Judgment Nagendra Rai, J. 1. -the tenant-appellant has filed the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28th February, 1985 passed in Title Suit No.19 of 1982 / 209 of 1985 by which the Vllth Addl. Sub-Judge, Patna has decreed the plaintiffs-respondents suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, expiry of the term of lease and default in payment of rent in term of the provisions contained in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control act ). 2. It is an admitted case of the parties that Patna Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) was constituted under the Bihar Town Planning and improvement Trust Act to provide for the development of the town of Patna. At present the trust has ceased to exist and its duties and functions are being performed by Patna regional Development Authority constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Regional development Authority Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Authority ). The trust acquired the lands and developed the same and also constructed houses over some of the lands and leased the same to the persons fulfilling the eligibility condition con-tained in the rules and regulations of the frust. 3. According to the plaintiff no.1 he took the suit premises described in schedule-1 on lease (wrongly described as hire purchase-cum-lease) on 28.6.1972 by a registered deed of lease (Ext.1) for a period of 99 years on the terms and conditions mentioned in the said document and came in possession over the same. The plaintiff at the relevant time was in Bihar judicial Service and his son plaintiff no.2 was looking after the affairs on his behalf and on 1.6.1973 the house was let out to the defendant, who at the relevant time was the Managing Director of the Bihar Ware housing Corporation, on monthly rent of rs.425/-for six months. After the expiry of six months he did not vacate the premises, however, he continued in the same and paid rent upto July, 1980. The defendant appellant used to pay the rent monthly by cheque. For the month of August, 1980 he sent the rent by cheque also but the same was dishonoured because it did not bear the signature of defendant. The defendant appellant used to pay the rent monthly by cheque. For the month of August, 1980 he sent the rent by cheque also but the same was dishonoured because it did not bear the signature of defendant. Again he paid rent for the month of September and October, 1980 but from November, 1980 he stopped the payment of rent. It is further stated by the plaintiff that he retired from the Judicial Service and intend to start the practice in Patna High Court and as such requires the premises reasonably and in good faith for his own use. The plaintiff no.1 served notice upon the defendant terminating the tenancy and asking him to pay the arrears of rent and deliver the possession w. e. f.1.8.1981 but the defendant did not vacate the same, hence the suit. 4. The defendant contested the suit and asserted that the plaintiff no.1 is not the real owner of the land and the real owner is the authority and the suit at his instance is not maintainable in law. The defendant also denied the claim of the plaintiff for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. He stated that plaintiff agreed to sell the premises to him for Rs.75,000/-. According to the terms agreed the defendant-appellant was to pay Rs.500/- per month to the plain-tiff to enable him to pay the loan amounr taken by him at the time of taking lease. After retirement he will shift to his house in kanker Bagh Colony and after full payment of Rs.75,000/- and after expiry of ten years the plaintiff no.1 will execute a sale deed in favour of the defendant. In pursuance of the said agreement the defendant had paid Rs.50,000/- in all and was ready to pay the remaining amount (Rs.25,000/-) but in the meantime the plaintiff dishonestly filed the case. With regard to default in payment of rent it has been asserted on behalf of the defendant that there was no monthly mode of payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff no. I and the payment was made in the manner as desired by defendant-appellant. He has paid Rs.8135/-during the period of december, 1980 to January, 1982 but the plaintiffs did not grant the receipts and as such there was no default in payment of rent for more than two months. 5. I and the payment was made in the manner as desired by defendant-appellant. He has paid Rs.8135/-during the period of december, 1980 to January, 1982 but the plaintiffs did not grant the receipts and as such there was no default in payment of rent for more than two months. 5. During the pendency of the suit an order was passed under Sec.15 of the act for payment of arrears of rent on 29.8.83 but the defendant did not comply with the direction as a result of which by order dated 31st January, 1984 his defence was struck off against the ejectment. The effect of which is that his defence qua tenant stands struck off. The trial Court after considering the matter held that Ext.1 is a deed of lease and relationship of lessor and lessee was created between the trust (now the authority Defendant No.2) and the plaintiff. The terms of the lease (Ext.1) did not bar the sub-letting of the suit premises by the plaintiffs to defendant-appellant no.1 and as a result of letting out of the suit premises by the plaintiff to defendant no.1 a relationship of landlord and tenant was created between them. The defendant-appellant no.1 failed to prove that any agreement to sale was entered into by the plaintiff with him. It also held that tenancy was for a fixed period and tenant defaulted in payment of rent for more than two months. Accordingly it held that the plaintiff is entitled to decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, default in payment of rent for more than two months and expiration of term of tenancy. It also ordered for payment of arrears of rent. 6. The matter was placed before the learned Single Judge for hearing and the learned Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench by order dated 17.9.1987 to decide the question, as to whether the plaintiff is a landlord within the meaning of b. B. C. Act and is entitled to decree for eviction against the tenant appellant in view of the nature of the right created in his favour by agreement executed by the then trust (Ext.1 ). 7. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the plaintiff no.1 is not the landlord either in terms of definition of the landlord under Sec.2 (f) of the Act or within the restricted meaning as given under Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Bihar building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)and as such the suit filed by him for eviction against the tenant appellant is not maintainable in law. He has also challenged the other findings of the Trial Court. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents on the other hand contended that the suit premises has been leased out by the defendant authority in favour of the plaintiff no.1 for 99 years and the tenant appellant was admittedly inducted as a tenant by plaintiff no.1 and a relationship of landlord and tenant was created under the Act and the tenant cannot be allowed to challenge the title of the plaintiff no.1 in this suit. It was also contended that the plaintiff no.1 is a landlord within the meaning of the Act and as such the suit at his instance is maintainable. It was also contended that the findings of the trial Court regarding the grounds for eviction are based on the evidence on record, and nothing has been pointed out by the appellant to assail the said findings. This apart as his defence against ejectment has been struck-off he cannot assail the said finding in law. 9. The defence of the tenant appellant against ejectment has been struck-off for non-compliance of the order passed under section 15 of the Act as a result of which his defence qua tenant only would be struck-off. The other defences such as denial of title of the landlord, non-existence of landlord or tenant are available to him. In this case, the tenant appellant has challenged the question of title and the Court below has allowed him to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses and to lead evidence on that point only. 10. The first question which arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff no.1 in the landlord of the defendant under the Act and suit for eviction brought by him against the appellant is maintainable. 11. 10. The first question which arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff no.1 in the landlord of the defendant under the Act and suit for eviction brought by him against the appellant is maintainable. 11. Ext.1 is the deed of lease executed by the trust in favour of the plaintiff no, 1 on 20th June, 1972 and the document itself mentions that it is a deed of lease of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff no.1 for a period of 99 years with effect from the first day of the month, from which the payment of the premium by instalment starts. During the period of lease the plaintiff no.1 shall have the right of quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the demised building. Clause-15 provides that the lesseeplaintiff no.1 shall not for a period of ten years from the commencement of the lease transfer the building or any part of it by way of sale, exchange, gift, mortgage or otherwise except under a written permission of the trust and on such terms and conditions. as the trust may be pleased to lay down and any transfer in deference of this Clause shall make the lease liable to be terminated. Clause-20 provides that in case of breach of Clause-15 and other clauses the trust lessor will ask the lessee by a notice to remedy the evil done within one month or within such time allowed failing which the lessor has right to terminate the lease by giving 30 days notice. The said document is a registered document and from the contents as extracted above it is clear that it is a lease and lease alone between the trust and the plaintiff no.1 and the same has been given to the plaintiff no.1 for a period of 99 years with a right of quiet and peaceful enjoyment. In between the trust and the plaintiff no.1 the status of the plaintiff is of a lessee. It is further evident that Ext.1 does not prevent him from letting it out to a itenant. 12. The documents on the record including the letters (Annexure-8 series) written by defendant tenant and whose (genuineness has not been challenged clearly show that the premises was let out by the plaintiff respondent to the defendant appellant on a monthly rental of Rs.500/- which was later on reduced to Rs.425/-. 12. The documents on the record including the letters (Annexure-8 series) written by defendant tenant and whose (genuineness has not been challenged clearly show that the premises was let out by the plaintiff respondent to the defendant appellant on a monthly rental of Rs.500/- which was later on reduced to Rs.425/-. In this connection reference may be made to Ext. B/f, a letter written by the tenant appellant ho the plaintiff landlord wherein he has stated as follows; "i have taken your house bearing no. M-3/19, Shri Krishnapuri on a rental of rs.500/-per month. The payment of the rent shall be made in advance every month. The house shall be vacated after receipt of 15 days clear notice given by either side. The tenancy starts from 1st day of June, 1973. " In view of the aforesaid admission of the appellant coupled with the oral evidenas of P. Ws.1 and 2 it is clear beyond doubt that the premises was let out by the plaintiftrespondent no.1 to defendant thus there is a relationship of landlord and tenant bestween them. The Trial Court rightly rejected the evidence adduced on behalf of the tenant on the point that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. However, it has also been contended by the appellant that the owner of the premises is the trust (now authority) and it can file a suit for eviction under the provisions of the Bihar regional Development Authority Act wherein an elaborate provision has beerr made for eviction. The plaintiff no.1 whose status is only of lessee or a tenant canno bring a suit under the Act as he is not a landlord within the meaning of the Act. 13. I am unable to agree with the aforesaid submission for the reasons to be stated hereinafter. 14. Prior to the enactment of Renl control Act the relationship of landlord and tenant regarding buildings was governed by the provisions of Transfer of the Property act. The Rent Control Act provides protection to the tenant and the eviction can be granted on the existence of any of the grounds mentioned for eviction as provided under the Rent Control Act. The word landlord has been defined under the Rent control Act under Sec.2 (f) of the Act, which runs as follows; "see 2. The Rent Control Act provides protection to the tenant and the eviction can be granted on the existence of any of the grounds mentioned for eviction as provided under the Rent Control Act. The word landlord has been defined under the Rent control Act under Sec.2 (f) of the Act, which runs as follows; "see 2. (f); "landlord includes the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant. " 15. From perusal of Sec.2 (f) of the act it is clear that the definition of the landlord is very wide and includes even a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent whether on his own account or on behalf of another or as an agent, trustee etc. However, the wide amplitude of definition has been cut down with regard to the cases of eviction on the ground of personal necessity by explanation no.1 appended to Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act which provides that the word landlord shall not include as an agent as referred to in Clause 2 (6) of Sec.2. The landlord for the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal necessity has to prove that he is the owner of the building and he has right to occupy the same in his own right. 16. The Apex Court in the case of m. M. Quasim Vs. Lal Sharma and others, air 1981 S. C.1113 considered the meaning of the landlord as defined under the Rent control Act and held that the wide amplitude of the expression landlord has been cut down by the Explanation appended to section 11 (1) (c) of the Rent control Act. For the purpose of Clause (c)such landlord in the sense in which word owner is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant from his own occupation. 17. For the purpose of Clause (c)such landlord in the sense in which word owner is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant from his own occupation. 17. The word ownership denotes the relationship between a person and an object forming the subject matter of the ownership. There are various rights or incidents of ownership. It is not necessary that all should be present in every case. 18. Similar question as raised in this case came up for consideration before the supreme Court in the case of Swadesh ranjan Sinha V/s. Haradeb Banerjee, 1992 air S. C.1590. In that case the Calcutta metropolitan Development Authority granted lease of sixteen flats to Kadamtols Housing co-operative Society, Calcutta under a registered document. The society allotted the flats to its member including the plaintiff of that case by sub-lease for a term of 99 years. The plaintiff let out the flat to the defendant on a monthly rental of Rs.110/-. Later on he asked the tenant to vacate the premises. The tenant did not vacate it and thereafter a suit for eviction was filed under the provision of West Bengal Premises tenancy Act on the ground of default in payment of rent and on the ground of personal necessity as provided under Section 13 (1) (i) and 13 (1) (ff) of the said Act. The suit was decreed on the ground of personal necessity. In appeal it was held that the plaintiff was not the owner within the meaning of Sec.13 (1) (ff) of the Act which was affirmed by the High Court. The plaintiff appealed before the Supreme Court. The definition of landlord in that case is more or less similar to the definition under the Rent control Act as it also includes any person who for the time being, is entitled to receive or but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether or not on his own account. Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act is similar to Sec.11 (1) (c)of the Rent Control Act. Considering the aforesaid provisions the Apex Court held that the plaintiff of that case has only to prove that he has better title than that of the defendant tenant. Section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act is similar to Sec.11 (1) (c)of the Rent Control Act. Considering the aforesaid provisions the Apex Court held that the plaintiff of that case has only to prove that he has better title than that of the defendant tenant. The plaintiff being allottee of the flat has right to possess the premises for a period of 99 years as heritable and transferable property. He being lessee in relation to the society is owner of the property so far as the defendant tenant is concerned. In the aforesaid case it was held as follows : paragraph-8 : Ownership denotes the relationship between a person and an object forming the subject matter of his ownership. It consists in a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem, being good against all the world and not merely against specific person (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. , Ch.8, p.246 etc. Seq. ). There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. Such a right may be indeterminate in duration and residuary in character. A person has a right to possess the thing which he owns, even when he is not in possession, but only retains a reversionary interest, i. e. , a right to repossess the thing on the termination of a certain period or on the happening of a certain event. Paragraph-9 : All that a plaintiff needs to prove is that he has a better title than the defendant. He has no burden to show that he has the best of all possible titles. His ownership is good against all the world except the true owner. The rights of an owner are seldom absolute and often are in many respects controlled and regulated by statute. The question, however, is whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person challenging it. Paragraph-10 : The plaintiff is an allottee in terms of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (See section 87 and 89 ). He has a right to possess the premises for a period of 99 years as a heritable and transferable property. The question, however, is whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person challenging it. Paragraph-10 : The plaintiff is an allottee in terms of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (See section 87 and 89 ). He has a right to possess the premises for a period of 99 years as a heritable and transferable property. During that period he has a right to let out the premises and enjoy the rental income therefrom, subject to the statutory terms and conditions of allotment. The Certificate of allotment is the conclusive evidence of his title or interest. It is true that he has to obtain the written consent of the Society before let-ting out the premises. But once let out in accordance with the terms of allotment specified in ins statute, he is entitled to enjoy the income from the property. Allthough, he is a lessee in relation to the society, and his rights and interests are subject to the terms and conditions of allctment, he is the owner of the property having a superior right in relation to the defendant. As far as the defendant is concerned, the plaintiff is the landlord and the owner of the premises for ail purposes dealt with under the provisions of the Act. " 19. The law iaid down by the Apex court squarely covers the present case here the lease was for 99 years which vested absolute right of enjoyment and the plaintiff has superior right to the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff no.1 is the landlord under the Rent Control Act as defined and he is also the landlord within the restricted meaning in terms of explanation appended to section 11 (1) (c) 20. There is another reason to hold that the plaintiff is the landlord of the premises. The own admission of the defendant and the finding as mentioned above clearly show that the defendant-appellant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff. In such a situation the doctrine of tenant estoppel will come into play. There is another reason to hold that the plaintiff is the landlord of the premises. The own admission of the defendant and the finding as mentioned above clearly show that the defendant-appellant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff. In such a situation the doctrine of tenant estoppel will come into play. In Stringers Estate, Shaw V, Jones-Ford, LR 6 Ch D 1, the doctrine of the tenants estoppel has been explained in the following way; "where a man having no title obtains possession of land under a demise by a man in possession who assumes to give him a title as tenant, he cannot deny his landlords title as, for instance, if he takes for twenty-one years and he finds that the landlord has only five years title, he cannot after five years set up against the landlord jus terti, though, of course, the real owner can always recover against him. That is a perfectly intelligible doctrine. He took possession under a contract to pay rent so long as he held possession under the landlord, and to give it up at the end of the term to the landlord, and having taken it in that way he is not allowed to say that the man whose title he admits and under whose title he took possession has not a title. That is well established doctrine. That is estoppell by contract. " 21. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence act contains the aforesaid principle and the apex Court in the case of Ram Pasricha V. Jagannath, AIR 1976 S. C.2335 has held that in a suit for eviction by landlord, the tenant is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord because of Sec.116 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the defenant tenant cannot be permitted in law to challenge the title of the plaintiff after having been inducted as a tenant by him, on the other hand he is inhibited from doing so under section 116 of the Evidence Act. Thus, hold that the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit premises and the present suit for eviction is maintainable. 22. In view of the striking off the defence of the tenant appellant I agree with the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that the tenant shall be deemed to have no defence against ejectment as tenant. Thus, hold that the plaintiff is the landlord of the suit premises and the present suit for eviction is maintainable. 22. In view of the striking off the defence of the tenant appellant I agree with the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that the tenant shall be deemed to have no defence against ejectment as tenant. Even then the Court has to see whether on the basis of the case and evidence adduced by the landlord case for eviction has been made out or not. 23. So far the eviction on the ground of personal necessity is concerned, both the plaintiffs have stated that plaintiff no.1 requires the premises reasonably and in good faith for starting the legal profession by plaintiff no.1 after his retirement in the high Court. There is nothing in their evidence to disbelieve their statements and in my view the Trial Court has rightly accepted the same and as such I agree with the finding of the Trial Court that the premises is required reasonably and in good faith by the plaintiff no.1. However, the Trial Court has not given the finding on the point of partial eviction in terms of proviso to Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act and as such there is clear violation of the aforesaid proviso which has been held by the judicial pronouncement to be mandatory in nature. On the said ground I would have remanded the matter but as the plaintiff-respondent has proved the other ground of eviction the failure of the court below to determine the question of partial eviction does not vitiate the judgment. 24. According to the plaintiff the defenant tenant did not make the payment of rent for the month of August, 1980 and thereafter defaulted the payment of rent from November, 1980 till the fiiing of the suit. The tenant appellant has come out with a case that he had paid Rs.8135/-between december, 1980 to January, 1982 but the plaintiff respondent did not grant receipt. According to him there was no default in payment of rent for more than two months. The evidence on record shows that the said assertion was denied by the landlords in their evidence and there is no material on record to prove the factum of payment of the aforesaid amount. According to him there was no default in payment of rent for more than two months. The evidence on record shows that the said assertion was denied by the landlords in their evidence and there is no material on record to prove the factum of payment of the aforesaid amount. The Trial Court rightly held that tenant appellant was liable for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent for more than two months. 25. The findings of the Trial Court that tenant is liable for eviction on the ground of expiry of term of tenancy is not according to law. In this case after the expiry of term ot tenancy the landlord permitted the tenant to continue in possession and accepted the rent and as such a fresh tenancy month to month shall be deemed to have been created. In that view of the matter, the finding of the Trial court on the said point is set aside. 26. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that there is no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Hon ble Ashlsh N. Trivedi, J.-l agree