JUDGMENT 1. The appellants being aggrieved by the order dated 27.9.89 passed in M.A. No. 38/87 by the learned Single Judge of this Court have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. It is undisputed that the respondent No. 1 is a Public Trust registered under M.P. Public Trust Act. 1951. One Suraj Prasad was the managing trustee of the said Shankerji Manidr Trust. On 6.12.76 an application under Section 26 was submitted to the Registrar of the Public Trust by some villagers that the managing trustee Suraj Prasad was mismanaging the Trust and Trust property for his own benefit. The Registrar after giving the notice to the managing trustee, and enquiry held that the Trust property was not being properly managed and administered, therefore, it was necessary to make an application to the District Judge under section 27 of the Act. On receipt of the application the Court made an enquiry and holding that the managing trustee was mismanaging the Trust and Trust property, by its order dated 6.10.79 ordered removal of the existing trustees including the managing trustee directed appointment of the new trustees. It is also directed that the trustee be delivered possession of the Trust property. 3. The new trustee obtained partial possession of the Trust property but as some items of lands were in possession of other persons, on 17.11.1980 an application purporting to be under section 27 of the Act read with Order 21 Rule 35 C.P.C. was filed before the District Judge praying therein that possession of survey No. 378.79 (amended as 97) and 296 could not be delivered to them as it was in possession of the non-applicant No. 2 and 5 who claim through the managing trustee Suraj Prasad, the same be delivered to them through agency of Court. It was also submitted that the orders passed by the Court, under the Act have the force of the decree, threfore the order be executed and the trustees be put in possession. 4. To understand the facts better the description of the parties is required to be detailed. It was also submitted that the orders passed by the Court, under the Act have the force of the decree, threfore the order be executed and the trustees be put in possession. 4. To understand the facts better the description of the parties is required to be detailed. Shri Shankerji Mandir Trust, Bargi through Chhotelal (working trustee) was the applicant, Suraj Prasad S/o Asharam (the removed managing trustee) was non-applicant No. 1 who died during the pendecy of the petition before the trial Court and was substituted by his legal representative Shiv Prasad and Anand Latori Jharia S/o Biharilal was non-applicant N. 2 who was also ordered to be dispossessed by the impugned order dated 13.12.86, preferred M.A. No. 22/87 Latori Jharia Vs. Shri Shankerji Mandir Trust. The appeal was dismissed by order dated 16.9.67. The parties do not know nor the record show as to whether the order passed by this Court in M.A. No. 22/87 was subject to further appeal or not. Rameshwar Prasad was M.A. No. 3 who died during the pendey of the application before the trial Court and was substituted by Pannabai, Reghvendra and Virendra Kumar. This Virendra Kumar was already on record on N.A. No. 4. Kishanlal was. N.A. No. 5. Against Latori it was alleged that he is in possession of the Trust property under some sale deed executed by original N.A. No. 1 Suraj Prasad. Against Rameshwar Prasad and Virendra Kumar it was alleged that they are in possession through Suraj Prasad. Kishanalal the M.A. No. 5 submitted before the trial Court that Suraj Prasad in his capacity of managing trustee transferred by lease the land belonging to the Temple. 5. The original N.A. No. 3 and 4 Rameshwar Prasad and Virendra Kumar in their written statement contended that land survey No. 206, area 0.474 hectares (1.17 acres) of village Bargi was in their possession in their proprietary rights. It was submitted by them that one Vanshgopal was Malguzar of the village Bargi and after his death his two sons. Vasudeo Prasad and Yadunandan Prasad came into possession of the property. Vasudeo Prasad died leaving behind him Rameshwar Prasad (original N.A. No. 3) as son and successor Yadunandan Prasad died leaving behind him Smt. Rukmanibai as widow. According to them said Rameshwar and Rukmanibai by came in possession of the said land. Vasudeo Prasad and Yadunandan Prasad came into possession of the property. Vasudeo Prasad died leaving behind him Rameshwar Prasad (original N.A. No. 3) as son and successor Yadunandan Prasad died leaving behind him Smt. Rukmanibai as widow. According to them said Rameshwar and Rukmanibai by came in possession of the said land. It was also submitted by them that they are not in possession of the property either for or on behalf of or through Suraj Prasad. They submitted that land was being used as Khaliyan (place for keeping crops) and Rameshwar Prasad had built house about 25 years back. After hearing parties the leanred trial Court by its order dated 21.1.1982 passed in M.J.C. No. 83/80 relying upon Usha Jain Vs. Manmohan Bajaj 1980 M.P.L.J. 623 came to the conclusion that the original non-applicants were not entitled to object to execution of the distress warrant as they were third parties. The trial Court also held that their right to apply for an enquiry arises only after delivery of possession is effected. The trial Court relying upon Temple of Shri Jagannathji Vs. Salharu and another 1969 M.P.L.J. 74 held that the Court can order possession against trustees de son tort. The said order was challenged by Rameshwar and Virendra Kumar in Civil Revision No. 147/82 before this Court. By order dated 4.5.82 the said revision was allowed and the case was remanded back to the learned trial Court to proceed in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties to prove their respective contentions. 6. The respondent No. 1 Trust examined PW-1 Chhotelal the managing trustee as the only witness. On the other hand Virendra Kumar was examined as N.A.W. 1 and Latorilal was also as N.A.W. 2.As the matters relating to Latorilal and Kishanlal are not before this Court it is not necessary to consider their respective cases. After hearing the parties and considering the evidence the leanred trial Court by its order dated 13.12,86 held that the objections were liable to be rejected and warrant for possession should be issued in favour of the Trust. Being aggrieved by the order dated 13.12.86 Virendra Kumar, Raghvendra Prasad and Pannabai had preferred M.A. No. 38/87 but subsequently Raghvendra Prasad was transposed as respondent No. 4. The legal representatives of Suraj Prasad were joined as respondent No. 2 and 3 and the Trust was shown as respondent No. 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 13.12.86 Virendra Kumar, Raghvendra Prasad and Pannabai had preferred M.A. No. 38/87 but subsequently Raghvendra Prasad was transposed as respondent No. 4. The legal representatives of Suraj Prasad were joined as respondent No. 2 and 3 and the Trust was shown as respondent No. 1. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties held that as the Temple and Dharmashala were situated on part of Khasra No. 206, and as the allotment of part of Khasra No. 206 in favour of Rukmanibai was illegal and as the presumption attached to the correctness of the revenue entry in Ex. P-l (a) was rebuttal it was not possible to hold that the appellants were owners of the property. It also held that the Collector at the time of allotment was obliged to consider as to whether the entire Khasra was Trust property or not because admittedly part of Khasra No. 206 was property of the public Trust, and if the finding was not in favour of the public Trust then to what extent the Trust was the owner. The leanred Single Judge holding that there was not sufficient mateiral available on record to indicate that Collector had done this particular exercise, further holding that the burden on the appellants was not discharged nor does the order show how much land out of Khasra No. 206 was settled with them, they would not succeed in the appeal. Repelling the objection regarding section 27 of the Act relating to the jurisdiction of the District Judge, the learned Single Judge held that the earlier order passed by the Districts Judge was in fact a decree, therefore, the same could be executed. Consequently the appeal was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in M.A. No. 38/87, Virendra Kumar, Gendibai and Pannabai have preferred this appeal. Shri C.K. Sharma, learned counsel appeared for the appellants. Shri A.K. Pandey, learned counsel appeared for the respondent No. 1. None appeared for the respondent No. 2 to 4. We have heard the parties at length. 7. Shri C.K. Sharma, learned counsel appeared for the appellants. Shri A.K. Pandey, learned counsel appeared for the respondent No. 1. None appeared for the respondent No. 2 to 4. We have heard the parties at length. 7. Shri C.K. Sharma learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the approach of the learned trial Court and the learned Single Judge was not in accordance with law Shri Sharma submitted that appellants were third parties and were not noticed in the carlier proceedings regarding removal of the managing turstee, therefore, the order passed in said proceedings is not binding upon them. It was also submitted that the respondent No. 1. Trust came with the plea that the appellants were in possession through Suraj Prasad and they could not be permitted to change their stand and were not entitled to submit that even if the appellants were trespassers, they were liable to be dispossessed. Continuing the arguments it was contended that in any case question of title could not be investigated and the Courts were wrong in holding that the burden lay on the appellants to prove that they were the owners while in fact the respondent Trust should have proved their title and owncrship. The whole Khasra No. 206 was not recorded as Trust in the register maintained by the Registrar of Public Trust under Section 7 of the Act, and therefore, it could not be held that it was Trust Property. Lastly it was contended that the title of Rukmanidevi could not be examined in these proceedings nor was the Court competent to go into correctness, validity and proprietory of the order of the Collector settling the land in favour of said Rukmanidevi. Replying to the aforesaid arguments, Shri A.K. Pandey contended that as the proceedings under section 27 of the Act are in nature of execution proceedings, if the appellants wanted to resist delivery of possession in favour of the respondent no. 1 trust, they were requirted to prove their title. According to him the appellants, if they arc third parties, they may establish their title by filing civil suit. It was also submitted that the courts below were justified in enquiring into the title of Rukmanidevi and to do substantial justice between the parties the correctness, validity and propreiety of the order of the Collector could also be gone into. According to him the appellants, if they arc third parties, they may establish their title by filing civil suit. It was also submitted that the courts below were justified in enquiring into the title of Rukmanidevi and to do substantial justice between the parties the correctness, validity and propreiety of the order of the Collector could also be gone into. According to him, if the appellants were not in possession through Suraj Prasad and are trespassers, no fault can be found with the order passed by the learned courts below. Regarding the findings recorded u/s 7 of the act. it was contended that from the documents it is clear that though Survey No. 206 is not mentioned in the register the entry is sufficient to show that Survey No. 206 was also recorded as the trust property. 8.(A). U/s 4 of the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 (hereinafter) referred to as the Act.), an application for registration of public trust is to be made. The Registrar on receipt of such application shall make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining whether the trust is a public trust. Whether any property is the property of such trust etc. On completion of the inquiry provided for u/s 5, the Registrar shall record his finding with reasons therefor as to the matters mentioned in Section 5. These findings are to be recorded u/s 6 of the Act. The findings so recorded shall be entered into the register maintained by him and the Registrar shall also publish on the notice baord of his office the entries made in the register. The entries so made shall subject to the provisions of the Act and subject to any change recorded under the provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, be final and conclusive. It can be deduced from the language of sections 4 to 7 that on completion of the inquiry the findings are to be recorded and the same are to be entered in the register. The entries shall be final and conclusive except to the extent provided u/s 7 (2) of the Act. 8. Section 8 of the Act reads as under:- 8. The entries shall be final and conclusive except to the extent provided u/s 7 (2) of the Act. 8. Section 8 of the Act reads as under:- 8. Civil Suit against the findings of the Registrar- (1) Any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any properly found to be trust property, aggrieved by the finding of the Registrar u/s 6 may, within 6 months from the date of the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of the Section 7, institute a suit in a civil court to have such findings set aside or modified. (2) In every such suit, the civil Court shall give notice to the State Govt. through the Registrar, and the State Govt, if it so desires, shall be made a party to the suit. (3) On the final decision of the suit, the Registrar, shall if necessary, correct the entries made in the register in accordance with such decision. 9. The scope of sections 5 and 8 of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of A. Karim Vs. Municipal Committee, Raipur 1966 M.P.L.J. 58. The Supreme Court held that in the inquiry in dispute it is directed to the question whether the trust is public or private. It does not take into its sweep questions as to whether the property belongs to a private individual and is not the subject-matter of any trust at all. The only persons who are required to file objections in response to a notice are persons interested in the public trust, not those who dispute the existence of the trust of that a particular property belongs to the trust. Only beneficiaries or others who claim a right to manage the trust can file objections and those objections of a limited class are to be considered by the Registrar. The Supreme Court further held that the interest to which section 8(1) refers must be read in the light of S. 5(2) as interest of a beneficiary or of a person who claim right to maintain the trust or any interest of a similar character, it is not the interest which is adverse to the trust set up by a party who does not claim any relation with the trust at all. A person who was not a party to the proceedings cannot be said to be aggrieved by the decision of the Registrar. He would not be found to file a civil suit as provided by S.8 if the property in which he claims exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a public trust. Like S.8, section 4 (5) is also confined in its operation to persons who could have appeared before the Registrar u/s 5 (2). The Supreme Court in para 13 of the judgment observed as under: Then again, the right to file a suit to which S.8(1) refers is given to persons who are aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar. Having regard to the fact that the proceedings before the Registrar are in the nature of proceedings before a civil court, it would be illogical to hold that the respondent who was not a party to the proceedings can be said to be aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar. The normal judicial concept of a person aggrieved by any order necessarily postulates that the said person must be a party to the proceedings in which the order was passed and by which feels aggrieved. It is unnecessary to emphasise that it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that though a person is not a party to the proceedings and cannot participate in them by way of filing objection would still be bound to file a suit within the period prescribed by S 8(1) if the properly in which he claims an exclusive title is held by the Registrar to belong to a public trust. Similarly, the right to prefer an appeal against the Registrar's order prescribed by S. 4(5) necessarily implies the person must be a party to the proceedings before the Registrar otherwise how would he know about the order ? Like S.8(1). S.4(5) also seems to be confined in its operation to persons who are before the Registrar, or who could have appeared before the Registrar u/s 5(2). The whole scheme is clear; the Registrar enquires into the question as to whether a trust is private or public, and deals with the points specifically enumerated by S. 4(3). Like S.8(1). S.4(5) also seems to be confined in its operation to persons who are before the Registrar, or who could have appeared before the Registrar u/s 5(2). The whole scheme is clear; the Registrar enquires into the question as to whether a trust is private or public, and deals with the points specifically enumerated by S. 4(3). Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the fact that the property now in suit was added to the list of properties belonging to the wakf, cannot affect the respondent's title to it. 10. It is thus clear that a person who is not a party before the Registrar is neither required to file an appeal nor is obliged to file a suit u/s 8 of the Act. According to sub-section (3) of S.8 on the final decision of the suit, the Registrar is obliged to correct the entries made in the register in accordance with such decisions, the entries made u/s 7 shall be final and conclusive. In the instant case the entries made in the register are on record. Column no. 9 refers to the immovable properties which arc as follows: I. Temple building valued Rs. 700/- 2. Dharmshala valued Rs. 1200/- 3. Fields Khasra No. 331, area 2.97 acres valued Rs. 408-8-0. 4. Fields Kh. No. 378 area 3.95 acres valued Rs. 305/-. 5. Fields Kh. No. 97 area 3.83 acres valued Rs. 150/- From these entries it is clear the Survey No. 206 is not recorded as the trust property. What in fact arc recorded, as public trust property, are temple and building which admittedly are situate on Khasra No. 206. If whole of the Kh. No. 206 is not recorded as trust property, then by no interpretive process can it be held that because temple and Dharmshala contracted on Kh. No. 206 are trust properties, the whole of Survey No. 206 would be trust property. According to S.7 the entries made in the register are final and conclusive. If any person having interest in the public truss or its property, was aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar, then it was for him to file a suit u/s 8 of the Act and unless the findings are corrected, it cannot be held that whole of Survey No. 206 belongs to the trust. 11. The Distt. If any person having interest in the public truss or its property, was aggrieved by the findings of the Registrar, then it was for him to file a suit u/s 8 of the Act and unless the findings are corrected, it cannot be held that whole of Survey No. 206 belongs to the trust. 11. The Distt. Judge in the earlier proceedings ordered removal of the managing trustee and also directed that the trustees be put in possession. Admittedly, the appellants were not parties to those proceedings. Any order passed u/s 27 would not bind the third party. The scheme of the Act u/s 26 and 27 in our opinion is that the Registrar on his being satisfied that the original object of the public trust has failed or that the trust property is not being properly managed or administered, or directions of the court are necessary for the administration of the public trust, then alter hearing the working trustee, he may be directed to apply to the court for directions within the time specified by the Registrar. If the trustee failed to make an application as required, the Registrar himself may make an application to the court. Section 26 read with sections 6 and 7 would clarify the position, the key words are the 'trust property'. The Registrar on his satisfaction that the trust property' is not being properly managed, may ask the working turstee to make or on his failure, may make an application to the court. As observed above, the Registrar after recording his findings u/s 6 regarding the trust, its property and other matters, shall make an entry of the same in the register maintained by it and the said entry shall be final and conclusive. It can therefore, be held that the whole survey No. 206 is not shown to be that trust property in the register maintained u/s 7 and as no suit for correction of the entry was filed u/s X (I) of the Act. threfore, the entries are final and conclusive. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the survey number would not decide conclusively the title over the land. It was submitted by him that if the description and boundaries of the property are given then the survey numbe would loose its importance. 12-A. As mentioned above, the entry merely temple and Dharmshala. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the survey number would not decide conclusively the title over the land. It was submitted by him that if the description and boundaries of the property are given then the survey numbe would loose its importance. 12-A. As mentioned above, the entry merely temple and Dharmshala. It does not give the description and boundry mark of whole survey no. 206. It cannot be, therefore, held that the entire extent of survey No. 206 in fact was included in the entry. However, we are not making any final adjudication on the rights of the parties because we are only concerned with the application filed u/s 27 of the Act. The Registrar filed an application u/s 27 of the Act before the....... court for removal of the trustee, appointment of a new trustee and for a direction the possession of the trust property be given to the newly appointed trustee. The Court exercising its powers u/s 27 removed the old trustees appointed new trustees and directed that possession of the trust property be given to the new trustees. As slated above, some properties allege to be the trust properties, could not be delivered to the trustees, threfore they filed an application u/s 27 of the Act. It was contended in the application that the lands under Survey No. 378, 97 and 206 are in possession of the original non applicant Nos. 2 to 5 through Surajprasad the trustees were bound to prove that the opponents were in possession through Surajprasad. The court below did not make a proper inquiry as to whether the said opponents were in possession of the property through Surajprasad or in their individual rights. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of A. Karim (supra) person who is not party to the proceedings is not bound by the findings unless he is claiming through a party to the proceedings. In the instant case the appellants arc not claiming through Surajprasad but are selling up their individual titles. It is contended by the appellants that after the abolition of proprietary rights certain grass lands could be allotted to the ex-Malguzar. Placing reliance on Ex. In the instant case the appellants arc not claiming through Surajprasad but are selling up their individual titles. It is contended by the appellants that after the abolition of proprietary rights certain grass lands could be allotted to the ex-Malguzar. Placing reliance on Ex. D-1 A it was contended that Survey No. 206 ad-measuring 1.17 acres, was settled in the name of Rukmanibai W/o Ydunandan and the entry in Ex-D-1 A certifies that except the areas of temple and Dharmshala the rest of the land is settled. Ex - D-1A is Khasra Panchasala for the yeai 1953 -54 to 1957-58. Ex-D-18 in Khasra Panchsala which shows Rukmanibai is recorded as the person in possession and in column no. 10 temple and Dharmshala are mentioned. Ex D-l C, Khasra for the year 1967-68 shows Survey No. 206. 0.474 hectare to be recorded in the name of Rukmanibai. Ex D4D for the years 1970-71 to 1973-74 is also to the same effect. So is the entry is Khasra Panchasala for the years 1976. 1978 and 1979 which is on record as Ex. D- 18. The map Ex - D - 2 is also available on record showing the situation of survey No. 206hich also shows certain constructed areas. It is not disputed before us that the construction on the extreme right is the temple, the construction in the middle is Dharmshala and consturction on the extreme left is the house constructed by Rameshwar Prasad. These documents shows that land in Survey No. 206 was alloted in favour of Rukmanibai through whom the appellants claimed their title. In our opinion the district court and learned single judge were not justified in examining the correctness, validity and propriety of the order passed by the Collector. II the trust is aggrieved by these entries made in the khasra then they were bound to make an application either before the Collector challenging its correction and seeking cancellation of the allotment or they should have filed a civil suit challenging the entries made in the Khasra, but in summary proceedings under sec. 27 question of title could not be investigated. It was for the trustees to show that the trust is the owner of the property and the property was so recorded u/s 7 of the Act and only on their proving this fact, proceedings u/s 27 could be drwan. 27 question of title could not be investigated. It was for the trustees to show that the trust is the owner of the property and the property was so recorded u/s 7 of the Act and only on their proving this fact, proceedings u/s 27 could be drwan. In the instant case, the district could and learned single judge were not justified in holding that because the order passed u/s 27 can be executed like a decree, therefore, the appellants are liable to be evicted. 13. Shri Pandey learned counsel for the respondent, relying upon the Jagannathji Pub. T. Vs. Salhara Prasad 1969 M.P.L.J. 74 submitted that if a person claiming to be a trustee usurped possession of some of the trust properties interfering with the management of trust properties by the rightful trustee and the Registrar applied u/s 26(2) for directions the Court could order delivery of possession against a trustees de son for u/s 27(2)(f) of the Act. True it is that such a direction can be issued by the Court, but the first requirement would be to prove that the property is in possession of the said trustee or was in possession of the trustee and now under his authority somebody else is in possession or the person in possession claims through or under the said trustee. In the case on hands, though the trustees came with the case that non applicants 2 to 5 were in possession through Surajprasad but in our opinion they have utterly failed in proving that the present appellants were in possession through Surajprasad. Chhotelal, the working trustee, as A.W.I para 2 of his examination-in-clue could not give the area of the temple or Dharmshala. What he stated was that the area on which trees are growing has been taken by Virendra Malguzar. In cross examination he could not detail the survey number nor could be describe the property properly. He nowhere states that the appellants arc or were in possession through Surajprasad. On (he other hand, in para 4 he admits that the land on which house of Virendra and Rameshwar is situate and where the crops were kept, was never in possession of Surajprasad. Virendra N.A.W. 1 in para 2 of his statement has clearly stated that Suraj Prasad was never in possession and he had never taken possession from Surajprasad. On this material aspect there was no cross examination. Virendra N.A.W. 1 in para 2 of his statement has clearly stated that Suraj Prasad was never in possession and he had never taken possession from Surajprasad. On this material aspect there was no cross examination. Hut on the other hand, in para 6 it was suggested that they have forcibly entered in possession of Survey No. 206. On these facts the judgment reported in the case of Jagarnath Pub. Turst (Supra), would not be applicable. The respondent/trust would not be permitted to deviate from its original stand. For serving a wan ant for possession applicants have to prove that the orders passed u/s 27 were binding on the present appellants because they are claiming through a person who was a party to the proceedings. In absence of such material evidence it cannot be held that there was any justification to exercise powers u/s 27 of the Act. 14. Relying upon Dhanpal Singh Vs. Hariram 1973 M.P.L.J. 1014 Shri Pandey submitted that u/s 27 of the act. the Distt. Judge is given powers, to decide whether a trust about which a declaration has already been given is being properly managed or not and if it is not so being managed to remove the trustees, appoint new trustees and: to give directions regarding management of the trust. The above decision dictates that when a trustee is removed it follows that he is to hand over the possession of the trust property to the new trustee appointed and unless that is done the directions as to how the property is to be managed by the new trustee becomes otiose. The court further held that the authority to give direction, to the trustee who is removed, to deliver possession of the property is implicit in S-27 and is covered by clause (I). The transferees from the trustee with knowledge that the property is trust property arc in the position of trustees de son tort and they can also be directed to deliver possession of he property and it is not necessary that the new lurstec should be forced to file a suit for possession. The observations made in this vase are not of universal application. The transferees are in the position of the trustee deson tort but to obtain relief against them the trust has to prove that such (sic) are claiming under or through earlier trustees. In absence of such pleadings. The observations made in this vase are not of universal application. The transferees are in the position of the trustee deson tort but to obtain relief against them the trust has to prove that such (sic) are claiming under or through earlier trustees. In absence of such pleadings. Proof and findings, a direction u/s 27 cannot be issued. The decisions not an authority to hold that any person who is in possession of the property in his independent rights, who was never noticed and heard before, can also be dispossessed. If this is the interpretation, it would be against the principles of natural justice and the very scheme of the Act. The appellants never claimed through Surajprasad, but on the other hand, the trust submitted before the court that the appellants are in possession through Surajprasad. So far as the inquiry u/s 27 regarding dispossession is concerned, the court is to make a summary inquiry as to whether the third party is claiming through or under the removed trustee and if the court holds that it is so then such third party can always be dispossessed. But in a case where serious questions of title are involved, the court exercising its powers u/s 27 of the Act, cannot hold an inquiry and cannot give any findings regarding the title over the property, it was neither proper nor legal to examine the correctness, validity and propriety of the order of the Collector. That was a separate issue. If the trust was aggrieved by the said allotment, the trust could challenge the order made in favour of Rukmanibai. In absence of such a challenge, in these sumamry proceedings, title could not be investigated, It was for the trustees to show that they were the owners and the present appellants were bound by the earlier directions issued by the Court u/s 27 of the Act. 15. In view of the above findings we hold that the findings recorded by the learned district judge and single judge regarding title, were beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. If the trustees wanted to dispossess the appellants, they could only succeed on proving that the appellants were trustees de son tort and not otherwise. The trust is free to challenge the order of the Collector, if it is still permissible in law. 16. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. If the trustees wanted to dispossess the appellants, they could only succeed on proving that the appellants were trustees de son tort and not otherwise. The trust is free to challenge the order of the Collector, if it is still permissible in law. 16. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the application for delivery of possession is dismissed. No costs.