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1995 DIGILAW 65 (CAL)

Birendra Nath Jha v. Coal India Ltd.

1995-02-13

GITESH RANJAN BHATTACHARJEE

body1995
JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– This is a writ petition regarding fixation of seniority of the petitioner in service vis-a-vis the seniority of the private respondent No.7. The respondent No.2 Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. is a subsidiary of respondent No. 1, Coal India Limited and is also a Government company According to the averments made in the writ petition the writ petitioner is working under the Central Coalfields Limited in the position of Additional Chief Personnel Manager which is Grade M2 post and the respondent No.7 Sri S. K. Singh is holding the post of the Chief Personnel Manager under the Central Coalfields Limited. The petitioner and the respondent No.7 both are governed in respect of the service matters by the Common Coal Cadre framed by Coal India Limited. The petitioner's contention is that the petitioner joined the East India Coal Company in 1962, that is, before nationalisation as Labour Welfare Officer and on 17.11.71 after the formation of the Organisation for the Management of Coking Coal Mines which took over the mines of the said company, the petitioner was taken over and became an employee of the said Organisation. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that on 1.7.72 the petitioner was appointed by the respondent No.2, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (HCCL) as Personnel Officer at its headquarters in the scale of Rs. 400-1250. It is also the case of the petitioner that on 20.4.72 the said respondent No. 2 published an advertisement for the recruitment of Personnel Officer in the same scale 400-1250 and pursuant to the said advertisement and after interview three persons including the respondent No.7 were given appointment and the respondent No.7 joined the service on 6.12.72 as Personnel Officer, but suddenly thereafter within a period of six months the respondent No.7 (and two others who are no more in service) were promoted to the post of Sr. Personnel Officer and placed in a higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect from the date when they initially joined the service on 6.12.72. It is also the contention of the petitioner that such promotion was given to the respondent No.7 without following proper procedure and without the formation of any Departmental Promotional Committee. Personnel Officer and placed in a higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect from the date when they initially joined the service on 6.12.72. It is also the contention of the petitioner that such promotion was given to the respondent No.7 without following proper procedure and without the formation of any Departmental Promotional Committee. It is the further contention of the petitioner that by such discriminatory action on the part of the authorities concerned the respondent No.7 was given a higher scale of pay and a higher post ignoring the seniority of the petitioner in service. The petitioner made representation to the concerned authority demanding justice in the matter and on consideration of the said representation the petitioner was given the higher scale of pay of Rs. 800-1250 but not from the date on which respondent No.7 was given that scale, namely, 6.12.72 and rather from a subsequent date, namely, 31.12.73 which is resented by the petitioner as highly discriminatory. It is also the contention of the petitioner that thereafter also the petitioner get promotion in the usual manner but at every stage of promotion he was made junior to the respondent No.7 and the petitioner made representation against such injustice but nothing was done except giving assurance. 2. On 7.12.84 the petitioner made a representation through proper channel to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Bharat Coking Coal Limited stating inter alia that his seniority had been fixed wrongly. That representation of the petitioner dated the 7th December, 1984 for fixation of proper seniority was forwarded by the Director (Personnel), Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) to the Director (Personnel), Coal India Limited under a forwarding letter dated the 27th November, 1985 which along with the said representation of the petitioner dated the 7th December, 1984 has been collectively marked as Annexure-A to the writ petition. I am given to understand that at the time when the petitioner made the said representation in December 1984 he was enjoying the Grade E-5. As I could understand, at the time when the petitioner was appointed on 1st July, 1972 be was given Grade E-2. In the said forwarding letter dated the 27th November, 1985 the Director (Personnel), Bharat Coking Coal Limited supported the claim of the petitioner. As I could understand, at the time when the petitioner was appointed on 1st July, 1972 be was given Grade E-2. In the said forwarding letter dated the 27th November, 1985 the Director (Personnel), Bharat Coking Coal Limited supported the claim of the petitioner. I am told that the respondent No. 7 was promoted to Grade E-6 on 19th December, 1985 whereas the petitioner was promoted to the said Grade on 25th November, 1986 and that the respondent No. 7 was promoted to the post of Additional Chief Personnel Manager in Grade E-7 on 24th April, 1989 and then to the post of Chief Personnel Manager in Grade E-8 on 24th March, 1993 whereas the petitioner was promoted to Grade E-7 on 30th July, 1991 and then placed in Grade E-8 on 1st April, 1993. In paragraph 14 of the writ petition it is stated that the post of Additional Chief Personnel Manager is in Grade E-7 and the post of Chief Personnel Manager is in Grade E-8 and that by a circular these two grades, that is, E-7 and E-8 were merged and a new grade was formed as M2. From paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition it would appear that the Grade M2 was formed with effect from 1st April, 1993. As we have already noted the respondent No.7 was promoted on 24th March, 1993 to E-8 Grade since converted to M2 Grade by merger with E-7. The petitioner was placed in the M2 Grade with effect from 1st April, 1993, that is, the date on which both the Grades E-7 and E-8 merged to form the Grade M2. It is the contention of the petitioner that before the respondent No.7 was promoted to the rank of the Chief Personnel Manager in Grade E-8 the respondent No.5 Director (Personnel), BCCL wrote a letter to the Director (P & IR), Coal India Limited, Annexure-B to the writ petition, forwarding therewith a self-contained note, as desired by the latter, on the representation of the writ petitioner and eight others. In that note the Director (Personnel), BCCL seems to have recommended in favour of the writ petitioner and eight others for re-examination and re-fixation of seniority of the petitioner and eight others vis-a-vis the respondent No.7 as per the rule of the Company. In that note the Director (Personnel), BCCL seems to have recommended in favour of the writ petitioner and eight others for re-examination and re-fixation of seniority of the petitioner and eight others vis-a-vis the respondent No.7 as per the rule of the Company. It is also the contention of the petitioner in paragraph 16 of the writ petition that after receiving the said letter and note the respondent No.4. Director (Personnel), Coal India Limited, formed a committee for examining and considering the representation of the petitioner and eight others by an office memorandum dated 16th/18th July, 1991. It is also the contention of the writ petitioner that as the said Committee, however, did not meet a Second Committee was formed consisting of Sri Ramesh Kr. Mehta, Director (Personnel), ECL, Sri P. C. Haridas, Director (Finance), N. C. L. and Md. Jamaluddin, CGM (M.P. & I.R., C.I.L. Calcutta) by office order dated the 18th January, 1993 and that the said Committee held their meeting on 23rd April, 1993 and submitted the report after a long time recommending for notional seniority of the petitioner. It is also the case of the petitioner that the said recommendation was duly processed and forwarded to the respondent No.3 Chairman, Coal India Limited but when the entire question of fixation of seniority was pending the respondents suddenly fixed a date for interview for promotion to the post of the Chief General Manager (Personnel). It is alleged that the persons called for interview were Sri S. N. Mishra, General Manager (Personnel) BCCL, (2) S. K. Mishra, General Manager (Personnel) S.E.C.L. (3) S.J. Singh, General Manager (Personnel) ECL and the respondent No.7 General Manager (Personnel) C.C.L. The interview was however not held on that date due to some administrative reasons and the date for interview was again fixed on 14th May, 1994. It may be noted here that the post for which the interview had been fixed was in Grade M3 and the interview was scheduled for promotion from Grade M2 to M3. It is the contention of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 and those others who have been called for the said interview are all in the rank of M2 but the petitioner has not been called for that interview although his juniors have been called. It is the contention of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 and those others who have been called for the said interview are all in the rank of M2 but the petitioner has not been called for that interview although his juniors have been called. Being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the concerned respondents to refix his seniority over the seniority of the respondent No.7 and for denial of opportunity to appeal in the interview for promotion to Grade M3, the petitioner has filed this writ petition on 6th June, 1994. On 13th June, 1994 this court give direction for affidavits and also passed an interim order to the effect that any appointment to the post of the Chief General Manager (Personnel) during the pendency of this writ application shall be subject to the result of the writ application. The respondent No.7 has been given promotion to Grade M3 on 29.6.94 during the pendency of the writ petition. Then the petitioner again moved this court in the proceeding as the respondent No.7 was going to be considered for appointment to the still higher post of Director (Personnel), and accordingly, on 28th July, 1994 the court after hearing both sides issued another direction that any appointment to the post of the Director (Personnel) during the pendency of this writ application shall be subject to the result of this writ application. 3. One of the main grounds on which the writ petition has been resisted on behalf of the contesting respondents is the ground of delay in filing the writ petition, as canvassed by the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 at the time of hearing. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the writ petitioner is aggrieved by fixation of seniority dating as far back as 1972 and he has filed this writ petition only in 1994. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the writ petitioner is aggrieved by fixation of seniority dating as far back as 1972 and he has filed this writ petition only in 1994. On the other hand it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that delay in filing the writ petition is not fatal for this writ petition because of the distinguishing feature of this case that in view of the representation of the petitioner and the recommendation of the BCCL authorities thereon the respondent No.4, Director Personnel, Coal India Ltd. formed a Committee consisting of high officials for examining the matter and the Committee also submitted a report in the matter in 1993 recommending fixation of notional seniority of the petitioner. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that since the respondent No.3 Chairman, Coal India Limited has not taken any decision on the report submitted by the said Committee and, pending the fixation of seniority, the authorities concerned have suddenly fixed interview of certain persons including the respondent No.7 but excluding the petitioner for promotion to the post of the Chief General Manager (Personnel) in Grade M3, the petitioner has been constrained to file the present writ petition. The contesting respondents have however in their affidavit-in-opposition taken the plea that the report of the Committee has no binding effect. The fact however remains that a Committee was appointed for the purpose of examining the representation of the petitioner and in course of time the Committee submitted the report. But them at the same time, it has to be noted that the question of disturbing the existing position of the writ petitioner qua respondent No.7 in the matter of seniority will arise only if it is found that the seniority fixed in favour of the respondent No. 7 qua the petitioner as far back as in 1973 is liable to be disturbed now. Without disturbing the seniority position of the petitioner qua the respondent No.7 as it was in 1973 the question of altering the seniority of the petitioner qua the respondent No.7 at any subsequent stage till today cannot arise. Rightly or wrongly the respondent No. 7 was placed sometime in 1973 in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with effect horn 6.12.72, although initially the respondent No.7 was given the scale of Rs. Rightly or wrongly the respondent No. 7 was placed sometime in 1973 in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with effect horn 6.12.72, although initially the respondent No.7 was given the scale of Rs. 400-1250 when be joined on 6th December, 1972 and when the petitioner was already enjoying the scale of Rs. 400-1250 with effect from 1st July, 1972. The petitioner's contention is that although on point of joining date he was senior to the respondent No.7 in the scale of Rs. 400-1250, the authorities concerned, by placing the petitioner subsequently in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect from the initial date of joining of the respondent No. 7 but without giving the said scale yet to the petitioner, acted arbitrarily and with hostile discrimination thereby unduly making the respondent No.7 senior in the grade of Rs. 800-1250 to the petitioner who was subsequently given that grade. That precisely is the sore point of the writ petitioner. 4. The inception of the petitioner's grievance has been marked in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the writ petition. It is this that the petitioner joined the grade of Rs. 400-1250 on 1.7.72 whereas the respondent No.7 joined that grade subsequently on 6.12.72, but within a period of six months the respondent No.7 and some other officers were placed in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect from 6.12.72 without the petitioner being placed in that grade at that time although he was senior to them so far as joining date in the grade of Rs. 400-1250 was concerned. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the alleged discrimination on the part of the authorities concerned and made a representation demanding justice, as has been staled in paragraph 11 of the writ petition. In Paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is stated that the said representation was considered and the petitioner was given higher scale of pay of Rs. 800-1250 with effect from 31.12.73 and not from any earlier date. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is also stated that since the petitioner was given the higher scale of Rs. 800-1250 with effect from 31.12.73 and not from the date from which the respondent No.7 and two other officers were given that scale the discrimination and mala fide acts on the part of the respondents continued. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition it is also stated that since the petitioner was given the higher scale of Rs. 800-1250 with effect from 31.12.73 and not from the date from which the respondent No.7 and two other officers were given that scale the discrimination and mala fide acts on the part of the respondents continued. In Paragraph 13 of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner got promotion thereafter in the usual manner but at every stage of promotion he was made junior to the respondent No.7 and the petitioner made representation against this injustice but nothing was done except giving assurance and that on 7.12.84 the petitioner made a representation through proper channel to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, BCCL stating inter alia that his seniority had been fixed wrongly, etc. The said representation of the petitioner dated 7.12.84 is a part or Annexure-A to the writ petition and the same was forwarded to the Director (Personnel), Coal India Limited by the Director (Personnel), BCCL under a forwarding letter dated 27.11.85 which also forms part of Annexure-A to the writ petition. The said forwarding letter virtually contained a recommendation in favour of the petitioner. There is nothing on record to show that in between 31.12.73 and 7.12.84 the petitioner submitted any written representation regarding his seniority. 5. One thing is clear that being aggrieved by the act of placement of the respondent No.7 in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect from 6.12.72 without the petitioner also being placed in the said grade, the petitioner indeed promptly made a representation to the concerned authority. It also appears that the authorities concerned considered his representation and disposed of the same by giving relief by placing him in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 with effect from 31.12.73. It is therefore clear that the authorities concerned considered the representation of the petitioner as far back as in 1973 regarding his grievance, at the point of its inception, for not being placed in the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 although the respondent No. 7 had been placed in that grade with retrospective effect. It is also clear that on consideration of his representation in the matter the authorities concerned gave the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 although the respondent No. 7 had been placed in that grade with retrospective effect. It is also clear that on consideration of his representation in the matter the authorities concerned gave the higher grade of Rs. 800-1250 to the petitioner with effect from 31.12.73 hut turned down his representation for being placed in the said grade from the date on which respondent No.7 was placed in that grade or from any anterior date. It is therefore crystal clear that rightly or wrongly the authorities concerned considered the grievance of the petitioner at the point of its inception as far back as in 1973 and also granted him certain relief but refused to grant him such relief as could or would have given him seniority over respondent No.7 in the grade of Rs. 800-1250. Therefore, it is not that the petitioner's representation or grievance went unattended or was not considered or disposed of by the authorities concerned at the time when such grievance was raised. Rather they disposed of the same promptly and gave the petitioner certain relief but refused to give him the entire relief which would have placed him in a position senior to the respondent No.7 in the said grade of Rs. 800-1250. 6. In this perspective the question which poses presently is whether the petitioner can agitate the same matter now in Court by this writ petition in the year 1994, that is, 21 years after the matter was dealt with and disposed of by the authorities concerned. The Paragraph 12 of the writ petition indicates that he was not fully satisfied about the manner in which his representation was disposed of by the authorities concerned in or about 1973. Thereafter a long period of 11 years rolled away and in the meantime the petitioner, the respondent No.7 and others got promotions in successive grades at different times, but the petitioner did nothing effective to press his grievance, or was lulled by ineffective assurances. Then the petitioner submitted his representation dated the 7th December, 1984, vide Annexure-A to the writ petition. Nearly one year elapsed thereafter. Then the petitioner's said representation dated the 7th December, 1984 was forwarded by the Director (Personnel), BCCL to the Director (Personnel), CIL under the forwarding letter dated the 27th November, 1985, Annexure-A to the writ petition containing recommendation in favour of the petitioner. Nearly one year elapsed thereafter. Then the petitioner's said representation dated the 7th December, 1984 was forwarded by the Director (Personnel), BCCL to the Director (Personnel), CIL under the forwarding letter dated the 27th November, 1985, Annexure-A to the writ petition containing recommendation in favour of the petitioner. Even thereafter the petitioner and the respondent No.7 and others moved upward along the ladder of promotions to successive grades on different dates. Ultimately the respondent No. 1 formed a Committee by an order dated 18.1.93 and the said Committee held meeting on 23.4.93 and recommended fixation of national seniority of the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that instead of considering that report the authorities concerned proceeded to consider the respondent No.7 for promotion to Grade M3, and that is why ultimately the petitioner filed the writ petition on the 6th June, 1994. The fact however remains that the question of re-fixing the seniority in Grade M2 is inextricably linked up with the question of seniority position of the concerned incumbents at all earlier stages upto the basis seniority in the Grade of Rs. 800-1250 (E3). It may be noticed that even in the representation dated the 7th December, 1984 the petitioner did not press for seniority above the respondent No.7 and rather pressed for being placed at least at par with the concerned officers (including the respondent No.7). As it appears from a copy of the report placed before me, the Committee in their report dated 12.11.93 has recommended that since a long period has in the meantime passed it is not possible to re-fix seniority now from such a long anterior date and that seniority of the writ petitioner and another in the Grade M2 may be re-fixed at par with the respondent No.7. The petitioner's contention therefore does not seem to be correct that the Committee recommended for re-fixation of the seniority of the petitioner above the respondent No.7. However, the recommendation of the Committee also, it may be appreciated, does not serve any practical purpose which I shall discuss later. The petitioner's contention therefore does not seem to be correct that the Committee recommended for re-fixation of the seniority of the petitioner above the respondent No.7. However, the recommendation of the Committee also, it may be appreciated, does not serve any practical purpose which I shall discuss later. The long delay of 21 years in filing this writ petition for getting his seniority re-fixed is indeed a stumbling-block for the petitioner and this stumbling-block cannot be overcome by the petitioner by relying on the fact that the Committee appointed in 1993 re-examined the matter and submitted a report recommending for placing him at par with the respondent No. 7 in respect of seniority in Grade M2 or that in 1985 the petitioner's case was recommended by the Director (Personnel), BCCL. The spell of recommendations for eight long years from 1985 to 1993 is indeed too long a period to justify or condone a delay of 21 years in approaching the Court. 7. On point of delay the learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred to the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in (1) A. Sagaya Nathan v. Divnl Personnel Officer, Southern Railway, AIR 1991 SC 424 . In that case the complaint of the appellants was that they were still not promoted to the higher post although their juniors had been promoted as early as May 1983 and that the appellants had not been considered for promotion. Promotion to the higher post was governed by the rule of seniority. The tribunal found that the appellants were too late in agitating their grievance and it was solely on the basis of the delay that the tribunal did not enter on the merits of the appellants' complaint. It was the contention of the respondent that the juniors were promoted for justifiable reasons. 'Having heard counsel on both sides and perused the records' the Supreme Court was of the view that despite the delay this was a matter which required investigation and accordingly inter alia directed the tribunal to rehear the parties. On the basis of this decision of the Supreme Court it is argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that for delay alone the writ petition cannot be rejected. On the basis of this decision of the Supreme Court it is argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that for delay alone the writ petition cannot be rejected. In this connection it is however to be noticed that in the said decision the Supreme Court does not lay down any general principle regarding delay nor does the decision purport to lay down any principle of law deviating from the law of the point earlier decided by the Supreme Court. The said decision of the Supreme Court is rather confined to its own facts. The decision also docs not purport to project any ratio decidendi. That being so that decision is confined to its own facts and this has been made clear by the Supreme Court in observing that having heard counsel on both the sides and perused the records the Court was of the view, that despite the delay, that was a matter which required investigation. Now as the said decision of the Supreme Court is confined to its own facts and does not project any ratio decidendi we are bound to take notice of the other Supreme Court decisions on the point. It is also to be noticed that in the said case juniors were given promotion over seniors in service and that was not a matter for fixation of seniority as it is in our present case. In (2) M. L. Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1269 the Supreme Court had to deal with the question of seniority in service. There the seniority of the petitioner qua respondents Nos. 4 to 26 was determined as long age as 1956 in accordance with 1952 Rules. The said seniority was reiterated in the seniority list issued in 1958, the writ petition under consideration before the Supreme Court was filed in 1971. The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the petitioner could not be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years and that the fact that a seniority list was issued in 1971 in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Karnik's case, AIR 1970 SC 2092 would not clothe the petitioner with a fresh right to challenge the fixation of his seniority qua respondents Nos. 4 to 26 as the seniority list of 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner qua these respondents as already determined in 1956. In the said decision in M. L. Cecil D'Souza (supra) the Supreme Court observed thus:–– "Satisfactory service conditions postulates that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved with an administrative decision affecting one's seniority should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over matter. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress." 8. In our present case also the petitioner's representation regarding his seniority qua respondent No.7 at the very initial stage was disposed of by the authorities concerned as far as back as in 1973 and thereafter officers advanced their service careers through different promotional stages and the writ petitioner did not approach this Court before 1994, that is, till 21 years after the matter was dealt with and disposed of by the authorities concerned. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the said decision of M. L. Cecil D'Souza in paragraph 9 thereof is also very illuminating :–– "9. Although seniority of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that the matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Baking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. Baking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of sometime." The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of our present case. It may be mentioned here that the said decision of the Supreme Court in M. L. Cecil D'Souza (supra) was rendered by a four Judge Bench. 9. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner made representations and ultimately in 1991 the authorities concerned constituted a Committee for considering the question of re-fixation of seniority and in that background delay cannot be a ground for rejecting the present application. This also does not seem to be a good execute. As we have seen for long years from the end of 1973 till the end of 1984 the petitioner did not take any effective steps except submitting representation, if at all, about his grievance regarding seniority after his representation regarding his grievance was disposed of by the authorities concerned in 1973 and even then from 1984 again to 1994 another 10 or 11 years rolled by but he did not approach the Court for redress although the officers concerned had in the meantime traversed upward journey in the promotional channel through different grades. In (4) Gian Singh v. P. & H. High Court, AIR 1980 SC 1894 it has been observed by the Supreme Court thus in paragraph 3 :–– "3. The writ petition was filed in this Court in 1978, about 11 years after the dates from which the promotions are claimed. There is no valid explanation for the delay. That the petitioner was making successive representations during this period can hardly justify our overlooking the inordinate delay. Relief must be refused on that ground. It is not necessary, in the circumstances, to consider the further submission of the respondents that............ " In (5) G. C. Gupta v. N. K. Pandey, AIR 1988 SC 654 it has been observed thus in paragraphs 15 and 16:–– "15. * * * * It cannot be doubted that an unlimited and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder, sense of insecurity and uncertainty. " In (5) G. C. Gupta v. N. K. Pandey, AIR 1988 SC 654 it has been observed thus in paragraphs 15 and 16:–– "15. * * * * It cannot be doubted that an unlimited and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder, sense of insecurity and uncertainty. May be, there may have been isolated cases of hardship but there must be some reservation about limitation on the Court's power in the public interest. Obvious considerations of public policy make it a first importance that the person aggrieved must take action requisite effectively to assert his right to that end so that if the contention can be justified, the Government service may be disturbed as little as possible. "16. Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration it be so minded not to unsettle settled things * * * *". 10. In our present case also the petitioner's grievance regarding placement of the respondent No. 7 above him in the grade of Rs. 800-1250 was dealt with and disposed of by the concerned authorities as far back as in 1973 and there is no justifiable ground for reopening that question now in this writ petition after a lapse of 21 years, in spite of the fact that during these 21 years the petitioner might have submitted some representations and the authorities might have appointed a Committee in 1991 or 1993. The ground of delay in filing the present writ petition is a major road block for which this writ petition in view of the authorities of the Supreme Court decisions discussed above has to be dismissed. 11. I have already mentioned that the Committee that was appointed in 1993 to examine the question of re-fixation of the seniority prepared its report on 12.11.93 as has been submitted at the time of hearing. During the hearing of the writ petition a copy of the report also has been placed before me. This report seems to have bodily quoted the contents of the paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the self-contained note prepared and forwarded by the Director (personnel), BCCL to the Director (P&IR) C.I.L. in the year 1991 (vide, Annexure-D to the writ petition). This report seems to have bodily quoted the contents of the paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the self-contained note prepared and forwarded by the Director (personnel), BCCL to the Director (P&IR) C.I.L. in the year 1991 (vide, Annexure-D to the writ petition). In this self-contained note as well as in the said report of the Committee it is stated infer alia that there is nothing on record to show if the placement of Sri S. K. Singh (the respondent No.7) and six others in the scale of Rs. 800-1250 with retrospective effect was as per rule of the Company. Thus it appears that the complete records could not be made available for the preparation of the self-contained note as well as of the report of the Committee. It is nothing unlikely that it may not be possible to readily trace out the appropriate records for having complete picture of the matter after a lapse of two decades. Having regard to the state of records, on merit also this Court does not feel inspired to mandate a re-investigation into the matter in respect of the stale claim of seniority. 12. Now even assuming that the fixation of the petitioner's seniority in the grade of Rs. 800-1250 in the year 1973 was wrong and unjustified yet the question still remains as to what relief this Court can grant to the petitioner on this writ petition. The Committee also found the matter not free from difficulties and that is why it recommended for notional seniority of the petitioner at par with the respondent No.7 in the Grade M2 and not above the respondent No.7. Let us pose a question as to what effective purpose, by such notional fixation of seniority in Grade M2, can be served. We have seen that the petitioner was promoted to the Grade B-7 on 30.7.91 and was then placed in Grade B-8 on 1.4.93 on which date both the Grades E-7 and E-8 were merged to form a new Grade M2. On the other hand the respondent No.7 was promoted to Grade E-7 on 24.4.89 and to B-8 on 24.3.93. He has since been promoted to Grade M3 on 29.6.94, of course during the pendency of the writ petition. On the other hand the respondent No.7 was promoted to Grade E-7 on 24.4.89 and to B-8 on 24.3.93. He has since been promoted to Grade M3 on 29.6.94, of course during the pendency of the writ petition. Now apart from the question of seniority of the petitioner the question still remains whether on 29.6.94, the date on which the respondent No.7 was promoted to Grade M3, the petitioner was qualified for consideration for such promotion to Grade M3, so that it could be said that the petitioner also should have been considered for promotion to Grade M3 along with the respondent No.7. In this connection the learned Advocate for the petitioner attracted my attention to paragraph 4.7 (c) of the Common Coal Cadre which governs inter alia the matters of promotion from one grade to another. It is the case of the contesting respondents that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. C.I.L. being the cadre controlling authority had decided that executives who were in E-8 grade on 1st April, 1993 and had put in two years of service in E-8 grade are eligible for being considered for promotion to M3 grade and that the executives who were in E-8 grade as on 1st April, 1993 but had not completed two years of service in E-8 grade should also be considered if such executives had completed a combined service of five) ears in Grades E-7 and E-8 taken together. Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition is the text of the said decision of the Chairman, C.I.L. It is the contention of the respondents that since the petitioner did not complete two years of service in Grade E-8 nor did he complete a combined service of five years in Grades E-7 and E-8 taken together, he was not yet eligible in terms of the aforesaid decision of the Chairman, C.I.L. for being considered for promotion to Grade M3 when the respondent No.7 was considered and promoted to the said Grade M3 on 29.6.94. 13. Rule 4.7(c) of the Common Coal Cadre deals with eligibility norms for promotion. Rule 4.7(c) provides that unless otherwise stipulated in the relevant cadre schemes, an executive has to put in a minimum of three years service in a particular grade before he becomes eligible for consideration for promotion to the next higher grade. 13. Rule 4.7(c) of the Common Coal Cadre deals with eligibility norms for promotion. Rule 4.7(c) provides that unless otherwise stipulated in the relevant cadre schemes, an executive has to put in a minimum of three years service in a particular grade before he becomes eligible for consideration for promotion to the next higher grade. Rule 4.7(c) however provides that 'any relaxation, either in the minimum length of service or minimum qualification, shall be only with the specific written approval of the cadre controlling authority'. Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Coal India Limited is the cadre controlling authority for promotion to the concerned grades. It is the contention of the contesting respondents that Chairman-cum-Managing Director, C.I.L. in exercise of his power as cadre controlling authority decided to follow the above mentioned criteria for promotion to M3 grade and according to that criteria the petitioner not having completed a combined service of five years jointly in Grades E-7 and E-8 was not yet entitled to be considered for promotion to Grade M3. That the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, C.I.L. is the cadre controlling authority in respect of this matter is not disputed. It is however submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, firstly, that the cadre controlling authority can only accord approval regarding any relaxation of the minimum length of service but he cannot himself take a decision in the matter. This, in my opinion cannot be the correct view. What can be validly done with the approval of the cadre controlling authority can also be done if it is required by the cadre controlling authority to be so done, particularly where the rule does not require that any proposal has to be initiated by any specified authority and has to be approved by a different authority. 14. Secondly, it has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that rule 4.7(c) of the Common Coal Cadre speaks of relaxation of service norms which, according to him, means relaxation in individual case and not relaxation in general. I however find it difficult to subscribe to this view, unless the rule necessarily restricts the scope of relaxation to only individual cases, the scope of relaxation includes not only relaxation in individual cases but also relaxation for general application. I however find it difficult to subscribe to this view, unless the rule necessarily restricts the scope of relaxation to only individual cases, the scope of relaxation includes not only relaxation in individual cases but also relaxation for general application. Rule 4.7(c) of the Common Coal Cadre does not restrict the scope of relaxation only to individual cases; rather the language used clearly admits relaxation for general application. Thirdly, it has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the text of the decision of the Chairman, C.I.L. Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition provides that the criteria fixed therein for promotion were applicable during 1993. It is submitted that since the promotion of the respondent No.7 took place in 1994 the said criteria were not applicable. This submission also does not seem to be correct, as, from the handwritten endorsement at the bottom of the said document, Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition, it would appear that the said criteria were also made applicable for 1994. Therefore there is no scope of argument that the said decision of the Chairman, C.I.L. regarding criteria was not applicable at the relevant time. But even assuming that the said decision regarding criteria of promotion was not applicable at the relevant time when the respondent No.7 was considered and promoted to Grade M3, yet we will find that the petitioner to be entitled to be considered for promotion to M3 was required under rule 4.7(c) to complete three years of service in the lower grade, namely, Grade M2 in which the combined period of service in the Grades E-7 and E-8 comes under consideration. As we have seen the petitioner was promoted to Grade E-7 on 30.7.91 and was placed in Grade E-8 on 1.4.93 and that being so on 29.6.94 when the respondent No.7 was promoted to Grade M3 the petitioner had not yet completed three years (not even two years) of combined service in Grade M2, that is, Grades E-7 and E-8 considered jointly. Therefore in any view of the matter there was no scope for the writ petitioner to be considered for promotion to Grade M3 on 29.6.94 along with the respondent No.7. Therefore in any view of the matter there was no scope for the writ petitioner to be considered for promotion to Grade M3 on 29.6.94 along with the respondent No.7. Consequently, even if the petitioner is given any notional seniority at par with or above respondent No.7 in Grade M2, that will not by itself entitle the petitioner to have any effective relief in the matter of being considered for promotion to Grade M3 a long with or before respondent No 7. because the petitioner inspite of notional seniority would not have at his credit the qualifying length of service for being considered for promotion to Grade M3 when the respondent No.7 was promoted to that Grade. Consequently, the promotion of the respondent No.7 to grade M3 cannot be resisted or assailed by the petitioner on the ground of refixation of seniority alone. That being so, the writ petition is found liable to be dismissed and the same is dismissed hereby, but without any order as to costs.