Judgment :- SRINIVASAN. J. 1. Application No. 612 of 1995 and 4481 of 1995: On 18.8.1995, I passed an order in Application No. 612 of 1995 referring to certain proceedings in the City Civil Court, Madras, and calling for the records therein. I posted the matter to this day (1.9.1995). The respondent in the application had filed and application on 16.8.1995, which was numbered as A. No. 4481 of 1995. That application has also been posted before me to-day. I have heard both the applications at length. 2. Application No. 4481 of 1995 is an atrocious application filed by the applicant herein, who wants to have the order passed on 9.11.1978 in A. No. 3801 of 1977 in C.S. No. 90 of 1963, set aside at this distance of time, after having obtained an advantage from this Court by the passing of the said order by making a statement before the Court that he would not claim any right over the superstructure on the property in question. 3. The relevant history of this case is shortly as follows: The applicants father was a lessee under the hereditary trustee of the trust property, which is known as Sir Raja Ramaswamy Mudaliar Charities. It is claimed that the applicants father came into possession of the property somewhere in 1929 as tenant. It is also claimed that some superstructures were erected by him, who was carrying on hotel business in the said premises. After the demise of the father, the present applicant entered into a registered lease in 1959 with the then trustee on 17.8.1959, in which a specific reference was made to the superstructures then existing and the super-structures permitted to be constructed by the lessee. Clause 5 of the lease deed is very significant, which reads as follows: “If the ‘lessee’ commits any default in payment of the monthly rent and the same be in arrears for a period of three months either consecutively or in the aggregate, or at the end of the period of this lease as per the lease deed, the ‘lessor’ is entitled to re-enter the premises and take possession of the same with all the superstructures that are now existing and that may be put up thereon by the ‘lessee’ without claim any compensation therefor to the ‘lessee’ or any obstruction by him’.” 4. The period fixed in the lease deed was ten years. The period fixed in the lease deed was ten years. Under clause 5, in 1969, the applicant was bound to vacate and hand over possession of the property to the lessor and the lessor was entitled to take all the super-structures, including those put up by the lessee without any claim for compensation by the lessee. 5. The hereditary trustee did not manage the trust properly and the Advocate General, Madras, filed Civil Suit No. 90 of 1963 under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the framing of a scheme for proper and better management of the trust by removing the trustees/defendants in the suit from the office of hereditary trusteeship and making provisions for empowering the Government to constitute a Board of non-hereditary trustees and also for vesting the properties in the trustees under the scheme. There were prayers for other reliefs with which we are not concerned. The suit was decreed on 18.8.1970. As per the decree, a scheme was framed and under clause 4 of the scheme, the Official Trustee was directed to take immediate possession of the Estate and its properties and administer the same in accordance with the scheme. Thus, the Official Trustee took charge of the trust properties. 6. The Official Trustee filed Application No. 3801 of 1977 for a direction to the applicant herein and other members of the family, who were the legal heirs of the applicants father, to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the said premises as well as to pay Rs. 2200/- p.m. towards damages for use and occupation for the period ending 28.2.1977, besides a sum of Rs. 350/- p.m. beginning from 1.3.1977, till the date of actual delivery of possession. The applicant and the other members of the family were represented by counsel. When the matter was argued, the applicant filed an additional affidavit before Court containing a statement that the respondents in that application (applicant herein and others) will not claim any right whatever over the superstructures. On that footing, the Court passed an order directing the Official Trustee to continue the lease in favour of the respondents therein on a monthly rental of Rs. 350/- with effect from 1.3.1977 and fixed the period of lease as five years from the date of execution of the fresh lease deed. 7. On that footing, the Court passed an order directing the Official Trustee to continue the lease in favour of the respondents therein on a monthly rental of Rs. 350/- with effect from 1.3.1977 and fixed the period of lease as five years from the date of execution of the fresh lease deed. 7. It should be mentioned at this stage that as per clause 5 of the lease deed extracted above, the respondents in Application No. 3801 of 1977, including the applicant herein did not have any right to claim any compensation for the superstructures or a right to retain the superstructure in their ownership. As per the lease deed, which was a registered one, the respondents therein were bound to deliver possession to the lessor along with the superstructures. The Official Trustee standing in the shoes of the lessor, was entitled to take the entire property, including the superstructures into his possession. At that time, the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act were not available to the lessee as the lease was entered into only in 1959. The Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1922, was emended in the year 1955. The Act of 1922 as samended in 1955, was made applicable to all the tenancies prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act. The lease having commenced in 1959, the lessee was not entitled to the benefits of the said Act. That Act was later amended only in 1980, when it was made applicable to the tenancies created before the amendment. Thus, on the late on which Application No. 3801 of 1977 was heard and decided, the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act were inapplicable to the lessee/applicant herein. Knowing fully well the position in law and the relevant clause in the lease deed, the applicant herein filed an affidavit in that proceeding containing a statement that the respondents in that application will not claim any right over the superstructure. 8. In spite of the order passed by this Court in the said application, the applicant made bold to approach the City Civil Court, Madras, with a suit on 13.7.1983. The suit was numbered as O.S. No. 5379 of 1983. 8. In spite of the order passed by this Court in the said application, the applicant made bold to approach the City Civil Court, Madras, with a suit on 13.7.1983. The suit was numbered as O.S. No. 5379 of 1983. In that suit, he claimed that he was entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, and therefore, entitled to purchase the land and also for a decree for injunction restraining the Official Trustee from taking proceedings for evicting him. In that plaint, reference was made to the proceedings in the High Court as follows: “This Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to the benefits of City Tenants Protection Act. This plaintiff submits that he did not understand the implication of the statement given by him before the High Court in A.3801 of 1977 disclaiming the right to the superstructure, the present value of the same more than 5 to 7 lakhs. For the simple reason that the defendant demanded an enhanced rent this plaintiff need not consent to give up the valuable right in the superstructures. The counsels appeared for this plaintiff before ‘the High Court threatened him that he will have to vacate the suit site if he is not amenable for giving up the right in the superstructure. This plaintiff was forced to act upon the misrepresentation of his counsel and enter a compromise which is per se not within the competence and jurisdiction of the High Court especially in a summary proceedings”. He proceeded to state that there was no estoppel against statute and in spite of the order of this Court, he was entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the Act. But, when the applicant gave evidence in that case as P.W. 1, he did not choose to utter a word about the alleged threat or misrepresentation by counsel. The suit was dismissed by the City Civil Court on 19.9.1989, holding that the applicant was not entitled to a decree as prayed for by him. In the course of the judgment, the City Civil Court has pointed out that the plaintiff therein, who is the applicant herein, did not speak a word about the alleged threat by his counsel. The Court found that there was not an iota of evidence in that regard. In the course of the judgment, the City Civil Court has pointed out that the plaintiff therein, who is the applicant herein, did not speak a word about the alleged threat by his counsel. The Court found that there was not an iota of evidence in that regard. Against that judgment, the applicant filed A.S. No. 93 of 1991 and that was dismissed on 9.7.1992. The Appellate judge has found that the applicant herein was not entitled to claim any right to the superstructure and that the only remedy of the applicant, if all, was to have filed an appeal against the order of the High Court in Application No. 3801 of 1977. 9. It is stated that the applicant presented a Second Appeal in this Court against the said judgment but the Registry informs me that the papers in the Second Appeal, were returned on 27.1.1994 and they have not yet been re presented. Even though learned counsel, who appeared for the applicant in this application, viz. Mr. P. Gopalan on 30.6.95, said that he would re present the papers and bring up the Second Appeal for orders as to admission, the applicant has not chosen to do so. In view of the fact that the applicant has not even represented the papers in spite of lapse of more than a year and a half after the return by this Court, the applicant is not entitled to claim any benefit on the basis of the said presentation of the Second Appeal or on the ground that the Second Appeal is pending on the file of this court. Thus, it is clear that the judgment in O. S. No. 5379 of 1983 holding that the applicant is not entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act having been confirmed in A.S. No. 93 of 1991 has become final. 10. Not satisfied with that litigation, the applicant started a parallel litigation by filing another suit on 27.8.1983. The prayer in that suit was a peculiar one. The applicant prayed for a decree for mandatory injunction directing the Official Trustee to join the execution and registration of a lease deed for the suit land from the date fixed by that Court, as directed by the High Court in Application No. 3801 of 1977 in C.S. No. 90 of 1963 for a monthly rent of Rs. The applicant prayed for a decree for mandatory injunction directing the Official Trustee to join the execution and registration of a lease deed for the suit land from the date fixed by that Court, as directed by the High Court in Application No. 3801 of 1977 in C.S. No. 90 of 1963 for a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- for a period of five years. That plaint was returned several times and the applicant took his own time to re present the papers. Ultimately, the suit was numbered as O.S. No. 4427 of 1985. The then Official Trustee did not take care to file written statement in that suit, in spite of several adjournments. On 23.4.1986, the Official Trustee was set ex parte. The matter was posted for ex parte evidence to 30.4.1986 and thereafter to 15.7.1986. On the later date, the plaintiff was absent and the suit was dismissed for default. The plaintiff filed I.A. No. 13747 of 1986 for restoration of the suit to file. Notice was ordered in that application to the Official Trustee and he entered appearance through counsel and filed a counter. The application was argued at length, and the suit was ultimately restored to file by the court on condition of payment of costs of Rs. 250/-. The plaintiff paid the sum of Rs. 250/- and the suit was restored on 26.6.1990. The matter was again posted for ex parte evidence on 5.7.1990. It must be noted here that though the suit was dismissed for default and restored to file after the Official Trustee entered appearance through counsel, no notice was given to the Official Trustee when the matter was posted to 5.7.1990 for evidence. The learned judge of the City Civil Court proceeded to treat the matter as if the Official Trustee continued to be ex parte and posted the matter without notice to him. The matter was adjourned twice for ex parte evidence and posted ultimately on 11.7.1990. The plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. He marked four documents, viz., Exs: A1. to A4. The City Civil Court passed a decree on that day. The judgment of the City Civil Court reads thus: ‘P.W. 1, examined. Exs: A1. to A4 marked, claim proved. The suit is decreed with costs as prayed for. Time one month’. 11. The plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. He marked four documents, viz., Exs: A1. to A4. The City Civil Court passed a decree on that day. The judgment of the City Civil Court reads thus: ‘P.W. 1, examined. Exs: A1. to A4 marked, claim proved. The suit is decreed with costs as prayed for. Time one month’. 11. On the face of it, judgment of the City Civil Court is unsustainable, as it is evident that the court had not applied its mind to the pleadings in the plaint or the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff (applicant herein) in that suit was that the High Court was not competent to pass an order is Application No. 3801 of 1977 for lease of building and land. He referred to the other suit filed by him claiming the benefits of Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act which was then pending. The relevant averments referring to the order of the High Court were as follows: “But the plaintiff never agreed to give up the building constructed by his father over the suit site, the value of the same will be around Rs. 3 lakhs, namely, the present market value. On the other hand, the court wrongly said in the order ‘the court recording the statement that the respondent (present plaintiff) will not claim any right over the superstructure, it is ordered as follows:— ‘this plaintiff submits that the plaintiff neither deposed on oath giving up any claim to the valuable building nor gave statement to the effect as stated above, Besides, the High Court had no jurisdiction to record any such statement as there is estoppel against statute”. In spite of the said pleading in the suit, the judge of the City Civil Court did no consider the question whether the order of the High Court in Application No. 3801 of 1977 was binding on the plaintiff therein or not. The Court ought to have considered that question, and if it was of the opinion that the order was not binding, it should have given a finding to that effect. But, on the other hand, without going into the question, the Court passed a decree, which runs directly counter to the order passed by this Court. The Court ought to have considered that question, and if it was of the opinion that the order was not binding, it should have given a finding to that effect. But, on the other hand, without going into the question, the Court passed a decree, which runs directly counter to the order passed by this Court. While the order of this Court directed the Official Trustee to execute the lease deed in favour of the applicant herein for the building and the land, the judge of the City Civil Court granted a decree directing the Official Trustee to execute a lease deed with reference to the land alone for the same amount, as fixed by the High Court. 12. A part from that, there was nothing whatever in the evidence about the affidavit filed by the applicant herein in the High Court in A. No. 3801 of 1977 or the statement that no right will be claimed in the superstructure. Thirdly, the learned judge of the City Civil Court, failed to take note of the contents of Ex: A.3, which was the lease deed dated 17.8.1959 filed by the plaintiff himself, wherein clause 5 made clear that the plaintiff in that suit, viz., applicant herein had no right to the superstructure after 1969. In spite of all these factors, the learned judge of the City Civil Court simply closed his eyes and mind and granted a decree as prayed for by the plaintiff in that suit. He had no jurisdiction to pass a decree contrary to the order passed by this Court earlier. 13. There is no doubt whatever that the said decree is a nullity in the eye of law. There cannot be a decree by a Subordinate Court, which runs counter to the order passed by the High Court unless the Subordinate court declares that the order of the High Court is a nullity. I have already pointed out that the City Civil Court Judge did not even consider that aspect of the matter. He simply ignored the order of this Court, which was for a lease of the land and the building on the basis of the statement contained in the counter affidavit filed by the applicant herein. 14. I must also make a reference at this stage to a further development in the case. He simply ignored the order of this Court, which was for a lease of the land and the building on the basis of the statement contained in the counter affidavit filed by the applicant herein. 14. I must also make a reference at this stage to a further development in the case. The Official Trustee coming to know of the ex parte decree passed on 11.7.1990, filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree even on 7.8.1990, i.e. within a period of one month from the date of decree. In that application, the applicant herein filed a Counter and contested the same vehemently. The City Civil Court Judge dismissed that application on 28.2.1992 holding that the Official Trustee did not give sufficient explanation for his absence on 11.7.1990. It is represented by the present Official Trustee that he has applied for certified copy of the said order, but the same has not yet been granted. 15. Once it comes to the knowledge of this Court that a decree has been passed by the City Civil Court without jurisdiction, running counter to the order of this Court, it is the duty of this Court to call for the records and see that the decree is nullified. In the present case, the decree passed by the City Civil Court in O.S. No. 4427 of 1985 is a nullity and it is not necessary for me to set aside the same. In Kiran Singh. v. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ), the Supreme Court said: “It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” I have already called for the records in the case by my earlier order and they are before me. I have heard counsel on both sides on the question of validity of the decree in O.S. No. 4427 of 1985. I have heard counsel on both sides on the question of validity of the decree in O.S. No. 4427 of 1985. I hereby declare that the said decree which runs counter to the order of this Court in Application No. 3801 of 1977, cannot prevail over and above the order of this Court and the applicant herein cannot take any advantage of the said decree. It is also brought to my notice that there is an application for execution of that decree which is pending. 16. In my judgment in Annapporni. v. Janaki (1995(1) L.W. 141), I have dealt with in detail the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. This is a fit case in my opinion in which I should exercise my suo motu powers and I have done so. I hereby declare that the decree passed therein is a nullity and wholly void and consequently inexecutable. 17. The Official Trustee has filed Application No. 612 of 1995 for a direction to the applicant herein to pay enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 2500/- p.m. for the execution of lease deed for further period of five years from the date of order by this Court in respect of the schedule mentioned property. Subsequently, the Official Trustee has filed and additional report into Court in which he has claimed a sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards past damages. It is only when that application was opposed by the applicant herein who is the respondent therein by filing a counter the above facts came to be known to this Court and the records in the said City Civil Court proceedings were called for by me. 18. During the pendency of the said application, the applicant has filed A. No. 4481 of 1995 for setting aside the order dated 9.11.1978 in A. No. 3801 of 1977 in C.S. No. 90 of 1963. At the outset it must be pointed out that the allegation in the affidavit is that the counsel, who appeared for the applicant herein in A. No. 3801 of 1977 acted in collusion with the Official Trustee. The relevant part of the affidavit reads thus:— “But during the course of hearing of the Application No. 3801 of 1977, his counsel then on record, Mr. The relevant part of the affidavit reads thus:— “But during the course of hearing of the Application No. 3801 of 1977, his counsel then on record, Mr. Mahaboob Jan, in collusion with the Official Trustee threatened me that in case I am refusing to give up my title to the superstructure of Door No. 7, Poonamallee High Road in favour of the respondent-Trust in which the Hotel business is being carried, High Court, High Court will be throwing me out of possession. He had played fraud upon me compelling me to come to a compromise in the case and give a statement disowning my title with the said superstructure. I have given a statement before the Honourable High Court on the instructions of my counsel that I am not claiming the Hotel building which by then was valued at Rs. 6 to 7 lakhs. Without any implication of consequences, I did so. But the ‘Honourable High Court had not applied its mind at all to find out whether the claim of the superstructure by the respondent is lawful and without going into the question of my ownership to the superstructure and statutory benefit under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, passed the following consent order.’ Curiously, the applicant said in the next paragraph: “I submit that if the compulsion of the Advocate appearing on behalf was not due to collusion and fraud, at least, his conduct of compelling me to a statement before the High Court, detrimental to my interest, should have been due to misrepresentation.” 19. Apart from the fact that the averments made, extracted above, in the affidavit now filed, are entirely different from the averments made in the plaint in O.S. No. 5379 of 1983 and O.S. No. 4427 of 1985. The records show that the applicant has been bold enough to make a deliberately false statement in the present affidavit. He has stated that the Advocate then on record was one Mr. Mahaboob Jan, who colluded with the Official Trustee. But, it is seen from the records that when Application No. 3801 of 1977 was pending the applicant herein changed the counsel and filed Application No. 3105 of 1978 for revocation of vakalath given if favour of A. Mahaboob Jan and Abdul Rashid. That Application was ordered by Court on 1.9.1978 as the counsel on record had given their consent for change of vakalath. That Application was ordered by Court on 1.9.1978 as the counsel on record had given their consent for change of vakalath. Then the applicant had engaged Habibullah Badsha, T.P. Sankaran and Chandrasekaran, who entered appearance on behalf of the present applicant and other respondents in the said application. In fact, it is seen from the order passed in Application No. 3801 of 1977 that it was Mr. Habibullah Badsha, who appeared before Court and argued the matter on behalf of the respondents therein. In those circumstances, the present allegation that on account of collusion between Mr. Mahaboob Jan and the Official Trustee, the former threatened the applicant herein and compelled him to agree to give up his title to the superstructure and thus had played a fraud upon him, is absolutely false. He has made such a malicious allegation against the Advocate in the present application only for the purpose of buttressing his case for setting aside the order made in Application No. 3801 of 1977. He has chosen to make that allegation after a period of nearly 17 years. That itself shows that the applicant will go to any length to thwart the order of this Court made in 1978 and would not hesitate to commit perjury. 20. Learned counsel for the applicant raised four contentions. The first contention is that the order passed in A. No. 3801 of 1977 is a compromise order under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, not having been complied with, the order passed by this Court in A. No. 3801 of 1977 is a nullity. For this purpose, learned counsel for the applicant places reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Banwarilalal. v. Chando Devi ,. ( AIR 1993 SC 1139 ). In that case, the Supreme Court held that if an agreement or compromise was fraudulent, then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the Explanation to the Proviso to Rule 3 and as such, not lawful. In that case, the plaintiff challenged the order recording the compromise on the ground that his counsel in collusion with the defendant in the suit, had played a fraud on him by filing a fabricated petition of compromise, although no compromise had been effected between him and the defendant. In that case, the plaintiff challenged the order recording the compromise on the ground that his counsel in collusion with the defendant in the suit, had played a fraud on him by filing a fabricated petition of compromise, although no compromise had been effected between him and the defendant. He has also mentioned the details of the fraud played upon him in the petition so filed and it was stated that the compromise itself was voied, illegal and against the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the materials on record showed that the compromise was hot lawful within the meaning of Rule 3 and therefore, the order recording compromise could be recalled. That ratio will have no application in the present case. It is to be seen here that there is no compromise order or decree based on a compromise in A. No. 3801 of 1977. I have already stated the circumstances, under which the order in that application came to he passed. It was an application for a direction to the members of the family of the applicant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the demised premises. The applicant herein had himself filed an affidavit containing a statement that he would not claim any right over the superstructures in that land and on that footing, the court granted a benefit in favour of the applicant herein and the said members of the family, who were respondents in that application by giving a lease for a period of five years on a payment of Rs. 350/- p.m., towards rent. I have already referred to the contents of the registered lease deed of the year 1959. The applicant herein had no right whatever to the superstructure after the expiry of the period fixed in that lease deed, i.e., 1969. The applicant, by acknowledging the true position, without delivering possession of the building and land, got a benefit of a leasem his favour. Thus there is no question of any compromise between the parties or an order passed on such compromise. 21. The applicant, by acknowledging the true position, without delivering possession of the building and land, got a benefit of a leasem his favour. Thus there is no question of any compromise between the parties or an order passed on such compromise. 21. I have already referred to the circumstances that in the subsequent proceedings filed by the applicant himself in the City Civil Court he had two occasions to speak about the alleged collusion and fraud between his counsel and the Official Trustee, but be did not do so either in the pleadings or when he was in the witness box in both the proceedings, viz., O.S. No. 5379 of 1983 and O.S. No. 4427 of 1985. After 17 years after the order in the application, now the applicant has come forward with the said allegation in present application. In view of the facts stated above this application is wholly unsustainable. This allegation has been made only for the purpose of bringing the case within the parameters of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Banwari Lal (supra). Obviously, the affidavit has been drafted after reading the judgment of the Supreme Court. The facts narrated above are sufficient to throw away the case of fraud and collusion by his counsel with the Official Trustee. 22. The second contention is that after the order passed by this Court in 1978, the right to the superstructure was not transferred by the applicant to the trust by any registered deed. According to him, it is a property worth more than Rs. 100/- and therefore, a registered document is necessary to pass title to the superstructure to the trust. There is no substance in this contention. I have already referred to clause 5 of the lease deed, which was a registered document. Under that clause, there was a registered contract by which the applicant was bound to leave the property on the expiry of the period of lease and on his leaving the property, the superstructure will be taken by the lessor. That clause in the registered deed was sufficient to confer upon the lessor title over the superstructure in 1969 on the expiry of the lease period. 23. That clause in the registered deed was sufficient to confer upon the lessor title over the superstructure in 1969 on the expiry of the lease period. 23. The third contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that he is entitled to the benefit of City Tenants Protection Act and he could not have given up the statutory benefit in the proceedings in A. No. 3801 of 1977. Here again, there is no substance, as I have already pointed out, the Act was not then applicable to the lessee/applicant herein as the lease came into existence only in 1959. On the date when this Court passed the order in A. No. 3801/77, the applicant had no right under the said Act and he was fully aware of the same. 24. The last contention is that the Official Trustee never claimed the benefit of clause 5 of the lease deed. It is unnecessary for the Official Trustee to do so. On the other hand, the Official Trustee filed an application for eviction as against the applicant and other family members of the applicant, in A. No. 3801/77. At that time, the applicant had no other alternative, but to agree to the passing of an order for a lease in his favour with regard to the land and building and got the same from Court. Having obtained that benefit, the applicant is estopped from denying the right of the Official Trustee to claim the superstructure as well. 25. In the circumstances, Application No. 4481 of 1995 for setting aside the order in A. No. 3801 of 1977 is wholly unsustainable and not maintainable in law. No provision of law has been quoted in the Judges Summons excepting Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. I am convinced that the application is not maintainable and it is hereby dismissed. Application No. 612 of 1995: The respondent herein shall execute a lease deed on a rent of Rs. 2500/- per mensem with respect to the property in House and land bearing Door No. 6, Poonamallee High Road (know as E.V.R Salai), Madras-3, measuring 304? and measuring 720 sq. ft. in the ground floor and 720 sq. ft. in the first floor situated within the Sub Registration District of Periamet and Registration District of North Madras. 2500/- per mensem with respect to the property in House and land bearing Door No. 6, Poonamallee High Road (know as E.V.R Salai), Madras-3, measuring 304? and measuring 720 sq. ft. in the ground floor and 720 sq. ft. in the first floor situated within the Sub Registration District of Periamet and Registration District of North Madras. The Official Trustee is directed to furnish to the counsel for the respondent herein a draft lease de ed on or before 5.9.1995, and the respondents counsel shall state his objections, if any by 6.9.1995. Post this application on 8.9.1995 for approval of the draft and further orders.