Judgment : This appeal is against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation-I (Deputy Commissioner of Labour-I), Madras, awarding a compensation of Rs.67,200 to the first respondent herein, whose son by name Ramu died in an accident, while he was engaged in the dismantling of the illumination arrangements in the temple tower. 2. The appellant temple had asked the second respondent herein, who is an electrical contractor, for illumination of Kapaleeswarar Temple Tower during the festival occasion and after the festival was over, on 18.5.1992, when the deceased Ramu was attending the dismantling work in the tower on the instruction of the second respondent, he fell down from the tower and succumbed to the injuries. Therefore, his mother, the first respondent herein, filed the petition before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation against the temple and the contractor claiming compensation for the death of her son. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation accepting the claim of the first respondent herein awarded the compensation of Rs.67,200 payable by the appellant herein the temple. Hence, this appeal. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant Mr.Varadarajan contended that the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has found that the appellant, is a principal contractor without considering the important requirement of the section, viz, that the agreement must be for the purpose of the business or trade, but in this case, the temple is not engaged in any trade or business and therefore, the application of Sec.12(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (hereinafter referred to as Act) is incorrect, that even when Sec. 12(1) of the Act has been applied in this case, automatically Sec. 12(2) of the Act comes into operation for indemnifying the principal employer, by the contractor, but in this case, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation has excluded the application of Sec. 12(2) of the Act holding that the work done by the deceased was not connected with the trade or business, that this finding of the Commissioner is diametrically opposite to the finding of the Commissioner for application of Sec.12(1) of the Act and therefore the order of the Commissioner has to be set aside. The learned counsel has cited number of decisions to support his argument that unless the principal employer is engaged in a trade or business, Sec. 12(1) of the Act is not applicable. The learned counsel has cited number of decisions to support his argument that unless the principal employer is engaged in a trade or business, Sec. 12(1) of the Act is not applicable. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the illumination work of the temple tower was done free of charges by the second respondent as a gratuitous work as it relates to the temple and the temple cannot be made liable for compensation in this case, for any reasons. 4. The fact remains that the deceased Ramu was brought only by the second respondent-Contractor for the dismantling work of the electrical installation from the tower and there is no direct contract between the appellant and the deceased Ramu. On the instruction of the appellant- temple to the second respondent to instal the illuminations for the festival, the second respondent illuminated the tower and the second respondent, after the festival, had brought the deceased Ramu for the dismantling work. Therefore, normally the temple will be the principal employer for the reason that the contractor brought the deceased for the work to be done for the benefit of the temple. It is true that under Sec.12(1) of the Act, only when a person contracts with another for the purpose of the trade or business for execution of any work, he will be the principal employer for the workmen, who executed the work. Therefore, unless the appellant was engaged in any trade or business, certainly, it cannot be called as a principal employer. That is why the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the temple cannot be a principal contractor as it was not engaged in any business or trade. But on a perusal of Ex.R-1, which is the acceptance order of the Executive Officer of the appellant, it shows that there was an agreement between the appellant and the second respondent to illuminate the marriage hall Arulmigu Kapaleeswarar Karpagambal Kalyana Mandapam and the specific clause in this order is that the contractor, whose offer was accepted for the illumination of the marriage hall, should illuminate the temple tower free of cost for four festivals of the temple in a year viz., Panguni Peruvizha, Theppa Utsavam, Navarathri Peruvizha and Laksha Deepa Vizha. Ex.R-1 proves then truth that the second respondent contractor did not voluntarily undertake the illumination work free of cost gratuitously but as per the agreement Ex.R-1 he was bound to illuminate the temple tower free of cost, otherwise his offer for the contract of illuminating the marriage hall would not have been accepted by the temple. Therefore, the illumination of the temple is part of the contractual work relating to the marriage hall. 5. The marriage hall, belonging to the appellant is given for hire for celebrating the marriages and charges are collected for the use of the hall. Therefore, certainly, it is a commercial activity of the temple for augmenting the income of the temple. So it cannot be stated that the appellant temple was. not engaged in any trade or business as it was letting out the marriage hall for charges which is a business. The Commissioner has found that as illuminating of the temple tower is connected with the agreement Ex.R-1 relating to the illumination of the marriage hall, the appellant squarely comes within the definition of Sec. 12(1) of the Act as the principal employer. Even though the learned counsel for the appellant contended before me that the decoration of the marriage hall will be done only by the parties, who hire the marriage hall, this argument is not acceptable in view of the reason that in Clause 2 of Ex .R-1, the rates are fixed for payment to the contractor by the temple for the decoration works. Therefore, it is very clear that the temple itself had engaged the contractor for the decoration works of the marriage hall subject to the condition that he shall do illumination of the temple tower also. In view of this reason, certainly the appellant temple was the principal employer of the deceased Ramu. 6. Then the question is whether the appellant is entitled to be indemnified by the contractor under Sec. 12(2) of the Act. Applying the dictum of this Court held in Gurusami Mudaliar v. Executive Engineer, Mettur Canals Division, (1956)3 Lab. L.J. 44, which has enumerated five ingredients of the section, the Commissioner has found that the principal employer in this case could not be indemnified. As held in the above decision, the following are the five requirements: 1. Applying the dictum of this Court held in Gurusami Mudaliar v. Executive Engineer, Mettur Canals Division, (1956)3 Lab. L.J. 44, which has enumerated five ingredients of the section, the Commissioner has found that the principal employer in this case could not be indemnified. As held in the above decision, the following are the five requirements: 1. The principal employer must have contracted with another person for the execution of any work by the latter; 2. Such a contract must have been made by such principal in the course of his trade or business; 3. Such work must form part of the principal’s trade or business; 4. The workmen employed by the contractor must have been involved in the accident arising out of an in the course of his employment; and 5. Such accident must have occurred in or about the premises on which the principal had undertaken to do the work or otherwise under his control or management. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that when the Commissioner has accepted that the contract was for the purpose of trade or business, automatically, it has to be accepted that the work attended by the deceased was part of the business or trade of the principal but, in this case, after applying Sec.12(1) of the Act, the Commissioner has excluded Sec. 12(2) of the Act from its applicability, which, according to the learned counsel is an inconsistent finding and therefore the indemnity under Sec.12(2) of the Act has to be extended to the principal employer. Of the above five ingredients, laid down by this Court in the case cited above, there is subtle difference between the condition Nos.2 and 3. Condition No.2 is that the contract must have been for the purpose of trade or business of the Principal employer and Condition No.3 is that the work done by the deceased at the time of the accident must form part of the principal’s trade or business. In this case. even though the illumination work of the temple tower is not the trade or business of the temple, the contractor was compelled to attend to this illumination work because the contract for the decoration of the marriage hall was accepted, subject to this condition. Therefore, the contract for the performance of the illumination of the tower has become the business contract. Therefore, the contract for the performance of the illumination of the tower has become the business contract. But the illumination of the temple tower, as mentioned above, is not connected with the business. There may be a contract during the course of the business for performing certain things not connected with the business. For the indemnity of the principal employer, not only the contract must have been in the course of the trade or business, but the work entrusted also must relate to the trade or business. But, in this case, even though the contract as in the course of business, the work performed by the deceased viz., dismantling the electrical installation of the temple tower was not connected with the trade or business of the temple. Therefore, applying this distinction, the Commissioner has found that the second respondent was not bound to indemnify of the temple. I find that the distinction made by the Commissioner is well-reasoned and acceptable. Therefore, the appellant temple cannot claim the benefit to be indemnified under Sec. 12(2) of the Act. 8. The appellant has not disputed the wages of the deceased or the quantum of the compensation fixed by the commissioner. As the quantum is not challenged, the appellant is bound to pay the compensation fixed by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation. As I find no substance for any interference by this Court, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.