needs of Tcomplete justice of a cause or matter, the Apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Art. 142, but only to what is or is not Tcomplete justice of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise. ( 4 ) IN State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar the Supreme Court had occasion to consider amplitude of the power of the Supreme Court under Art. 141 or 142 of the Constitution in comparison to the power of the High Court under Art. 226. The matter was considered in the context of the submission made in some cases that the Supreme Court had issued directions for absorption of temporary and ad-huc Government servants on permanent basis and, therefore, the High Court could issue similar directions. The Supreme Court rejected the contention in the following words: a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. The Supreme Court rejected the contention in the following words: a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. It has to be presumed that for special grounds which must have been available to the temporary employees in those cases, they were not entitled to the relief granted. It is, therefore, futile to suggest that if this Court has issued an order which apparently seems to be similar to the impugned order, the High Court can also do so. There is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. The Constitution has, by Art. 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition is circumscribed by the limitations discussed cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge. ( 5 ) SECTION 320 Cr. P. C. deals with compounding of offences under Indian Penal Code. Sub-section (6) specifically states that the High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its statutory power of revision under Section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section. Section 320 basically deals with the right of a person to compound certain offences specified therein. Right conferred in regard to sub-section (I) is unlimited in the sense that permission of the Court is unnecessary. The right to compound in regard to offences under sub-section (2) is limited in the sense that the person can compound the offence only with the permission of the Court. The conviction of the Criminal Court, under subsection (1) is merely to record the compounding and order consequential disposal. The function of the Criminal Court under sub-section (2) is to decide whether permission could be accorded or not in the facts and circumstances of the case and pass consequential order. The conviction of the Criminal Court, under subsection (1) is merely to record the compounding and order consequential disposal. The function of the Criminal Court under sub-section (2) is to decide whether permission could be accorded or not in the facts and circumstances of the case and pass consequential order. ( 6 ) THE jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure either in revision or appeal and the restrictions imposed on the power of Criminal Court in the matter of granting permission to compound is as much applicable to the Court of Magistrate and Court of Sessions Judge as to the High Court. To say that the Supreme Court in a given case, adopted a particular course of action is one thing; to say that the High Court or even an inferior Criminal Court can do what ever the Supreme Court did is quite a different thing. The jurisdiction of the High Court should be traced to some provision of the Code of criminal Procedure. Under the scheme of Section 320, no person has right to compound any offence not specifically mentioned therein. I am, therefore, unable to consider the decision of the learned, Single Judge in Natthu Khans case as laying down a binding precedent. ( 7 ) I have heard learned Counsel for the parties on merits. According to the prosecution case as unfolded before the Trial Court, at about 8. 30 a. m. on 22. 11. 85, the seven accused armed with weapons trespassed into the house of PW 5. PW 7 wife of PW 5 was in inner courtyard while PW 5 was inside the room having breakfast: All the accused persons entered the room, 7th accused caught hold PW 5, 2nd accused gave a lathi blow to PW 5, first accused with a sword aimed a cut on the neck which PW 5 tried to ward off with his hand and sustained two injuries on the hand. First accused again gave a cut on the elbow and according to the version given in Court, when PW 7 came out on hearing the commotion, first accused with a sword inflicted a cut injury on her. All the remaining accused assaulted both the victims with lathis and stones. First accused again gave a cut on the elbow and according to the version given in Court, when PW 7 came out on hearing the commotion, first accused with a sword inflicted a cut injury on her. All the remaining accused assaulted both the victims with lathis and stones. ( 8 ) THE above version was sought to be supported by the injured PW 5 and PW 7 and neighbouring eye-witnesses PW s 8, 10 and 11. PW 6 the Doctor who examined the injured persons on the same day found three lacerated injuries on PW 5 and four incised injuries on PW 7. The injuries were simple. ( 9 ) THE earliest version is one given in the FIR. The FIR stated that when PW 7 was outside the house about to can her children, the seven accused armed with weapons entered the house and assaulted PW 5. Before this, first accused chased PW 7 asking her to stop and telling her that he would deal with her. She ran inside the house shouting and was dilly assaulted. ( 10 ) IT can be seen that even regarding the origin of the occurrence, the version given by the witnesses in Court is different from the version given in the FIR. According to PW 5 and PW 7, the latter was assaulted outside the house and PW 5 was assaulted inside the house, while according to neighbours, both were assaulted inside the house. It is inexplicable how the neigbbours from outside could see any incident happening inside the room of a house. If the prosecution version is true, PW 5 must have sustained three incised injuries inflicted with the sword but the doctor is definite that he had only lacerated injuries. ( 11 ) FOR these and other reasons, learned Sessions Judge who considered the evidence and circumstances at considerable length food it not possible to act on the prosecution testimony and acquitted the accused giving them benefit of doubt. I have been taken through the important parts of evidence and having considered the same, I am unable to hold that the learned Sessions Judge ignored any material part of evidence or that the view taken by him is perverse of unreasonable so as to call for interference. ( 12 ) I find no reason to interfere and accordingly dismiss the revision and the appeal. Appeal dismissed. .