Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 5.8.1993 rendered by P. Xess, District Judge, aurangabad, dismissing the appeal as time-barred, in a suit for declaration that the deed of gift, dated 14.11.1984 executed by Ram Bishun yadav in favour of Maheshwari Devi and Manmati Devi was illegal and void. The chronology of the events leading to the surfacing of the disputes may be succinctly stated. The suit for declaration, that the gift deed dated 14.11.1984 was illegal and void, was dismissed on 7.4.1989 and an application was filed for obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court on 27.6.1989 and the copy was supplied on 7.7.1989. Thereafter the First Appeal was filed on 11.7.1989 under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code along with an application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (compendiously "the Act") for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Cause for delay in filing the appeal was indicated in the application. The cause was that after the judgment of the trial court, the appellant fell ill on 25.4.1989 and was bed-ridden and under the treatment of the doctor at asansol till 22.6.1989. Thereafter when she recovered from illness, she applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial court on 27.6.1989 and after receiving the same she filed the appeal, and this is how sufficient cause has been made for condonation of delay. But the learned District Judge took the view that no sufficient cause was made out, hence by the impugned judgment and decree dismissed the appeal. Against that decree the present Second Appeal has been filed. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that as the appellant was suffering from infective Hepatitis with Jaundice since 25.4.1989, hence on account of inability the appeal could not be filed within time. As soon as she recovered from illness an application for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree was filed and the certified copy was obtained on 7.7.1989. The appeal was filed along with an application to condone the delay. Sufficient cause was made out. He urged that there must be justice-oriented approach in considering the cause for delay in filing the appeal. The appeal was filed along with an application to condone the delay. Sufficient cause was made out. He urged that there must be justice-oriented approach in considering the cause for delay in filing the appeal. He leaned heavily on G. Ramegowda Major V/s. The Special land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (A. I. R.1988 S. C.897), where their lordships of the Apex Court under paragraph 7, having considered other cases of that Court, have ruled that if there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel, in that event there shall be no reason for condonation of delay, but each case has to be considered on its own facts, and if there appears that the conduct of the appellant was bona fide and the cause shown appears to be, correct, in that event with a view to have substantial justice and not technical justice, the delay must be condoned. 3. The learned counsel for the respondents refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and urged that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 4. Having evaluated the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the point for consideration is as to what are the contours for condonation of delay in an application being filed under Sec.5 of the act. There is no doubt that after the appeal has become time-barred, valuable right has accrued to the respondents and it can be said that the right of action available to the appellant has come to an end, subject to revival of the same after condonation of delay and treating the appeal to have revived. 5. Before grappling with the problems posed by the learned counsel from either side, it is appropriate to comprehend the nature and policy underlying the statutes of limitation and certain cardinal principles of interpretation. It is well known that statutes of limitation bars the remedy and not the right of the suitor. In that respect it contains rules of procedure only and forms part of the rex fori". If an action is brought in a court of law, in that event wherever the cause of action arose the period of limitation is governed by the appropriate limitation enactment or by some other relevant statute. In that respect it contains rules of procedure only and forms part of the rex fori". If an action is brought in a court of law, in that event wherever the cause of action arose the period of limitation is governed by the appropriate limitation enactment or by some other relevant statute. The policy of the Limitation act is that dormant claims may not be revived, as by that time the evidence available may be wiped out and hence the person with good cause of action must pursue them with reasonable diligence. It is better to refer to volume 28 of the halsburys Laws of England (Fourth edition), page 2066, para 605 as follows: "the Courts have expressed three differing reasons supporting the existence of the statutes of limitation : (1) That long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (2) That a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a state claim; (3) That persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence. " (See R. B. Policies at Lloyds V/s. Butler, (1950) 1 K. B.76 at 81, Jones v. Ballgrove Properties Ltd. , (1949) 2 -K. B.700 ; Board of Trade V/s. Cayzer irvine Co. , (1927) AC.610 ). 6 In American Jurisprudence, (2nd) Volume 51, page 602, para 17 contains a statement as under : "statutes of limitation are founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims which are valid are not usually allowed to remain neglected if the right to sue thereon exists. Statutes of limitation are designed to prevent undue delay in bringing suit on claims and to suppress fraudulent and state claims from being as-serted to the surprises of the parties or their representatives. " 7. Under paragraph 18 there is following statement in the said american Jurisprudence: "viewed broadly, however, the statutes of limitation embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate activity, punish negligence and promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs. Thus statutes of limitation. rest upon reasons of sound public policy in that they tend to promote the peace and welfare of the society, safeguards against fraud and oppression and compel the settlement of claims within reasonable period after their origin and while the evidence remains fresh in the memory of the witness. " 8. Thus statutes of limitation. rest upon reasons of sound public policy in that they tend to promote the peace and welfare of the society, safeguards against fraud and oppression and compel the settlement of claims within reasonable period after their origin and while the evidence remains fresh in the memory of the witness. " 8. The elementary rules of interpretation of the statutes of limitation ought to be consistent with it. Its nature is disabling statute, the provision deserves to be interpreted at the plain language. It is a statute of repose, hence it is inspired with the idea not to keep the controversies alive indefinitely. As a benevolent legislation, it must be interpreted as far as the plain language permits, in favour of person whose remedy is being lost even though the right survives. There is another aspect for benevolent construction. In many cases the fixation of the period for a suit, appeal or revision by the legislature is arbitrary and very often results in hardship. 9. In my opinion, the application under Sec.5 of the Limitation act may not be dismissed just on the technicality and the circumstances pointed out for condonation of delay need not be considered in a pedantic manner, rather Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be interpreted in a justice oriented way. The earlier view used to be that every days delay must be explained. If that is so, it can also be expected that every hours delay has to be explained and every minutes delay and thereafter every monents delay and there would be no end to it. 10. In A. I. R.1988 S. C.897 (supra) it was pointed out after reviewing the entire authorities on the subject that the contours of the area of discretion of the case in the matter of condonation of delay must be justice oriented and Sec.5 of the Limitation Act need not be interpreted in a pedantic manner. 11. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kamiji (AIR 1987 S. C.1353) it was held that to ask for each days explanation is not a reasonable approach, otherwise there could be made every hours explanation for delay and every minutes under the circumstances, I am satisfied that the delay in filing revision was satisfactorily explained and the revision ought to have been decided on merits. 12. Kamiji (AIR 1987 S. C.1353) it was held that to ask for each days explanation is not a reasonable approach, otherwise there could be made every hours explanation for delay and every minutes under the circumstances, I am satisfied that the delay in filing revision was satisfactorily explained and the revision ought to have been decided on merits. 12. I am of the considered opinion that there must be a justice oriented reasonable approach in the matters of condonation of delay. Keeping in view that the statute of limitation is a benevolent legislation, it may be interpreted in favour of a person whose remedy is being lost even though his rights survive. Refusing to condone the delay would have disastrous results in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and thereby the cause of justice would be defeated. As against this when the delay is condoned, both the parties shall have opportunity to fight out their cases on merits and the maximum that can happen would be that the case would be decided on merits after full opportunities to both parties. 13. The procedure for remedy may be interpreted keeping in view the nature of the statute. As the statute of limitation is a benevolent legislation, it may be interpreted in that way in favour of the person whose remedy is being lost. There were unavoidable circumstances, as in the present case, on account of which the appeal could npt be preferred in time. The illness indicated in the prescription appears to be not simple illness and the lower appellate court was not justified to disbelieve it. The Court is not expected to act as an expert in such matters. In case the illness was pleaded as a cause for explanation of delay in that event the Court must look into the circumstances in a justice-oriented way and not in a technical way to frustrate the cause of justice. At best the doctor could have been summoned to ascertain the actual nature of illness of the appellant as indicated in the prescription. But that was not done. In the circumstances the cause shown by the appellant appears to be genuine and bona fide and sufficient cause was made out and hence the delay ought to have been condoned and the lower appellate court was not justified to reject the application under Sec.5 of the Act. But that was not done. In the circumstances the cause shown by the appellant appears to be genuine and bona fide and sufficient cause was made out and hence the delay ought to have been condoned and the lower appellate court was not justified to reject the application under Sec.5 of the Act. I hereby condone the delay and treat the appeal before Lower Appellate Court to have been filed within time. 14. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present Second Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside. The result is that the matter is remanded to the Lower Appellate court to be decided afresh in accordance with the law. As the matter was dragged on for too long, what is required is expedition. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.