Judgment : The suit filed by the plaintiff is to restrain the defendant by an order of perpetual injunction from infringing the plaintiff’s copyright in the artistic work green label stand back pouch, by use of golden label stand back pouch, or any other pouch similar to plaintiff’s green label stand pack pouch; for a perpetual order of injunction restraining the defendant by itself, its partners/proprietor, servants, agents distributors, stockists or any of them from in any manner passing off or enabling others to pass off the defendant’s goods as and for the goods of the plaintiff by use of golden label stand pack pouch or any other pouch similar to plaintiffs green label stand park pouch of in any other manner whatsoever; and for consequential reliefs. 2. The suit is filed under Sec.62 of the Copyright Act. Before instituting the suit, the plaintiff also filed an application tor leave permitting it to institute the suit before this Court on 212. 1992. That application was allowed. Pursuant to the same, the suit was filed. Thereafter, after getting notice, the defendant has tiled this application to revoke the leave granted to the plaintiff. 3.. For getting leave of the court, it was averred by the plaintiff that the respondent (defendant) is manufacturing and selling coffee packed in golden label stand pack pouches, that the respondent’s golden label stand pack pouches are an imitation of the plaintiffs artistic work green label stand pack pouch in colour scheme, get up and lay out, that the defendant has infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the artistic work green label stand pack pouch under Sec.61(2) of the Copyright Act. According to the plaintiff, the respondent/defendant’s activities give rise to cause of action within the jurisdiction of this Court, and as the respondent is located at Ongole. Andhra Pradesh, k has become necessary to obtain leave of this Court to sue the defendant before this Court. .4. it is further averred in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit filed in support of the application for leave, that the cause of action arose at Madras within the jurisdiction of this court. The appellant who is the owner of the copyright in the artistic work green label stand pack pouch has one made’ branch office at No.81 Dr. Rangachari Road. Mylapore.. Madras and Regional Accounts Office at No.611/612. Mount Load. The appellant who is the owner of the copyright in the artistic work green label stand pack pouch has one made’ branch office at No.81 Dr. Rangachari Road. Mylapore.. Madras and Regional Accounts Office at No.611/612. Mount Load. Madras, is is also stated that the applicant’s Madras Offices account for approximately 35% of All India Safes turnover of the applicant. The applicant’s Madras Branch Office is involved in the sale marketing of coffee, tea and spices in the State of Tamil Nadu. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala and the Union Territory of Pondicherry. It is on these allegations, leave was sought for from this Court. 5. In the plaint, it is stated in paragraph 18 that the cause of action in respect of copyright infringement has arisen at Madras within the meaning of Sec.61 (2) of the Copyright Act, and, Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to file the suit in this Court which has got the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 6. In the application to revoke the leave (Application No.814 of 1993 it is stated that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant is carrying on business in Ongolc District of Andhra Pradesh and that the defendant has no branch office outside Andhra Pradesh within the jurisdiction of this Court. According to the defendant, the plaintiff has offices all over India and has a strong marketing force and that the plaintiff has invoked Sec.62 of the Copyright Act only with a view of harass the defendant, knowing fully well that the defendant from Ongole, does not possess the infrastructure or resources to defend itself in this Court. According to the defendant, the plaintiff is abusing the process of law and has invoked Sec.62 of the Copyright Act in order to stifle competition by unfair and unethical means The defendant would say that the balance of convenience is in favour of the defendant, and that the suit ought to have been filed before the District Court. Ongolc, where the defendant would be better equipped- to defend itself. For these reasons, the defendant has prayed for revocation of the permission already granted to the plaintiff. .7. Sec.62 of the Copyright Act deals with jurisdiction of courts or matters arising under thai Chapter. Chapter 12 deals with civil remedies. There are two subsections to Sec.62. Ongolc, where the defendant would be better equipped- to defend itself. For these reasons, the defendant has prayed for revocation of the permission already granted to the plaintiff. .7. Sec.62 of the Copyright Act deals with jurisdiction of courts or matters arising under thai Chapter. Chapter 12 deals with civil remedies. There are two subsections to Sec.62. Sub-sec.(1) says that the suit in respect o( the infringement conferred by this Act shall be instituted in the District Court having jurisdiction. Sub-sec.(2) is relevant for the purpose of this case, it says that ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any other law for the time being in force, a "District Court having jurisdiction’ shall include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of instituting of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or. where there arc more than one such person, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain’. .8. The importance of giving a separate definition is also relevant for the purpose of this case. It is an amendment. The amendment itself was necessitated in view of the difficulties of owners of copyrights in instituting suits in various courts. The reason for the amendment is stated thus: "... .The Committee fee’s that the provisions of the original sub-clause (2) would virtually make registration of copyright compulsory and would be an undue restriction on the owner of the copyright to exercise his rights In the opinion of the committee many authors are deterred from instituting infringement proceedings because the court in which such proceedings are to be instituted is situated at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence. The committee feels that this impediment should be removed and the new sub-clause (2) accordingly provides that infringement proceedings may be instituted in District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries on business, etc." 9. Sec.2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code defines "district" and "District Court’. While defining the same, it is stated ‘District" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court") and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. .10. Sec.2(4) of the Civil Procedure Code defines "district" and "District Court’. While defining the same, it is stated ‘District" means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a "District Court") and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. .10. It is by virtue of this section, clauses 11 and 12 of the Amended Letters Patent provide for the local limits of the original jurisdiction as to suits. As per clause 12, the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered, to receive, try, and determine suits of every description if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated or, in all other cases, if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court, or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain, within such limits; except that the said High Court shall not have been such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause at Madras, in which the debt or damage, or value of the property used for does not exceed one hundred rupees’. It is by virtue of clause, 12 of the amended Letters Patent, this Court has got original jurisdiction. 11. The learned counsel for the defendant contended that even if Sec.62 of the Copyright Act enables the plaintiff to institute a suit, that must be in accordance with clause 12 of the Letters Patent for that is the District Court, and the powers of the District Court are to be exercised by the High Court. According to him, unless the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of this Court of carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court is not entitled to entertain the suit and the proper Court so far as the this case is ccncerned is only the District Court, Ongole (Andhra Pradesh). 12. According to him, unless the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of this Court of carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court, this Court is not entitled to entertain the suit and the proper Court so far as the this case is ccncerned is only the District Court, Ongole (Andhra Pradesh). 12. A reading of Sec.62 of the Copyright Act will make it clear that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code have no application insofar as institution of suits is concerned and the same has nothing to do with the case of action, or the residence of the defendant. This question came for consideration in the decision reported in The Daily Calendar Supply Bureau, Sivakasi v. The United Concern, AIR. 1967 Mad. 181, wherein this Court held thus: "Clauses 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent confers ordinary original civil jurisdiction to the High Court, over the Presidency Town of Madras, Bombay, etc. Therefore, the area of the Presideay Town will be a District as defined in Sec.2(4) of the Civil P.C., 1908 and when the High Court exercises its original civil jurisdiction over the city limits, it can be deemed to be a District Court, in those cases where resort to the definition in Sec.2(4) of the Civil P.C. is permissible for the purpose of fixing jurisdiction. Sec.9 of the Civil P.C. gives power to every Civil Court to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, and the explanation to that section says that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of civil nature. It is well recognised that copyright is property and, therefore, a suit seeking reliefs for infringement of copyright is a suit of a civil nature. If such infringement occurs, and the cause of action for a suit based on the infringement arises within the area of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, that court can be deemed to a be a District Court as per definition in Sec.2(4) of the Civil P.C. and will have power to try the suit. If such infringement occurs, and the cause of action for a suit based on the infringement arises within the area of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, that court can be deemed to a be a District Court as per definition in Sec.2(4) of the Civil P.C. and will have power to try the suit. In Sec.62 2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, a cross-reference to the Civil P.C. is given which can very well imply that the term ‘District Court’ in Sec.62 (l)‘of that Act, should be given the same meaning as in Sec.2(4) of the Civil P.C. In Sec.62(2) it is stated that "for the purpose of Sub-sec.(1),a ‘District Court having "jurisdiction shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil P.C. includes a District Court, etc.". This would show that the application of the definition of a ‘District Court’ in the Civil P.C. should be excluded only for the limited purposes mentioned in Sec.62 (2), but the definition will apply in all other respects. Under Sec.20 of the Civil P.C. it is the place where the defendant resides that gives jurisdiction to the court. But Sec.62 (2) of the Copyright Act alters this principle, and defines the place where the plaintiff resides or carries on business as the place where the suit has to be filed. It is only for the purpose of making this alteration that Sec.62(2) of the Copyright Act uses respects, the Civil P.C. will apply". 13. The said decision was followed in the judgment reported in Brooke Bond India Limited v. Balaji Tea (India) Private Limited, (1989)2 M.L.J 132: (1989)2 L.W.551. in which the plaintiff herein was the plaintiff (in that suit also) There also, this Court held thus: "The first question is very easily answerable. There is no doubt that this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the provisos of Sec.62(2) of the Copyright Act. The plaintiff has made an allegation in the plaint its copyright has been infringed by the defendant and a prayer for injunction restraining the defendant from committing such infringement is made in plaint. Hence, the suit is one falling under Chapter XII of the Copyright Act, 1957. Sec.62(1) of the Act provides that every suit arising under the said Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright shall be instituted in the District Court having jurisdiction. Hence, the suit is one falling under Chapter XII of the Copyright Act, 1957. Sec.62(1) of the Act provides that every suit arising under the said Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright shall be instituted in the District Court having jurisdiction. Sub-Clause (2) of Sec.62 of the Act explains that for the purpose of Sub-sec.(1), a "District Court’ having jurisdiction shall include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction at the time of the institution of the suit, the person instituting the suit actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court at the time of the institution of this suit. Insofar as the City of Madras is concerned, this Court is the "District Court having jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Sec.62(l) of the Act. (Vide: The Daily Calendar Supply Bureau, Sivakasi v. The United Concern, A.I.R.1967 Mad.381." 14. In that judgment, the question of joinder of causes of action also came up for consideration. The learned Judge held that the joinder of causes of action should not be in contravention of any particular provision of law which could be an abuse of process of Court. The learned Judge held that the intention behind Sec.62(2) of the Copyright Act is to save the wronged person whose copyright has been infringed from the trouble or inconveninence of going to use the defendant at another place which may very often be a far away place. In that view, the learned Judge held that joinder of causes of action in that case was not proper and declined the issue against the plaintiff. 15. That part of the decision was taken in appeal before a Division Bench was taken in appeal before a Division Bench in O.S.A.Nos.278 and 279 of 1989. The judgment of the Division Bench is a reported in Brooke Bond India Limited v. Balaji Tea (India) Private Limited, (1989)2 M.L.J. 132. The Division Bench, in paragraph 6 of the judgment, held that insofar as the institution of the suit is concerned, the decision of the learned judge is proper and correct. The Division Bench reversed the decision of the learned Judge regarding joinder of causes of action. The Division Bench, in paragraph 6 of the judgment, held that insofar as the institution of the suit is concerned, the decision of the learned judge is proper and correct. The Division Bench reversed the decision of the learned Judge regarding joinder of causes of action. The relevant portion of the Division Bench judgment reads thus: “Learned single Judge has held that the plaintiff/ appellant’s suit alleging infringement of copyright is maintainable in this Court. He has referred to Sec.62(1) of the Copyright Act and Sub-sec.(2) thereof which explains that for the purpose of Sub-sec.(i) a” district court having jurisdiction “ shall include a District Court within the local limits of the institution of the suit, the person instituting the suit actually and voluntarily reside” or carries on business or personally works for gain and said, “It is not in dispute that the plaintiff carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court at the time of the institution of this suit and insofar as the City of Madras is concerned, this Court is the” District Court having jurisdiction “ within the meaning of Sec.62(1) of the Act.”...“ In view of these binding decisions of this Court, it cannot be said that this Court has no jurisdiction in view of Sec.62 of the Copyright Act. 16. The learned counsel then submitted that the High Court is exercising the power only under Letters Patent and that cannot be treated as law. According to the learned counsel, the Letters Patent is only is charter. For the said purpose, he relied on Sec.100-A of the Civil Procedure Code. Sec.100-A, C.P.C. deals with appeals from second appeals. It says:” notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal“. Th learned counsel stated that when words” any other instrument having the force of law or in any other la1 for the time being in force “ are already there, specific mention of Letters Patent in that Section makes it clear that since it is not a law, but only a chapter, Letters Patent cannot be treated as having the force of law. 17. According to me, the said contention of the learned counsel has no force. 18. ‘Letters Patent’ was all along treated as law, but its application was limited only to Chartered High Courts. That is why the words ‘or in any other instrument having the force of law’ are reiterated. Even if we consider the Letters Patent as the instrument not a law or it has the force of law. Again, the said contention of the learned counsel for the defendant cannot have any force view of decided cases. 19. In Chunnilal Basu and another v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta and others, A.I.R. 1972 Cal.470, this point was dealt with (in paragraph 30). The Calcutta High Court held that Letters Patent is the law in force, and it comes within the definition of ‘existing central law’ and the same has the force of law. Paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment read thus: ”Next Mr. John placed before me the definition of “Indian Law” as defined in Sub-sec. (29) of Sec.3 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897). It runs thus: “Indian Law shall mean any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, Rule, Order, by-law or other Instrument, which before the commencement of the Constitution, had the force of law in any province of India or part thereof or thereafter had the force of law in any Part A State of Part C. State or part thereof but does not include any Act of Parliament of United Kingdom or any Order in Council, rule or other instrument’ made under such Act”. Mr. John has submitted from the above definition that as the Letters Patent was promulgated under the provisions of the Act of Parliament it should never be considered to be a part and parcel of the Indian Law and that is should have no application in any part of India after the promulgation of the Constitution. Mr. John has submitted from the above definition that as the Letters Patent was promulgated under the provisions of the Act of Parliament it should never be considered to be a part and parcel of the Indian Law and that is should have no application in any part of India after the promulgation of the Constitution. From the above Mr.John has submitted that the Letters Patent should be deemed to have come to an end. Mr.Deb, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 on the other hand, has disputed the said contention and asserted that the Letters Patent cannot be said to have come to an end. According to Mr.Deb those provisions are still in force. Mr.Deb has drawn the attention of the Court to Chapter V of the Part VI of the Constitution of India. Art.214 to Art.23 1 of the Constitution relate to the establishment and Constitution of the High Court as well as appointment of High Court Judges and some other provisions concerning High Court. The relevant Article for our consideration is Art.225 of the Constitution. The said Article reads "subjects to the provisions of this law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court including any power to snake rules of court and to regulate the sittings of the court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution". Art.372(1) may also be referred to in this connection. It provides: "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactment referred to in Art.395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or.amended by competent legislature or other authority". Mr.Deb has submitted that the underlined portions of the Articles referred are relevant for the determination of the point at issue. The Letters Patent, being the law in force and the law administered on the appointed day, should be taken as continuing as law of the land. Mr.Deb has submitted that the underlined portions of the Articles referred are relevant for the determination of the point at issue. The Letters Patent, being the law in force and the law administered on the appointed day, should be taken as continuing as law of the land. In answer to the contention of Mr.John regarding the implication of the "existing Central Laws Mr.Deb, on the other hand, contended that we should "not import, the words "existing Central Laws" in those Articles (Arts.225 and 372) to give some meaning to the same when those words are excluded and the words "laws in force" and Law administered" have been used. I also agree with the said contentions of Dr.Deb and hold that the Letters Patent, 1865 being the law in force and also being the law administered, the same were not affected by the definition of the "existing Central Law". As such the said contention of Mr.John fails". 20.. In Edward Mills Company Limited v. State of Ajmer, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 25: 1955 S.C.A. 24: 1955 S.C.J.42: (1955)1 S.C.R.735: (1955)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 1, the question that came up for consideration was, what the meaning of ‘law in force’ under Art.372 of the Constitution of India. Relevant portions of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the said decision are complete answer for the contention of the defendant. "Thus Clause (1) of the article provides for continuance, in force, of the existing laws notwithstanding the repeal by the Constitution of the enactment mentioned in Art.395 and Clause (2) provides for their adaptation with a view to bring them into accord with the provisions of the Constitution. The Government of India Act, 1935 undoubtedly stands repealed by Art.395 of the Constitution but laws made thereunder which were in existence immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, would continue under Art.372(1) and could be adapted under the second clause of that article. Mr.Chatterjee argues that Art.372 has no application to the present case inasmuch as the order made by the Central Government under Sec.94(3) of the Government of India Act could not be regarded as ‘a law in force’ within the meaning of Art.372. Mr.Chatterjee argues that Art.372 has no application to the present case inasmuch as the order made by the Central Government under Sec.94(3) of the Government of India Act could not be regarded as ‘a law in force’ within the meaning of Art.372. A distinction is sought to be made by the learned counsel between an "existing law" as defined in Art.366(10) and a ‘law in force’ and it is argued that though an ‘order’ can come within the definition of "existing law", it cannot be included within the expression law in force’ as used in Art.372. It is argued next that even if the word ‘law’ is wide enough to include an order, that order must be a legislative and not a mere executive order promulgated by an administrative authority, and in support of his contention the learned counsel has relied on a number of cases decided by the Privy Council and the different High Courts in India. The first point does not impress us much and we do not think that there is any material difference between "an existing law" and "a law in force". Quite apart from Art.366(10) of the Constitution, the expression "Indian Law" has itself been defined in Sec.3(29) of the General Clauses Act as meaning any Act, ordinance, regulation, rule, order, or bylaw which before the commencement of the Constitution had the force of law in any province of India or part thereof. In our opinion, the words "law in force" as used in Art.372 are wide enough to include not merely a legislative enactment but also any regulation or order which has the force of law..........". 21. In view of Sec.120 of the Civil Procedure Code, Sec.20 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to the facts of this case. Sec.62 of the Copyright Act being a special enactment so far as the copyright infringements are concerned, that has to prevail, and the place where the plaintiff resides or carries on business or works for gain, is the court which has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 22. In view of this finding, the application by the defendant to revoke the leave already granted by this Court, is dismissed. No costs.