JUDGMENT A. K. MATHUR, J. - Both these petitions involve common question of law and fact; therefore, they are disposed of by this common order. 2. For convenient disposal of both the petitions, the facts given in the case of Jubbulpore General Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others (Misc. Petition No. 407 of 1984) are taken into consideration. 3. The petitioner by writ petition, has challenged the validity of rule 20-C(1)(iii) as ultra vires of section 8 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and submitted that he is entitled to set-off. 4. The petitioner - M/s. Jubbulpore General Industries Pvt. Ltd., is a registered firm under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and holds registration certificate. This petition relates to the period of assessment from January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1979. The petitioner deals in manufacturing of wheat flour, maida, suji and rava. The respondent No. 1, Additional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, assessed the petitioner by his order dated May 31, 1982. During the assessment year, the turnover of the petitioner was determined at Rs. 1,25,25,309 and the tax was assessed at Rs. 3,30,989. The petitioner in the course of his manufacturing activities, purchases raw material, namely wheat, after paying sales tax. In accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(a) of the Act, he claimed set-off of the sales tax paid by him on purchases of tax paid on raw material under the notifications dated October 8, 1978 and March 31, 1979 at the rate of 0.5 per cent up to March 31, 1979 and of 205 per cent after April 1, 1979. This claim was disallowed by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that he was not entitled to such set-off on the purchases of raw materials as the corresponding sales of manufactured goods were effected outside the State of Madhya Pradesh through commission agents. It is alleged that the sales of manufactured goods effected outside the State of Madhya Pradesh amounting to Rs. 15,38,959. Its corresponding purchases of raw material amounting to Rs. 3,23,901 at the rate of 0.5 per cent and Rs. 11,07,331 at the rate of 2.5 per cent totalling in all Rs. 14,31,232 were entitled to a set-off in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(a) of the Act. 15,38,959. Its corresponding purchases of raw material amounting to Rs. 3,23,901 at the rate of 0.5 per cent and Rs. 11,07,331 at the rate of 2.5 per cent totalling in all Rs. 14,31,232 were entitled to a set-off in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(a) of the Act. According to the respondent No. 1, the petitioner was entitled to such a set-off on purchases of raw material only on the sales of manufactured goods effected in Madhya Pradesh and in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. 5. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated May 31, 1982 (annexure A), an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur/respondent No. 2, challenging that the set-off has not been properly calculated. The respondent No. 2 held that the set-off should be allowed in accordance with the provisions of section 8(1)(a) of the Act read with rule 20-C(1)(iii) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). The respondent No. 2 accordingly held that the petitioner was not entitled to set-off on the raw material purchased, the corresponding sales of manufactured goods of which were effected outside the State of Madhya Pradesh. 6. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated May 30, 1983 (annexure C), a revision was filed before the respondent No. 3. It was argued before respondent No. 3 that rule 20-C of the Rules is contrary to section 8 of the Act and ultra vires; but the respondent No. 3 could not give any finding on this. However, a penalty under section 43(1) of the Act amounting to Rs. 20,000 was cancelled and he left issue that it is debatable that whether set-off can be allowed on the purchases of raw material and sale of manufactured goods effected outside the State of Madhya Pradesh the dealer is entitled to the set-off or not. Therefore the petitioner challenged the validity of rule 20-C(1)(iii) of the Act as ultra vires of section 8 of the Act. Hence this petition. 7. Therefore the petitioner challenged the validity of rule 20-C(1)(iii) of the Act as ultra vires of section 8 of the Act. Hence this petition. 7. A reply has been filed by the respondents contesting the position that rule 20-C is ultra vires of the Act and submitted that set-off is only permitted on the purchase of goods if they are manufactured and sold either in the State of Madhya Pradesh or outside the State in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and the set-off is not permissible on sale which was made outside the State, of those manufactured goods. 8. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary to refer to section 8 of the Act, which reads as under : "Section 8 : Set-off or refund of tax in respect of tax-paid goods in certain circumstances. - (1) Subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed a set-off, as provided in this section shall be granted in such manner as may be prescribed, to a registered dealer in respect of tax-paid goods in the circumstances specified below : (a) When a registered dealer purchases any tax-paid goods, other than tendu leaves and whole pulses which have borne tax under sub-section (1) of section 6 at full rate exceeding the concessional rate of 4 per cent or exceeding such other concessional rate as may be notified by the State Government in respect of use of such goods as raw material or incidental goods and subsequently consumes or uses such goods as raw material or incidental goods in the manufacture or in the processing of any goods or in the mining of any goods specified in Schedule II which have not been exempted under section 12, he shall be entitled to a set-off at a rate equal to the difference between the tax at full rate under sub-section (1) of section 6 at the concessional rate of 4 per cent or such other aforesaid concessional rate as the case may be in respect of such goods in such manner and on such quantum of the price at which such goods were purchased from a registered dealer, as may be prescribed. (b)(i) When a registered dealer sells any goods specified in Schedule II, which are tax-paid goods in his hands to any person other than a registered dealer, or any agency and the sale of such goods is exempt from tax, in whole or in part, under a notification issued under section 12 or under any provision of this Act, he shall subject to the compliance of the restrictions or conditions if any specified in such notification or prescribed under such provision, be entitled to set-off at a rate equal to the difference between the tax at full rate on such goods under sub-section (1) of section 6 and the tax at the rate specified under the said notification or provision. (ii) When a registered dealer purchases any goods specified in Schedule II which are tax-paid goods in his hands and the sale thereof by the selling registered dealer to him is otherwise exempt from tax, in whole or in part, under a notification issued under section 12 or under any provision of this Act, the registered dealer purchasing such goods shall subject to the compliance of the restrictions and conditions if any specified in such notification or prescribed under such provision, be entitled to set-off at a rate equal to the difference between the tax at full rate on such goods under sub-section (1) of section 6 and the tax at the rate specified in the said notification or prescribed under such provision." Rule 20-C(1) of the Rules 1959 which has been made for purpose of giving effect to section 8 of the Act, reads as under : "Rule 20-C : A grant of set-off under section 8. - (1) The set-off under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 8 shall be granted subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely :- (i) the tax-paid goods consumed or used as raw material or used as incidental goods, as the case may be, should have been specified as raw material or incidental goods in his registration certificate; (ii) the goods manufactured after consuming or using the tax-paid raw material should have been sold by the registered dealer in the of Madhya Pradesh or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of the territory of India; and (iii) the registered dealer claiming the set-off shall, at the time of his assessment produce copies of the relevant bills or cash memoranda obtained from the registered dealer in support of the fact that goods purchased by him and consumed or used as raw material or used as incidental goods have borne tax at full rate under sub-section (1) of section 6." 9. Shri B. L. Nema, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in fact rule 20-C(1)(ii) of the Rules, 1959, is ultra vires of section 8 of the Act because section 8 gives a power to grant a set-off and rule 20-C(1) which is a subordinate legislation cannot restrict the operation of section 8; therefore, rule 20-C(1)(ii) is beyond the power of the rule-making authority and, therefore, it is ultra vires of section 8 of the Act and contrary to section 8; therefore, it should be struck down. 10. Shri R. P. Agrawal with Shri P. D. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the set-off has been given only on such terms, and conditions as may be prescribed by the rule-making authority. It is submitted that section 8 of the Act only lays down that set-off can be granted. But how the set-off should be granted and under what condition, it should be granted has been laid down by the rule-making authority. It is submitted that section 8 itself starts with the rider that it will be applicable to on such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed. Therefore, set-off can only be granted on such conditions to be prescribed by the rule-making authority. It is submitted that section 8 itself starts with the rider that it will be applicable to on such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed. Therefore, set-off can only be granted on such conditions to be prescribed by the rule-making authority. Learned counsel submitted that section 51(2)(c) of the Act which empowers the State Government to frame rules, lays down that the restrictions and conditions shall be laid down for grant of a set-off under section 8. Section 51(2)(c) of the Act reads as under : "Section 51 : Power to make rules. - (1)...... (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the State Government may make rules prescribing - (a).............. (b).............. (c) the restrictions and conditions subject to which and the manner in which set-off shall be granted under section 8." Therefore, learned counsel submitted that rule 20-C(1) of the Rules is not contrary to section 8 but it is supplementary to section 8. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records. 12. The opening section of section 8 which clearly lays down that subjects to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, this expression is very significant as section 8 only lays down that set-off will be granted and but set-off should be granted under what circumstances that is not mentioned in the Act. This has been left to the discretion of the rule-making authority. Section 8 of the Act is an enabling provision for grant of set-off. But a set-off shall be granted under what conditions and under what circumstances that is not enumerated in this section. Therefore, sub-section (1) of section 8 starts with condition that subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed. Therefore, it shows that in order to give effect to this enabling provision, it has to be laid down by the subordinate legislation that under what conditions this set-off shall be granted. The Act has conferred a power on the subordinate authority to frame the rules for grant of set-off. If the Act itself had provided the conditions and circumstances under which the set-off is to be granted and the Rules has circumscribed that grant of set-off then perhaps this argument would have been opened to the learned counsel. The Act has conferred a power on the subordinate authority to frame the rules for grant of set-off. If the Act itself had provided the conditions and circumstances under which the set-off is to be granted and the Rules has circumscribed that grant of set-off then perhaps this argument would have been opened to the learned counsel. But when the Act itself is a silent and it confers a power on a subordinate legislative authority to legislate for the conditions on which set-off is to be granted and the subordinate legislative authority frames the rules for grant of such set-off under section 51(2)(c) then in these circumstances, it is not correct to contend that the rule has gone beyond the provisions of the Act. The rule can only be declared to be ultra vires the Act, if the subordinate legislative authority has over-stepped its limits or has laid down the rules contrary to the provisions of the Act then of course such subordinate legislation can be declared to be ultra vires of the provisions of the Act. But when the Act itself gives a power to the subordinate authority to legislate that under what circumstances and conditions, the set-off is to be granted then such legislation cannot be said to have gone beyond the provisions of the Act. Shri B. L. Nema, learned counsel for the petitioner, has invited our attention to the judgments of the honorable Supreme Court in support of his contentions and we will refer them. 13. But in the present case, there are only three kinds of sales, which have been permitted the set-off under rule 20-C(1)(ii), viz., goods manufactured after consuming or using the tax-paid raw material sold by the registered dealer in the State of Madhya Pradesh or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of the territory of India. These three categories have been only permitted the set-off. The contentions of Shri B. L. Nema, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that fourth category, i.e., the goods manufactured out of the tax-paid goods sold by the manufacturers outside the State of Madhya Pradesh through its commission agent, this category is also entitled to the benefit of the set-off. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that exclusion of this category from the benefit of set-off, the rule he travelled beyond sections 8. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that exclusion of this category from the benefit of set-off, the rule he travelled beyond sections 8. As mentioned above, section 8 itself shows that the terms and conditions have to be laid down by the State that under what conditions the set-off is to be given and the pursuance of the power given by the Act under section 51(2)(c), the State Government has prescribed the rule 20-C(1)(ii) of the Act and permitted the set-off only in three contingencies, i.e., the sale within the State of M.P., sale in the course of inter-State and commerce or in the course of export outside of India. Therefore, State has only permitted the benefit in these three contingencies. This appears to be so because if tax-paid goods are again sold after manufacturing the same in the State then that consumer will be put to double taxation in the State which may not be conductive to the benefit of manufacturers or to the public at large. In the contingency when the goods are sent outside the State and are sold by the commission agent, the State cannot be said to have doubled the tax on goods. Element of sale is necessary through the word sale has not been used in rule 20-C(1) of the Rules, but if we read rule 20-C with section 8 of the Act, the intention is that sale should take place within the State in all the three contingencies of sale enumerated in rule 20-C(1)(ii), sale takes place in the State of Madhya Pradesh or in the course of inte-State trade or commerce, or even in the course of export outside the territory of India. The dealer has to show the sale within State. It may be that in export outside the territory of India sale may not be exigible to tax by virtue of certain conditions or exemption granted by the State, but nonetheless sale has to be shown in State for export outside India. But for all practical purposes, sale has to be shown in State for export outside India. But for all practical purposes, sale has to be shown in the State. Therefore, in these circumstances, there appears to be a rationale behind confining the benefit of the set-off to these three contingencies of sale and it cannot be said that it is without any rational basis. 14. But for all practical purposes, sale has to be shown in the State. Therefore, in these circumstances, there appears to be a rationale behind confining the benefit of the set-off to these three contingencies of sale and it cannot be said that it is without any rational basis. 14. Before we refer to the cases cited by Shri B. L. Nema, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions that rule 20-C(1)(ii) of the Rules is contrary to section 8 of the Act and it should be struck down as ultra vires we may refer the decision of the honorable Supreme Court which is nearer to the present case as cited by Shri R. P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent. In the case of Balakrishna Chetty & Sons & Co. v. State of Madras [1961] 12 STC 114 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 1152 , a similar question arose under the Madras General Sales Tax Act that what is correct interpretation of section 5 which deals with the exemptions, i.e., exemption has to be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed and the rules prescribe certain conditions for availability of exemption and the question was that whether the party has contravened those conditions or not. In this background, section 5 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act came up for consideration which reads as under : "Section 5 : Subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, including the conditions as to licences and licence fees, the sale of bullion and specie, of cotton yarn and of any cloth woven on handlooms and sold by persons dealing exclusively in such cloth shall be exempt from taxation under section 3." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that "on a proper interpretation of section 5, expression 'subject to' only means that the exemption under the licence is conditional upon the observance of the conditions prescribed and upon the restrictions which are imposed by and under the Act whether in the rules or in the licence itself; that is, a licensee is exempt from assessment as long as he conforms to the conditions of the licence and not that he is entitled to exemption whether the conditions upon which the licence is given are fulfilled or not. The use of the words 'subject to' has reference to effectuating the intention of the law and the correct meaning is 'conditional upon'". Therefore, operation of section 8 is a conditional one on fulfilling the terms laid down by the subordinate legislation and by subordinate legislation, only three kinds of sales have only permitted the set-off. Thus, in our opinion, such kind of conditional legislation cannot be said to be ultra vires of section 8. In this connection, our attention was invited to the decision of this Court given in the case of Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1972] 30 STC 1 and in that case, unamended provision of section 8 came up for interpretation and there also, in the main section only two kinds of sales ware permitted the set-off - one where the goods were sold in the State of M.P. or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce on furnishing a declaration in the prescribed form and their Lordships held that under these two conditions only this benefit is applicable. But section 8 was amended by substituting new section with effect from April 1, 1987, by Act No. 24 of 1987 and in the amended provision this was left to the discretion of the rule-making authority for providing the benefit of the set-off and in that two sales were common, i.e., sale in the State of M.P. if sale in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and third the export outside of India, was added. Therefore, it gives us a clue to the intention of the Legislature that they have given this discretion to the subordinate legislative authority because on account of opening of the Indian economy and free market perhaps all kinds of contingencies of sale cannot be put in the Act itself. Therefore, they have given this latitude to the subordinate legislative authority so that it can easily amend the rule by incorporating certain sales entitling the benefit of the set-off in a given situation in the altered circumstances from time to time. 15. Somewhat in identical situation, a recent case from Gujarat State on a purchase tax was also brought to the notice of the honourable Supreme Court in the Case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 88 STC 98; AIR 1993 SC 1048 . 15. Somewhat in identical situation, a recent case from Gujarat State on a purchase tax was also brought to the notice of the honourable Supreme Court in the Case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 88 STC 98; AIR 1993 SC 1048 . In that case, additional purchase purchase tax was levied under section 15-B and it was held that it is neither in the nature of excise duty nor a tax on use. It is an additional tax on the purchase of raw material used in manufacture of other goods. A certain concession was given to manufacturers in purchase of certain types of raw material; and this tax was refunded or set-off, under certain conditions in which rule 42-E was framed. All these provisions are intended to encourage industry and to derive revenue at the same time. In that context, their Lordships observed that reasonable construction should be allowed and literal construction may be avoided if that defeat the manifest object and purpose of the Act. In that context, their Lordships affirmed the contention of the State under rule 42-E read with section 15-B of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act and observed : "......What in effect the State says is this : 'Raw material when purchased is taxable but I won't tax the raw material if you sell the goods manufactured out of such raw material within the State because I derive larger revenue there; I do not want to tax both the raw material and the manufactured goods, in the interest of trade and public. But if you dispose of the manufactured goods in some other manner, I will tax the purchase of raw material because there is no reason why I should forego the purchase tax due on raw material, when I am not getting any revenue from your method of disposal or despatch of manufactured products'. There is nothing objectionable in the State saying so." 16. There is nothing objectionable in the State saying so." 16. In the present case also, applying the same analogy, the contention of the State is that the State is prepared to give a set-off that the goods which has been purchased as a raw material in manufacture of goods, are sold in the State or in the course of inter-State trade and commerce or by export outside the territory of India, because the State is going to get a revenue in the State out of such goods and, therefore, this benefit has been given to such sales only and the goods which are not being sold in the State and are sold outside the State, no such set-off is to be given. This contention of the State cannot be said to be bad or cannot render the rule 20-C(1)(ii) as ultra vires of section 8, as no conditions for grant of set-off has been laid down in section 8. In fact, section 8 will be redundant if rule has not been framed for giving effect to this benefit because the section itself says that it is subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed that means the provision of Act will only come into effect if such conditions are laid down and the conditions have been laid down by the State by prescribing the rule, i.e., rule 20-C(1)(ii). Therefore, in these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the rules does not travel beyond section 8 and it is not ultra vires. 17. In the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras v. Sha Sukraj Peerajee [1968] 21 STC 5 (SC); AIR 1968 SC 67 is a case where it was not a question that whether the validity of rule 21-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules came up for consideration that whether this is ultra vires of section 19(2)(c) of the Act or not. Section 19 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act reads as under : "Section 19(1) : The State Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act." Therefore, it was a general provision providing that the rule for carrying out the purpose of this Act, but it was not subject to such conditions and restrictions to be prescribed. Therefore, this case does not provide us the analogy for deciding the controversy involved in the present case. 18. Therefore, this case does not provide us the analogy for deciding the controversy involved in the present case. 18. In Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen [1959-60] 17 FIR 57 (SC); AIR 1960 SC 12 , this was a case relating to Industrial Disputes Act and on account of dispute between the banks and their employees there arose, a dispute regarding the word "remuneration" appearing under section 10(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In that connection, a reference of section 5 of the Banking Companies Rules, 1949, came up for consideration and their Lordships observed : "..... We do not say that a statutory rule can enlarge the meaning of section 10; if a rule goes beyond what the section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute. We have, however, pointed out earlier that section 10 itself uses the word 'remuneration' in the widest sense, and rule 5 and form I are to that extent in consonance with the section." This case also does not provide us any assistance. 19. In Sales Tax Officer v. K. I. Abraham [1967] 20 STC 367 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1823 this was a case under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and the Rules framed under the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules, 1957 and in that the interpretation of section 8(4) came up for our consideration. There, the words "in the prescribed manner" came for interpretation and in that context, their Lordships held that section 8(4) does not authorise the rule-making authority to prescribe a time-limit within which declaration is to be filed by registered dealer, and therefore, their Lordships held that the third proviso to rule 6(1) is ultra vires of section 8(4) read with section 13(4)(e). This case also dose not provide us any assistance because the word used in our Act is subject to such restrictions and conditions. Therefore, section 8 in our case will be only operable if such restrictions and conditions are laid down and if such restrictions and conditions are not laid down then section itself will not operational in the present case. 20. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. Therefore, section 8 in our case will be only operable if such restrictions and conditions are laid down and if such restrictions and conditions are not laid down then section itself will not operational in the present case. 20. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. AIR 1976 SC 1031 , this was a case in which the interpretation of article 246(1) and (3) of the Constitution came up for consideration and in that context, their Lordships observed : "The words 'notwithstanding' in clause (1) and 'subject to' in clause (3) mean that where an entry is in general terms in List II and part of that entry is in specific terms in List I, the entry in List takes effect notwithstanding the entry in List II. This is also on the principle that the 'special' exclude the 'general' and the general entry in List II is subject to the special entry in List I." This case also does not provide any assistance so far as this case in hand is concerned. 21. In Utah Construction & Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Pataky [1965] 3 All ER 650, the validity of regulation 98 came up for challenge and it was held that regulation 98 is ultra vires and invalid because it could not be as being within the power to make regulations conferred by section 22(1) of the Scaffolding and Lifts Act, 1912. In that, the expression came up for consideration was "manner of carrying out" appearing in section 22(2)(g)(iv) which only envisages a system of working and did not justify a regulation imposing an absolute duty of protecting the drive and tunnel or an absolute duty of ensuring the safety of persons employed in the drive or tunnel. Therefore, it was held that regulation 98 was beyond the scope of the Act. But, in the present case, we have already held above that rule 20-C(1)(ii) is not beyond section 8. Hence this case also does not help in any manner. 22. Therefore, it was held that regulation 98 was beyond the scope of the Act. But, in the present case, we have already held above that rule 20-C(1)(ii) is not beyond section 8. Hence this case also does not help in any manner. 22. In Bhagawan Store v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1971] 27 STC 287 (Orissa), section 5(2)(A)(d)(i) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, provides that purchasing dealer could deduct from the taxable turnover purchases from a registered dealer of goods declared by the State Government under section 3-B Rule 27(3) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 was amended by notification dated March 26, 1963, which put a further burden on the purchasing dealer to establish that the selling registered dealer and had either paid or was liable to pay purchase tax in respect of the goods, which the purchasing dealer purchased from the selling dealer. In this context, it was held that rule 27(3) went beyond the provisions of the act and thereby be declared ultra vires the Act. But, that is not the case here. Therefore, this case is distinguishable. 23. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar [1969] 74 ITR 41, the question was that whether rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, as amended in 1948, framed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 can dismiss an appeal for default of appearance of the appellant and it was held that this is beyond the provisions of section 33(4) and the same was declared as ultra vires. This case is also distinguishable as we have already held above that rule 20-C(1)(ii) is not beyond the scope of section 8. 24. Hence as a result of the above discussions, we are of the opinion that rule 20-C(1)(ii) is not ultra vires of section 8 of the Act rather it is intra vires and supplement the section 8 of the Act. Hence, there is no merit in both the petitions (Misc. Petition No. 407 of 1984 and Misc. Petition No. 416 of 1984) and the same are dismissed. The amount of security, if any deposited, shall be refunded to the petitioner. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.