Honble RAVANI, C.J. – In all these three S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petitions, common question of facts and law arise, therefore, at the request and with consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties all these revision petitions are ordered to be heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. (2). In S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 365/1988, the following questions of law have been raised. The answers to the questions are indicated on the right hand side column. Q. (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in holding that tax is payable by petitioner on the turn over of cotton seed when kappas (unginned cotton) has been purchased from registered dealer and tax paid on it by the petitioner? Ans. In the affirmative. In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. Q. (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case assessment under section 7-B or R.S.T. Act is valid ? Ans. In the affirmative. In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. (3). In S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 292/1990, the following questions of law have been raised. The answers to the questions are indicated on the right hand side column. Q. (A) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the cotton- seeds obtained during the process of ginning of tax paid unginned cotton purchased by the petitioner is again liable to tax under the provisions of Rajasthan Sale Tax Act 1954? Ans. In the affirmative. In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. Q. (B) Whether the cotton seeds obtained by the petitioner merely as a bye product during the process of ginning amounts to manufacture and thus a separate commercial commodity comes into existence so as to attract the sales tax on the sale of cotton seeds? Ans. In the affirmative. In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. Q. (C) Whether the Tribunal ought to have allowed the set off or an adjustment of tax paid on the purchase of unginned cotton by the petitioner against the tax leviable if any on the sale of cotton seeds obtained by the petitioner from the tax paid ginned cotton? Ans. In the negative.In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. Q. (C) Whether the Tribunal ought to have allowed the set off or an adjustment of tax paid on the purchase of unginned cotton by the petitioner against the tax leviable if any on the sale of cotton seeds obtained by the petitioner from the tax paid ginned cotton? Ans. In the negative.In favour of Revenue and against the assessee. Q. (D) Any other question/questions of law as may be considered to be arising out of the order of Tribunal, as may be considered fit and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Ans. No other question of law has been raised. (4). In S.B.Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 1001/1994, the questions raised are identically same as raised in S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 292/1990 and the answers to the same are also as stated hereinabove. Reasons for the answers are as following;– (5). For deciding the aforesaid questions, it is conceded that the facts of S.B.Sales Tax Revision Petition No.292/1990 be taken into consideration. This concession is made in view of the facts that except for the difference of names of the dealers and period of assessment, the questions raised in all the three Revision Petitions are substantially the same. (6). The petitioner carried-on the business of cotton. It purchased unginned cotton from the agriculturists, who are un- registered dealers. The petitioner also purchased unginned cotton from the registered dealers in auction, namely, Co-ope- rative Societies. While purchasing unginned cotton, the petitioner paid saels tax as applicable within the State of Rajasthan. The petitioner applied to the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajathan, Jaipur under section 12-A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (in short `the R.S.T. Act) for determination of the following questions :– 1. Whether ginned cotton sold vide bill No. 7788 dated 21.2.86 which has been obtained by ginning of S.T. paid cotton purchased vide Bill No. 3430 dated 3.2.86 of M/S Ranglal Hiralal & Co. Sumerpur is exempt from sales tax u/s 2(s)(ii) of R.S.T.Act 1954? 2. Whether cotton seed obtained out of aforesaid S.T. paid cotton sold vide Bill No. 7811 dated 27.2.86 can be sold as S.T. paid in view of section 2(s)(ii) of R.S.T.Act,1954. 3. Whether ginned cotton and cotton seed out of aforesaid S.T. paid cotton can be sold as S.T. paid by way of sales outside the State. 2. Whether cotton seed obtained out of aforesaid S.T. paid cotton sold vide Bill No. 7811 dated 27.2.86 can be sold as S.T. paid in view of section 2(s)(ii) of R.S.T.Act,1954. 3. Whether ginned cotton and cotton seed out of aforesaid S.T. paid cotton can be sold as S.T. paid by way of sales outside the State. Since tax has already been paid on unginned cotton vide Bill No. 3430 dated 3.2.1986. (7). The aforesaid questions have been answered by the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan, Jaipur as per order dated June 22, 1987 as follows :– Question No.1 :- Ginned cotton sold vide Bill No. 7788 dated 21.2.86, obtained by ginning of sales tax paid cotton is exempt from sales tax under section 2(s) (ii) of the RST Act, 1954, provided it was purchased after payment of R.S.T. at full rate of tax on cotton. Question No.2;- Cotton seeds obtained out of purchase of cotton which has suffered full rate of RST would be held taxable being a separate commercially identifiable commodity derived through manufacturing process. Question No. 3 :- This question is hypothetical because it seeks an answer for a probable S.O.S. sale not supported by any particular bills etc. Hence no determination. (8). In essence, the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan Jaipur held that the cotton seeds obtained during the process of ginning was a separate commercial commodity, therefore, the sale of such cotton seeds would attract sales tax. (9). Being aggrieved by and feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan, Jaipur the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 14 of the R.S.T. Act before the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal (in short the Tribunal). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as per its judgment and order dated April 25,1990. (10). Thereafter, the petitioner has approached this court by filing this revision petition. (11). The short question that arises is, whether the cotton seed is covered by the definition of the term, cotton occurring in Section 14(ii) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short the C.S.T. Act). (12). Section 14 of the C.S.T. Act declares certain goods to be of special importance in inter State trade or commerce. (11). The short question that arises is, whether the cotton seed is covered by the definition of the term, cotton occurring in Section 14(ii) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short the C.S.T. Act). (12). Section 14 of the C.S.T. Act declares certain goods to be of special importance in inter State trade or commerce. The definition of the term `cotton contained in Section 14(ii) of the C.S.T., Act reads as follows :– "Cotton, that is to say, all kinds of cotton (indigenous of imported) in its unmanufactured State, whether ginned or unginned baled, press- ed or otherwise, but not including cotton waste." (13). While deciding the appeal filed by the assessee the Tribunal has followed the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab V/S Chandu Lal Kishori Lal (1). In that case, the assessee was a partnership firm. It carried on the business of buying and selling cotton and also of ginning and pressing cotton. The assessee purchased unginned cotton and after ginning the cotton by a mechanical process and removing the seeds, sold the ginned cotton to customers outside the State. The assessee paid purchase tax on the purchase turn over for the period from April 1, 1961 to March 31, 1962. In respect of cotton seeds sold by it to registered dealers, the assessee claimed deduction from the purchase turn over under section 5(2) (a) (vi) of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948. The assessing authority did not allow the deduction on the ground that the goods sold i.e. cotton seeds were not the goods in respect of which purchase tax has been levied. In other words, the assessing authority took the stand that the unginned cotton under went a manufacturing process and the goods produced were different from those pur- chased. The order of the assessing authority was challenged before the appropriate authority including the High Court. The High Court decided the matter in favour of the assessee. The State carried the matter before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948 and also the relevant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It was contended before the Honble Supreme Court that ginning of cotton was a manufacturing process and on account of this manufacturing process, two distinct commercial commodities having substantially different identity came into existence. The Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions of the Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948 and also the relevant provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It was contended before the Honble Supreme Court that ginning of cotton was a manufacturing process and on account of this manufacturing process, two distinct commercial commodities having substantially different identity came into existence. The Supreme Court upheld this contention and held as follows :– ``In our opinion, the appellants are right in their contention that the ginning process is a manufacturing process. But the question presented for determination in the present case is some what different viz. whether the respondent is entitled to the exemption under section 5(2) (a) (vi) of the Act in the context and setting of the language of sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. "Declared goods" in section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 are individually specified under separate items. "Cotton ginned or unginned" is treated as a single commodity under one item of declared goods. It is evident that cotton ginned or unginned being treated as a single commodity and as a single species of declared goods cannot be subject under section 15 (a) of the Central Sales Tax Act to a tax exceeding two percent of the sale or purchase price thereof or at more than one stage. But so far as cotton seeds are concerned it is difficult to accept the contention that the sale of cotton seeds must be treated as a sale of declared goods for the purposes of section 15(a) or (b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It is true that cotton in its unginned state contains cotton seeds. But it is by a manufacturing process that the cotton and the seed are separated and it is not correct to say that the seeds so separated is cotton itself or part of the cotton. They are two distinct commercial goods though before the manufacturing process the seeds might have been a part of the cotton itself. There is hence no warrant for the contention that cotton seed is not different from cotton. It follows that the respondent is not entitled to deduct the sale price of the cotton seeds from the pur- chase turn over under section 5(2)(a) (vi) of the Act. (14). There is hence no warrant for the contention that cotton seed is not different from cotton. It follows that the respondent is not entitled to deduct the sale price of the cotton seeds from the pur- chase turn over under section 5(2)(a) (vi) of the Act. (14). The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Honble Supreme Court has been explained and distinguished in a latter decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab V/s S.G.R.Cotton G. & P Factory (2). (15). It is rued that the Honble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of ChanduLal Kishori Lal (Supra) while deciding the case of S.R.G. Cotton (Supra). But the Honble Supreme Court has not in any way re-considered its earlier decision in the case of Chandu Lal Kishorilal (Supra). The Supreme Court has not diluted the principle laid down therein or taken a different or contrary view than which has been taken by it earlier. (16). On a careful reading of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of S.G.R. Cotton (supra), it becomes evident that the question before the Supreme Court was slightly different. The Honble Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether the turn over of cotton included the ``cotton seeds and ginned or unginned cotton still in the possession of the respondents and undisposed of. The Honble Supreme Court held that the cotton seeds retained by the assessee cannot form the part of the entire turn over of cotton. After referring to its earlier decision and the facts of the case of S.G.R. Cotton (Supra), the Supreme Court has referred to the question which was raised before it and has answered the same in the last paragraph of the judgment. The entire paragraph is resproduced hereunder :– "The question before us is whether the entire turnover of cotton was entitled to deduction under section 5(2)(a)(vi) of the Punjab Act. We think that the entire purchase price of the cotton can be claimed as a deduction because no part of the cotton after ginning was retained by the respondents. The entire ginned cotton was sold by the respondents to the registered dealers. The retention of the cotton seeds can make no difference. We think that the entire purchase price of the cotton can be claimed as a deduction because no part of the cotton after ginning was retained by the respondents. The entire ginned cotton was sold by the respondents to the registered dealers. The retention of the cotton seeds can make no difference. The assessing authority is not entitled to take into account cotton seeds for the purpose of computing the deduction to which the assessee is entitled. (17). Thus, in essence, the question before the Honble Supreme Court was whether in the turn over of cotton the undisposed stock of cotton seeds and ginned and unginned cotton which was still in the possession of the assessee could also be included or not. The Honble Supreme Court in its earlier decision has categorically held that the cotton seeds which emerged upon a manufacturing process applied to the unginned cotton, whereby the cotton and the seeds are separated, and that the seeds so separated could not be identified as part of the cotton itself. Applying this principle, the Honble Supreme Court has held that while considering the entire turn over of cotton, the retention of the cotton seeds by the assessee cannot and would not make difference. This is so because cotton seed is not cotton. (18). Therefore, the argument that the Honble Supreme Court has explained its earlier decision and in the process has re- considered its earlier decision so as to change or dilute the principle laid down in its earlier decision cannot be acce- pted. (19). The learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that in the definition of the term `cotton waste is specifically excluded. In his submission cotton seed has not been excluded from the definition of the term `cotton therefore, it is further submitted that the `cotton seed cannot be excluded from the definition of the term `cotton and it cannot be subjected to tax. (20). There is basic fallacy in the argument. The argument proceeds on the premise that the first part of the definition of the term `cotton takes within its sweep a separate and distinct commodity, namely, `cotton seeds. `Cotton seed may be in the embryo as an intergal part of unginned cotton. But, it is not the same thing as cotton. Cotton has been defined by the Legislature. The argument proceeds on the premise that the first part of the definition of the term `cotton takes within its sweep a separate and distinct commodity, namely, `cotton seeds. `Cotton seed may be in the embryo as an intergal part of unginned cotton. But, it is not the same thing as cotton. Cotton has been defined by the Legislature. Had the Legislature indended to include even the `cotton seed in the definition of the term `cotton, nothing prevented the Legislature to state so specifically in the definition of the term `cotton. It could have been easily stated so, by inserting the phrase `including cotton seed after the phrase `all kinds of cotton. The very fact that the Legislature took care to describe `cotton by using the words `indigenous or imported in its unmanufactured state, whether ginned or unginned, baled, pressed or otherwise, and yet it did not use the expression `including the cotton seeds, indicates that the intention of the Legislature was not to treat the `cotton seeds as one and the same commodity, namely, `cotton. In other words, the Legislature did not intend to in- clude `cotton seeds in the definition of the term `cotton. It is not open to the Court to insert any word in the language employed by the Legislautre, much more so in a taxing statute. (21). Moreover, as indicated hereinabove, the argument is based on the fallacious premise that the commodity cotton includes the commodity cotton seeds in commercial parlance and in the word of commerce, cotton and `cotton seed are two different commodities having substantially different identity of their own. This fact could not be disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Therefore the submission that since there is no exclusion of cotton seed in the definition of the term `cotton, the `cotton seeds should be treated as one and the same commodity as cotton cannot be accepted. Purposely, there is no exclusion of cotton seeds. there can be exclusion of something which is included therein. Cotton waste is an integral part of cotton and by referring to the popular parlance and the leading of the world of commerce, it could be considered to be the same commodity, namely cotton. But as indicated hereinabove in the popular parlance and in the world of commerce, cotton seed is not considered to be inclusive of commodity cotton. Cotton waste is an integral part of cotton and by referring to the popular parlance and the leading of the world of commerce, it could be considered to be the same commodity, namely cotton. But as indicated hereinabove in the popular parlance and in the world of commerce, cotton seed is not considered to be inclusive of commodity cotton. Therefore, there is no need to exclude cotton seed. Had there been any exclusion of cotton seed, there would have been unnecessary unwarranted assumption on the part of the Legislature to assume that cotton seed forms the part of cotton and it is the same commodity even in popular parlance and in the world of commerce. This would be against the reality. It has to be presumed that the Legislature has the wisdom to know the reality of life. It is by exercise of this wisdom that the Legislature has used phraseology while describing the term `cotton contained in Section 14(ii) of the C.S.T.Act. (22). In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Honble Supreme Court which is referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents in the case of Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Assn. vs. State of Raj. (3). In the said decision, the Honble Supreme Court has inter alia interpreted the expression, that is to say, occurring in Section 14(i) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Supreme Court has observed that the purpose of using the phrase, that is to say, is to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used as a rule to amplify a meaning and in the context of single point sales tax, the expression is meant to exhaustively enumerate the kind of good in a given list. (23). The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Telangana Steel Industries vs. State of A.P. (4). The Honble Supreme Court after referring to the definitions of `iron and steel and `wire rods and wires contained in Section 14 of the C.S.T. Act held that the wires manufactured from wire rods even though separate will not be taxed sepa- rately. This is so because of the definition of the expression wire rods and wires contained in Section 14 of the Act. This is so because of the definition of the expression wire rods and wires contained in Section 14 of the Act. The relevant part of the definition is reproduced in para 9 of the reported decision. It reads as follows :– "14 certain goods to be of special importance in inter- State trade or commerce. It is hereby declared that the following goods are of spe- cial importance in inter State trade or commerce- (iv) iron and steel, that is to say . . . . . (xv) wire rods and wires- rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper . . . . (24). On the bare reading of the definition of wire rods and wires, it becomes evident that the reliance placed on this decision is of no help to the petitioners. The question raised before the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid reported decision turned on the definition of the commodity `wife rods and wires contained in Section 14 of the Act. It was because of the definition of the commodity `wire rods and wires that the Honble Supreme Court held that though wire rods and wires were two different commodities they could not be taxed separately. Such is not the cases before me. On the contrary, in this case, on account of the definition of the term `cotton contained in Section 14(ii) of the C.S.T. Act that the cotton seeds are required to be treated separately. The reliance placed on the aforesaid reported decision is of no help to the petitioners. On the similar lines is another decision of the Honble counsel for the petitioners in the case of Krishna Chander Dutta (spice) Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.T.O. (5). In that case, the question raised before the Honble Supreme Court turned on the definition of the commodity `Pepper and Turmeric. The words contained in the relevant Notifications were ``Whole, Broken, Ground or Powedered. Obviously the Pepper and Turmeric whether Whole, Broken, Ground or Powedered were clubbed together in the same item. The Honble Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 held that the Pepper whole and Pepper Powder could not be taxed separately. This decision is also of no help to the petitioners. (25). Obviously the Pepper and Turmeric whether Whole, Broken, Ground or Powedered were clubbed together in the same item. The Honble Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 held that the Pepper whole and Pepper Powder could not be taxed separately. This decision is also of no help to the petitioners. (25). The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that when unginned cotton is taxed, the value component of it included the value of cotton seeds also. Therefore, it is submitted that when the value of cotton seeds has suffered tax when unginned cotton has been taxed, the cotton seeds cannot be taxes separately. (26). Again, with utmost respect, it has to be said that the argument is based on the fallacious assumption. The term `cotton does not inlcude `cotton seed. `Cotton and `cotton seed are two different commodities having substantially different identify of their own. When cotton ginned or unginned is taxed, by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the cotton seed is also taxed. Cotton seed comes into existence after manufacturing process takes place. As a result of the manufacturing process either as a by product or as an end product, cotton seed comes into existence. Therefore, to say that when unginned cotton is taxed, the cotton seeds is also taxed is not correct. This is so in view of the definition of the term `cotton contained in Section 14(ii) of the C.S.T. Act. (27). The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the tax levied on unginned cotton has to be given set off against the tax now sought to be levied on cotton seed. (28). A pointed question was put to the learned counsel for the petitioners to show any provision of law under which the petitioners could claim the set off. The learned counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that he is not in a position to lay his hand on any provision of law either under the R.S.T.Act or under the C.S.T.Act on the basis of which the assessee could claim set off. (29). It is the fundamental principle incorporated in the Constitution (Article 265) that no tax could be levied or collected except by authority of law. That con- verse is also true that no set off or remission could be claimed by an assessee except as provided by law. (29). It is the fundamental principle incorporated in the Constitution (Article 265) that no tax could be levied or collected except by authority of law. That con- verse is also true that no set off or remission could be claimed by an assessee except as provided by law. An assessing officer cannot give set off or remission which is not provided for in law. If an Assessing Officer was to be permitted to do so, it may create chaos. He may give set off or remission to some people though there is no such provision in law. This would amount to giving power of taxing the people to an Assessing Officer. Such a situation can never be imagined. It can never be imagined that the Legislature ever wanted such a situation to be created. In view of this position of law the question is not required to be discussed further. (30). In view of the aforesaid position, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decisions in the case of Advance Bricks Co. vs. Assessing Authority (6) and in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Burmah Shell Refineries Ltd. (7), are not required to be dealt with in details. In the aforesaid decisions, the question was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in the context of the facts and circumstances and in the context to the provisions of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, no pro- vision of law is pointed out on the basis of which the petitioners could claim set off. (31). Accordingly, all these three Revision Petitions stand disposed of. The answers to the questions raised in all these three Revision Petitions are indicated hereinabove in paras 2,3, and 4 of this judgment and order. The Registry shall send a copy of this judgment and order to the Tribunal for proceeding further in accordance with law.