Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19.7.88 (decree signed on 27.7.88) passed by Sri Suresh Prasad Sinha, Subordinate Judge, III, at Jamshedpur in Title (Partition) Suit No. 109/28 of 1985/88 decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1. 2. The appellants before this Court were defendants 1 to 3 whereas respondent No. 1 was the plaintiff and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were defendants 4 to 8 before the lower court. The suit was filed for partition of the property mentioned in the schedule of the plaint according to the share of the parties. According to the plaintiff the house premises described in schedule formerly belonged to one Parbat Lal who died in 1955 leaving behind his four sons, namely, Murari Lal, Banwari Lal, Jairarm Lal and Kanhaiya Lal. Jatram Lal is the plaintiff and Kanhai Lal is defendant No. 8. Murari Lal died about 10 years ago leaving behind defendant Nos. 1,2 and 3 as his son, daughter and widow respectively. The heirs of Murari Lal inherited the share of Murari Lal in the property in equal share amongst themselves. Similarly, Banwari Lal died five years ago leaving behind defendant Nos. 4,5,6 and 7 as his widow, daughters and son respectively. Defendant Nos. 4 to 7 inherited the share of Banwari Lal in equal share or proportion. The four sons of Parbat Lal continued in joint possession of the house property even after the death of their father. They agreed to partition the suit property among themselves in equal share i.e. 1/4th share each, but the same was not done by metes and bounds, rather, they continued to live in different portions of the suit house according to their convenience. They started their business separately but the house property remained in joint occupation. After the death of Murari Lal and Banwari Lal their heirs also continued residing in their separate respective portions of the suit house. The ground rent, electricity and water charges were still being paid jointly to the Tisco, being the landlord, in the joint names of all the four brothers of the plaintiff. After the death of Murari Lal and Banwari Lal their heirs also continued residing in their separate respective portions of the suit house. The ground rent, electricity and water charges were still being paid jointly to the Tisco, being the landlord, in the joint names of all the four brothers of the plaintiff. It is alleged that during the life time of Banwari Lal, he had taken the signature of all the brothers in some blank paper with an understanding that he would get a partition deed prepared incorporating the fact that each would have equal share in the suit property, but thereafter, Banwari Lal did nothing of the kind because he was occupying almost double the share of the plaintiff. Regarding arrangement and enjoyment of the suit property, dispute cropped up as a result of which on 17th November, 1985 the plaintiff demanded partition from the defendants of the suit house. The said request for partition was refused and hence the suit. 3. By filing written statement defendant Nos. 1 to 7 contested the suit. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a joint written statement, whereas defendant Nos. 4 to 7 were in another set. Defendant No. 8, Kanhaiya Lal did not contest the suit and the substituted heirs 9 to 21, though appeared in the suit by filing vakalatnama, did not file any written statement contesting the claim of the plaintiff. 4. The case of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 is that the plaintiff has no cause of action inasmuch as the suit property was already partitioned amicably on 9.11.1969 and a partition deed was duly executed to that effect. A memorandum of partition was prepared and all the sons of said Parbat Lal signed the same. Partition was accepted by the parties which was witnessed by the witnesses. Similarly joint business which was in the name and style of M/s. Prabat lal and Murari Lal has also been partitioned by them which is evident from the memorandum of partition. The original copy of the said memorandum is in the custody of the plaintiff and with some oblique motive the plaintiff has suppressed the same knowingly. Joint possession of the suit house has been denied and it is asserted that since the date of partition the plaintiff and his three brothers exclusively and separately are residing in their respective allotted portions of the house property. Joint possession of the suit house has been denied and it is asserted that since the date of partition the plaintiff and his three brothers exclusively and separately are residing in their respective allotted portions of the house property. Further case of these defendants is that it was agreed upon that the liabilities incurred towards the business of Parbat Lal will be taken by Banwari Lal and Murari Lal and they will bear the liability of the business of Parbat Lal. In lieu thereof they will be allotted a bigger portion and other two brothers would get smaller portion. Joint payment of ground rent and other charges have been denied by these defendants. It is said that although the bills stand in the name of four sons of Parbat Lai but separate sub-meters in their respective names have been installed and charges are paid separately because according to the restriction imposed by Tisco. the main meter could not be separated. The allegation of obtaining the signature on a blank paper by Banwari Lal during his life time has been categorically denied. Apart from this, there defendants have alleged that the suit is not maintainable on various grounds. 5. The case of defendants 4 to 7 is that Prabat Lal had one eldest son, namely, Manna Lal who separated from the joint family of Prabat Lal having relinquished his claim in the joint business and property of his father, that is, Parbat Lal. In 1960 all the remaining four sons of Pargat Lal got their ancestral ornaments mutually partitioned by way of family arrangement. Accordingly, the suit property was partitioned among those four sons in 1969 by dint of a mutual family settlement. The terms of family settlement were reduced in writing and signed by all the four sons of Prabat Lal as final deed of family partition of business, capital, books of account as well as the house property. A detailed map was prepared showing the boundary areas and portions partitioned allotted and possessed by different parties which was annexed to the said deed of family settlement. This map was also signed by said four sons of Parbat Lal. Since the date of partition, the parties are enjoying the suit property which is more than 18 years and there was never any scope of misunderstanding or dispute regarding separate and independent enjoyment of the respective partitioned portion. This map was also signed by said four sons of Parbat Lal. Since the date of partition, the parties are enjoying the suit property which is more than 18 years and there was never any scope of misunderstanding or dispute regarding separate and independent enjoyment of the respective partitioned portion. On these grounds it is alleged that the suit as framed is not maintainable. 6. On .aforesaid pleadings of the parties the learned court below framed the following issues: 1. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 2. Has the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties? 4. Whether there was family settlement between the parties for the suit premises? 5. Whether there was a partition of the suit house by metes and biunds arrived at between the parties as alleged by the defendants.? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a preliminary decree of partition for his 1/4th share in the suit premises" 7. What other relief (s), if any, the plaintiff is entitled to? 7. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidences, the learned court below decreed the suit against which the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have preferred this appeal. By order dated 28.2.1995 the name of appellant No. 3, Smt. Mani Devi has been deleted and in her place her heirs and legal representatives have been substituted in this Court after hearing the parties. - 8. MR. M.Y. Eqbal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that the finding of the trial court is vitiated firstly for the reason that the trial court has not carefully noticed the evidences of the plaintiff regarding claim of partition. Referring to the evidence of PW.l he urged that the admission of plaintiff (PW1) is enough to prove the previous partition. According to in the statement of PW1 to the effect that "Shantipurwak Tai Kar Ranhe Lage" is enough to prove the claim of defendants regarding previous mutual partition. Referring to the evidence of PW.l he urged that the admission of plaintiff (PW1) is enough to prove the previous partition. According to in the statement of PW1 to the effect that "Shantipurwak Tai Kar Ranhe Lage" is enough to prove the claim of defendants regarding previous mutual partition. Secondly the court below has not construed the import of Ext, C dated 9.11.69 properly which is not a document affecting partition, rather, a document which has incorporated the factum of partition, already effected prior to execution of Ext, C. It is urged that PW1 having accepted partition of movable properties as well as the business properties, cannot be allowed to deny the assertion in Ext. C. Lastly it is contended that a document which is mere a document incorporating partition already done, does not require registration. In support of his contention he has relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1966 SC 292 and 1836, 1976 (3) SCC 119 AIR 1968, Patna, 417 and AIR 1973 Orissa, 112. 9. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents countering the argument of Mr. Eqbal, has submitted that the learned court below has correctly come to a finding that there was no previous partition inasmuch as there is nothing on the record to show that any mutual agreement was entered into and ultimately reduced in writing. However, he submits that the observation of the court below that Jewelries and golds were partitioned and divided among the plaintiff and his brothers during the life time of Parbat Lal is an error of record. Commenting on the document, Ext. C Mr. Prasad has urged that the same cannot be relied upon inasmuch as the signatures alleged to have been put on this document are undated. Similarly, the map contains the signature without date. According to him Ext. C. is a document by means of which partition was effected and not that after mutual partition the recitals were reduced in writing and in such view of the matter the said document is compulsorily register able under Sec. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. According to him a document by reason of which partition takes place, has to be registered and in absence of registration, the same cannot be looked into. According to him a document by reason of which partition takes place, has to be registered and in absence of registration, the same cannot be looked into. In support of his argument he has relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1976 SC 807 AIR 1980 Allahabad 184 AIR 1968 SC 1299 and AIR 1979 Calcutta, 222. 10. Mr. P.K. Sinha appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has supported the argument of Mr. Eqbal by submitting that Ext. C. being a document which has only reproduced the sentiments of the parties in writing, does not require registration. According to him mutual partition took place between the parties and in order to record the intention of the parties, Ext. C was created and thus Ext. C cannot be construed as a document which is the basis of partition. Relying on a decision reported in 1938 Indian Appeal, 87, Mr. Sinha has urged that a document of family settlement is a secret one which should not be brought to public. Moreover, Ext. C or D do not create any right or new title to the parties to the agreement because this was affected after the mutual agreement arrived at by the parties Lastly it is contended that even if Ext. C or D are not admissible in evidence, those can be used for co-lateral purposes. 11. Mr. N.K. Prasad has strongly contended that respondent No. 2, who was defendant No. 4 before the lower court cannot be allowed to support the appellants simply for the reason that the parties against whom the decree has been passed but not appealed against, cannot be heard. He submits that no doubt the court can modify the decree against the non-appearing party but definitely such party who has not challenged the decree against him, cannot be allowed to support the party is whose favour the suit was decreed. 12. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the parties material evidence are to be looked into. As noticed above the case of the plaintiff is that the house in question was jointly occupied by the sons of Parbat Lal and they were occupying different portions of the house for the sake of their convenience. 12. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the parties material evidence are to be looked into. As noticed above the case of the plaintiff is that the house in question was jointly occupied by the sons of Parbat Lal and they were occupying different portions of the house for the sake of their convenience. The plaintiff has pleaded that all of them agreed to divide the suit property in equal shares i.e. each having 1/4th share but they did not get the property partitioned by metes and bounds. As against this the case of defendants 1 to 3 is that the said house property was amicably partitioned 1 to 3 is that the said house property was amicably partitioned on 9.11.1069 which was duly accepted by the parties and acted upon. It is also their case that not only this house property but also the business of Late Prabat Lal was partitioned amicably and since 1969 the parties were enjoying their respective shares of the properties both residential house and shop premised as also the business and there was no occasion for any objection by any of the parties. After the death of Parbat lal the four sons sat together and after due consultation for several days amicable partition was effected in respect of the house property and business left by Parbat Lal. During discussion it was agreed between the parties that as Banwari Lal and Murari Lal were to bear the liabilities of the business of late Prabat Lal, they would be allotted a bigger portion and other two sons, namely, the plaintiff and Kanhaiya Lal would get smaller portion. Similarly the plea of defendants 4 to 7 is that in 1969 joint family business was separated between four sons of late Prabat Lal and they carried out their own separate business independently and with information to this effect to the Income Tax and Sales Tax department. In the same way the residential house left by Prabat Lal was also partitioned among the four sons of Parbat Lal in 1969 and the terms and conditions of mutual agreement were reduced into writing by means of a deed of family settlement. 13. The plaintiff, Jairam Lal has been examined as PW 1. In the same way the residential house left by Prabat Lal was also partitioned among the four sons of Parbat Lal in 1969 and the terms and conditions of mutual agreement were reduced into writing by means of a deed of family settlement. 13. The plaintiff, Jairam Lal has been examined as PW 1. In his deposition, inter alia, he has stated that after the death of his father the house property devolved to his four sons and their names were entered in the records of Tisco. The sisters did not got any share in the property. After the death of the father all the four brothers got the house in jointness and for the sake of convenience they were residing in the house in separate portions. According to him though the business was separated, the house remained in jointness and rent and other charges were being paid jointly. In para 7 of his deposition he has denied that any partition was made on 9.11.1969. He also denied the existence of any document and map in this regard. He also denied the responsibility of Banwari Lal and Murari Lal for sharing the liability of his deceased father. However, in his cross examination he has stated that after marriage they were living separately in the house. According to him, though 10-12 years ago a blank paper was singed by him at the instance of Banwari Lal, he did not make any complaint anywhere. He also admitted that since their marriage 17-18 years ago their expenditures were also separated. According to him, before filing of the suit he did not protest about the separate possession but only asked for partition. In para 17 of his cross examination the plaintiff has deposed that 2-3 years after the death of his father, they were separated in business and at that stage no dispute was there. He categorically admitted in this para that they started living in the suit house separately by deciding the same peacefully (Shanti Purwak Tai Karke:Rahne Lage). This was done not by. any difference or dispute. In para 14 of his deposition the plaintiff has categorically stated that his signature is not on the plaint (marked X/l for identification) and the vakalatnama was not signed by him (marked X/2 for identification). He has also admitted the fact that the father and mother divided the gold ornaments among the brothers. any difference or dispute. In para 14 of his deposition the plaintiff has categorically stated that his signature is not on the plaint (marked X/l for identification) and the vakalatnama was not signed by him (marked X/2 for identification). He has also admitted the fact that the father and mother divided the gold ornaments among the brothers. In para 15 he has said that he is unable to say from when they were separated by metes and bounds. However, he has stated that he was married in 1955 and after 4-5 years the younger brothers got married and after that mess was separated. He has also admitted that after they had separated and started living in the suit house separately by deciding amicably, no objection/protest was made against any brother and no letter was even sent to this effect, Everything was done mutually. 14. Ext. C is the deed of family partition. His signature on this deed has been marked as Ext. A. At one stage the plaintiff admits that it is his signature but immediately reiterated by saying that it looks like his signature. He has also denied his signature on the joint application filed before the Income Tax Officer on 31.12.1969. This document has been marked as Ext. B/l and the signature of the plaintiff has been marked with objection as Ext. X/3 for identification. He has also denied his signature on Ext. Y, the map showing partition. 15. On the other hand, DVV-1, Sheonand Lal examined on behalf of defendants 1 to 3, in his evidence, has stated about the previous partition and payment of ground rent separately. In his cross examination he has categorically stated that since 1969 the plaintiff did not ask for any partition after the aforesaid mutual deed of family settlement. According to him the deed was signed by the parties and the witnesses. He, however, admitted that no step was taken for entering the names of the parties separately in the records of Tisco. Similarly, DW-1 Binod Kumar, examined on behalf of defendants 4 to 7 has stated about the previous partition in 1969. He has proved Ext. C, the partition deed and Ext. He, however, admitted that no step was taken for entering the names of the parties separately in the records of Tisco. Similarly, DW-1 Binod Kumar, examined on behalf of defendants 4 to 7 has stated about the previous partition in 1969. He has proved Ext. C, the partition deed and Ext. D, the map attached therewith.- In his cross examination he has deposed that he was 8 years old in 1969 and was reading in class V. The most important witness in DW2 examined on behalf of defendants 4 to 7 who is Mukti Lal. He is one of the signatories on the deed of family settlement and is an independent witness. He has proved his signatures on the deed of family settlement marked as Ext. B/l and B//2 respectively. He has also stated that he signed the document after the same was signed by the parties. In cross examination on behalf of the defendants 1 to 3 he has deposed that the said document was prepared after mutual agreement. In cross examination by the plaintiff .he has said that the signature was put at 4 p.m. and other witnesses were also there who only put their signatures but did not give any date. This is in all the oral evidences adduced on behalf of the parties. 16. The deed of partition is Ext. C which contains the subject as follows: FAMILY PARTITION OF BUSINESS CAPITAL IN BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF M/S PARBAT LAL MURARI LAL AND ALSO DIVISION OF HOUSE PROPERTY. This heading itself indicates that by this deed not only the house property but also they business capital and books of accounts were partitioned. The contents of the deed indicates that the parties who were the members of Hindu undivided family, were carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Prabat Lal and Murari Lal. On 9.11.1969 they separated amoung themselves and decided an amicable partition of the movable and immovable property belonging to the aforesaid family. In order to avlid future difficulties and misunderstanding the parties agreed among themselves on the advice of the well wishers and friends and relatives and other mutual consideration they settled down all the accounts of the family business. On 9.11.1969 they separated amoung themselves and decided an amicable partition of the movable and immovable property belonging to the aforesaid family. In order to avlid future difficulties and misunderstanding the parties agreed among themselves on the advice of the well wishers and friends and relatives and other mutual consideration they settled down all the accounts of the family business. They decided to divide the capital of the business till date in four equal shares among themselves as well as four equal shares of the house property, holding No. 1 at Burmamines market, Jamshedpur-7. It was agreed that each of the parties will get 1/4th share in capital and 1/4th share in house property. It was further agreed that the liabilities and assets of the said business namely, M/s. Parbat Lal Murari Lal will be taken over by the 2nd party, namely, Banwari Lal. They agreed that hence forth the status of the parties will be individual and from that date the parties are separated each other and they became absolute owner of the share amicably allotted to them as well as the share of the house property allotted as per schedule attached to the deed. The last portion of the deed reads as follows: Whereas there has been no other acknowledgment in writing of the business as well as the House property at holding No. 1, Burmamines market, Jamshedpur-7 and the parties desire that it may be reduced to writing. That the parties acknowledge that the partition of business as well as house property has taken place on 9.11.69 i.e. Kartik Badi 30th of S.year-2026 Diwali (Sunday) and the net Capital of business has been divided between the four aforesaid members equally, as above mentioned, and the House property as per the plan and schedule Nos. noted therein. This document has been signed by all the four sons of late Prabat Lal. It was also signed by the witnesses. 17 Ext. B/1 is a joint petition dated 31.12.1969 filed before the Income Tax Officer by reason of which the four sons of Parbat Lal had informed the authorities that they had divided the business capital and the joint house property in four equal shares on the basis of family partition executed on 9.11.1969. A prayer was also made that this total partition may be recorded by the authority and each member has become an individual from 9.11.1969. A prayer was also made that this total partition may be recorded by the authority and each member has become an individual from 9.11.1969. The signature of the plaintiff is at serial No. 3 and this letter has been marked as X/3 for identification. The map showing partition of the house property has been marked as Ext. D. 18. From the aforesaid discussion of the evidences on record. One thing is clear that since 9.11.1969 the plaintiff did not make any objection regarding the distribution of the shares by mutual agreement. The suit was filed on 25th of November, 1985 meaning thereby that after nearabout 16 years the plaintiff has tried to reck up the matter. The most striking feature of the case is that the plaintiff himself has denied his signature on the plaint as well as on the vakalatnama attached to the plaint. It appears that the learned court below has failed to notice this aspect of the matter which goes to the root of the case. If a person, being plaintiff denies his signature on the plaint and the vakalatnama itself, in my opinion, he makes himself liable to be non-suited on this ground alone. It is true that no issue was framed by the court below in this regard but as a fact of finding court, the High Court, in a First Appeal, has jurisdiction to take note of this aspect. Similarly the plaintiff, Jairam Lal has categorically deposed that they began to live separately by mutual consent. According to him he was married in 1955 and since then they used to live separately in the house. He also admitted that since their marriage, the expenditures were also separated. He admitted his signature on Ext. C, (Ext. A) but immediately said that it looks like his signature. It appears that the learned Court below has completely misdirected itself by not taking into consideration the evidence of PW1, the plaintiff himself. The court has even not cared to deal with the evidence of PW1 in deciding the issues. In my considered opinion this non-consideration of the evidence of PW 1 has misled the trial Court in coming to the conclusion. The Court below has only discussed and criticised the evidences of DWs. He has rejected the pleas advanced by the defendants/appellants by rejecting the evidence by the defendants/appellants by rejecting the evidence of DWs. In my considered opinion this non-consideration of the evidence of PW 1 has misled the trial Court in coming to the conclusion. The Court below has only discussed and criticised the evidences of DWs. He has rejected the pleas advanced by the defendants/appellants by rejecting the evidence by the defendants/appellants by rejecting the evidence of DWs. This is not a legal consideration by the Court below. 19. On these backdrops even fit is assumed that the deed of family partition does affect the partition and requires registration but in law this document can be used for co-lateral purposes. If the contentsof the documents is considered along with the evidence of PWl and import of Ext. B/l, it can be easily held that an amicable settlement was entered into which was reduced in writing by the aforesaid deed of family partition, Ext. C. 20. In the case of Kale V/s. Dy. Director of Consolidation reported in -- , necessity of registration of a deed of family agreement has been considered by their Lordships. After noticing various decisions their lordships have held, inter alia, as follows: It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here, also a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore, does not fall within the mischief of Sec. 17(2) (sic) (Sec. 17(1)(b)?) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable. 21. I have already noted above that this family arrangement of 1969 was acted upon by the parties since 16 years and during this period the plaintiff did not raise any objection to the same. It is well settled that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to the arrangement clearly operates as an estoppel so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. It is well settled that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to the arrangement clearly operates as an estoppel so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. In my opinion, the trial Court erred in law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel which always applies whenever any party to the valid settlement tries to assail it. 22. Under similar circumstances, in the aforesaid decision of Kale (Supra) their Lordships have further observed as follows: The High Court further erred in not considering the fact that even if the family arrangement was not registered it could be used for a collateral purposes, namely, for the purpose, of showing the nature and character of possession of the parties in pursuance of the family settlement and also for the purpose of applying the rule of estoppel which flowed from the conduct of the parties who having taken benefit under the settlement keep their mouths shut for full seven years and later try to resile from the settlement. In Shyam Sunder V/s. Siya Ram AIR 1973 All. 392, 389 it was clearly held by the Allahabad High Court that the compromise could have been taken into consideration as a piece of evidence even if it was not registered or for that matter as an evidence of an antecedent title. The High Court observed as follows: The decision in Ram Gopal V/s. Titlshi Ram AIR 1938 All, 641 (FB) is clear that such a recital can be relied upon as a piece of evidence. x x x x x x x It is clear, therefore, that the compromise can be taken into consideration as a piece of evidence. x x x x x x x To sum up, therefore, we are of the view that the compromise could have been relied upon as an admission of antecedent title. 23. This Court, in the case of Ram Stimiran and Ors. V/s. Chandrawati Devi and Ors. F.A. 343/1969 disposed of on 11.8.95 has relied upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and held that the family arrangement was a piece of evidence which can be looked into for consideration. 24. The Apex Court again in the case of Roshan Singh and Ors. V/s. Zile Singh and Ors. V/s. Chandrawati Devi and Ors. F.A. 343/1969 disposed of on 11.8.95 has relied upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court and held that the family arrangement was a piece of evidence which can be looked into for consideration. 24. The Apex Court again in the case of Roshan Singh and Ors. V/s. Zile Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 , while considering the necessity of registration has held as follows: It is well settled that while an instrument of partition which operates or is intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or serving ownership and causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst the parties to it, requires registration under Sec. 17(1)(b) of the Act, a writing which merely recites that there has in time past been a partition, is not a declaration of will, but a mere statement of fact, and it does not require registration . The essence of the matter is whether the deed is a part of the partition transaction or contains merely an incidental recital of a previously completed transaction. The use of the past tense does not necessarily indicate that it is merely a recital of a past transaction. It is equally well-settled that a mere list of properties allotted at a partition is not an instrument of partition and does not require registration. Section 17(1)(b) lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some right in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place cannot be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. Two propositions must therefore flow : (1) A partition may be effected orally, but if it is subsequently reduced into a form of a document and that document purports by itself to effect a division and embodies all the terms of bargain, it will be necessary to register it. If it be not registered Sec. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. If it be not registered Sec. 49 of the Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. Secondly evidence of the factum of partition will not be admissible by read on of Sec. 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (2) Partition lists which are mere records of a previsoaly completed partition between the parties will be admitted in evidence, even though they are unregistered, to prove the fact of partition. 25. On these backdrops of settled principles of law, in my opinion the plaintiff cannot be allowed to re-open the matter after lapses of considerable years. More over, it appears that when the plaintiff found that he is not in a position to dispell the factum of previous partition against the deed of family partition (Ext.C) he has even gone to the extent of denying his own signature on the plaint as well as on the vakalatnama. By this conduct it is clear that he has suppressed the fact and made himself liable for non-suited. The learned trial Court has miserably failed to consider this aspect of the matter and has only based his findings on surmises. As a trial Court, it was its duty to consider the evidence of PW1 along with the contents of Ext.C and B/1. The plaintiff has utterly failed to prove that Banwari Lal got his signature on a blank paper 10-12 years ago. No other witness has been examined on his behalf to support his allegation. On the other hand, Muktilal is an independent witness who has clearly deposed that after the deed was signed by the parties, he along with other witnesses put their signature on the same. 26. Having considered the pros and cons of the case, In my opinion, the learned court below has committed grave error of law and facts by decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 27. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.