Judgment S. C. Jain, J. (1.) ON 3.3.80 at about 8 a.m. Ramkesh, the revision petitioner herein, was intercepted and was found in possession of 12 litres of mixed cow and buffaloes milk for sale. 600 ml. of milk was purchased as sample. It was divided into three parts and after addition of preservative the three phials were duly sealed. One of the phials was sent to the public Analyst who after analysing the same submitted his report dated 22.4.80 to the effect that the sample contained milk fat 2.1% and non-fatty solids 3% and therefore it was deficient by 53% in respect of fat and 65% in respect of non fatty solids. After observing the due formalities a complaint was filed by the Food Inspector. (2.) AT the trial the Food Inspector examined Ram Singh, P.W. 2 as witness of purchase of sample and Ram Kishun, a clerk of the C.H.O's office P.W. 3, to prove the sanction and despatch of the notice of prosecution to the accused. The accused examined in his defence Abdul Rahman, D.W. 1. The learned Magistrate believing the prosecution evidence convicted the revision petitioner under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and sentenced him to undergo R. I. for 9 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for six months. (3.) FEELING aggrieved the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 1982, which was heard and dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur vide his order dated 17.6.82 thereby confirming the judgment and order of the trial court. It is that judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur the sustainability whereof has been challenged before me. (4.) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned State counsel and have gone through the relevant record. The first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the courts below have failed to take into consideration that according to Rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1956 (for short the rules), the Inspector was bound to obtain 660 ml. of milk as sample and had to send 220 ml. of milk to the Public Analyst, whereas he had sent only 200 ml. of milk as sample and had to send 220 ml. of milk to the Public Analyst, whereas he had sent only 200 ml. of milk for that purpose, ad since the requirement of the said rule has not been complied with, the judgment of conviction cannot be sustained. The language in which Rule 22 is couched has to be examined. The said rule is reproduced below: "22. Quantity of sample to be sent to Public Analyst-The quantity of sample of food to be sent to the Public Analyst/Director for analysis shall be as specified below: Article of Food Approximate quantity to be sent 220 ml (i) Milk (ii) to (XXXVII) ..... (5.) AN analytical examination of the above said provisions would show that the intention of Legislature is that the approximate quantity of 220 ml. should be supplied to the Public Analyst. Conversely it is not the intention that if the quantity less than 220 ml. is sent then the proceeding would stand vitiated. If the quantum of the article of food supplied by the Food Inspector to the Public Analyst was sufficient for analysis and caused no prejudice to the accused then mere fact of his sending lesser quantity than that prescribed would not vitiate the report of the Public Analyst. The Public Analyst has not reported that the quantity of milk sent to him was not sufficient for analysis, rather he analysed the sample and submitted his report which shows that the quantity sent to him was sufficient for analysis. Thus no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the accused. The first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any force. (6.) THE second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the requirement of Section 10 (7) of the Act has not been met with and, therefore, the conviction of the accused could not be upheld. I have considered this argument also. Under Section 10 (7) of the Act the Food Inspector is obliged to call one or more persons to be present when he takes the sample. When the Food Inspector does call the neighbouring shop keepers to witness the taking of sample, but none is willing to co-operate, he cannot compel their presence. In such circumstances the prosecution is relieved of its obligation to get independent witnesses associated at the time of taking of the sample. When the Food Inspector does call the neighbouring shop keepers to witness the taking of sample, but none is willing to co-operate, he cannot compel their presence. In such circumstances the prosecution is relieved of its obligation to get independent witnesses associated at the time of taking of the sample. (7.) THE third argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the prosecution has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 11 (3) of the Act. I do not find any substance in this argument also. Even if there is any delay in sending the sample to the Public Analyst it did not result in any prejudice to the petitioner. After receipt of the report of the Public Analyst the petitioner did not apply for sending the second part of the sample to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis which shows that he was not prejudiced at all. (8.) LASTLY, it has been argued that the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act have not been extended to the petitioner by the trial court as the petitioner was below 18 years of age. I have given a thoughtful consideration to this submission. Under Section 20AA of the Act it has been provided that the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or Section 360 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 shall not apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless that person is under 18 years of age. (9.) THE question doing rounds right now is as to at what point of time the age of the accused should be below 18 years in order to claim the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. (10.) LEARNED counsel for the State has laid stress on the words "person convicted of an offence under this Act" and has argued that from the use of the above words in the section it is clear that the age of the offender to be considered for extending benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act should be seen at the time of conviction and not at the time of commission of the crime. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the State. The sample was taken on 3.3.80. Report of the Public Analyst is dated 22.4.80. Therefore the offence was committed on 3.3.80. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the State. The sample was taken on 3.3.80. Report of the Public Analyst is dated 22.4.80. Therefore the offence was committed on 3.3.80. In his statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. the accused had given his age as 18 years on 5.5.82. When the trial court's judgment was pronounced he must be running his 18th year. Even as per his statement he could not be less than 18 years on 5.5.82. Since the requirement of Section 20AA is that the person convicted of the offence should be under 18 years of age, it would be material for the purpose of this case to consider whether the age of the accused on the date of offence or on the date of the trial courts judgment is to be taken into consideration. On all the three material dates, i.e. 3.3.80 when the sample was taken, 22.4.80 when the Public Analyst recorded his report and 5.5.82 when the trial court judgment was pronounced, he was certainly not less than 18 years. (11.) IN Kamarunnisa v. State of Maharashtra, 1974 ACC 374, the Supreme Court while applying the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 had called for a report from the Probation Officer. That was a case in which the accused had been convicted under Section 379, I.P.C. and the question was whether he was less than 21 years on the date of conviction. After a perusal of the report of the Probation Officer even though the age given therein was less than 21 years, the Supreme Court having regard to the other circumstances of the case did not consider it proper to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. (12.) IN Yaduraj Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1977 SC 698 , the question of applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. It was held that the age given by the accused in their statement under Section 342, Cr. P.C. (now Section 313, Cr. P.C.) has no special significance in the absence of a proper plea being taken under the Act. There was no reliable evidence showing the true ages of the accused. This new plea claiming benefit under the Act cannot be entertained. P.C. (now Section 313, Cr. P.C.) has no special significance in the absence of a proper plea being taken under the Act. There was no reliable evidence showing the true ages of the accused. This new plea claiming benefit under the Act cannot be entertained. On the facts of that case it was observed by the Supreme Court that if a proper plea of Probation of Offenders Act had been taken before the trial judge then that court could have got the accused medically, examined in order to ascertain his true age, if it doubted the correctness of the statement of accused under Section 342, Cr. P.C. (now Section 313. Cr. P.C). (13.) IN Ramji Misar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088 , it was very clearly and specifically laid down that the crucial date for reckoning the age, where an appellate court modified the judgment of the trial judge and when Section 6 becomes applicable to a person only on the decision of an appellate or a revisional court, was the date upon which the trial court had to deal with the offender. (14.) ON a consideration of the above case law it appears to be clear that the relevant date to be taken into consideration while applying the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act would be the date on which the trial court pronounces its judgment and not the date on which the accused got his statement recorded under Section 313. Cr. P.C. or the date of the offence. That appears to be reasonable also because ages as given by the accused in their statements under Section 313. Cr. P.C. are just approximate. If a plea of Offenders Act is specifically taken before the trial court, in those circumstances an opportunity is provided to prosecution to contest the same and to the trial court to get the age of the accused tested and verified by his medical examination. But if such a plea is not taken then the rough estimate of age given in the statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. cannot be taken as a guideline factor for extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. Similar view has been taken by a single Judge of this Court in Nagar Swasthya Adhikari v. Nain Chand, 1979 AWC 507 . P.C. cannot be taken as a guideline factor for extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. Similar view has been taken by a single Judge of this Court in Nagar Swasthya Adhikari v. Nain Chand, 1979 AWC 507 . In the instant case there is no satisfactory material on record to indicate the exact age of the accused on the date when the trial court pronounced its judgment. Even if the age given by the accused in his statement under Section 313. Cr. P.C. is taken into account he would certainly be not less than 18 years of age when the trial court delivered its judgment. Under these circumstances, the benefit of the provisions of the Offenders Act has been correctly denied to the accused petitioner. The order of the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur dated 17.6.1982 therefore, suffers from no Infirmity or irregularity, much less an illegality. (15.) IN view of the discussions made above, this revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed.