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1995 DIGILAW 705 (MP)

Om Prakash v. Ram Babu

1995-09-12

D.M.DHARMADHIKARI, FAKHRUDDIN

body1995
JUDGMENT At the time of hearing of this appeal on admission, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 stood up to raise a preliminary objection that the appeal itself is barred by time. The office has not noticed it and made up endorsement on the question of limitation. Since the stamp impression on the certified copy showing the date on which the copy was applied and supplied were not legible, we called for the original record from the copying section. From the concerned Register and the record made available to us, it is clear that the judgment in appeal was passed on 25.4.1994 and on the same day, the application for certified copy was filed by depositing Rs. 2/- as copying charges. The Copying Section had given the applicant date 3.5.1994 for his appearance. The applicant did not appear on 3.5.1994. The application was sent to the Record Room on 25.5.1994. The applicant then appeared as later as on 6.9.1995 -- about one year and two months after filing the application. In the appropriate column, the copy is shown as ready on 6.9.1995 and on the say day, he was asked to supply further funds. He supplied Rs. 24/- as further charges and the copy was also supplied to him on the same day, i.e. 6.9.1995. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the applicant having failed to appear on 3.5.1994, he is not entitled for the entire copying period for filing the appeal alongwith the certified copy. Reliance was placed on Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.M. Arthur (AIR 1922 PC 352); Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettar (AIR 1928 PC 103); Sitaram v. Chameli Bai ( AIR 1961 MP 310 ) and Lata Bal Mukand v. Lajwanti ( AIR 1975 SC 1089 ). Learned counsel for the appellant argues that even if he had not appeared on 3.5.1994, he could not be denied the copying period because the copy is shown to have become ready only on 6.9.1995, and, therefore, he is legally entitled to the entire period spent in obtaining the certified copy. Section 12 of the Limitation Act allows exclusion of the period of obtaining certified copy. In subsection (2) to section 12, for that purpose, expression used is as under : "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) ..... Section 12 of the Limitation Act allows exclusion of the period of obtaining certified copy. In subsection (2) to section 12, for that purpose, expression used is as under : "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) ..... (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded". The expression was discussed by the Privy Council in the cases (supra) and it distinguished the word "requisite" from "required" to hold that 'no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed, if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain an order.' There is no warrant for the proposition that, the time actually consumed in obtaining the decree must be deducted." "The word "requisite" is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word required. It means ''properly required" and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default". It is apparent to us that when the application for copying was made on a paltry sum of Rs. 2/-, additional funds were required and had the applicant not defaulted in appearing to the date given by the Copying Section, i.e. 3.5.1994, the copies could have been prepared much earlier. The default on the part of the applicant is clear from the notings on the certified copy which are mentioned above. He waited indefinitely and at his convenience supplied the deficit funds and obtained the copy. It is undisputed that he appeared on 6.9.1995, supplied the funds on 6.9.1995 and obtained the copy on 6.9.1995. It appears that when he approached the Copying Section for obtaining copy, further funds were demanded and he supplied them and obtained the copy. The entire time consumed by the applicant in obtaining the copy, therefore, cannot be held to be one which was requisite for obtaining the copy and the same cannot be added or excluded for computing limitation. It appears that when he approached the Copying Section for obtaining copy, further funds were demanded and he supplied them and obtained the copy. The entire time consumed by the applicant in obtaining the copy, therefore, cannot be held to be one which was requisite for obtaining the copy and the same cannot be added or excluded for computing limitation. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal has to be held as barred by time and it is dismissed as such.