This civil revision arises out of judgment and decree dated 8.3.94 passed by the Assistant District Judge No. 1, Cachar, Silchar in TA No.44 of 1991 dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 23.7.93 passed by the Munsiff No.3 Silchar in TS No. 132 of 1990 decreeing the plaintiff's suit for eviction of the defendant. 2. The opposite party as plaintiff instituted TS No. 132 of 1990 for eviction of the defendant from a house situated within Silchar Municipality on two ground : (1) on the ground of default; (2) that the house was required by the plaintiff i.e. on the ground of bonafide requirement. Both the Courts below found that the defendant was not a defaulter. So, the only ground which now survive for consideration is the ground of bonafide requirement. Another point which was raised in the written statement by the defendant is as follows : "That the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The plaintiff alone has no locus standi to file this suit. AH the heirs of late Ismail Mia, Ibrahim Mia and brother and sister of the plaintiff are necessary parties in this suit. In the absence of whom the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief. All the heirs of late Nepal Chandra Bose are necessary parties in this suit.'' ".... ...this suit without impleading the heirs of late Nepal Chandra Bose as parties in this suit. The suit of this present nature is not maintainable." 3. This point of non-joinder was also found by the Courts below in favour of the plaintiff. The pleadings regarding bonafide requirement is mentioned in para 2 of the plaint. A portion of which is quoted below : "... ...The plaintiff is now doing the business of selling cassette by sitting in the passage which runs from the residential house of the plaintiff to the PWD Road. The father of the plaintiff had two other brothers viz; Ismail and Ishak and each of them got in their share equally of the shop house situated by the side of the PWD Road. The plaintiff got the northern portion and heirs of Ismail got rooms on the south of the rooms of the plaintiff and south of this room is the passage to the PWD Road, where the plaintiff is now selling cassette. The plaintiff got the northern portion and heirs of Ismail got rooms on the south of the rooms of the plaintiff and south of this room is the passage to the PWD Road, where the plaintiff is now selling cassette. Out of 3 rooms of the plaintiff 2 rooms are the suit house and the northern most room of the plaintiff is in occupation (of SM Enterprises. As the plaintiff requires the suit houses for his business for maintaining his family, the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the house to enable the plaintiff to do business for his livelihood but the defendant did not vacate the house...." "...... the plaintiff bonafide requires the house for this own business...... the defendant has a vacant house in south of the building of Shri P. Das Advocate." 4. No. issue on bonafide requirement was framed by the Courts below, but that aspect to the matter was considered by the Courts below in deciding issue Nos.4 and 5. The issue Nos. 4 and 5 are as follows : Issue No. 4 : Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from he suit property ? Issue No. 5 : To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to ? 5. Section 5 (1) (c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 provides as follows: "5. Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejection.(1) (c) Where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purpose of repairs or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court." 6. In paragraph 12 of this revision it is stated as follows : "That after the decree was passed against the petitioner, one room of the plaintiff opposite party which is adjacent to the house under occupation of SM Enterprises fell vacant as the tenant of that room Shri B. Pal vacated the room. The plaintiff/ opposite party instead of himself occupying the same let out the same to a Dentist Dr. Laskar." 7. The plaintiff/ opposite party instead of himself occupying the same let out the same to a Dentist Dr. Laskar." 7. In ground No. (xiii) it is stated as follows : "For that after the decree was passed against the petitioner one rented house of the plaintiff fell vacant but the plaintiff instead of occupying the same himself, let out the same to one tenant. This fact which is a susbsequently event may be taken note of by this Hon'ble Court. This fact will go the disprove the plea of bonafide requirement which was set up by the plaintiff/opposite party." 8. The finding on bonafide requirement by the trial Court is as follows : "The next question cames up whether the plaintiff bonafide requires the house for his own use. The plaintiff in his pleadings as well as in evidence before Court stated that presently he has to run his business of selling cassette/by sitting in the passage which runs from the residential house of the plaintiff of the Central Road in most uncomfortable and inconvenient way due to want of accommodation .'Hence, he requires the suit house for carrying on his business activities. DW 1, the defendant in his cross stated that the plaintiff runs a cassette shop which covers an areas of 3 feet x 6 feet near the road side. To understand the issue of bonafide requirement of the suit premises local inspection of the suit premises and the premises d occupied by the plaintiff for his business was conducted in presence of learned Advocates for both parties on 11.6.93. It was found in course of local investigation as stated in para 2 of the memorandum of local inspection that at the extreme deft there is a private path of around 4 feet width. At the entrance of the path just below the staircase the plaintiff occupies as area of 2 feet x 6l/2 feet carried on his cassette business under name and style of Situ Music Centre. The fact that the e plaintiff due to want of proper accommodation has to carry on his business in a most uncomfortable and inconvenient place found corroboration from the local inspection of the suit premises and the cassette shop of the plaintiff. The fact that the e plaintiff due to want of proper accommodation has to carry on his business in a most uncomfortable and inconvenient place found corroboration from the local inspection of the suit premises and the cassette shop of the plaintiff. There is no evidence on record to show that the plaintiff has any other suitable vacant accommodation to shift his existing cassette shop neither the defendant could bring on record any material to show that the plaintiff has any ulterior motive or evil design to evict the defendant. Under the circumstances, it can be held that the plaintiff genuinely, pressingly and honestly needs the premises in question for his use. Hence the defendant is liable to be ejected from the suit house." 9. The finding of appellate Court is as follows : "......But the suit house is bonafide required for running business by the plaintiff himself. Case record further reveals that during trial the learned Court made a local investigation and submitted a report (memo) to that effect. While considering this vital part of the suit room is genuinely and honestly required for own business purposes of the plaintiff. The suit room was constructed by the predecessor of the plaintiff for their benefit and interest but leaving that room under occupation of the defendant he is running a shop for his livelihood on a small room of 2'x 6' where a man even cannot stand. It is not known from the facts of the case what should be more bonafide necessity for getting the suit room under his occupation. It is pressingly needed for him. Having the suit room which is located in the heart of the town and in the commercial centre under occupation of the defendant he was getting a monthly rent of Rs.60/- whereas for his own business he is standing on the foot path on a very small strip leaving his ancestral valuable property in the hand of-the defendant. I find the reasoning shown by the learned trial Court on this vital issue (Issue No. 4) is quite convincing and there is no necessity to interfere with his decision and reasonings." 10. I have heard Mr. BK Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. CKS Baruah, learned counsel for the opposite party. 11. Mr. Goswami fairly submits that the finding on bonafide requirement is a finding of fact. I have heard Mr. BK Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. CKS Baruah, learned counsel for the opposite party. 11. Mr. Goswami fairly submits that the finding on bonafide requirement is a finding of fact. But that finding of fact being a jurisdictional matter, the Court must be cautious in passing the decree for eviction and that finding of fact must be a proper one in the eye of law. Merely saying that the house in question is required by the plaintiff bonafide is not sufficient. The ground must be made out in the plaint as well as in the evidence and that bonafide requirement must exists all through even at the time of passing of the judgment and decree by the revisional Court and even if the revisional Court found that at that time the bonafide requirement as urged by the plaintiff is not in existence, the decree can be set aside. 12. The next ground urged by Mr. Goswami is that in a suit for ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement it is absolutely necessary to frame an issue on that point and non-framing of issue causes prejudice to the parties". The general law is that if no issues are framed and if the parties go to the trial knowing fully the case of the rival parties no prejudice is caused. But that cannot be utilised in case of a suit under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 on the ground of bonafide requirement and in this connection Mr. Goswami places reliance on AIR 1981 SC 1711 (Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad) v/here in paragraph 10 of the judgment the Supreme Court pointed out as follows : "...... In order to avail of the benefit conferred by section, 12 to seek eviction of the tenant the landlord must satisfy the essential ingredients of the section. The landlord in this case seeks eviction of the tenant under S. 12(1)(f), he must, therefore, establish (i) that he requires bonafide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business; and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of S. 12(1) (f)is squarely on the landlord. The burden to establish both the requirements of S. 12(1) (f)is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under S. 12 (1) (f) the Court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues namely (i) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bonafide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business and (ii) whether he proves that he has. no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Without elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleading is generally of no relevance." 13. There the Supreme Court considered section 12 of the MP Accommodation Control Act and section 12 (1) (f) of that Act reads as follows: "That the accommodation let for non-residential purpose is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing of starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and mat the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." 14. The Supreme Court pointed out that in such a matter there must be proper pleadings and issues must be framed. I am not inclined to set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below on the ground of non-framing of issues but the Courts below in deciding suits for ejectment on the ground of defaulter/bonafide requirement or such other matters, the Court is duty bound to frame proper issues to decide the matter. The Court should not take recourse to the principle that non-framing of issues is not fatal inasmuch as if the parties go to the trial knowing the case of the rival parties fully. The Court should not take recourse to the principle that non-framing of issues is not fatal inasmuch as if the parties go to the trial knowing the case of the rival parties fully. Where the Courts derive jurisdiction to grant relief on establishment of certain facts that should be put in issue always and invariably to bring it to the focus to establish the ingredients to bring home the facts necessary to establish or negate it. 15. Mr. Goswami also places reliance in AIR 1987 SC 1984 (Budhwanti vs. Gulab Chand Prasad) where in paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out as follows : "...... It is true that in a second appeal a finding on fact even if erroneous will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the finding is vitiated by application of wrong tests or on the basis of conjectures and assumptions then a High Court will be well within its rights in setting aside in a second appeal a patently erroneous finding in order to render justice to the party affected by the erroneous finding." 16. The next case relied by Mr. Goswami is AIR 1990 SC 723 (Hira Lal vs. Gajjan) where the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment pointed out as follows : "....... So also in a case where the Court below ignored the weight of evidence and allowed the judgment to be influenced by inconsequential matters, the High Court would be justified in representing the evidence and coming to its own independent decision as held in Madan Lal vs. Gopi, AIR 1980 SC 1754 ." 17. In the findings of the Courts below as quoted above, there is no discussion of evidence and/or the tests which are required to be applied for deciding the question of bonafide requirement. It is settled law that the bonafide requirement of the landlord should be genuine and honest and conceived in good faith and the Courts below must also come to a finding that it is reasonable. The landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it, that desire to become 'requirement' in law must have the objective element of a 'need'. The Court is duty bound to take all the factors and circumstances so that the protection afforded to the tenant is not rendered futile. 18. The landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it, that desire to become 'requirement' in law must have the objective element of a 'need'. The Court is duty bound to take all the factors and circumstances so that the protection afforded to the tenant is not rendered futile. 18. In (1988) 3 SCC 131 (Ram Das vs. Ishwar Chander), where the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 and 11 laid down the law as follows : "10. It is, no doubt, true that the question whether the requirement of the landlords is bonafide or not is essentially one of tact, notwithstanding the circumstance that a finding of fact in that behalf is a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. All conclusion drawn from primary facts are not necessarily questions of law,, They can be, and quit often are, pure questions of fact. The question as to bonafide requirement is one such. 11. Statutes enacted to afford protection to tenants from eviction on the basis of contractual rights of the parties make the resumption of possession by the landlord subject to the satisfaction of certain statutory conditions. One of them is the bonafide requirement of the landlord, variously described in the statutes as 'bonafide requirement', reasonable requirement, bonafide and reasonable requirement, or, as in the case of the present statute, merely referred to as "landlord requires for his own use". But the essential idea basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that, further, the Court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession however honest it might otherwise be has inevitably a subjective element in it and that, desire, to become a 'requirement' in law must have the objective element of a 'need'. It must also be such that the Court considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection aforesaid by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or whittled down." 19. Regarding the revisional jurisdiction the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 and 14 of that, judgment pointed out as follows : "13. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection aforesaid by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or whittled down." 19. Regarding the revisional jurisdiction the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 and 14 of that, judgment pointed out as follows : "13. But, here section 15 (5) of the Act enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the 'legality and propriety' of the order under revision which is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the Court of revision, in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts also, though the revisional Court is not a second Court of first appeal" (see Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devalate vs. Vithalrao Marutirao). 14. Referring to the nature and scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the limitations inherent in the concept of a 'revision' this Court in Shri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangswamy Chettiar) observed : ( SCC p. 261, para 2) 'Appeal' and 'revision' are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the distinction between 'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person, such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the of case second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction... ...Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa. These are general observations. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to the language employed by the statute." 20. The Supreme Court in para 17 also pointed out as follows : "......Courts can take a cautious congnizance of the subsequent events in order to mould the relief. The High Court did that. No. fault could be found with that." 21. The Supreme Court in para 17 also pointed out as follows : "......Courts can take a cautious congnizance of the subsequent events in order to mould the relief. The High Court did that. No. fault could be found with that." 21. This point has been further elaborated in the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1988) 1 SCC 251 (Variety Emporium vs. VRM Mohd. Ibrahim Naina) and in para 16 the Supreme Court laid down the law as follow: "No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceeding before it and mould the relief in the light of those events. Me may, however, draw attention to a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunatih Prasad, the ratio of which may be stated thus : When an action is brought by landlord for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement, the landlord's need must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from Court to Court, if subsequent events occur which, if noticed, would non-suit the landlord, the Court has to examine and evaluate those events and mould the decree accordingly. The tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement of the landlord no more exists by pointing out such subsequent events to the Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be incorrect to say that as a decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant, he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. The tenant can be precluded from so contending only when decree or order for eviction has become final. Justice RS Pathak, who concurred with Justice D A Desai and Justice Venkatararniah, expressed the same view thus : "It is well settled now that in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenant, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. That position is indisputable (see page 624: SCC p. 119)." J 22. In the facts and circumstances on the background of this law let us now have a look at the findings on the bonafide requirement by the Courts below as well as the subsequent events as brought to the notice of this Court in civil revision application as quoted above. A portion of evidence of the DW 1 is quoted below : "My father Nepal Bose took the house on rent from Ishak Mia in 1925. During last 20/25 years my father gave up the southern portion of the rented premises to the extent 7 feet frontage towards the southern portion. The landlord told that they would themselves carry on business and accordingly my father amicably gave up the possession. After such giving up the landlord let out the portion to 2 tenants." 23. This portion of the evidence of DW 1 shows the conduct of the landlord. 24. In the local inspection the learned Munsiff found as follows : "The suit house is situated in a double storyed Assam type building consisted of and one rooms in a raw at the ground floor and SM Enterprises is situated just contiguous right of the suit house and New Light Tailors situated just contiguous to the suit house 'Selection' is situated extreme left of the said building. 2. At the extreme left there is a private path of around 4 feet width. At the extreme end of the path just below the staircase the plaintiff occupies an area of 2 feet 2 inch x 6½ feet and carried on his cassette business under the name and style of 'Jitu Music Centre'." 25. PW 1 Md. Nuruddin deposed that for want of space he is continuing his business on the road. But the local inspection which has been quoted above will show that he was running his business just below the staircase. So the evidence of PW 1 that for want of space he is continuing his business on the road is not correct and except this there is no evidence regarding the bonafide requirement. In the evidence of DW 1 this plea of bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was denied. So the evidence of PW 1 that for want of space he is continuing his business on the road is not correct and except this there is no evidence regarding the bonafide requirement. In the evidence of DW 1 this plea of bonafide requirement of the plaintiff was denied. So, the Courts below did not consider the evidence and this finding of bonafide requirement appears to be based on conjecture and surmise and is not a finding in the eye of law. Regarding subsequent events as quoted in the revision application, it is crystal clear that the plaintiff got the possession of a room, but that was let out to another person and this fact which was brought to the notice of this Court has not been denied by the landlord. Accordingly, I find that as on today the bonafide requirement as pleaded by the landlord does not exist and no decree can be passed on that ground. 26. For the reasons stated above, the decree passed by the Courts below on the ground of bonafide requirement shall stand quashed and the suit shall stand dismissed. 27. As I am deciding the matter on this ground of bonafide requirement, there is no need to decide the other question of non-joinder as urged by Mr. Goswami and I am not interfering with that findings arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the learned appellate Court inasmuch as I am satisfied that basically these are finding of fact and J am not inclined to interfere with that finding of fact. 28. This revision application is accordingly allowed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are quashed and the suit, that is TS 132 of 1990 in the Court of Munsiff No. 3 Silchar shall stand dismissed.