T. P. GARG, J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment dated 19-2-1986 (Annexure T to this petition) rendered by IIIrd Additional District Judge, Mathura, respondent No. 1, in Civil Revision No. 257 of 1983, Sri Suresh Chandra Jain v. Sardar Prtiam Singh Kalsi. 2. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. One Seth Bhagwan Dass, son of Seth Gopal was the owner and landlord of the premises in dispute. He had let out the aforesaid premises to the present petitioner through a registered lease deed dated 9-5- 1947, on monthly rent of Rs. 26. Seth Bhagwan Dass transferred the aforesaid premises to Sri Suresh Chandra Jain respondent No, 3, who consequently became the owner and landlord of the disputed premises bearing Municipal No 1176/4. He had brought a suit being S. C. C. Suit No. 75 of 1976 for ejectment and recovery of rent against Singh Sardar Pritam Kalsi In the aforesaid suit, on 9-2-1978, Sardar Pritam Singh Kalsi, had moved an application for adjournment, but the same was rejected although his counsel was present. The Civil Judge, Mathura, exercising the powers of Judge, Small Causes Court decreed the aforesaid suit for ejectment and recovery of rent by taking recourse to Order XVII, Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved by the aforeasaid decree, the present petitioner moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the aforesaid decree. The Judge, Small Causes Court-cum-Civil Judge, Mathura, vide his order dated 26-5-1978 passed in Misc. Case No. 11 of 1978 (Annexure 2 to the petition) dismissed the aforesaid application with cost. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision being Civil Revision No. 39 of 1970 under Section 25 of the Small Causes Courts Act against the Order dated 26-5-1978 vide Judgment dated 14-9-1978 passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Mathura (Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit), the revision was partly allowed the suit for ejectment was dismissed while the suit for recovery of Rs. 705. 25 P. as arrears of rent was decreed. The respondent/landlord moved an application to review the judgment dated 14-9-1978 (Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit ). 705. 25 P. as arrears of rent was decreed. The respondent/landlord moved an application to review the judgment dated 14-9-1978 (Annexure 3 to the counter-affidavit ). The review application was allowed by the IInd Additional District Judge vide his judgment dated 25-1-1979 (Annexure 4 to the counter-affidavit) and consequently the revision filed by the petitioner tenant was dismissed in toto with costs. The tenant filed a second revision being Civil Revision No. 1019 of 1979 under Section 115, C. P. C. in the High Court which was dismissed as not maintainable. Simultaneously the tenant also filed writ petition being C. M. W. P. No. 10399 of 1988 under Article 226 of the Consti tution of India which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 26-11- 1980 (Annexure 6 to the counter-affidavit.) The landlord then made an applica tion for execution of the decree in the Court of Munsif, Mathura, objcetions under Sec. 47, C. P. C. were filed by the tenant and others contending, inter, alia, that the decree was a nullity and as such inexecutable. In the course of execution proceedings, the court permitted the tenant and others to lead evidence in support of their contentions raised in the objection petition under Section 47, C. P. C. The landlord, thereafter, moved an application that it was beyond the competence of the court to have permitted Pritam Singh Kalsi and others to adduce evidence presumably on the ground that the executing court could not go behind the decree. This plea did not find favour with the executing court. Thereafter, the landlord moved an application before the lower court for review of the order. The Munsif, Mathura, vide his order dated 15-9-1983 (Annexure 3 to the petition) however, dismissed the review application. The landlord thereafter filed a revision petition in the Court of IIIrd Additional District Judge, respondent No. 1, who vide his judgment dated 19-2-1986, passed in Civil Revision No. 257 of 1983 (Annexure 1 to the petition), allowed the same and get aside the order dated 15-9-1983 (Annexure 3 to the petition ). It was, inter alia, held that it was not open for the court below to decide whether or not decree was without jurisdiction and that it was beyond the competence of the lower court to have permitted the tenant opposite party and others to lead evidence. It was, inter alia, held that it was not open for the court below to decide whether or not decree was without jurisdiction and that it was beyond the competence of the lower court to have permitted the tenant opposite party and others to lead evidence. Aggrieved by this judgment, Pritam Singh Kalsi, tenant, has filed the present petition. 3. During the pendency of the petition Pritam Singh Kalsi died on 26-11-1991 and an application for bringing his legal heirs on record was moved on 18-2-1992. The counsel for respondent No. 3 having no objection, the delay in filing the same is condoned and the application is allowed. Let the legal representatives of Pritam Singh Kalsi, namely, Smt. Harbhajan Kaur, Rakshpal Singh Kalsi and Hardeo Singh Kalsi be brought on record and their names be shown in the title of the petition. 4. It was at the outset argued on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that the decree sought to be executed was a nullity because the court passing the decree lacked inherent jurisdiction. Reliance has been placed on two authorities cited as Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 and Babu Nandan v. Mst. Sumitra, AIR 1961 All 287 . 5. In Kiran Singhs authority (supra), it was laid down by the Supreme Court that it is the fundamental principle that a decree passed by Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its validity can be challenged whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied on even at the stage of execution and even in collatural proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. Relying upon Kiran Singhs authority (supra), Honble S. N. Sahai, J, of this Court in Babu Nandans authority (supra), observed that judgment-debtor can raise objection during execution that decree cannot be executed, having been passed by court having no jurisdiction, even though he had not raised it during suit. 6. There can be no dispute with the aforesaid proposition and the principle laid down in the two authorities relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner. 6. There can be no dispute with the aforesaid proposition and the principle laid down in the two authorities relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner. But then it appears to me that it is not the case here in the instant matter. In the instant case, the Civil Judge, Mathura, exercising the powers of Judge Small Cause Court certainly had jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and pass the decree in question as will be evident from the discussions in the following paras. 7. It may be mentioned that ejectment of the petitioner and others had not been sought from open land. A perusal of the lease deed dated 9-5-1947 shows that a "bara" was let out to Pritam Singh Kalsi on a monthly rent of Rs. 23 annas 2 only. Besides, the tenant was also required to pay house tax and water tax at the rate of Rs. 2 annas 14 per annum. From the term "bara" it is clearly made out that the lease deed had not been executed in respect of open land. The term bara connotes/denotes an enclosure. Moreover, the fact that the tenant was saddled with the liability of paying house tax also goes to show that there was some building or structure in the "bara" otherwise he could not have been made liable to pay house tax. In this view of the matter, the court which passed the decree in the instant case, had jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and pass the decree. 8. The recent case cited as Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Rohan Lal Ranchhodddas (dead) by LR. s, 1993 SC and FBRC 250, is a complete answer to the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this authority the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under: "it may be noticed that we are dealing with the question of nullity of a decree because the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. It appears there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". In the context which we are dealing, a decree is said to be nullity if it passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passed a decree or there is. It appears there is a lot of confusion as to what is meant by "decree being null and void". In the context which we are dealing, a decree is said to be nullity if it passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Merely because a court erroneously passed a decree or there is. n error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires that powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree;" 9. The observation of the Honble Supreme Court thus shows that the mere fact that some error in passing of the decree is shown by the agerieved party, that would not be sufficient to call a degree a nullity. A decree, would be nullity if it is shown that the court passing a decree no jurisdiction or authority to pass the decree. A decree to be called a nullity is to be examined in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the court which passed the decree and not merely a voidable decree. The Supreme Court in this authority was dealing with a case in which a compromise was entered into by the tenant and there was no specific statement of the fact that there existed statutory grounds for eviction. The Supreme Court was pleased to observe that there was an ample admission by the tenant of the grounds contained in Section 12 (3) (a) as well as under Section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses (Control) Act, 1947 and SC it will not be, open to him to challenge its correctness as the admissions made in judicial proceedings are absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate the decree cannot be called a nullity to enable the executing court to go behind it. 10. The learned lower Revisional Court has rightly relied upon a decision reported in V. D. Modi v. R. A. Rehman, AIR 1970 SC 1475 . In the case reported in this authority (V. D. Modis case (supra), a suit had been filed for ejectment of the tenant in the court of Judge Small Causes. 10. The learned lower Revisional Court has rightly relied upon a decision reported in V. D. Modi v. R. A. Rehman, AIR 1970 SC 1475 . In the case reported in this authority (V. D. Modis case (supra), a suit had been filed for ejectment of the tenant in the court of Judge Small Causes. In the execution proceedings, however, the tenant raised the contention that the court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and its decree was on that account a nullity. According to the tenant/judgment- debtor, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodiging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 and that in any event Parts II and III of that Act did not apply to open land and on that account the decree of High Court confirming the decree of District Court was without jurisdiction. The court executing the decree rejected the contention and appeal against that order to a Bench of the Court of Small Causes also unsuccessful. 11. The High Court of Gujarat in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, moved by the tenant, however, reversed the order of the Judge Small Causes and held that the petition for execution be dismissed. With Special Leave, V. D. Modi went in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court of Gujarat and restored the order of the Court of Small Causes. It was held by the Honble Supreme Court that "when a decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceedings if the objection appears on the face of the record ; where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires exami nation of the question raised and decided at the trial of which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection and to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In the case reported in this authority the question whether the court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment depended upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease. In the case reported in this authority the question whether the court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment depended upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease. The ratio decendi of this case fully applies to facts of the instant case because in the instant case too, the question whether the Court of Small Causes had or had not jurisdiction depends upon the inter pretation of the terms of the agreement of the lease. 12. In the case of Salim Sultan v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge Bulandshahr, AIR 1983 All 31 during the execution of the decree for possession of land, the judgment debtors rasised an objection that there were constructions on the land whose demolition was never sought in trial nor decreed and as such the decree for simple possession of land was not executable. The decree-holder contended that there were no such construction. The executing court did not permit or take into consideration of the objection raised. In the petition before this Court it was held that objection raised by the judgment-debtors required an examination of a question which could have been, but had not been raised by the petitioner either in the suit or during appeal. It was further held that the judgment-debtors in substance wanted to urge before the executing court that since certain constructions stood over the land in suit, passing of a mere decree for possession was erroneous. That objection obviously could not be entertained by the executing court. It was further hold that the executing court could not, therefore, be held to have committed any such mistake in not permitting the judgment debtors to raise the said objection, which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is thus clearly made out that the court can only see whether or not the decree is with out jurisdiction. Where however, in making such a finding, it is necessary to make investigation, then the executing court has no competence to permit that investigation to be made. 13. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. It is thus clearly made out that the court can only see whether or not the decree is with out jurisdiction. Where however, in making such a finding, it is necessary to make investigation, then the executing court has no competence to permit that investigation to be made. 13. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ramji Dass Shriram, (Judgment Debtors) AIR 1982 SC 34, it was held as under:- "it is true that a decree which is passed without jurisdiction to pass it is a nullity and the question as to the absence of jurisdiction may be raised even in execution proceedings or in collateral proceedings. But where such an objection is raised in an execu tion proceeding the decree must be apparently without jurisdiction i. e. on the face of it the decree must show that it was passed by a court which was incompetent to pass it. Where in execution proceedings the question raised is whether the court which passed it had or had not jurisdiction to pass it, and as such it is neces sary to make investigation then the executing court has no com petence to permit that investigation to be made. The question must be regarded as finally decided by the decree of the court which tried the suit. In execution no plea that merely challenges the validity or propriety o the decree on the ground that it u contrary to the provisions of law, can be raised". 14. In the instant case, the petitioner has not been able to show that there has not been a fair trail. He has also failed to bring out any circum stance on record to show that the decree has been obtained by fraud or col lusion. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus held to be untenable nor any of the two authorities relied upon by him comes to the rescue of his client. The executing court in permitting the peti tioner to lead evidence has thus certainly committed an illegality and the lower revisional court has rightly set aside the order dated 15-8-1983 passed by it vide order dated 19-2-1986. 15. The present petition has no merit even from another angle. The executing court in permitting the peti tioner to lead evidence has thus certainly committed an illegality and the lower revisional court has rightly set aside the order dated 15-8-1983 passed by it vide order dated 19-2-1986. 15. The present petition has no merit even from another angle. As stated above, in the suit being SCC Suit No. 75 of 1976 for ejectment and recovery of rent against the petitioner and others on 9-2-1978, an application for adjournment was moved by the counsel on behalf of Pritam Singh Kalsi, petitioner, but the same was rejected in the presence of his counsel (who and moved the said application ). The Judge Small Causes Court proceeded to decide the suit forthwith under the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decreed the aforesaid suit for ejectment and recovery of rent. Aggrieved by the said decree (dated 9-2-1978) the petitioner moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the said decree. The said application was dismissed and rightly SC by the trial court vide order dated 26-5-1978. It was held that the application was not legally maintainable. A revision against that order was partly allowed vide order dated 14-9-1978 (Annexure-3 to the counter affidavit ). The landlord/respondent moved an application for review of the said order dated 14-9-1978 which was allowed by the IInd Additional District Judge vide judgment dated 25-1-1979 (Annexure-4 to the counter affidavit) and consequently the revision filed by Pritam Singh Kalsi was dismissed in toto with costs. The petitioner preferred a second revision being Civil Revision Nor. 1019 of 1979 under Section 115 C. P. C in the High Court which was dismissed as not maintain able. Simultaneously the tenant/petitioner also filed Writ Petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10399 of 1980 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16-11-1980 (Annexure-6 to the counter affidavit) which reads as under:- "having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, I find no merit in this petition. The view taken by the courts below is correct. The petition is consequently rejected. " 16. From the above, it is evident that the decision of this Court dated 26-11-1980 reproduced above, clearly operates as resjudicata and it was thus beyond the competence of the executing court to open the same again. The view taken by the courts below is correct. The petition is consequently rejected. " 16. From the above, it is evident that the decision of this Court dated 26-11-1980 reproduced above, clearly operates as resjudicata and it was thus beyond the competence of the executing court to open the same again. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the writ petition having been dismissed in limine without a speaking order would not operate as resjudicata. After giving my careful consideration to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find the same to be with out merit. 17. In the case Daryao and others v. State of U. P. AIR 1961 SC 1457 the Honble Supreme Court has observed (on page 1466) that if the writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits, it would be a bar ; if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that ho had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar. (f the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima, facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order, it would not bo easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar peti tion filed under Article 32. 18. A perusal of the order dated 26-11-1980 passed by this Court and reproduced above, clearly shows that this Court found no merit in the petition and further held that the view taken by the courts below, was correct. 18. A perusal of the order dated 26-11-1980 passed by this Court and reproduced above, clearly shows that this Court found no merit in the petition and further held that the view taken by the courts below, was correct. From this it is evident that this Court before dismissing the writ petition in limine gave all due consideration to the orders parsed by the lower courts and also heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it can thus well be said that the writ petition, although dismissed in limine, was a decision on merits. In this view of the matter, the decision of this Court made in the writ Petition No. 10399 on 26-11-1980 would certainly operate as resjudicata and as such it is not open to the executing court to decide whether or not the decree was without jurisdiction. 19. In the result, there being no merit in this writ petition, the same is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim stay order dated 3-3-1986 is accordingly vacated. Petition dismissed. .