Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur v. Versus Sohni Devi
1995-07-28
R.R.YADAV
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment R.R. Yadav, J.-The instant revision has been filed under amended Section 115, CPC against the order dated 9-3-94 passed by Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 18/94 granting temporary injunction by reversing the order of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur City, Jodhpur dated 30-9-91 in Civil Misc. Case No. 3 14/89. 2. Brief facts necessary to be noticed for disposal of the instant revision are that the plaintiff-opposite parties sought permission for raising residential construction over their land which was granted with necessary amendments on 12-9-86 and was renewed up to 13-1-89. 3. The plaintiff-opposite parties have made substantial changes in the permission granted to them and instead of constructing drawing room, bed room and dining room they have constructed a big hall and in this hall a restaurant is being run. 4. When it was detected that instead of raising residential construction the construction has been raised of commercial nature, a notice was issued to the plaintiff-opposite parties. The Assistant Engineer was directed to make a report after spot inspection and the case was fixed on 17-3-1989 and arguments were heard. On 27-3-1989 the order was passed for demolition of illegal construction by defendant-revisionist --Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur. 5. Aggrieved against the order of demolition the plaintiff-opposite parties have filed a suit for permanent injunction along with an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC for temporary injunction. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 30-9-199 1 refused temporary injunction on the ground that the plaintiff-opposite parties have no prima facie case in their favour. 6. Aggrieved against the order dated 30-9-199 1 passed by learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur City, Jodhpur the opposite parties filed a miscellaneous appeal, as contemplated under Order 43, Rule 1(r), CPC and after hearing both the parties the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur set aside the order passed by the learned Munsif and granted temporary injunction to the effect that till decision of the suit the construction made by the plaintiff-opposite parties shall not be demolished. 7. Aggrieved against the aforesaid Judgment passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur the instant revision under amended Section 115, CPC has been filed by the defendant-revisionist. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the revisionist at length at admission stage. 9.
7. Aggrieved against the aforesaid Judgment passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur the instant revision under amended Section 115, CPC has been filed by the defendant-revisionist. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the revisionist at length at admission stage. 9. Learned Counsel for the revisionist urged before me that the learned lower appellate Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the Judgment of the trial Court refusing injunction without meeting the reasons given by the trial Court. 10. Learned Counsel for the revisionist also urged before me that the order passed about granting or refusing temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC by the trial Court can be interfered only if it is found by the lower appellate Court that the trial Court has acted arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records. 10.11. The aforesaid two arguments of the learned Counsel for the revisionist are interlinked, therefore, I propose to discuss these two parts together. 112. A close scrutiny of the Judgment given by the learned lower appellate Court reveals that the appellate Court has given cogent and convincing reasons for reversing the order passed by the learned trial Court to the effect that if the defendant-revisionist is allowed to demolish the construction in question nothing would remain to be decided during the trial of the suit. According to the learned lower appellate Court if temporary injunction is refused at this stage, it would virtually amount to dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff-opposite parties before its trial which would amount travesty of justice. 113. In my humble opinion the aforesaid reason given by the learned lower appellate Court is sufficient to meet the reasons given by the learned trial Court refusing injunction. Thus the argument raised on behalf of defendant-revisionist that the learned lower appellate Court has reversed the Judgment of the trial Court without meeting the reasons given by the trial Court is not acceptable. Aforesaid reason given by learned lower appellate Court is sufficient to counter-blast all reasons given by learned trial Court for refusing temporary injunction. 114. As regards the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist, there is no quarrel with the proposition of law argued by him.
Aforesaid reason given by learned lower appellate Court is sufficient to counter-blast all reasons given by learned trial Court for refusing temporary injunction. 114. As regards the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist, there is no quarrel with the proposition of law argued by him. A close scrutiny of the Judgment given by the learned trial Court throws a flood of light that the learned trial Court has arbitrarily and perversely refused to grant temporary injunction which tantamount to authorise defendant-revisionist to demolish the construction in question during the pendency of the suit before its trial for which suit itself was filed before the trial Court. Once revisionist is allowed to demolish the construction in question nothing would remain to be decided on merits and virtually it would amount to dismissal of suit without its trial on merits. 115. In my humble opinion the learned trial Court was manifestly wrong when it gave a finding that the injunction prayed for could not be granted as it falls outside the scope of Order 39, Rule 1, CPC. 116. Aperusal of Rule 1 of Order 39 indicates that a damage threatened or likely to be caused to the property in suit can be restrained by a proper injunction. If the construction in question for which a suit for permanent injunction has been filed on various grounds itself is demolished during the pendency of the suit decidedly nothing would remain to be decided in the suit, therefore, temporary injunction could be granted under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC as it falls within the definition of damage’ contemplated under the said rule. 117. Similarly, under Rule 2 of Order 39, CPC besides the injuries already specified in Rule 1 ‘other injury of any kind’ could also be prevented by granting a temporary injunction.
117. Similarly, under Rule 2 of Order 39, CPC besides the injuries already specified in Rule 1 ‘other injury of any kind’ could also be prevented by granting a temporary injunction. Trial Court was required to give widest interpretation to the word ‘injury’ under Order 39, Rule 2, CPC for doing justice even if the injury which the plaintiff may suffer was not an injury in the ordinary sense within the meaning of Rule 22, therefore, the case is squarely covered under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC and the learned trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it and the learned lower appellate Court has rightly interfered with the order passed by the trial Court by granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant-revisionist from demolishing the disputed construction during the pendency of suit. 118. It is well to remember that in such a situation even if the case was not found to be covered under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC, the learned trial Court has ample jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction under Section 151, CPC in exercise of its inherent power. 119. Assuming for the sake of argument if the case is not covered under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC even then the injunction order granted by the learned lower appellate Court would be treated to have been passed under Section 151, CPC in order to decide the intricate question regarding power of the defendant-revisionist to order for demolition of the disputed construction on various grounds taken in the plaint by the plaintiff Undeniably there is provision for compounding in such cases and in case the matter is found to be compound-able then the defendant-revisionist cannot said to have authority to order for demolition. .20. It is well to remember that the main object of temporary injunction is to preserve the subject-matter of suit in status quo till the decision of the suit whenever and wherever it is found by a civil Court that there is threatened ‘damage’ or ‘injury’ likely to be caused to the subject-matter of the suit. Thus, even if a case was not found to be covered by the learned trial Court under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC yet it ought to have passed an order under Order 39, Rule 7, CPC for preservation of the disputed construction till decision of the .suit on merits. 19.21.
Thus, even if a case was not found to be covered by the learned trial Court under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC yet it ought to have passed an order under Order 39, Rule 7, CPC for preservation of the disputed construction till decision of the .suit on merits. 19.21. It is admitted before me that the defendant-revisionist had already passed an order for demolition of the disputed construction, therefore, the injury about to be caused is not only threatened but there is a real danger of the subject-matter of the suit being damaged by way of demolition. Hence the plaintiff-opposite parties were entitled for injunction and as such the order passed by the learned lower appellate Court restraining the defendant-revisionist from demolishing the construction during the pendency of the suit is eminently just and proper and does not require interference of this Court. 20.22. In my humble opinion there are ample evidence on record of actual danger of demolition of the construction in question hence there is no factual or legal infirmity in reversing the order passed by the trial Court by the learned lower appellate Court. 223. A pointed question was asked by this Court to the learned Counsel for the revisionist as to how this revision is entertainable under amended Section 115, CPC merely on the basis of jurisdictional error without fulfilling the conditions enumerated under provisos (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC? The learned Counsel for the revisionist was also called upon to explain as to how if the order granting temporary injunction by learned lower appellate Court is allowed to stand it would occasion a failure of justice or it would cause irreparable injury to the revisionist? 224. In reply tothe aforesaid question, the learned Counsel for the revisionist placed reliance on a decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Devi v. Jung Bahadur, reported in AIR 1977 Raj 196 . 225. A little deeper understanding of the case of Smt. Vimla Devi (supra) would reveal that it was decided by learned single Judge on 20-4-77 yet the amendment introduced under provisos (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC which came into force on 1-2-77 was not brought to the notice of learned single Judge while deciding the aforesaid case.
In case of Smt. Vimla Devi (supra) it is ruled by the learned single Judge that a revision under Section 115, CPC is entertainable on jurisdictional error as enumerated under provisos (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC. 226. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances in my humble opinion the decision rendered by learned single Judge in the case of Smt. Vimla Devi ( AIR 1977 Raj 196 ) (supra) is per incuriam on question of entertainability of a revision under amended Section 115, CPC as newly inserted provisos (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC although enforced on the date of Judgment yet it was not brought to the notice of learned single Judge. 227. In my considered opinion after insertion of provisos (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC the defendant-revisionist is not required to establish merely jurisdictional error as contemplated under sub-section (1)(a), (b) and (c) of Section 115, CPC but he is further required to establish that the conditions contemplated under provisos (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC are also fulfilled. 228. Learned Counsel for the revisionist candidly admitted before me that the facts of this case clearly indicate that first condition enumerated under proviso (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC is not attracted at all but according to him in the present case proviso (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 115, CPC are attracted. As according to him if the order impugned passed by the learned lower appellate Court is allowed to stand it would occasion failure of justice and would also cause irreparable injury to the revisionist. 229. In my considered opinion the aforesaid argument of the learned Counsel for the defendant-revisionist is fallacious and is being raised merely to be rejected hence it is hereby rejected. It is not understandable as to how the demolition of the construction which itself is subject-matter of suit for permanent injunction if not permitted to be demolished before trial of the suit on merits would occasion failure of justice or would cause irreparable injury to the defendant-revisionist. 230. Admittedly the defendant-revisionist had passed an order for demolition of the construction in question on 27-3-89 and it has waited for more than 5 years than it can further wait for a year till the disposal of the suit on merits.
230. Admittedly the defendant-revisionist had passed an order for demolition of the construction in question on 27-3-89 and it has waited for more than 5 years than it can further wait for a year till the disposal of the suit on merits. In my opinion it would be a sad day indeed if compulsions of equity and justice are sacrificed on the basis of procedural law. 29.31. Irrespective of the rigidity of the rules and adherence to the procedural law there is apparently considerable scope of discretion of civil Courts under CPC for granting or refusing injunction. The use of discretion is desirable from the point of introducing an element of humanism which carries with it justice-oriented approach without allowing the substantial justice either to escape or slide on mere technicalities. .32. Men of broad social vision pledged to the philosophy of natural justice in CPC which provides to facilitate justice and further its ends. Too technical construction of Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 7, CPC read with Section 115, CPC in granting or refusing temporary injunction that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity is to be avoided. He who clings to the letter, clings to dry and barren shell and misses the truth and substance of justice and fair play; Whenever and wherever there is choice before the civil Courts they are expected to .choose the meaning which accord with reasons and justice. What is just and reasonable should always be treated to be lawful. 30.33. I havecritically gone through the Judgment impugned given by the learned lower appellate Court and in my considered opinion if the order impugned passed by the learned lower appellate Court is, allowed to stand neither it would occasion failure of justice nor it would cause irreparable injury to the defendant-revisionist rather in the circumstances of this case it is eminently just and proper to restrain the defendant-revisionist from demolishing the construction in question till the disposal of the suit. As a result of the aforementioned discussion the instant revision is not entertainable within the meaning of amended Section 115, CPC hence it is hereby dismissed in limine.