Judgment :- Dhinakar, J. Baby Mathew, who was under the employment of the respondents died on 29-3-1989 on account of an attack made against him when he was about to leave the premises wherein he was working as a salesman in the arrack shop at Anakkara. His legal heirs filed a petition for compensation before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and on being denied an award by the Commissioner have preferred this M.F.A. 2. The Commissioner refused to order compensation on the ground that Baby Mathew was not a workman within the meaning of S.2(1)(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 (for short'the act). It was also held by the Commissioner that the arrack shop wherein Baby Mathew was working is an establishment covered under S.2(15) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1960. Both sides have agreed that the above said finding that the arrack shop is an establishment covered under S.2(15) is not relevant for deciding the question in this M.F.A. 3. Two questions arise for our consideration in this M.F.A. and they are: (1) Whether Baby Mathew was a workman as contemplated under S.2(1)(n) of the Act? (2) Whether the homicidal attack made on Baby Mathew can be termed as an "accident" as contemplated under S.3 of the Act'? 4. It is not in dispute mat Baby Mathew was employed by the respondents as a salesman in the arrack shop and that on the night of 29-3-1989 when he was about to leave some people attacked them as a result of which he died. Under the Act, workman means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business) who is employed in any such capacity, as is specified in Schedule II. The schedule appended to the Act states that a person employed for the purpose of making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise adapting for use, transport or sale of any article or part of an article in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof twenty or more persons are so employed. The schedule appended to the Act states that a person employed for the purpose of making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise adapting for use, transport or sale of any article or part of an article in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof twenty or more persons are so employed. An Explanation further clarifies mat for the purposes of this clause persons employed outside such premises of precincts but in any work incidental to, or connected with, the work relating to making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise adapting for use, transport or sale of any article or part of an article shall be deemed to be employed within such premises or precincts. The Act being a welfare legislation we have to give a wider interpretation to the provisions of the Act. It is admitted that Baby Mathew was a salesman in the arrack shop of the respondents. Clause (iii) of Schedule II makes it clear that to be a workman aperson must be employed for the purpose of making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, and finishing. It also further says that if any article or part of an article in any premises was otherwise adapted for use, transport or sale by the person employed then such person becomes a workman. Once it is agreed that Baby Mathew was a salesman in the arrack shop it is clear mat he was adapting for sale of an article, viz. the arrack in the said shop. There can be no doubt in view of clause (iii) of Schedule II that Baby Mathew was a workman as defined under S.2(1)(n) of the Act. 5. In Savlaram Vilhoba v. Salubai Vilhoba & others (AIR 1938 Bom.171) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court look the view that where the whole process of work on which or part of which the workman is employed comes within the description of "adapting-goods for transport or sale" the workman falls within Schedule II Clause (iii), although it may not be shown that he himself actually took part in that portion of the process which involves any physical work on or alteration of the article in question. The workman concerned in the above said Bombay case was employed as a salesman in a godown where the practice was for purchasers of cotton bales 10 go down to the godown in order to take delivery of the bales and the purchaser was given a delivery order in respect of the number of unascertained bales which he has purchased. Beaumont, C.J. speaking for the Bench slated: "I think that if the whole process of work on which or part of which the workman is employed conies within the description of "adapting goods for transporter sale", the workman falls within the schedule, although it may not be shown that he himself actually took part in that portion of the process which involves any physical work on or alteration of the article in question." The said observation is in tune with the view which we have taken. We therefore hold mat Baby Mathew was a workman as defined under the Act. 6. The next question for us to consider is whether the homicidal attack which was perpetrated upon Baby Mathew on the fateful night can be termed as an accident to attract S.3 of the act. Section 3 runs as follows: " If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:" It was contended before us that Baby Mathew did not suffer an injury on account of an accident but only on account of an attack made upon hi in. We are not able to agree with the said contention. When there is a lack of design on the part of a person who suffered that injury then the act which caused that injury on that person is certainly an accident. Here Baby Mathew did not certainly have any design to suffer a homicidal attack though it can be said that there was design on the pail of the attackers to cause injuries on Baby Mathew. 7. Here Baby Mathew did not certainly have any design to suffer a homicidal attack though it can be said that there was design on the pail of the attackers to cause injuries on Baby Mathew. 7. In Varkeyaclian v. Thoiniiian (1979 KLT 97) a Division Bench of this Court took the view mat the term 'accident' for the purpose of the law relating to compensation for personal injuries sustained by workmen and the employer's liability in that behalf includes any injury which is not designed by the workman himself, and it is of no consequence that the injury was designed and intended by the person inflicting the same. We adopt the said view of the earlier Division Bench. 8. The Commissioner did not give any finding as to whether the accident was one which arose out of and in the course of the employment of Baby Mathew. As there is no such finding by the Commissioner which could only be decided by him on facts we consider it expedient to remand the matter back to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation so as to enable the parties to let in evidence on this aspect, viz. whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. 9. The M.F.A. is disposed of by directing the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to dispose of the claim afresh in accordance with law.