ORDER S.K. Dubey, J. 1. By this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order of the Labour Court, Durg dated 23-9-1981 passed in Case No. 127/MPIR/87 (Annexure-C) and the order of the Industrial Court dated 29-9-1984 (Annexure-D), whereby the order dated 26-9-1967 passed by the employer, the respondent No. 3 (Annexure-A) imposing punishment of reduction of pay-scale of the petitioner to minimum of the lower grade of Turner Rs. 135-175/- from the grade of Rs. 156-231/- for a period of five years with effect form the date of service on the charges of misconduct levelled in the charge-sheet dated 12-8-1967 was upheld. 2. The petitioner contends that exactly on the same set of facts and the circumstances, the same charges were also levelled against one Narhari Tripathi. A common domestic enquiry was held against both. After conclusion of the common enquiry, the petitioner was inflicted a penalty of reduction to lower grade as ordered in (Annexure-A), while Narhari Tripathi was dismissed from service. The petitioner and Narhari Tripathi challenged the orders of punishment before the Labour Court by their separate applications under Section 31(3) read with Sections 61 and 62 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short the Act'). The Labour Court dismissed the applications of both the employees. The petitioner and Narhari Tripathi aggrieved of the order of Labour Court filed two separate revisions under Section 66 of the Act, (now stands omitted by M. P. Act 41/1981), before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court dismissed the said revisions. The petitioner and Narhari Tripathi challenged the orders of the Labour Court and that of Industrial Court, passed in Revisions by a writ petition M. P. No. 722 of 1972. A Division Bench of this Court quashed the orders so challenged and remitted the case to the Labour Court vide order dated 15-2-1979, with a direction to consider the report of the Enquiry Committee along with the evidence collected in the domestic enquiry without taking further evidence and to record its own conclusions on the charges against the petitioner and Narhari Tripathi with a further direction that in case it is found that all or some of the charges are proved against the two employees, the Labour Court would then decide as to what penalty should be awarded and to what reliefs the two employees are entitled. 3. 3. After the order of this Court in M. P. No. 722 of 1972, the Labour Court recorded a finding in case of Narhari Tripathi that he disobeyed the lawful and reasonable orders of the superiors and did not perform his duties therefore, committed a misconduct under clause 12(l)(d) of Standard Standing Orders of the M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963, framed under M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961. But, the Labour Court interfered in the order of punishment being too harsh and excessive, hence, directed reinstatement forfeiting back wages as a measure of punishment. However, in case of the petitioner the punishment awarded by the employer was maintained by the Labour Court. 4. Against order of the Labour Court, the petitioner as well as Narhari Tripathi again preferred revisions under Section 66 of the Act before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court held that the act committed by Narhari Tripathi did not amount to misconduct and, therefore, allowed his revision, vide order dated 3-4-1984 (Annexure-B), set aside the order of Labour Court of withholding of back wages and directed reinstatement with full back wages. While, the revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Hence, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 5. The respondent/employer, aggrieved of the order in revision filed by Narhari Tripathi, also filed a writ petition M. P. No. 629/84 at Bench of this Court at Indore, wherein a compromise was arrived at between the respondent/employer and Narhari Tripathi, in which 25% of back wages from the date of dismissal i.e. 26th September, 1967 till his reinstatement on 22-8-1972, were agreed to be forfeited as penalty. Accordingly, the order of the Industrial Court was modified by the order dated 20-4-1987/passed in the said petition M. P. No. 629 of 1984. A photo copy of the order was filed by the respondent/employer during the course of hearing. 6. Smt. Indira Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the same set of facts, same charges, and the common evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry against the petitioner as well as Narhari Tripathi, the Industrial Court exonerated Narhari Tripathi holding the act committed by Narhari Tripathi as not constituting any misconduct. 6. Smt. Indira Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on the same set of facts, same charges, and the common evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry against the petitioner as well as Narhari Tripathi, the Industrial Court exonerated Narhari Tripathi holding the act committed by Narhari Tripathi as not constituting any misconduct. But, on the other hand the same Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court while deciding the revision of the petitioner by a separate order dated 29-9-1984, dismissed the revision of the petitioner without distinguishing the case of the petitioner with that of. Narhari Tripathi. Learned counsel submits that on the same facts, common evidence on the common charges two inconsistent orders have been passed by the Industrial Court which cannot stand. The Industrial Court lost sight of the fact of passing of the order in revision of Narhari Tripathi which was earlier in point of time. Not only this, such an order of punishment upheld by the Labour Court and Industrial Court has resulted in discrimination in the matter of punishment and hit by the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution, Counsel pressed into service two decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Iron and Metal Traders Pvt. Ltd. v. M. S. Haskiel, AIR 1984 SC 629 and Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1984 SC 1499 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Moolchand v. Jiwaji University, 1993 MPLJ 744 = 1993 JU 332. 7. Shri G. M. Chapekar, Senior Advocate appearing with Shri A. K. Khaskalam, contended that though the discrimination may be brought about either by the Legislature or the Executive or even the Judiciary and the inhibition of Article 14 can extend to all actions of the State denying equal protection of the laws whether it be an action of any one of the three limbs of the State. However, in case of judicial decisions, it has to be remembered that the judicial decisions are to be considered on the facts of each particular case and that what may specifically appear to be unequal application of law, may necessarily amount to equal protection of law, unless an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination is demonstrated. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 . Reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 . Hence, it was submitted that as no such intentional or purposeful discrimination is pointed out, and, on the same set of evidence, the acts committed by the petitioner constituted misconduct, the order of punishment was maintained by two Courts. The findings recorded are findings of facts, hence, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be made, reliance was placed on a decision of Supreme Court in case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, AIR 1984 SC 38 . It was also submitted that this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot interfere in the matter of punishment substituting the punishment being excessive or exonerating the petitioner/employee, a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Jitendra Singh v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976 was cited. 8. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this matter should go back to the Industrial Court for deciding the revision petition of the petitioner afresh. Admittedly, against the petitioner and Narhari Tripathi, on exactly the same facts and common charges of misconduct a common enquiry was held. After conclusion of the enquiry, the Management dismissed Narhari Tripathi from service while the petitioner was awarded a lesser punishment of reduction in lower grade of Turner. Both the employees challenged the orders of punishment before the Labour Court. Ultimately, in second round in case of Narhari Tripathi, the Industrial Court recorded a finding that the acts alleged and committed by Narhari Tripathi do not constitute the misconduct, hence, exonerating Narhari Tripathi set aside the order of punishment of forfeiture of back wages. On the other hand, on the same set of facts, charges and evidence against the petitioner, the Industrial Court recorded a different and inconsistent finding and maintained the order of punishment. In the circumstances, the order of this Court passed in M. P. No. 629/84, based on compromise will not bind the petitioner, as the petitioner was not a party to that nor it would be binding as precedent, as it is axiomatic that when a direction or order is made by consent of the parties, the Court does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay down any principle. Quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty because without an investigation into the facts, it could not be assumed whether a similar direction must or to be made as a measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 . 9. Coming to discrimination, it is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution protects all persons from discrimination by the Legislature as well as Executive organs of the State. Therefore, it is expected from public officials that they will discharge their duties honestly in accordance with rule of law. This is the presumption which is heightened when the law places a discretion in the higher authorities as distinguished from minor officials. By placing the two petitioners in a group and dealing with them with the drastic action, who have committed the same acts of alleged misconduct, if not treated alike in the matter of punishment without any distinguishing features, that,will give rise to a vice of Article 14. See the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Iron and Metal Traders and Sengara Singh (supra) and a decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Moolchand (supra). 10. It is equally well settled that Article 14 extends to all State actions even acts of judiciary and would hit arbitrary or wilful discrimination by a Court. True, the Article does not guarantee uniformity of decisions or the exercise of judicial discretion. Every judicial decision must depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case before the Court and what may specifically appear to be unequal application of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law unless there is shown to be present in it an element and purposeful or conscious discrimination. However, a discrimination, arising out of oversight is no discrimination at all as the mistake committed by oversight can always be rectified. See Bhudan Choudhry's case (supra) and Ramnath Verma and Ors. etc. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 603 . 11. However, a discrimination, arising out of oversight is no discrimination at all as the mistake committed by oversight can always be rectified. See Bhudan Choudhry's case (supra) and Ramnath Verma and Ors. etc. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 603 . 11. Much reliance has been placed by the respondent's counsel on Budhan Choudhry's case, it will be appropriate to refer a passage from para 9 at page 195 which reads thus :- "It is suggested that discrimination may be brought about either by the Legislature or the Executive or even the Judiciary and the inhibition of Article 14 extends to all actions of the State denying equal protection of the laws whether it be the action of anyofce of the three limbs of the State. It has, however, to be remembered that, in the language of Frankfurter, J., in - 'Snowden v. Hughes', (1943) 321 U.S. 1 (K) "the Constitution does not assure uniformity of decisions or immunity from merely erroneous action,-whether by the Courts or the executive agencies of a State." The judicial decision must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination (See per Stone, C. J. in - 'Snowden v. Hughes; (K) (supra)". 12. True, in the case in hand, there is no suggestion whatsoever by the petitioner of intentional and purposeful discrimination. However, in the opinion of this Court the contention of the petitioner deserves consideration as recording of two inconsistent findings and conclusions on the same set of facts and circumstances, on same charges of misconduct on the same set of evidence adduced in the enquiry and on the same set of pleadings the Industrial Court committed a mistake without distinguishing the case of the petitioner with that of Narhari Tripathi who was exonerated holding that acts alleged and proved do not constitute misconduct. While the petitioner's punishment was maintained, may be because of oversight or inadvertently. It may not be considered as discrimination in two persons similarly situated without any distinction, but, the mistake crept in requires to be rectified, unless the Industrial Court on reappraisal distinguishes the case of the petitioner with that of Narhari Tripathi. While the petitioner's punishment was maintained, may be because of oversight or inadvertently. It may not be considered as discrimination in two persons similarly situated without any distinction, but, the mistake crept in requires to be rectified, unless the Industrial Court on reappraisal distinguishes the case of the petitioner with that of Narhari Tripathi. 13. As a result of the above discussion, the petition is allowed. The order of the Industrial Court is quashed and the matter is sent back to the Industrial Court for deciding the revision afresh in accordance with law. Parties shall appear before the Industrial Court, Bench at Raipur on 28th September, 1995 for which no notice need issued to the parties as they have been noticed through their counsel here. In the circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner.