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1995 DIGILAW 661 (ALL)

AZIM KHAN v. NAJUK BE

1995-07-04

S.C.JAIN

body1995
S. C. JAIN, J. The facts giving-rise to the writ petition are that the res pondent No. 1, Smt. Najuk Be, wife of Azim Khan, petitioner herein, filed a petition under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (. Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, by which she claimed Rs. 10,000 as dower, Rs. 40,000 for goods given in dowry and Rs. 1,500 as maintenance during Iddat. Thus, she claimed total amount of Rs. 51,500. 2. Summonses were ordered to be issued to the non-applicant, i. e. the husband-opposite party (petitioner herein ). The summonses were not served personally on the petitioner. But a report was submitted by the process in this regard, which reads as under : ""summon ki tamili mujh ke dwara kee gayee to abhiyukt ghar par nahin milta hai athawa summon tamili karne se bachta hai, Shrimaoji abhiyukt ka giraftari warrant bhejane ki kripa ki jawe. Report sewa roein preshit hai. Sd/-Illegible 21-1-1992" 3. On the basis of the said report of the process-server the court con cerned proceeded ex-parte against the husband, petitioner to this writ petition and after recording the statement of the respondent-wife, passed an ex-parte decree in favour of the wife aforesaid on 7-12-1992. 4. An application for setting aside ex-parte order was moved by the petitioner on 30-3-199? and the court concerned set aside the ex-parte order on payment of Rs, 250as conditional costs. 5. The wife, the respondent to this writ petition, challenged that order before the Sessions Judge. Plight, who by his order, dated 26-8-1994 accepted the revision petition and set aside the order passed by the trial court. 6. In this writ petition that order dated 26-8-1994 passed by the Sessions Judge has been challenged 7. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been no service of summons on the husband petitioner nor any sum mons was tendered to him nor he had any knowledge about the suit, which was proceeded ex-parte against him. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner before proceeding ex-parte the Magistrate concerned was bound to record his satisfaction that the husband-opposite party (petitioner to this peti tion) is wilfully avoiding service of summons or wilfully neglecting to attend the court. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner before proceeding ex-parte the Magistrate concerned was bound to record his satisfaction that the husband-opposite party (petitioner to this peti tion) is wilfully avoiding service of summons or wilfully neglecting to attend the court. In the judgment he has not recorded any such satisfaction that the husband-opposite party, i. e. petitioner herein, is wilfully avoiding or deliberate ly neglecting to attend the court. Only the order for proceeding ex-parte has been passed without recording satisfaction in so many words as provided under Rule 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce; Rulo 1986. He also pointed out that before tiling of this petition under Section 3 of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 there had been a compromise between the parties in a petition under Section 125, Crpc wherein on receipt of Rs. 12,000 by she wife the matter was ordered to be settled finally. About this suit the petitioner could not have any knowledge when the summonses was not served upon him. He relied upon two decisions, one of Karnataku High Court, (Khembai v. Kajindar reported in 1981 Crlj page 690, another of Madras High Court, Sukhirthammal v. Subramanian, reported in 1985 Crlj page 1294 in support of his contention that non-compliance with the procedure prescribed for the service of summons makes the exparte order a nullity. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent countered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the compromises arrived at between the parties in April, 1992 was with respect to the proceedings under Section 125, Crpc and not with respect to these claims. i. e. Mahr, return of dowry articles etc. and, therefore, the petitioner cannot take the benefit of that compromise recorded in the proceedings under Sec tion 125, Crpc. 9. Regarding satisfaction of the court that the husband opposite party (the petitioner herein) is wilfully avoiding service of the summons or wilfully neglecting to attend the court he draw my attention towards the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard wherein he has observed that when the Magistrate proceeded ex-parte it meads that he was satisfied that the respondent i. e. the petitioner herein, was wilfully avoiding service or neglecting to attend the court and this order of ex- parte on the order-sheet itself fulfils this purpose. According to the learned counsel for the respondent application for restoration was filed on 30-3-1993, i. e, much more after three months and that it has not been mentioned in the application for restoration as to when he came to know about the ex parte order. The application for restoration was beyond time i. e. seven days && prescribed under Rule 4 and the learned Sessions Judge has rightly dismissed the application on this ground. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce.) Act, 1986 is special Act and the provisions of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure are not applicable in this case and, hence, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. Rule 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Rules, 1986 provides the procedure for the service of summons. Rule 4 of the said Rules provides that all evidence in the proceedings under the Act shall be taken in the presence of the respondent against whom an order for the payment of provision and maintenance, Mahr or power or the delivery of property in proposed to be made or, when his personal attendance is dis pensed with, in the presence of his pleader and shall be recorded in the manner specified for summary trials under the Code: "provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that the respondent is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court, Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte and any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on application made within seven days from the date thereof subject to such terms as to payment of cost to the opposite party as the Magistrate may think just and proper" 11. A perusal of the proviso to Rule 4 aforesaid shows that it is only when the Magistrate is satisfied that the respondent is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine the case ex parte. la this case there is no specific averment in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the respondent is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the court. la this case there is no specific averment in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that the respondent is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the court. On the basis of the report of the process-server he proceeded ex parte and the Sessions Judge concerned has inferred from this order-sheet that the Magistrate was satisfied. The compliance of this provision should be made in the strict sense as it provides for recording evidence ex parte. It is the satisfaction of the Magistrate which should be in specific terms that the respondent is willfully avoiding or neglecting to attend the Court. In the absence of tab specific order I feel that the inference drawn by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be accepted 12. Under these circumstances, keeping in view the fact and circum stances of the case, set aside the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Plight on 26-8-1994 and restore the order of the Magistrate setting aside the ex parte order but the cost is awarded to the respondent to the extent of Rs. 1,000. It is made clear that on payment of the conditional cost of Rs. 1000 ex-parte order is set aside. The trial Court shall proceed with the case expeditious and shall conclude the same within a period of six months from the date when certified copy of this order is produced before him. Needless to say that the parties shall co-operate in conclusion of the case within a period of six months. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Petition allowed. .