JUDGMENT 1. :- The petitioner has filed this writ petition against the order dated 5th of July, 1985 (wrongly typed as 5th August, 1985) by which the petitioner was suspended and the order dated 2nd of October, 1988 by which the petitioner was dismissed from services. The writ petition was earlier allowed on the ground that the copy of the enquiry report was not provided to the petitioner and in D.B. Special Appeal No. 488 of 1991, decided on 8th of July, 1993 [judgment reported in 1993 (1) RLR 51] preferred by the respondent, it was held that the dismissal of the petitioner is not vitiated on account of non-supply of the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the writ petition was sent back to this Court for deciding the other points raised by the petitioner. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised before me the following points: (1) It is submitted that re-constitution of the Board should have been within a period of six months in accordance with the proviso to Section 59 of the Rajasthan Indian Medicine Act, 1953. The Board was dissolved on 27th of October, 1987 and the action was not taken by the Administrator within six months and on this basis it is submitted that the power by the administrator is dehors the Act itself and since the Board was not re-constituted, no action can be taken. So far as this point is concerned, I feel that this power has to be exercised by the State Government if the Board has failed to exercise or has exceeded or abused the power conferred upon it or failed to perform the duty imposed upon it then the State Government may dissolve the Board. It is the enabling power and can be considered only directly (sic directory) in nature. Non-constitution of the Board would not paralise the entire working of the respondents if the said power is exercised by the Administrator. The power under this Section 59 is only directory in nature and the exception which has been caused to the main section can also take the same character. In these circumstances, it cannot be considered that the enquiry is vitiated on the ground that the power cannot be exercised since there was no reconstitution of Board within a period of six months. In these circumstances, it cannot be considered that the enquiry is vitiated on the ground that the power cannot be exercised since there was no reconstitution of Board within a period of six months. (2) The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention towards the provisions of Section 27(2) the Act of 1953 in which it is provided that the State Government shall make rules regulating the power of Board to punish the Officers and servants of the Board appointed under the Section. It is submitted that because the regulations have not been framed, therefore, the action taken by the Administrator (in the absence of the Board) it is without jurisdiction. In this regard, the provisions of Section 28 of the Act provides that the condition of service of the Registrar and other officers and servants of the Board appointed under Section 27 shall be same as those (sic) of their pay, allowances, leave, pension and provident fund shall be governed by the rules applicable to the later. The opening word of this Section "the conditions of servants of the Board appointed under section 27 shall be the same as those in service of the State Government" makes it clear that all the service conditions of the State Government are made applicable to the employees of the respondents as well. The word "service condition" was considered by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. dr. Ganpat Singh, 1978 WLN 674 , and it was observed that the expression service condition includes compulsory retirement of the Government servant. What has not expressly excluded, cannot be excluded by implication. It is for this reason that the disciplinary action which was taken by the respondent is in accordance with the C.C.A. Rules as applicable to the Government Servants. This practice is followed since long and it is an admitted postition that the rules regulating the power of the Court for punishment have not been prescribed separately as contemplated by Section 27(2). If provisions of Section 27(2) and Section 28 are read together, the logical conclusion would be that in case the rules regulating the power of the Board to punish the officers and servants of the Board is prescribed then it will be applicable. If provisions of Section 27(2) and Section 28 are read together, the logical conclusion would be that in case the rules regulating the power of the Board to punish the officers and servants of the Board is prescribed then it will be applicable. If they are not prescribed, then the general rules which are applicable to the service of the State Government servants of similar status would be applied. The later part of Section 28 that all questions of pay, allowances, promotions, leave, pension and provident fund, cannot be construed to exclude the power of punishment and it can never be contemplated even by the State Legislature or the State Government that in the absence of rules under section 27 (2) the C.C.A. Rules would not be applicable. The practice which has been followed for decades cannot be said to be without any basis and their appears to be no justification in concluding that in the absence of framing of rules under Section 27(2) the power under section 28 under C.C.A. Rules, cannot be exercised. The respondents, therefore, were within their jurisdiction to apply the provisions of C.C.A. Rules and the action cannot be considered to be without jurisdiction. (3) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the condition of service has not contemplated non-payment of any amount during the period of suspension. Reliance has been placed on the decision of V.P. Gindroniya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1494, where it was observed as under : "It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension is the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is susbpended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey." 3. On the basis of the above observations of the Apex Court, it is submitted that the petitioner was entitled for the salary during the period of suspension. It is admitted that the subsistance allowance should be paid, but the claim is made for the entire salary. On this point also, I have considered the matter. The C.C.A. Rules have contemplated that it is within the jurisdiction/direction (sic discretion) of the disciplinary Authority to award full salary during the period of suspension or not. Since the C.C.A. Rules have been made applicable, therefore, it was within the discretion of the Appoint- ing Authority. The discretion cannot be interfered. No case is made out to prove that the discretion is arbitrary. I do not consider that the petitioner was legally entitled for the entire salary. Since the C.C.A. Rules have been made applicable, therefore, it was within the discretion of the Appoint- ing Authority. The discretion cannot be interfered. No case is made out to prove that the discretion is arbitrary. I do not consider that the petitioner was legally entitled for the entire salary. The decision of the Apex Court has no application to the facts of the present case, but it was under the disciplinary action which was taken and the Rules specifically provided that the suspended employee is legally entitled for subsistance allowance. For the balance amount, it is for the disciplinary Authority to give the relief or not give the relief which has to be considered after taking into consideration the facts to each and every case and ultimate decision. In these circumstances, the submission that the petitioner is legally entitled for the .full salary cannot be entertained as the argument is even against the rules which provided only for making the payment of subsistence allowance and for the balance amount, the Disciplinary Authority has to pass appropriate order. This contention, therefore, has no force. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the list of six witnesses were given, but only one witness was summoned and no reason has been given as to why the five other witnesses have not been called for. In this regard, their (sic there) could have been two options, one either to produce the witnesses by the petitioner himself or to request the enquiry officer to summon them. Admittedly, the witnesses were not produced. No record has been shown by which it could be found that the enquiry officer was required to summon the witnesses of the petitioner in defence of the charges. In respect of witnesses of respondents, it is submitted that they filed only the affidavits and the opportunity of cross-examination was not proided. This contention, therefore, has no force. 5. Next question by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case is that the disciplinary action could have been taken by the State Government. It is submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the appointment has to be made by the State Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to produce the copy of the appointment order. It has not been pointed out that the appointment was made by the Government. It is submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the appointment has to be made by the State Government. The learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to produce the copy of the appointment order. It has not been pointed out that the appointment was made by the Government. In these circumstances, it cannot be considered that the Disciplinary Authority's power vested with the Government alone and the Board/Administrator has no power for disciplinary action. This contention has no force. 6. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has not been provided the opportunity of cross-examination. In this case there were 17 charges and in enquiry report 7 charges were proved and 8 were not proved and no finding were given in respect of 2 charges. Five witnesses were produced by the presenting officer. The disciplinary Authority found that only charge No. 4, 7, 12 are proved and charge No. 6 is consequently proved. In respect of charge No. 8, it was found that the record is not available and, therefore, no decision can be taken on this charge and for charge No. 16 it was found that since the punishment of warning has already been given, therefore, no further action is to be taken. For charge No. 17 no finding was recorded. For charges No. 11 and 13 since the matter was subjudice no decision was given. The charge No. 6 refers only with regard to not proper inspection of documents. Charge Nos. 4,. 7 and 12 have been discussed in detail in the enquiry report and are of serious nature like misappropriation etc. and it was never desired by the petitioner that he wants to cross-examine any witness of the presenting officer. On the contrary, it is mentioned that the petitioner does not want to say anything in this matter. It may also be observed that no reply has been filed by the petitioner. In these circumstances, I do not consider that any case or interference is made out in the extra-ordinary jurisdiction. The finding which has been recorded are of facts and neither there is any mistake apparent nor apparent illegality requiring interference by this Court. Moreso, this court is not sitting as an appellate authority.Order accordingly. *******