JUDGMENT R.D. Shukla, J. 1. The appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 14.10.1988 of Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Indore, passed in Claim Case No. 76 of 1987, whereby claimants-appellants' petition for compensation has been dismissed. 2. This is not in dispute that motor bus No. MPW 9204 was owned by respondent No. 2 and was being driven by the respondent No. 1, at the time of accident, i.e., 14.7.1987. The respondent No. 1 was in the employment of respondent No. 2. The original respondent No. 3, Surendrasingh, who died during the pendency of the claim petition before the Tribunal, was the driver and owner of motor cycle No. MPN 6711. This is also not in dispute that claimant-appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are parents of deceased Chandra Shekhar Vyas and Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are his brothers. It is also not in dispute that this Chandra Shekhar Vyas was a political worker and was a Member of Legislative Assembly at the relevant period. 3. The claimants-appellants' contention, in brief, is that deceased Chandra Shekhar Vyas was sitting as a pillion rider on the motor cycle. The same was being driven by Surendrasingh cautiously and in slow speed. A young boy tried to cross the road all of a sudden on a bicycle. Surendrasingh, therefore, swerved the motor cycle towards right. Meanwhile, the bus driven by respondent No. 1 came with a high speed and dashed against the motor cycle. Chandra Shekhar was thrown, sustained grievous injuries and was admitted in M.Y. Hospital for treatment, but died on 3.8.1987. Deceased Chandra Shekhar Vyas was unmarried. The appellants, i.e., claimant Nos. 1 and 2 (parents of Chandra Shekhar) and his brother Sharad Vyas, claimant No. 5, were wholly depending on him. It was further pleaded that deceased Vyas was an M.L.A., Member of Senate of the Indore University and was Director of Citizen Urban Co-operative Bank. He also used to support the work of Heera Market and was getting a salary of Rs. 600/- p.m. for that work. The income of Vyas was nearly Rs. 1,500/- p.m. As the bread-earner of the family has expired, the claimants are facing hardship. A total compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh) was, therefore, demanded. 4. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 made appearance in the court and refuted the assertions made by the claimants. 600/- p.m. for that work. The income of Vyas was nearly Rs. 1,500/- p.m. As the bread-earner of the family has expired, the claimants are facing hardship. A total compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh) was, therefore, demanded. 4. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 made appearance in the court and refuted the assertions made by the claimants. It was asserted by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that the driver of motor cycle, i.e., Surendrasingh was wholly responsible for the accident as he took a sudden swerve towards the right side and dashed against the stationary bus which was stopped by the bus driver after locating the collision between motor cycle and bicycle. Surendrasingh also filed written statement and accepted the contention of the claimants. However, he died during the pendency of petition. His legal representatives were not brought on record. The learned Tribunal found that Surendrasingh was wholly responsible for the accident and, therefore, dismissed the claim petition in tola. Hence, this appeal. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the driver, respondent No. 1, must have located the boy crossing the road and, therefore, he ought to have slowed down the vehicle (i.e., bus) and thereby could have aborted the accident. Thus, he did not avail the last opportunity of aborting the accident. As against it, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that Surendrasingh being the driver of the motor cycle must have located the approaching bus and, therefore, he ought not to have swerved the vehicle towards the right which ultimately resulted in accident. 6. We were taken to the evidence on record. This appears to be a case of composite negligence. Reference may be had to a case decided by us, Gujarat State Road Trans. Corporation v. Shardabai, M.A. No. 228 of 1987; decided on 25.8.1995. 7. Chandra Shekhar Vyas was a pillion rider. He was not driving the vehicle himself and, therefore, it could not be said that he contributed to the accident. It was the negligence of the two drivers (i.e., driver of the bus and the driver of the motor cycle) which contributed to the accident and, therefore, so far as legal representatives of Chandra Shekhar Vyas are concerned, they are entitled to the compensation. 8. It was the negligence of the two drivers (i.e., driver of the bus and the driver of the motor cycle) which contributed to the accident and, therefore, so far as legal representatives of Chandra Shekhar Vyas are concerned, they are entitled to the compensation. 8. Ravi Shankar Shukla, CW 6, has supported the contention of the claimants and stated that the driver of the motor cycle tried to abort collision and save the boy crossing the road suddenly and thereby swerved the vehicle towards the right. Meanwhile, the bus driven by respondent No. 1 came with a high speed and dashed against the motor cycle. No suggestion has been made from the side of respondents regarding the assertion of stopping the vehicle after locating the approaching motor cycle. Under the circumstances it will be deemed that respondents accepted this contention of Ravi Shankar Shukla. Reference may be had to A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian AIR 1961 Cal 359 , wherein it has been held as under: Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. This is not merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. This much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. We also affirm the same view. 9. Respondents' witness, Mahendra singh, DW 1, has supported the assertions made in the written statement and stated that motor cycle came at a high speed and dashed against the stationary bus which was stopped by him after locating the motor cycle and the bicycle. It has been pleaded by the respondents that there was collision between motor cycle and bicycle as well. But, there is absolutely no evidence to support this contention of the respondents. It has been pleaded by the respondents that there was collision between motor cycle and bicycle as well. But, there is absolutely no evidence to support this contention of the respondents. Under these circumstances and in view of the finding given above regarding absence of suggestion, we hold that the driver of the motor cycle and the driver of the bus both were responsible for the accident. This may further be observed here that heavier the vehicle greater is the responsibility on the driver to keep control over it. It appears that the driver of bus did not avail the last opportunity of aborting the accident. He did not stop the bus after locating the bicycle whereby a boy was trying to cross the road. Had he stopped the bus probably the accident could have been aborted. In view of the above, we hold both of them (i.e., deceased Surendrasingh and the driver of motor bus Mahendra singh) equally responsible for the accident. 10. Normally, a claimant sues either of the joint tortfeasors but in this case though Surendrasingh was made a party at the initial stage, but later on after his death no legal representative was substituted. Thus, it appears that the claimant purposely avoided apportionment of liability. 11. The claimants have stated that the income of Chandra Shekhar Vyas was nearly Rs. 1,500/- p.m. That appears to be correct as Chandra Shekhar Vyas was holding various political posts including Member of M.P. Legislative Assembly. As deceased was a political worker, his expenses on person or his associates must have been slightly more and, therefore, if 50 per cent amount is deducted towards his personal expenses it can very well be inferred that he was supporting his family members, i.e, parents and crippled and infirm brother, to the extent of Rs. 750/-p.m., which comes to Rs. 9,000/- per year. The claimant (father of deceased Vyas) Prayagdatta was aged 60 years and the mother, Saraswatidevi, was aged 55 years at the time of accident. The physically infirm brother Sharad, who was allegedly dependent on deceased Chandra Shekhar Vyas was aged about 24 years. In such a situation a multiplier of 12 would be proper to be applied. On applying the multiplier as such the loss comes to Rs. 1,08,000/-. The claimants are further entitled for loss of love and affection. An amount of Rs. The physically infirm brother Sharad, who was allegedly dependent on deceased Chandra Shekhar Vyas was aged about 24 years. In such a situation a multiplier of 12 would be proper to be applied. On applying the multiplier as such the loss comes to Rs. 1,08,000/-. The claimants are further entitled for loss of love and affection. An amount of Rs. 12,000/- would be proper on this head. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 1,20,000/-. Since claimants have purposely avoided apportionment by not bringing the legal representatives of Surendrasingh on record, we direct that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would be liable to pay only 50 per cent of the amount of compensation which comes to Rs. 60,000/-. 12. As a result, we allow the appeal partly and further direct that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall pay Rs. 60,000/- to the claimant Nos. 1, 2 and 5. They shall further pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application till realisation of the same. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000/-.