Judgment (1.) R. H. Zaidi, J. This writ petition arises out of the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is directed against order passed by respondent No. 1 acting as appellate authority, allowing the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 22 of the Act. (2.) PETITIONER Haji Bakridan, since deceased, filed release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act alleging that he was owner landlord of the shop in question. Which was let out to Ramroop, respondent No. 2 on 30-5-1958, when he used to reside at Burma. PETITIONER came back to India from Burma in the year 1966 and wanted to settle his sons and grandchildren in business to be carried in the shop in dispute. He pleaded that his requirement for the shop in dispute was genuine and donate, Ramroop respondent No. 2 without permission of the petitioner sub-let the shop in dispute to respondent He, therefore will not face any hardship in the event the release application was allowed ; but in case of its rejection, petitioner would suffer irreparable loss comparatively and greater hardship. He, therefore, filed the aforesaid release application, which was mainly contested by Shiv Kumar respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 2 admitted that he had already vacated the shop in question and now it was respondent No. 3, who carrying on business in the same. Respondent No. 3, on the other hand, contended that the said application filed by petitioner was legally not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. In support of their contentions, the parties have filed oral and documentary evidence. The Prescribed Authority by means of order, dated 22-12-1979, which is contained in Annexure V to the writ petition, after recording the finding on the question of bonafide and genuine need as well as comparative hardship in favour of the petitioner, was pleased to allow the release application. Respondent No. 2 Ramroop did not file any appeal against the judgment and order, dated 22-12-1979. Appeal was only filed by Shiv Kumar respondent No. 3 before respondent No. 1. (3.) THE appellate authority by his order, dated 18-11-1980 was pleased to allow the appeal. Respondent No. 2 Ramroop did not file any appeal against the judgment and order, dated 22-12-1979. Appeal was only filed by Shiv Kumar respondent No. 3 before respondent No. 1. (3.) THE appellate authority by his order, dated 18-11-1980 was pleased to allow the appeal. It would not be out of place to state that although the appeal by respondent No. 3 was allowed by appellate authority, but the findings on questions of bonafide need and comparative hardship recorded by the Prescribed Authority in favour of the petitioner, were reversed, the appeal was allowed only on the ground that the application filed by petitioner was legally not maintainable, therefore, petitioner has challenged the validity of the impugned order dated 18-11-1980 in this petition. (4.) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. On behalf of the petitioner it has been contended that the view taken by appellate authority that the application filed by petitioner under Section 21 of the Act was not maintainable, is manifestly erroneous and illegal and that appellate authority has failed to take into consideration the provision of Section 23 of the Act and erred in law in holding that under the Act, no remedy was provided against sub tenant. It was contended that the release application filed by petitioner under Section 21 of the Act was legally maintainable. Learned Counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance upon the decision in Chhakki Lal v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Mainpuri, AIR 1977 All 8 . On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for 'contesting respondents contended that the judgment and order passed by the appellate authority was perfectly valid and that the release application filed by the petitioner was legally not maintainable. It was also contended that in execution of the order passed against Ramroop, respondent No. 2, Shiv Kumar respondent No. 3 could not be ejected from the shop in question. (5.) IN my opinion the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner have got force and they are very founded. It was also contended that in execution of the order passed against Ramroop, respondent No. 2, Shiv Kumar respondent No. 3 could not be ejected from the shop in question. (5.) IN my opinion the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner have got force and they are very founded. Section 23 of the Act is equated as under: "enforcement of Eviction Order.- (1) The Prescribed Authority may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made under Section 21 or an appeal under Section 22, as the case may be, or against any other person found in actual occupation, and for putting the landlord into possession. (2) Every order of the Prescribed Authority in proceedings under this section shall be final. From the plain reading of the aforesaid section it is apparent that the order passed against tenant under Section 21 or appeal under Section 22, as the case may be, can be executed against any person found in occupation and person found in occupation and after evicting the tenant or any other person, the landlord is to be put in possession. The facts of Chhakki Lal (supra) are similar to the facts of the present case, for the purpose of the present case it is not necessary to state the facts, it would suffice to quote the relevant passage from paragraph 2 of the said decision: "even in case of sub-letting as aforesaid, I am of the opinion that since no decree for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord can be passed under Section 20, it would still be open to the landlord, not to file a suit under Section 20, but to make an application under Section 21, provided he needs the accommodation bona fide for his own use. IN such a case a decree under Section 20 would serve no purpose unless the land lord after getting that tenant evicted succeeds in getting the building released in his favour and for that he will again have to make an application for release, of course, in that event, under Section 21 of the Act. IN such a case a decree under Section 20 would serve no purpose unless the land lord after getting that tenant evicted succeeds in getting the building released in his favour and for that he will again have to make an application for release, of course, in that event, under Section 21 of the Act. If, on the other hand, the order for release is passed under Section 21 on the ground that the accommodation is needed by the landlord bona fide, such sub-tenant would automatically be ejected along with the tenant under Section 23 of the Act. IN this way multiplicity of the proceedings would be avoided." (6.) IN view of the aforesaid decision, the observation made and finding recorded by the appellate authority are legally not sustainable. Respondent No. 1 has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and erred in law in holding that the application filed by petitioner under Section 21 of the Act was not maintainable. Normally the matter would have been sent back to the appellate authority for a decision afresh, but in the present case no useful purpose will be served inasmuch as the appellate authority has already affirmed the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority on the question of bona fide nature of need and comparative hardship in favour of petitioner. The appeal was allowed merely on the ground that the release application filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand the case to the appellate authority. The writ petition deserves to be allowed with costs. (7.) THE writ petition is allowed with costs. THE judgment and order passed by the respondent No. 1, dated 18-11-1980 is hereby quashed. Petition allowed.