Honble KOKJE, J. – These petitions raise common points and therefore, were heard together and being decided together by this Order. (2). The petitioners in all these petitions were appointed to the posts in Class IV service of the Government of Rajasthan. They had applied in response to an advertisement.They were called for an interview and after interview, were appointed in the Pay Scale of Rs. 775-1025. The appointments were for a fixed period which was extended from time to time. In the months of March, April and May 1994, orders terminating the services of the petitioners were issued by the respondents. No specific reasons were stated in the Order of termination but only orders of the Director of Primary and Secondary Education, Bikaner were quoted as the basis for passing the Order. The petitioners contend that the termination of the services of the petitioners is extremely arbitrary and discriminatory. According to them, the petitioners were fully eligible for the appointments to the posts and were appointed after following the process of recruitment prescribed by the Rules. The petitioners further contended that though their appointment orders were for a fixed period, but as they were appointed after due selection, they held substantive posts. It was also contended that the principles of natural justice required a hearing to the petitioners before their appointments were held to be illegal. It was further contended that in some of the Districts of the State, such appointments were continued which would clearly show that the petitioners were discriminated against. The petitioners also contended that even assuming that while making appointments, the Rules were not strictly followed even then, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer as they were not at fault. When the petitioners were eligible and the essential provisions of the Rules were followed, some minor discrepancies in the procedure followed for the purpose of selection cannot render the appointments invalid. (3). In reply, the respondents contention was that the appointments were made against the Rules and therefore were not legal and valid. It was also contended that the appointments were made ignoring the total ban on appointments imposed by the State Government. The State Governments Circular making it compulsory to make recruitment through Employment Exchanges alone was stated to be flouted. In reply, the respondents contention was that the appointments were made against the Rules and therefore were not legal and valid. It was also contended that the appointments were made ignoring the total ban on appointments imposed by the State Government. The State Governments Circular making it compulsory to make recruitment through Employment Exchanges alone was stated to be flouted. It was further contended that certain complaints were made by the various Organisations like National Students Union of India, Rajasthan Rajya Karmchari Mahasangh and the District Employment Office, complaining about illegalities and irregularities in the process of the appointments. It was contended that the appointments were for a specific term and therefore, they could not be taken as substantive appointments and could be terminated without any notice or hearing by the respondents. (4). The recruitments to the Class-IV service is governed by the Rajasthan Class IV Services (Recruitment and other Service Conditions) Rules, 1963 (for short `the Rules hereinafter). Part-IV of the Rules relates to procedure for direct recruitment. Rules 14, 15 and 16 fall in this Part. They are being reproduced herein below for ready reference. R.14 Procedure of Recruitment.- Application for direct recruitment to the post in the Service shall be invited by the Appointing Authority from the persons whose names have been registered in the Employment Excha- nge by advertising the vacancies to be filled in, in such manner as may be deemed fit. R.15. Scrutiny of Applications- The Appointing Authority shall scrutinise the applications received by him and require as many candidates qualified for appointment under these Rules as seem to him desirable to appear before him for interview: Provided that the decision of the Appointing Authority as to eligibility or otherwise of a candidate, shall be final. R.16. Selection of the Candidates.- The Appointing Authority shall prepare a list of the candidates whom he considers suitable for appointment to the posts concerned, arranged in the order of merit and appoint them in the same order, subject to the provision of Rule 8. The inclusion of a candidates name in the list confers no right to appoint him unless the Appointing Authority is satisfied after such enquiry as may be considered necessary that the candidate is suitable in all other respects for appointment to the Service. (5). The inclusion of a candidates name in the list confers no right to appoint him unless the Appointing Authority is satisfied after such enquiry as may be considered necessary that the candidate is suitable in all other respects for appointment to the Service. (5). It would be clear from the aforesaid Rules that it is not necessary under the Rules to publish an advertisement inviting applications for the post in the Official Gazette or in the News Paper. The vacancies have to be advertised in such manner as may be deemed fit. If the Appointing Authority decides to advertise the vacancies by putting in on Notice Board, it cannot be said to be against the Rules. It is also not necessary that the candidates should be sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The names of the candidates must have been registered in the Employment Exchange and the petitioners are not alleged to be persons whose names have not been registered in the Employment Exchange. There is nothing on record to suggest that Rule 14 aforesaid was violated. (6). Rule 15 of the Rules relates to scrutiny of applications and calling candidates for interview. There is no allegation that candidates were not interviewed before appointments. (7). Rule 16 of the Rules requires that the appointing authority shall prepare a list of the candidates whom he considers suitable for appointment, arrange their names in merit and appoint them in the same order. It has also not been pointed out that this Rule was violated. (8). From the documents filed along with the reply, what appears is that the respondents action was based on the report of preliminary enquiry made against Shri Ramesh Chandra Doshi, the then District Education Officer (Male), Rajsamand and one Harish Paliwal, Lower Division Clerk, District Education Office, Rajsamand. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Dy. Director (Female) Education, Ajmer Circle, Ajmer. In this report, the only illegalities and irregularities alleged to have been committed by the aforesaid two persons are not calling the names from Employment Exchange, giving appointments during the period of ban imposed by the State Government, not publishing advertisement inviting application on daily newspaper, by putting up cyclostyle notice on the Notice Board of the District Education Office and irregularities in conducting interview. As already pointed out calling the names through Employment Exchange and publishing advertisement in the newspapers, are not the requirements of the Rules. As regards giving appointment during the period of ban imposed by the State Government, that is a internal matter between the State Govern- ment and its Officers and third parties are not concerned with it. The appointments given during the ban cannot be said to be a illegal appointments or appointments which are against the Rules. The Officer who contravenes the instructions of the Government as regards the ban on appointments may be proceeded against for non-compliance of the orders of the Government. But the appointments given, if otherwise in accordance with the Rules, cannot be taken away on the ground that they were made flouting the ban imposed by the State Government on appointments during that particular period. So far as irregularities in conducting interviews, no specific instances have been pointed out on the basis of which it can be said that the appointments were vitiated by favouritism and arbitrariness. In such cases also, unless it is shown that the person who was appointed was responsible in any way for getting himself appointed out of turn, the appointments cannot be taken away. On such grounds, the Government may fefuse to appoint the selected candidates if it is not satisfied about the validity of the procedure adopted for selection. But after issuing appointment letters and after the candidates joining their posts, they cannot be thrown out on the ground that there was something wrong with the selection, unless of course something specific is found against the candidates so appointed. (9). Voluminous case law has been cited by the parties, but I would refer to some of the decisions. (10). G.S. Lamba and other vs. Union of India and others (1) was referred to show that in the matter of appointments if a Rule has not been followed, inference could be drawn that the operation of the Rule was rela- xed by the authorities. This can be done on the basis of consistent action taken in derogation of that rule. G.S. Lamba and other vs. Union of India and others (1) was referred to show that in the matter of appointments if a Rule has not been followed, inference could be drawn that the operation of the Rule was rela- xed by the authorities. This can be done on the basis of consistent action taken in derogation of that rule. It was therefore argued that when the appointments were made after substantially complying with the Rules, even if any of the requirements of the Rules or the executive instructions of the Government imposing the ban on appointments was not followed, it could be presumed that such requirements were relaxed in the case of the present selection. (11). Syed Mansoor Ali vs. State of Rajasthan and another (2), was cited for the proposition that an appointment given after following due process of selection, is a substantive appointment even if the order mentioned it to be a temporary appointment. (12). Nand Lal etc. etc. vs. State of Rajasthan (3), was cited for the proposition that even if the order of appointment is illegal or void in law still before termination of services, an opportunity of being heard should be given to the employee. (13). The petitioners also relied on the decision of this Court in Parmeshwar Lal vs. The State of Rajasthan & Others (4), for the proposition that termination of services of persons employed without reference to Employment Exchange is not illegal. This question has been considered by me in detail in Jagdish and others vs. The State & others (RLW 1996 (1) 619). When the Rule does not require that the candidates should be sponsored through the Employment Exchange, the appointments cannot be said to be invalid. (14) Learned counsel for the respondents relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Ram Pratap vs. State of Rajasthan and others (6), it was held that mere competence of the authority to issue orders of appointment is not conclusive for holding that the competent authority could issue orders of appointment even without the availability of vacancy. Availability of vacant post or a vacancy in the cadre constitute condition precedent for exercise of power of appointment by a competent authority. (15). Availability of vacant post or a vacancy in the cadre constitute condition precedent for exercise of power of appointment by a competent authority. (15). This decision would not apply to the facts of this case because here the case of the respondents is not that there were no vacancies against which the petitioners were appointed. (16). Bihar Rajya Vidyut Parishad Field Kamgar Union vs. State of Bihar and others (7), was cited on behalf of the respondents for the proposition that when disputed questions of fact are involved, writ petition is not the proper remedy. (17). In this particular case, the question as to the validity of termination of appointments and the question does not involve disputed facts, the ruling has therefore not application to the present case. (18). Relying on the decision of Supreme Court in J.K. Public Service Commission and others vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan and others (8), it was contended on behalf of the respondents that relaxation of the Recruitment Rules cannot be presumed in the case like the present one. In the aforesaid case, it was held that regularisation of appointees without being subjected to open competitive examination held by Public Service Commission, purportedly done in relaxation of the Recruitment Rules was invalid as only condition of the service could be relaxed and not the condition of the recruitment. The Government cannot use its executive power to supplant Recruitment of Rules. (19). In the present case, there is no question of relaxation of rule because it has been seen that the Rules have been followed and there has been no specific violation of any Rule. (20). Decision of Supreme Court in Union Territory of Chandigarh vs. Dilbagh Singh and others (9), was cited for the proposition that cancellation of selection list after it was found after enquiry that the selection involved favouritism and corruption at the behest of members of selection committee, cannot be challenged. No hearing to members of hearing committee was required in such a case. (21). This case is also distinguishable on the facts because the case before me is not of cancellation of selection list before appointments were made but of the termination of appointments on the ground that the selection process was found to be vitiated. The decision has therefore, no application. (22). For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are allowed. (21). This case is also distinguishable on the facts because the case before me is not of cancellation of selection list before appointments were made but of the termination of appointments on the ground that the selection process was found to be vitiated. The decision has therefore, no application. (22). For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are allowed. The respondents shall continue the petitioners as candidates appointed after due selection under the Rules. The orders of termination of the services of the petitioners, if already issued, are quashed. (23). There shall be no order as to costs.