JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This appeal is directed against the decree and judgment dated 1-3-1994 passed by Additional District Judge, Mandi whereby the appeal of the appellants-defendants was dismissed and the decree and judgment dated 1-10-1991 of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Joginder Nagar were modified to the extent that the respondent-plaintiff being work-charged retrenched employee, shall be given preference for employment by the appellants-defendants over and above the daily waged employees as and when such a vacancy arises in future. The Sub-Judge had decreed the suit for mandatory injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and against the appellants-defendants directing them to re-employ the respondent-plaintiff as work charged T-Mate in Shanan Power House Circle, Joginder Nagar, District Mandi forthwith. Admittedly, the decree of the Sub-Judge was not executed and the respondent-plaintiff continues to be out of employment. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff was working as a work-charged T-Mate with the appellants-defendants at the Shanan Power House, Joginder Nagar w.e.f. 6-11-1980. He was retrenched on and w. e. f. 30-6-1982 vide order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. P-l. It was mentioned in the order Ex. P-l that he would be given preference/priority as and when recruitment would be made in future, according to the seniority of the retrenched work-charged employees. It is not in dispute that the respondent-plaintiff was at Serial No. 34 in the register of the retrenched employees- Instructions to give preference/priority in giving re employment to the retrenched employees according to their seniority, were also issued by the Secretary, Punjab State Electricity Board vide letter dated 22-6-1983 Ex, P-7. Despite this, the respondent-plaintiff was not given re-employment, though number of persons were employed as T-Mates or as work-charged employees. In these circumstances he filed his suit on 12-9-1989. 3. The appellants-defendants resisted the suit on number of preliminary objections that it was not maintainable in the present form; the respondent-plaintiff has no locus standi as well as cause of action to file it; the Civil Court has no jurisdiction and it was barred by time. In these circumstances he filed his suit on 12-9-1989. 3. The appellants-defendants resisted the suit on number of preliminary objections that it was not maintainable in the present form; the respondent-plaintiff has no locus standi as well as cause of action to file it; the Civil Court has no jurisdiction and it was barred by time. But on merits, it was admitted that they had recruited persons on daily wage basis after the retrenchment of the respondent-plaintiff, who were later on made work charged employees on completion of their 1000 working days as per the instructions dated 30-6-1986 Ex P-4 The respondent-plaintiff filed replication reiterating the allegations made in the plaint and alleging that the preliminary objections were without any substance 4. The trial Court overruled all the preliminary objections and held that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to re-employment as work-charged T-Mate. In the appeal before the Additional District Judge, the appellants-defendants urged two points that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the trial Courts decree and judgment were liable to be set aside on the basis of material on record. Answering these points the Additional District Judge has held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit and the decree and judgment of the trial Court are not liable to be set aside on the basis of material on record, but has modified it to the extent that the respondent plaintiff shall be given preference for re-employment over and above daily waged employees, as and when a vacancy of work-charged employee arises in future. Hence, the present appeal. 5 This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Shri Kuldjp Smgh, learned Counsel for the appellants-defendants, has mainly argued the point that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and has not disputed that as per the stipulations in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. P-l as well as the instructions dated 22-6~i9K3 Ex P-7, the respondent-plaintiff was required to be given re-employment in accordance with the seniority of the retrenched employees before other persons were engaged on daily wage or work-charge. After the retrenchment of the respondent-plaintiff, number of persons were engaged on daily wage and later on brought on work-charged establishment after they had put in 1000 working days following the instructions dated 30-6-1986 Ex. P-4. After the retrenchment of the respondent-plaintiff, number of persons were engaged on daily wage and later on brought on work-charged establishment after they had put in 1000 working days following the instructions dated 30-6-1986 Ex. P-4. Therefore, had the respondent-plaintiff been re-employed as daily wager, he would have also been brought on work-charged establishment alongwith others. In the alternative, he was required to be re-employed as work-charged employee in accordance with the seniority before any daily waged employee was brought on work-charged establishment. Therefore, the only question for determination for this Court is that whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction or not. 6. Shri Kuldip Singh has vehemently urged that the dispute raised in his suit by the respondent-plaintiff is an industrial dispute, which cannot be entertained by the Civil Court and the remedy lies under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). For making his submissions, he has relied upon the judgments in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke and others, AIR 1975 SC 2238; Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co, and another, AIR 1990 SC 255 and Regional Manager S. B. I. and another v. Ajay Sharma, 1994 (1) Sim LC 377. On the other hand, Shri Deepak Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has supported the impugned decree and judgment and urged that the Civil Court can entertain the dispute raised by the respondent-plaintiff in his suit. 7. After giving its best consideration to the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that there is a substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellants-defendants. Admittedly, the dispute raised in his Civil Suit by the respondent-plaintiff pertains to his re-employment as work-charged employee in accordance with the seniority of the retrenched employees at the time of making appointments on work-charged establishment by the appellants-defendants in Shanan Power House Circle after his retrenchment w. e. f. 30-61982. Though the respondent-plaintiff has based his claim on the stipulations mentioned in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. Though the respondent-plaintiff has based his claim on the stipulations mentioned in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. P-l and the instructions dated 22-6-1983 Ex, P-7, yet his right as workman flows from section 25-H of the Act, which provides as under :— “Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity (to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen) who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.” Once it is held that the dispute raised in the suit relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the respondent-plaintiff is to get an adjudication under the Act, By now, law in this regard has been settled by the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke and others and Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Ms, Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and another (supra). In the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd, after considering the earlier judgments, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 of the judgment have held ;— “To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act, (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C ot the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." And further in paragraph 24:— "We may, however, in relation to principle 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the. Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act, Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in section 2-A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above.” 8. In latter case of Jitendra Nath Biswas, after examining the Scheme of the Act, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have observed :— "It is, therefore, clear that this Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act not only confers the right on a worker for reinstatement and back wages if the order of termination or dismissal is not in accordance with the Standing Orders but also provides a detailed procedure and machinery for getting this relief. Under these circumstances therefore there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. Under these circumstances therefore there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. In Dhulabhais case, AIR 1969 SC 78, a five Judges Bench of this Court considered the language of section 9 and the scope thereof in respect of exclusion of jurisdiction and it was observed (at p. 89 of AIR): ‘Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive, In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.’ It is therefore clear that the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court by implication in respect of remedies which are available under this Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided in this Act." Relying upon this judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Nath Biswas, learned Single Judge of this Court in Regional Manager S. B. L and another v. Ajay Sharma (supra) has held that the dispute that transfer is not in consonance with the policy of the bank and is by way of victimisation, falls under Item No. 6 of Second Schedule to the Act, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred to entertain the suit or to grant interim relief, 9. On the other hand, Shri Deepak Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has urged that even by applying the law laid down in the above referred two judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, the dispute raised in the suit is an individual dispute of the respondent-plaintiff, therefore, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to judgments of the Supreme Court. It is sufficient if judgment in M\s. Western India Match Co Lid. v. The Western India Match Co, Workers Union and others, 1970 (1) SCC 22 S, is referred to, as it is the latest out of them. To substantiate his submission, he has referred to judgments of the Supreme Court. It is sufficient if judgment in M\s. Western India Match Co Lid. v. The Western India Match Co, Workers Union and others, 1970 (1) SCC 22 S, is referred to, as it is the latest out of them. Referring to Workmen V. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCR 1156, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that :— "........... there can be no doubt that though the words "any person” in the definition of an industrial dispute in section 2 (k) of the Central Act are very wide and would on a mere literal interpretation include a dispute relating to any person, considering the scheme and the objects of the Act all disputes are not industrial disputes and that a dispute becomes an industrial dispute where the person in respect of whom it is raised is, one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest,........ The parties to the reference being the employer and his employees, the test must necessarily be whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest even though such a dispute relates to a single workman. It must follow that the existence of such an interest, evidenced by the espousal by them of the cause, must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs, otherwise, as aforesaid, in some cases a dispute which was originally an individual one cannot become an industrial dispute. Further, the community of interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or not at the date when the cause occurred, for, without his being a member the dispute may be such that other workmen by having a common interest therein would be justified in taking up the dispute as their own and espousing it." 10. Further, the community of interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or not at the date when the cause occurred, for, without his being a member the dispute may be such that other workmen by having a common interest therein would be justified in taking up the dispute as their own and espousing it." 10. By promulgating section 2-A of Act No. 36 of 1965 even the individual dispute of a workman has been made industrial dispute and this section provides that where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. In view of this definition of ‘industrial dispute it can be safely held that the dispute raised in his suit by the respondent-plaintiff is an industrial dispute and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Admittedly, the respondent-plaintiff is a retrenched employee of Shanan Power House and the dispute raised by him was that despite the stipulations in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. PI and the instructions dated 22-6-1983 Ex. P-7, preference/ priority was not given to him for offering him re-employment whenever appointments on daily-waged or work-charged establishment were made after his retrenchment. This dispute is definitely connected with and arises out of the retrenchment of the respondent-plaintiff. 11. The result of above discussion is that the findings of the Additional District Judge on the point that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction, are set aside, as a consequence of which the appeal is accepted and the impugned decree and judgment dated 1-3 1994 are also set aside. However, in view of the admitted position that despite the stipulations in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. P-l and instructions dated 22-6-1983 Ex. However, in view of the admitted position that despite the stipulations in the retrenchment order dated 27-5-1982 Ex. P-l and instructions dated 22-6-1983 Ex. P-7 the respondent-plaintiff was not offered employment whenever appointments were made on daily-waged and work-charged establishment and the fact that the respondent-plaintiff is awaiting re-employment for the last about six years, since when he is pursuing this litigation and also that he has not been granted decree in his favour on the point of jurisdiction, it will not be fair and just to again force him to seek remedy under the Act. Therefore, this Court recommends that the Punjab State Electricity Board, which is a public undertaking and is expected to be a model employer implementing the Labour Laws to the benefit of its workmen, would consider to re-employ the respondent-plaintiff in a work-charged capacity as and when next vacancy arises in Shanan Power House Circle, No costs. Appeal allowed.