Judgment N.K.Sinha, J. 1. The four petitioners in their application under Sec. 482, Cr P C, seek the quashing of their prosecution in complaint case No. 680 under Secs. 298, 323, 342, 504 and 506, IPC pending in the Court of Shri N. K. Singh, judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Katihar. 2. The case of the petitioners may he stated in brief. Petitioner No.1 is the Divisional Commercial Manager, petitioner No.2, the Divisional Engineer, petitioner No.3, Inspector of Works and petitioner No.4, Assistant Commercial Manager, N.E. Railway, Katihar. O.P. No.2 is the Traveling Ticket Examiner, Katihar. On 23-7-1993 while petitioner No.3 was on Katihar Railway Station in course of his official duties, he was illegally detained by O.P. No.2 Petitioner No.3 was produced before the Railway Magistrate and was kept detained of 2-1/2 hours on the ground that he was not having valid ticket or pass. As a result of hue and cry among the railway Staff on the intervention of the senior officers of the railway petitioner No. 3 was let off. On a complaint made by petitioner No .3, O. P. No. 2 was asked to explain his conduct before petitioner No. 4 and Sri K. S. Verma the competent officers. On the refusal of O.P. No.2 with effect from 26-7-1993. O.P. No 2. being annoyed by the aforesaid order of suspension filed a complaint petition on 28-7-1993 making false and baseless allegation against the petitioners in league with the Railway Judicial Magistrate posted at Katihar. The complaint mentioned that O.P. No. 2 was T.T.E. in the Magistrates checking party. On 23-7-1993 at about 12 hours he had apprehended petitioner No.3 at platform No.5 as he was not carrying any ticket or certificate of the railway. On 26-7-1993 Sri K.S. Verma and petitioner No.5 asked the complainant to make a statement in writing in respect of the incident. When O.P. No.2 sought for time for the purpose on the ground that he did not have all the relevant papers with him, petitioner No.4 is said to have threatened him. On 27-7-1993 at about 1 p.m. O. P. No. 2 went to the chamber of petitioner No.1 to present his report where he found the four petitioners and two others whom he could not recognize. On 27-7-1993 at about 1 p.m. O. P. No. 2 went to the chamber of petitioner No.1 to present his report where he found the four petitioners and two others whom he could not recognize. O. P. No. 2 then offered to answer any question that may be asked whereupon petitioner No.1 inquired as to why he had not brought his statement in writing. On being told by O. P. No.2 that he did not know what petitioner No. 1 wanted to inquire from him, petitioner No.2 abused him and directed him to state in writing what he had been asked to do. Petitioner No.3 is then alleged to have placed paper and pen and after catching the neck of O. P. No.2 asked him to affix his signature thereon. On refusal of O. P. No.2 to oblige all the accused persons-petitioners are alleged to have caught hold of his hair and collar of the shirt and to have pushed him on to the chair. The petitioners are alleged to have then abused O. P. No.2 and then threatened to kill him as also to throw him out of job. Petitioner No.3 is then alleged to have pushed O. P. No.2 out of the chamber as a result of which he fell down, The complaint petition mentioned on witness namely. Kamaldeo Roy, T.T.E., Katihar. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar, examined the complainant on S.A. on 28-7-1993 and in course of an inquiry under Sec. 202, Cr. P.C. recorded the statement of Kamaldeo Roy on the same day. A report was also called for from the Railway Judicial Magistrate, which was received on the following day, i.e. 29-7-1993 that the complainant, namely, O. P. No.2 and submitted charge-sheet against Sheopujan Sharma, i.e. petitioner No.3 in his Court. The learned Chief judicial Magistrate, thereafter passed the impugned order, dated 30-7-1993 taking cognizance against the accused persons-petitioners for offences under Secs. 298, 323, 352 and 500, IPC and directed issue of summons. The case was then transferred to the file of Sri N. N. Singh, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class. 3. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioners and a counter-affidavit by O.P. No.2. The petitioners thereafter filed a rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by O.P. No.2. 298, 323, 352 and 500, IPC and directed issue of summons. The case was then transferred to the file of Sri N. N. Singh, Judicial Magistrate, 1st class. 3. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioners and a counter-affidavit by O.P. No.2. The petitioners thereafter filed a rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by O.P. No.2. The case of the petitioners is that issue of summons against the petitioners is patently an abuse of the process of the Court as a false complaint has been filed after concocting a cock and bull story against the senior officers of the railway by a Traveling Ticket Examiner to make a false defence to shield himself against the order of suspension duly passed against him by a competent authority. The prosecution has also been described as incompetent for want of sanction under Sec. 197, Cr. P.C. as the petitioners are public servants. These contentions have been controverter on behalf of O.P. No.2. 4. The argument of Sri Shashidhar Jha, learned Counsel for the petitioners is two folds. First that the prosecution of the petitioners on the basis of a false and fabricated complaint petition is an abuse of the process of the Court and. secondly that the prosecution was incompetent for want of sanction under Sec. 197, Cr. P. C. In support of his first contention learned counsel has referred to certain contradictions and infirmities in the complaint petition. The petitioners have also filed certain documents including the statement of Kamaldeo Roy the witness cited in the complaint petitioner and who had made a statement before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in support of the complaint in course of the inquiry that at the relevant time Kamaldeo Roy was present elsewhere and could not therefore, have witnessed the alleged occurrence. Certain other circumstances to show the falsity of the charge have also been relied upon such as that there was no occasion whatsoever for O.P. No.2 to have visited that chamber of petitioner No.1, a very senior officer of the Railway when no one had invited him there and when he had no occasion whatsoever to go there on his own accord. Another circumstance relied upon is that an order suspending O.P. No.2 from service had already been passed and he had a clear motive to falsely implicate senior officers of the railway with a view to create his defence or to put pressure upon them to withdraw the order of suspension against him. 5. In support of his first proposition Sri Jha referred to certain inherent improbabilities and inconsistencies in the story narrated by the complainant in his complaint petition. The complaint petition had stated that on 26-7-93 petitioner No.4 and one Sri K. S. Verma had asked O.P. No.2 to give statement in writing with regard to the incident dated 23-7-93 when he had apprehended petitioner No.3 on the platform without ticket and any certificate. The complainant went on to state that he had thereafter asked some time for the same. In the complaint the complainant O.P. No.2 categorically mentioned that on 27-7-1993 at about 1 p.m. which is the date and time of the alleged occurrence he had gone to the chamber of the Divisional Commercial Manager-petitioner No.1 for giving the report. The statement, it is pointed out is immediately contradicted by the sentence following where the complainant stated that after presenting himself before the petitioners (perhaps he refers to petitioner No.1) he requested petitioner No.1 to ask him, whatever he wished to and petitioner No.1 thereafter inquired as to why he had not brought the statement in writing. The inherent contradiction in the above two statements is, so very obvious that it is not possible to explain it or to reconcile them. Sri Jha next pointed out the only witness cited in the complaint petition namely, Kamaldeo Roy admittedly did not enter the chamber of petitioner No.1 at the time of the incident. Since the alleged occurrence took place inside the chamber of petitioner No.1 the solitary eye-witness mentioned in the complaint petition could not be relied upon by any stretch of imagination to support the statement made by the complainant in his complaint petition or in his statement on S.A. Another ground to attack the credibility of the complainants witness Kamaldeo Roy is said to be the statement made by him on 31-7-1993 before the Commercial Manager, a copy of which is Annexure-5 to the petition. In the aforesaid statement Kamaldeo Roy categorically stated that on 27-7-1993 which happens to be the date of occurrence in the instant case he was on duty in special bus checking and that he had participated in the said checking from 5.30 p.m. to 13 hours. The witness went on to add that he had on that date arrested two passengers without ticket and had realised fare and penalty from them. Mr. Jha stated that in view of Annexure-5 the complainants witness Kamal deo Roys credibility as a witness is completely impeached. Another circumstance relied upon by the petitioners to describe their prosecution. as malicious is that the question -of petitioner No.3 having been charge- sheeted by O.P. No.2 before the Railway Magistrate is difficult to believe for the simple reason that it is nobodys case that, petitioner No.3 on being apprehended by O.P. No.2 had been, released on bail by the Judicial Magistrate. It is, therefore argued that the report called for by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate from the Spl. Railway Magistrate and realized, by him stating that O.P No.2 had submitted charge-sheet against petitioner No.3 before him is all collusive and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate should not have placed reliance thereon. 6. Sri Shakeel Ahmad Khan learned Counsel appearing on behalf of O.P. No.2 argued that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioners after holding an enquiry under Sec. 202, Cr. P.C. the Court of competent jurisdiction namely, the Judicial Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred will have occasion to examine the evidence to be produced by the complainant and record a finding with regard to the guilt of the petitioners. He submitted that this Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Sec. 482, Cr. P.C. should not weigh the evidence to quash the prosecution of the petitioners and should at this stage only go by the allegations made in the complaint petition. I am inclined to share this view for the reason that the truth or falsity of the allegations made in the complaint petition could be heard and decided only in course of the trial by the Court of competent jurisdiction. It would not be either fair or in the interest of justice to prejudge the issue at this stage. I am inclined to share this view for the reason that the truth or falsity of the allegations made in the complaint petition could be heard and decided only in course of the trial by the Court of competent jurisdiction. It would not be either fair or in the interest of justice to prejudge the issue at this stage. The complaint petition (Annexure 2), the statement of O.P. No.2 made on S.A. (Annexure-3) and the statement of complainants witness Kamaldeo Roy made in course of enquiry (Annexure-4) to this petition may only be read for the purpose of finding out whether on the allegations made any offences are disclosed to have been committed by the four petitioners or anyone of them. In my opinion while doing so it found not be proper or desirable to refer to any other document filed by either the petitioners of a. P. NO. 2 including the subsequent statement of the complainants witness Kamaldeo Roy (Annexure-5) which by necessary implication would suggest that he could not have been present at the place of occurrence on the relevant date and time. The complaint petition also refer to an incident dated 26-7-1993 in which O.P. No. 2 and petitioner No.4 had some exchange of words and petitioner No. 4 is alleged to have threatened O.P. No. 2 not to indulge in leadership otherwise he will have to lose his job and life. The aforesaid allegations need not be taken serious notice of, for the complainants petition was admittedly filed for an occurrence dated 27-7-1993. It is alleged in the complaint petition that petitioner No.1 inquired from O.P. 2 as to why he had not brought statement in writing. Thereafter petitioner No. 2 told him, "Sale Mian Tum Yahan Bhi Netagiri Karne Aye Ho-Tumka Malloom Nahin Hai Ki Tum Kiske Samne Bol Rahe Ho Main Jo Kaha Roon Wah Chupchap Likh Kar do Nahin To Thik Nahin Hoga. Meanwhile petitioner NO. 3 placed paper and pen before O.P. NO. 2 and after catching hold of his neck asked him to silently put his signature thereon. Accordingly to the complaint petition there is a general and vague allegation that on complaints refusal the petitioners caught hold of his hair and collar of his shirt and threw him on the chair, abused him and threatened him stating. 2 and after catching hold of his neck asked him to silently put his signature thereon. Accordingly to the complaint petition there is a general and vague allegation that on complaints refusal the petitioners caught hold of his hair and collar of his shirt and threw him on the chair, abused him and threatened him stating. "Naukari se Nikalkar Alah Main Ke Yaha Pakistan Bhej Denge Musalman Jat hi Aisa Hote Hai Jis Thali Main Khata hai Usi Main Ched Karta Hai." The complainant specially alleged that on that very time petitioner No. 3 pushed him out of the chamber whereupon he came out and fell down. 7 It appears that there is some vagueness with regard to some of the allegations made in the complaint petition specially with regard to the petitioner or petitioners against whom they have been made. From the statement of complainant made on SA (Annexure-3) it appears that when the complainant went inside the chamber of petitioner No. 1, petitioner NO.3 appeared before him with blank paper and pen and after abusing him asked him to write thereon. When the complainant refused he stated that he would be killed and after catching hold of his neck threw him on the chair. The complainant in course of his SA in the same continuation stated "Bole Ki Sale Neta Bahut Jyade Bante Ho Tumhe Jan Markar Phenk Donge Pakistan Bhej Denge Ya Khuda Ke Yahan Bhsplace Bhej Denge". The next sentence in the statement is that after pushing him he was removed out of the chamber. The complainants witness Kamaldeo Roy in his statement in course of enquiry specifically state that petitioner No.4 had said "Musalman Jis Pattal Main Khate Hain Usi Me Ched Karte Hain." From what has been noticed above it follows that if at all there were any specific allegations they were only in respect of petitioner Nos. 3 and 4. If petitioner NO.1 inquired from O.P. No.2 as to why he had not brought his statement in writing he was perfectly within his right to do so. 3 and 4. If petitioner NO.1 inquired from O.P. No.2 as to why he had not brought his statement in writing he was perfectly within his right to do so. if petitioner NO.2 had chastised O.P. No.2 and had asked him to remember before whom he was making the statement nothing wrong can be found in his conduct for it was the chamber of petitioner NO.1 who happened to be a very senior railway officer being the Divisional Commercial Manager, Petitioner No.2 was also a very senior Railway officer being the Divisional Engineer and in the circumstances even if he said something to pull up O.P. NO.2 who happened to be the TTE no offence can be said to have been committed by him. The same cannot be said with regard to the allegations made against petitioner No.3 and 4 and at this stage it is difficult to subscribe to the view that on the allegations made no offence was disclosed against them. 8. The Appex Court in State of Haryana V/s. Ch. Bhajan Lal, had occasion to deal with the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution or under Sec. 482, Cr. P.C. to interfere with the proceeding relating to cognizable offence to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. While laying down that the powers should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases, their Lordships mentioned certain categories of cases where the High Court could legitimately exercise such powers to quash proceeding. While laying down that the powers should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases, their Lordships mentioned certain categories of cases where the High Court could legitimately exercise such powers to quash proceeding. Some of the categories of cases relevant for our purpose laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court are (a) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do no prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (b) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (c) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint is so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (d) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge and (e) where there is an express legal bar en grafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which the criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuation of the proceeding and or where there is specific provisions in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 9. As I have already indicated above the allegations made in the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused namely, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. For the reasons already indicated earlier it is not possible on the materials placed before this Court to record a finding that the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person on its basis can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. For the reasons already indicated earlier it is not possible on the materials placed before this Court to record a finding that the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person on its basis can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 or that the criminal proceeding has been instituted against them with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused. Thus while the petitioners appeared to have made out a case for quashing the criminal prosecution of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2. No such case has been made out in respect of petitioner Nos. 3 and 4. 10. This brings us to a consideration of the next argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that their prosecution is incompetent for want of necessary sanction under Sec. 197 of the Code. This concerns the category of cases indicated by the Apex Court mentioned above, vide (e) To substantiate the ground the petitioners must show that they are public servants employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and removable from the office either by or with the sanction of the Central Government. Further they have to prove that the offence alleged had been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. The petitioners are all railway officials. There is hardly any doubt that they are public servants within the meaning of Sec. 21, IPC. In P. R. Chowdhary and Ors. V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Apex Court had occasion to observe that a person employed by railway owned and managed by the Government of India is a public servant within the meaning of Sec. 21 of the Penal Code. That they are employed in the affairs of the Union also appears to be settled by the Court in Chini Mazdoor Sangh and Ors. That they are employed in the affairs of the Union also appears to be settled by the Court in Chini Mazdoor Sangh and Ors. V/s. State of Bihar, wherein their Lordships went on to observe that the present time except a few light railways the entire railway administration in the country is in the hands of the Central Government which indicates that the running of railway is not a legal or sovereign activity of the State and yet no body has ever urged that a railway employee is not subject to the provisions of Part XIV of the Constitution which deals with the service under the Union and the State. Their Lordships referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Deka V/s. General Manager, N. E. Frontier Railway, wherein even in regard to a Peon of the railway it was held that a rule framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution could not take away the constitutional guarantee given to such a person holding civil post under Article 311. On behalf of the petitioner it was pointed out that Article 309 finds place in Part XIV of the Constitution of India and under proviso to the said Article 309 of the Constitution of India and under proviso to the said Article 309 rule can be framed by the President or the Governor as the case may be to regulate the recruitment and condition of service of such person who are in employment in connection with the affairs of the State. There is no dispute between the President of India in exercise of the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution has made rules for the railway service known as Railway Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in this context service means service under the Ministry of Railways. 11. It is stated in paragraph 10 of the application that the petitioner Nos 1, 2 and 4 are class I officers recruited in the Indian Railways Service through I.A.S. etc. examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission and their appointing authority is the President of India. O. P. NO.2 in paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit admitted that the petitioner Nos. examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission and their appointing authority is the President of India. O. P. NO.2 in paragraph 10 of his counter affidavit admitted that the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are class I officers but added that their appointment, removal and transfers are being conducted by the Railway Board and as such they are the employees of the Railway Board and not of the Central Government. It was contended on behalf of O. P. No. 2 that in view of this there was no necessity for any sanction for the prosecution of the petitioners. So far petitioner No. 3 is concerned there is no contention put forward that he liked petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 was not removable from the office say by or with the sanction of the Central Government. Petitioner No. 3 is thus said to be under the Railway Board. In this connection both the parties placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in K.N. Shukla V/s. Navneet Lal Manilal Bhatta and another, wherein it was held that a Railway Officer officiating in class I of the transportation (Traffic and Commercial) Department is not an officer under the Central Government but is under the Railway Board and that the prosecution can be instituted without sanction of the Central Government since the official is an employee under the Railway Board. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the aforesaid decision was given by the Hon ble Supreme Court relying on Rule 1728 of Discipline and Appeal Rules for gazetted officers of the railways. Schedule 2 to the Rule provided for removal of class I officers by the Railway Board and the Railway Board had been invested with the power of the Central Government for such purpose by a notification in that behalf. It has been pointed out in paragraph 7 of the petitioners rejoinder to the counter-affidavit and not controverted by the O. P. NO.2 that Railway Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution and they have come in force from 1-10-1968. Since the aforesaid Rules have made material changes in the condition of service of Railway Officers, the decision of the Apex Court in K.N. Shukla (supra) will not apply to the facts of the present case. Since the aforesaid Rules have made material changes in the condition of service of Railway Officers, the decision of the Apex Court in K.N. Shukla (supra) will not apply to the facts of the present case. Photostat copies of the relevant Rules of 1968 have been filed by the petitioners along with the rejoinder to the counter-affidavit as Annexures 6 and 6/A, Part 111 of the said Rules deals with the penalties. The minor and major punishment are prescribed in Rule 6. Clauses (i) to (iv) of the said rule deal with the minor punishments, clauses (v) and (vi) deal with reduction to lower rank, clause (vii) with regard to compulsory retirement and removal from service is provided by clause (viii) and dismissal by clause (ix). Rule 7 mentions about the disciplinary authorities and provides that the penalties specified in Rule 6 may be imposed on a railway servant by the authorities specified in Schedules I, II and III. Schedule III deals with class of railway servants belonging to Group A and its copy is Annexure 6/A to the rejoinder. A plain reading of the Rules together with Schedule III leaves no room for doubt that the power to impose major penalties mentioned under clauses (vii) to (ix) of Rule 6 which includes the power of removal and dismissal from service is to be exercised in respect of railway servants of Group A by the President. Petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 being class I Railway Officers are Group A railway servants and under Schedule III read with Rule 4 and subrule (2) of Rule 7 of the Railway Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, are removable by the President of India and not by the Railway Board. In this connection it may be mentioned that under Sec. 3 (8)(b) of the General Clauses Act "Central Government" shall in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution means the President. In other words petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were under the Rules removable only by the Central Government and not by the Railway Board. The same, however, cannot be said in respect of petitioner No. 3 who admittedly does not belong to the class of railway servants known as Group A and consequently the Schedule III referred to above does not apply in his case. 12. The same, however, cannot be said in respect of petitioner No. 3 who admittedly does not belong to the class of railway servants known as Group A and consequently the Schedule III referred to above does not apply in his case. 12. This brings us to a consideration of the most important aspect of the case, namely whether the offences alleged had been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. It may be recalled that on the allegations made by the complainant in his complaint petition read with his statement made on SA, the allegations in respect of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 do not appear to prima facie constitute any offence. The allegations appear to be confirmed to petitioner Nos. 3 and 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra V/s. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, wherein it has been observed that: "Once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned." It was also observed that the scope of its being official should be construed so as advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. On the allegations made in the instant case the alleged occurrence took place inside the chamber of Petitioner No. 1. The petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were said to be sitting in the said chamber of petitioner No. 1 from before the occurrence. In that view of the matter the presence of all the four Petitioners in the chamber at the time of occurrence can be construed to be in course of their official duties. The admitted position is that the subject matter of the exchange of words that took place at the beginning of the occurrence in between the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and O.P. No. 2 on the other was in respect of some injury being made against O.P. NO. 2 in connection with his conduct in apprehending petitioner No. 3 a few days earlier. The complainant on his own admission had asked petitioner NO. 1 to enquire from him whatever he wanted. 1 and 2 on the one hand and O.P. No. 2 on the other was in respect of some injury being made against O.P. NO. 2 in connection with his conduct in apprehending petitioner No. 3 a few days earlier. The complainant on his own admission had asked petitioner NO. 1 to enquire from him whatever he wanted. It was only thereafter that petitioner No. 1 enquired from O.P. No. 2 as to why he had not brought his statement in writing and petitioner No. 2 had thereafter pulled UP O.P. No. 2 after O.P. NO. 2 had given a reply to the querry made by petitioner No. 1. Thus the exchange of words that took place in between petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 on the one hand and O.P. No. 2 on the other soon after O.P. No. 2 went to the official chamber of petitioner NO. 1 appeared to be inseparably connected with the duties attached to the office of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and hence it has to be found that in doing so they were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. The same cannot be said to be true in the case of the conduct of petitioner Nos. 3 and 4. Both in the complaint petition and in his statement on S.A. the complainant stated that petitioner NO. 3 caught hold of his neck and asked him to put his signature on a blank sheet of paper and pushed him out of the chamber. So far petitioner No. 4 is concerned the complainants witness Kamaldeo Roy had specifically named him for having caught hold of shirt of the complainant and to have assaulted him. It is true that the complainant did not specifically name petitioner NO. 4. While making such a general allegations against the petitioners but it is not very significant at this stage as we are merely concerned with the allegations made and not with regard to its truth. The aforesaid conduct imputed to Petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be said to have been committed in the discharge of their official duties or even purported to have been so discharged. Even in the decision of the Apex Court of Dr. The aforesaid conduct imputed to Petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be said to have been committed in the discharge of their official duties or even purported to have been so discharged. Even in the decision of the Apex Court of Dr. Budhikota Subbarao (Supra) relied upon by the petitioners it has been observed that a public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities and to that extent Section 197, Cr. P.C, has to be construed narrowly in a restricted manner. 13 For the reasons mentioned above this application is allowed in respect of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and their prosecution in the criminal case and issue of summons by the impugned order are hereby quashed, The application in so far petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned is hereby dismissed.