Judgment :- This is a petition by the employer who is aggrieved by the award made by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 3 of 1986, by which the petitioner was directed to reinstate the 1st respondent-workman with continuity of service and backwages. 2. It is not in dispute that the concerned workman, the 1st respondent herein was initially appointed on September 11, 1969 in the services of the petitioner as a Foreman in its Dock Office. Clause 7 of the order of that appointment provides as follows : "Though you are posted initially to do work in the Dock Office you shall however be liable to do work, in the Main or Dock Office of any type of work involving writing or such like desk work." * In the year 1982, on June 13, 1982, the workman was transferred by the petitioner from the Dock Office to the Main Office. It may be mentioned here that the Main Office is said to situate across the road from the Port within which the Dock Office of the petitioner is located. The workman did not report for duty at the Main Office as directed, he remained absent from June 15, 1982 onwards. According to the workman he went to the dock office on June 15, 1982 and found that his name was struck off and therefore, he did not go back to that office. According to him he is not liable for transfer to the Main Office, and therefore even after the transfer order has been served on him, he was not required to obey the transfer order. 3. The employer thereafter on August 11, 1982 served a charge sheet on the workman. In that charge sheet it was set out that the workman had been absent on June 15, 1982 and from June 16, 1982, eventhough he had been given definite instructions to report at the Main Office that he left immediately after lunch break on that date. The employer thereafter on August 11, 1982 served a charge sheet on the workman. In that charge sheet it was set out that the workman had been absent on June 15, 1982 and from June 16, 1982, eventhough he had been given definite instructions to report at the Main Office that he left immediately after lunch break on that date. It was also stated therein, that when two other employees of the petitioner served a letter dated June 18, 1982 on the workman, the workman after having received that letter abused them and threatened them and that acts of the 1st respondent workman in leaving the premises of the establishment without prior permission his unexplained absence, refusal to acknowledge the communication of the company, threatening and abusing his co-employees, amounted to gross misconduct, which would make the workman liable for punishment, if the misconducts were proved. 4. The workman in his explanation dated August 16, 1982 did not dispute the fact that he had stayed away from work. His only stand was that his name has been struck off in the dock office. He denied having threatened the co-employees. He did not signify any willingness to work in the main Office in accordance with the order of transfer. 5. The employer thereafter held a domestic enquiry. The enquiry was conducted by its personnel Officer. The records of the enquiry show that the petitioner appeared and sought an adjournment on September 14, 1982 and after the enquiry was adjourned to the following day, viz. September 15, 1982 the workman refused to participate any further in the inquiry, and he left the premises. Thereafter, the workman was placed exparte and witnesses were examined. One of the witnesses examined was one Loganathan, who was the section incharge of the dock Office who spoke to the fact that he had given the letter of transfer to the workman on June 14, 1982, at the dock Office at 9 a.m. After considering the evidence adduced at the enquiry, the enquiry Officer submitted a report in which he held that all the charges against the workman have been proved. The workman was thereafter removed from service by an order dated November 8, 1982. It was set out inter alia in that order that the charges of misconduct alleged against him have been proved at the enquiry. 6. The workman was thereafter removed from service by an order dated November 8, 1982. It was set out inter alia in that order that the charges of misconduct alleged against him have been proved at the enquiry. 6. It is that termination which led to the industrial dispute, in which the award impugned in this writ petition came to be made. Before the Industrial Tribunal, a preliminary issue was raised, regarding the validity of the enquiry. The Industrial Tribunal by an order dated June 13, 1989, after noticing that the enquiry Officer who had been examined before the Tribunal as M.W. 1 had categorically noted that the workman had refused to sign the proceedings of the enquiry on September 14, 1982 or September 15, 1982 as also the admission of the workman, who was examined as W.W. 1 that he had no enmity with the enquiry Officer, held that the enquiry held was fair and proper. 7. Thereafter the merit of the dispute was considered and the impugned award was made on October 25, 1991. The Tribunal in the course of its order framed several points for determination. The errors committed by the Tribunal in its award commenced from the stage, where it framed the points for determination. The first point framed by it was as to whether the charges against the petitioner before it, the workman have been proved by evidence recorded before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had completed overlooked the fact that the Tribunal had by an earlier order held that the enquiry conducted was fair and proper. The question of the employer adducing evidence to prove the charges before the Tribunal, therefore, did not really arise. The charges had been proved before the enquiry Officer and it was the record of that enquiry, which the Industrial Tribunal was required to examine along with any further evidence, which either of the parties chose to place before the Tribunal. On account of the errors so committed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal has completely omitted from consideration, all the charges framed against the workman, except the one relating to his absence from duty. The findings recorded by the enquiry Officer in relation to those charges continue to remain, as the only reason given by the Tribunal for not holding those charges to have been proved was that no evidence in relation to those charges were adduced before the Tribunal. The findings recorded by the enquiry Officer in relation to those charges continue to remain, as the only reason given by the Tribunal for not holding those charges to have been proved was that no evidence in relation to those charges were adduced before the Tribunal. That view of the Tribunal is wholly without any legal basis. 8. Even with regard to the charge relating to absence from duty, the Tribunal's finding was that the workman had failed to report for duty at the main Office on and after June 15, 1982, it came to that conclusion even dehors, the evidence that was considered by the enquiry officer. At the end of paragraph 5 of the award, the Tribunal has observed thus : "The charge that the petitioner failed to report for duty at the main office on and after June 15, 1982 stands proved by the evidence given before us" The Tribunal also found that the petitioner was bound to accept the transfer and act in accordance with the transfer order, which he had failed to do. The Tribunal observed at the end of paragraph 7 of the award as follows : "He is bound to work in any section or Office belonging to the respondent as provided in para 3 of Ex. M. 1 so long as his salary or wage is not reduced and his rank is not affected." * 9. Strangely enough, after having so held against the petitioner before it, the Tribunal proceeded to dilate at some length on the addiction of the workman petitioner, before it, to drink. The Tribunal held at paragraph 6 of the award, that the workman having for a long time served at dock office situated in the Madras Port premises, has given himself to the habit of consumption of easily available liquor. The habit of the workman in relation to his drink was not the subject matter of the adjudication, and was not also the subject matter of any charge. The Tribunal, however took note of the weakness of the workman, having regard to the documents which had been marked before the Tribunal, wherein it was found that certain memos have been issued to the workman. It was mentioned therein that the workman was addicted to alcohol and that such alcohol consumption had resulted in the workman being a nuisance to others in the past. 10. It was mentioned therein that the workman was addicted to alcohol and that such alcohol consumption had resulted in the workman being a nuisance to others in the past. 10. One would have expected the Tribunal after it had noticed these habits and character of the workman, and having regard to its own finding that the workman, had despite being duty bound to report at the place to which he had been transferred, had not only failed to do so, but had remained absent, ever since transfer order has been served upon him to sustain the order of discharge. The Tribunal strangely enough took upon itself the task of rehabilitating the workman by imposing his services upon the petitioner employer by observing the main flaw in the petitioner's (workman) conduct and character is traceable to his love for alcohol. Such a man really needs sympathy of the Court with a view to rehabilitating him". The rehabilitation recommended by the Tribunal was to be at the costs of the employer, who has been directed to reinstate the workman, notwithstanding the misconduct committed earlier. The Tribunal purported to exercise its power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, on the ground of its desire to rehabilitate the workman from his addiction of alcohol and directed that he be reinstated and paid the backwages from November, 1982 with attendant benefits. The direction so made by the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It cannot be sustained on any legal principle. 11. The workman had been found guilty of misconduct after the enquiry which had been properly held. It is the workman who chose to stay from the enquiry. The enquiry was found to be valid and having been held in accordance with the requirements of the applicable standing orders, and the principles of Natural Justice. The Tribunal, even independently of that enquiry, held that the petitioner/workman had without reasons remained absent, and had failed to comply with the order of transfer. The only course, which the Tribunal could have adopted after recording these findings was to dismiss the claim of the workman and not to proceed to direct, as it has, directing that the alcoholic workman as found by the Tribunal, to be rehabilitated by reinstating him, and rewarding his improper behaviour and misconduct with backwages for a period of almost ten years. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the workman submitted that the Tribunal has adverted to the Petitioner-Workman's conduct in the past, which was not put against the workman in the enquiry. Unfortunately for the petitioner/workman's case, it is that very past conduct which has led the Tribunal into making the order in favour of the workman. The only reason given by the Tribunal for directing reinstatement, is that the workman is an alcoholic and he needs rehabilitation. Had the past conduct of the workman been ignored, the Tribunal also would have avoided its error, and would have proceeded to consider the case put before it in the proper perspective. It is not necessary to place any reliance upon the workman's past conduct and it can well be kept out of consideration in deciding as to whether the discharge of the workman by the employer was in accordance with law. 13. The charges against the petitioner having been established before the enquiry Office, and the charges having so proved being sufficiently grave, the order of discharge was fully warranted, and the Tribunal could not have as it purported to, for all the wrong reasons, convert the penalty into a reward, by exercising the powers under Section 11-A, of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner at one stage sought to conduct that by reason of the provision in the standing order, the continued absence for a specified period results in the loss of lien to the job. Learned counsel for the workman rightly pointed out that such a provision cannot be applied, unless an enquiry is held by the employer into such absence and a finding regarding the misconduct properly recorded. in this context rightly referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D. K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993-II-LLJ-696). The Court therein held that even in the case of workman who is found to be absent for a long period the workman should be given an opportunity to answer the charge and an enquiry should be held and failure to do so would be arbitrary, unjust and unfair and would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this case, the enquiry has been held, the misconduct alleged against the workman was made known to him in the charge sheet. In this case, the enquiry has been held, the misconduct alleged against the workman was made known to him in the charge sheet. His explanation was duly considered and charges where held to be proved, after a proper enquiry. There is therefore, no infirmity in the order of discharge having been made on account of the workman's continued long absence from duty. 15. It may also be noticed here that during the pendency of this writ petition, this Court had directed the employer to reinstate the workman pending adjudication of the matters in controversy in this writ petition. Even though the employer had offered the workman a job at its main office, the workman did not choose to accept the offer, and persisted in contending that, he was only required to work in the dock office and nowhere else. Even the Tribunal, in its award has rightly found that the workman was required to serve, whether at the dock Office or at the main Office, as the condition relating to the transfer was a part of his terms and conditions of employment. 16. The impugned award, therefore cannot be sustained. The impugned award is quashed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs in this writ petition.