JUDGMENT 1. :- By these two writ petitions; one filed by Udaipur Distillery Company Ltd., Udaipur; and the other filed by Sona Distilleries Ltd., Alwar, the petitioners have prayed that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents be restrained from realising or charging the bottling fee in pursuance of r.68(2) of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 (for short 'the Rules') and they be prohibited from demanding bottling charges from them and that the Notification dated 16.3.1982 issued by the respondents enhancing the bottling fee from 003 Paisa to 010 Paisa may be quashed. They have further prayed that by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents be directed to refund Rs. 10 lacs to the petitioners which have been charged from them on account of the enhancement of bottling fee from 16.3.1982 to 31.12.1983. They have also prayed that pending decision of the writ petitions, if any action is taken by respondents or any amount is realised from them as bottling fee, the same may be ordered to be refunded back to them with interest 12% per annum. 2. After these writ petitions were admitted and notices were issued to the respondents, separate reply to the writ petitions were filed in each case, in which, it was pleaded that this bottling fee is being charged neither as a tax nor as a fee for rendering the services but it is a consideration for parting with the exclusive privilege to sell the liquor. Although, rejoinders to the replies to the writ petitions have been filed but in Udaipur Distillery Co. Ltd.'s case, the writ petition has now been amended and the following reliefs have also been prayed for: "By an appropriate writ, order or direction, section 16(1)(a) and section 16(1)(d) and section 21 insofar as they require a licence for manufacturing or bottling of liquor, may be declared unconstitutional and void. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, section 24 insofar as it purports to authorise the grant of exclusive privilege to manufacture liquor may be declared unconstitutional and void. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, r.69(2) of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956, may be declared unconstitutional, void and ultravires of the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act." 3. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, section 24 insofar as it purports to authorise the grant of exclusive privilege to manufacture liquor may be declared unconstitutional and void. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, r.69(2) of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956, may be declared unconstitutional, void and ultravires of the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act." 3. Briefly stated, the facts of these two writ petitions are : that the petitioners are manufacturers of Indian Made Foreign Liquor and are very old and well established reputed concerns. They have obtained the following licences as required under the provisions of the Act and the Rules : "Licence under r.47 for wholesale vend by manufacturer for the purposes of sale to wholesale vendors and requisite licence fee to the tune of Rs. 300/- as prescribed fee has been paid. Licence under r.68(5) for construction and working of distillery and requisite fee to the tune of Rs. 5,000/- has been paid. Licence for manufacture and whole vend under r.68 (6) has also been obtained and requisite fee to the tune of Rs. 1500/- has been paid. 4. According to the petitioners, r.68 of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 ('the Rules' hereinafter to be referred) regularises and fixes fee for different licences and under r.68(2) of the Rules, in addition to the above three licences, the licence fee for bottling of IMFL is also provided, whether the bottle is Quart, Pint, Nip or other miniature size. This fee which was 003 Paisa per bottle has now been increased to 010 Paisa per bottle. 5. It has been contended by the petitioners that no such bottling fee is being charged in any other State and therefore, the levy of this bottling fee is discriminatory and it has put a high burden on the petitioners because this bottling fee is not adjustable on the produce as the petitioners are required to compete with the IMFL manufacturers of ther States. They have further contended that r.68 does prescribe fee for different licences but unless the nature of a licence is prescribed, no fee can be levied. They have further contended that r.68 does prescribe fee for different licences but unless the nature of a licence is prescribed, no fee can be levied. They have also contended that when they have already obtained a requisite licences which are required for the IMFL manufacturers, the levy of bottling fee is nothing but is superfluous, unnecessary, unwarranted, without jurisdiction and ultravires of the provisions of the Act and the Rules as well as of the Constitution. 6. It has been submitted that r.68 of the Rules does provide for a lincence for bottling of country liquor and they are obliged to comply with the terms and conditions mentioned in this licence. Thus, the petitioners have submitted that this extra charge in the shape of bottling fee is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution because it puts unreasonable restrictions on the manufacturers of IFML. It has been further submitted that under section 41 of the Act, the respondents are not competent to levy or impose fee on the licences. The manner in which bottling fee is imposed is also much excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable. Even if this bottling fee is considered to be a tax, though it cannot be, the levy of bottling fee is beyond the competence of the respondents. It cannot be levied without sanction of the competent authority and so, it is hit by Articles 265 and 266 of the Constitution. 7. It has been further submitted that they have been granted a licence (COB) by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Govt. of India under r. 15(4) of the Registration and Industrial Undertaking Rules, 1952 for carrying on the business of the existing industrial undertaking and, therefore, this addition burden on them is against the provisions of the Act, Rules and the Constitution. 8. According to the petitioners, there is a difference between 'tax' and 'fee' and they have different connotation and until and unless the tax or fee is levied in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, it will be ultra vires and void. 8. According to the petitioners, there is a difference between 'tax' and 'fee' and they have different connotation and until and unless the tax or fee is levied in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, it will be ultra vires and void. It has been submitted that a fee to be legal must satisfy two things : (a) 'quid proquo' i.e. the authority levying the fee must render some services for the fee levied, however, remote the services may be; and (b) that the fee realised must be spent for the purpose of imposition and should not form part of the general revenue of the State. According to the petitioners, no services are being rendered and, therefore, this levy of fee is illegal and ultravirus of the Constitution, Act and Rules. 9. As stated above, before amending the writ petition, in Udaipur Distillery's case (supra), a reply to the writ petition was filed, in which, it was contended that levy of bottling fee is neither a tax nor a fee for rendering the services but it is a consideration for parting with the exclusive privilege to sell the liquor. It has been contended that the petitioners have already obtained the licences and are paying regularly the bottling fee and, therefore, they cannot now turn round and say that the levy of fee is illegal. According to the respondents, section 21 of the Act provides that no liquor shall be bottled for sale, and no excisable article shall be sold, otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted in that behalf. It has been contended that r.69 of the Rules has been framed to give effect to these provisions of section 21 of the Act read with sections 16(1)(d) and 16(1)(a) of the Act and, therefore, the levy of bottling fee is neither unconstitutional nor illegal. 10. After the writ petition was amended in Udaipur Distillery Co. Ltd.'s case (supra), a reply to the amended writ petition was filed. A rejoinder to the reply to the writ petition was also filed in which all the contentions raised in the writ petitions were reiterated. 11. 10. After the writ petition was amended in Udaipur Distillery Co. Ltd.'s case (supra), a reply to the amended writ petition was filed. A rejoinder to the reply to the writ petition was also filed in which all the contentions raised in the writ petitions were reiterated. 11. In reply to the amended writ petition, it has been contended that section 16(1)(d) of the Act provides that no liquor shall be bottled for sale except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of licence graned in that behalf by the Excise Commissioner or by an Excise Officer duly empowered in this behalf. It has been further contended that section 21 of the Act provides that no liquor shall be bottled for sale and no excisable article shall be sold otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted in that behalf. According to the respondents, keeping in view these provisions of the Act, r.69 of the Act has been framed. It was submitted that this bottling fee is being charged for the services rendered by the Department and it is neither excessive nor unreasonable. Reference has been made to Entry No. 84 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Reference has also been made to Entries No.8, 51 and 66 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Reference has been further made to sub-r. (3) of r.91 of the Rajasthan Distilleries Rules, 1976 and it has been submitted that in order to supervise and check at every stage the manufacturing and bottling process of liquor, the bottling fee is to be charged and, therefore, it cannot be said that the levy of bottling fee is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 12. It has been further contended that section 41 of the Act authorises the State Govt. to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act or other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue. Section 42 of the Act empowers the Chief Excise authority to make rules subject to the previous sanction of the Govt. According to the respondents, in view of these specific provisions and the services rendered by the Excise Department, it cannot be said that the imposition of fee on licences or bottling fee is beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 13. According to the respondents, in view of these specific provisions and the services rendered by the Excise Department, it cannot be said that the imposition of fee on licences or bottling fee is beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 13. In rejoinder to the reply to the amended writ petition, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that no special staff has been posted for the purpose of keeping control over bottling or supervising the same. The contentions raised in the amended writ petition have been reitereated. 14. We have heard M/s K.N. Joshi & Kailash Joshi for the petitioners and Mr. B.P. Agrawal, learned Advocate General and Mr.L.S. Udawat, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 15. It has been contended by Mr.K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that in pursuance of Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution read with Entry 24 of List II the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 has been enacted by the Parliament and by Amendment Act No.71 of 1956, 'fermentation industries' were included in item No.26 in that Schedule and the control of which has been vested in the Union. It has been, therefore, submitted by Mr. Joshi that the State Legislature has no power to control such industry. According to him, the fermentation industry will necessarily include the entire industry in regard to potable alcohol including establishment of distilleries, manufacture of potable alcohol etc. and, therefore, the State does not have any privilege in respect of manufacture of potable alcohol or bottling thereof after the said amendment of 1956 and the State cannot claim to part with such a privilege for a consideration. Entry No. 52 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as under : "52. Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest." Entry No. 24 of List H of Schedule VII of the Constitution is as under:- "24. Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I." Entry No.7 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as under "7. Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war." 16. Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I." Entry No.7 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as under "7. Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war." 16. On the strength of these three entries, i.e. Entries No.7 and 52 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution and Entry No.24 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, it has been claimed the before amendment of- the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 by the Amendment Act No.71 of 1956 and on inclusion of fermentation industries as item No.26 of the Schedule appended with the Act of 1951, the regulation of such industries including the licensing of new industrial undertakings, or for manufacturing of new articles or grant of licence or permission is vested in the Central Govt. and even if the State Govt. wants to set up its own alcohol manufacturing unit, it will have to obtain a licence from the Central Govt. It has been therefore, contended the State Govt. has no privilege and moreso an exclusive privilege for manufacture of country liquor or foreign liquor or any product of fermentation industry and, therefore, the provisions of sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(d) read with sections 21 and 24 of the Act are unconstitutional being vioaltive of the aforesaid provisions of Schedule VII of the Constitution. 17. Although this argument appears to be attractive but the matter does not rest at that. We would like to refer to certain other entries of Lists I, II and III of Schedule VII of the Constitution. List I pertains to the Union List, and List II, exclusively pertains to the States and List III is a concurrent List. 18. Entry No. 84 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as under : "84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except : (a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry." Entry No.8 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution reads as under : "8. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicatilng liquors." Entry No.51 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution is as under : "51. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same or lower rate on similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India:- (a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; (but not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this Entry)." Entry No.33(a) of List III, which forms part of Concurrent List is as under : "33. Trade and commerce in, and the production supply and distribution of, (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; 19. A harmonious reading of these entries including Entry No.84 of List I and Entries No.8 and 51 of List II and further, Entry No.33(a) of List III alongwith Entries No.7 and 52 of List I of Schedule-VII of the Constitution clearly go to show that a distinction has been made as regards the products of fermentation industries. The industries which produce Alcoholic liquor for human consumption or intoxicating liquor fall in different category and the production of industrial liquor which is not meant for human consumption falls in separate category. Entry No.52 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution read with Entry No.24 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution governs productions of industrial liquor but so far as the production of alcoholic liquor or intoxicating liquor meant for human consumption is concerned, it is definitely a subject relating to the State and the State has all powers to make rules or to pass and frame Act to regulate the production, manufacture, marketing, transport, purchase and sale of such liquor. 20. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Ors. 1990(1) SCC-109 , upon which great reliance has been placed by Mr. 20. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Ors. 1990(1) SCC-109 , upon which great reliance has been placed by Mr. K.N. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, after noticing Entry No.84 of List I and Entry No.51 of List II of Scheduled VII of the Constitution, their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in para 97 of the judgment as under : "A comparison of the language of these two entries clearly demonstrates that the powers of taxation on alcoholic liquors have been based on the way in which they are used as admittedly alcoholic liquor is a very wide term and may include variety of types of alcoholic liquors but our Constitution-makers distributed them into two heads (a) for human consumption; (b) other than for human consumption. Alcoholic liquors which are for human consumption were put in Entry 51 List II authorising the State legislature to levy tax on them whereas alcoholic liquors other than for human consumption have been left to the central legislature under Entry 84 for levy of duty of excise. This scheme of these two entries in Lists I and H is clear enough to indicate the line of demarcation for purposes of taxation of alcoholic liquors. What has been excluded in Entry 84 has specifically been put within the authority of the State for purposes of taxation. After noticing Entry No.8 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, it has been further observed in para 98 of the judgment as under : "This entry talks of intoxicating liquors and further on refers to production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of these liquors. It appears that the State has levied some kind of duties in various names at each of these stages used in this entry, that is, production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale. But from the scheme of entries in the three lists, it is clear that taxing entries have been specifically enacted conferring powers of taxation whereas other entries pertain to the authority of the legislature to enact laws for purposes of regulation. If we compare Entry No.8 in List II with Entry 51, it is clear that Entry 51 authorises the State legislature to levy tax and duties on alcoholic liquors falling in Entry 51, Entry 8 confers authority on the State legislature to enact laws for regulation. If we compare Entry No.8 in List II with Entry 51, it is clear that Entry 51 authorises the State legislature to levy tax and duties on alcoholic liquors falling in Entry 51, Entry 8 confers authority on the State legislature to enact laws for regulation. Similarly are entries in List I." Their lordships further noticed Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution and thereafter, observed in para 100 of the judgment as under : "Such a declaration is made by the Parliament and this industry that is industry based on fermentation and alcohol has been declared to be an industry under that Act and therefore, it is directly under the Control of the Centre and therefore, even in respect of regulation, the authority of the State legislature in Entry 8 List II would only be subject to the Industries Development and Regulation Act or Rules made by the Centre. Under these circumstances, it is dear that the State Legislature had no authority to levy duty or tax on alcohal which is not for human consumption as that could only be levied by the Centre." 21. Thus, it is clear from this authority that the State Legislature has power to regulate and control the production, manufacture, purchase, sale and transportation of the alcohlic or intoxicating liquors meant for human consumption and, therefore, the provisions of section 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(e) of the Act cannot be said to be ultravires of the Constitution or the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. 22. So far as the validity of section 24 of the Act is concerned, which pertains to the grant of exclusive privilege, their lordships of the Supreme Court have discussed this subject also in this judgment and in para 105 of the judgment, observed as under : "The basis of the privilege doctrine appears to be that alcoholic drinks or intoxicating drinks are expected to be injurious to health and therefore, the trade in these commodities is described as obnoxious and therefore, a citizen has no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and, therefore, the trade in alcoholic drinks which is expected to be injurious to health and obnoxious is the privilege of the State alone and the State can part with this privilege on receipt of the consideration. This basis of the privilege doctrine has to be examined in the context of our Constitution especially Acrt. 21 and Article 47." Their lordships upheld this doctrine of exclusive privilege. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with section 24 of the Act, which pertains to the grant of exclusive privilege for manufacture or supply of any country liquor, foreign liquor of intoxicating drugs within any local area of those parts of the State of Raj. to which this Act extends and therefore, the validity of section 24 of the Act is upheld. 23. Section 16 of the Act relates to the manufacture of excisable articles prohibited except under the provisions of this Act. Sub-s.(1)(a) of section 16 of the Act provides that no excisable article shall be manufactured and sub-s.(1)(d) also provides that no liquor shall be bottled for sale; except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted in that behalf by the Excise Commissioner or by an Excise Officer duly empowered in this behalf. Entry No.8 of List II of Schedule VII authorises the State legislature to regulate the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors and Entry No.33(a) of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution also authorises the control and regulation of trade and commerce in and the production, supply and distribution of the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products. In this view of the matter, the State legislature can certainly make provisions in the Act and the Rules regulating the sale, manufacture, production and distribution of liquor, which includes its bottling also because it has been provided in section 3(23) of the Act that to bottle means to transfer from a cask or other vessel to a bottle, jar, flask or other receptacle for the purpose of sale, whether any process of manufacture or rectification be employed or not, and bottling includes rebottling. Thus, the bottling is a process of sale and section 16(1)(a) and (d) of the Act says that no exciseable article intoxicable liquor) shall be manufactured and no liquor shall be bottled for sale, except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted in the behalf by the Excise Commissioner or by an Excise Officer duly empowered in this behalf, and, therefore, the liquor has to be bottled under a licence and such a licence has been obtained by the petitioners for the purpose of sale of liquor meant for human consumption, whereby it has been prescribed what will be the strength of a particular quality of wine and what will be its colour and in what quantity, it will be sold and what will be its price. The distilleries Rules, 1976, under which licence has been granted to the petitioners also provides that in what conditions, the liquor is to be sold. 24. R.91(3) of the Distilleries Rules, 1976 says that the Excise Commissioner may specify wherever possible that mechanical arrangements may be made for all operations upto the stage of bottling and may also lay down that bottling operation must be carried on under proper supervision in confirmity-with high standard of hygiene and the product should not be touched by human hand at any stage. The equipment shall be so designed that Rodents, birds, lizards, beetles or other foreign matter do not get mixed up with the step at any stage of its manufacture or bottling. Thus, certain conditions are prescribed as to how the liquor is to be bottled, before it is sent for sale. Even the terms and conditions appended with the licences also provide as to what precautions will have to be taken at the time of bottling of liquor, so that the liquor may not become hazardous to the public. Thus, these services are being rendered by the State Govt. and, therefore, it cannot be said that the levy of bottling fee is unconstitutional because no services are being rendered by the State. 25. Much stress has been laid on the theory of quid pro quo and in this respect, Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Govt. and, therefore, it cannot be said that the levy of bottling fee is unconstitutional because no services are being rendered by the State. 25. Much stress has been laid on the theory of quid pro quo and in this respect, Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. V. Hindustan Machine Tools AIR 1975 SC-2037 , wherein while discussing about the distinction between tax and the fee, their lordships have observed that unless the authority claiming to impose a fee renders a service in consideration of the levy exacted, the levy cannot be demanded. 'Fee' can only be levied by any authority only for some services rendered by it to the person from whom the levy is exacted. It was in this context that their lordships have observed that the fee for permission to construct a premises cannot be demanded by the village Panchayat. 26. The theory of quid pro quo has undergone a sea change after the above decision in Govt. of A.P.'s case (supra) and this is what has been noticed by one of us (J.R. Chopra, J.) in M/s Geeta Enterprises & Anr. V. State of Raj. & Ors. 1993(2) RLR-183 , wherein it has been observed as under : "The contempt of quid pro quo has undergone a definite change in Sreenivasa General Traders V. State of A.P. (AIR 1983 SC-1246), wherein it has been observed as under : "The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change subsequent to decision in AIR 1980 SC-1008. Correlation between the levy and the services rendered/ expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable relationship between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. Moreover, this is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person inspite of his unwillingness or want of consent. Moreover, this is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person inspite of his unwillingness or want of consent. A levy in the nature of a fee does .not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It is now increasingly realised that merely because the collection for the services rendered or grant of a privilege of licence are taken to the consolidated fund of the State and not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself decisive." 27. In M/s Geeta Enterprises & Anr. V. State of Raj. (supra), after noticing the other decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner and Secretary to the Govt. Commercial Taxes & Religious Endowments Department and Ors. V. Sree Murugan Financing Corporation, Coimbatore & Ors. 1992(3) SCC-488 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Mohd. Yasin 1983(3) SCC-229, it has been observed that keeping in view these authorities, it can safely be said that the State Govt. under its regulatory functions may levy the fee in pursuance of Entry 33 of List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution and if the permit fee which has been enhanced from Re.1/- per litre which was imposed in the year 1962 to Rs. 2/- per liter vide its Notification dated 26.3.1987, that cannot be said to be exorbitant keeping in view the price-rise in the intervening period. Thus, the levy of permit fee can neither be said to be unjust or unreasonable nor it can be said to be excessive. 28. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (supra), their lordships have gone to the extent that though a fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. 28. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (supra), their lordships have gone to the extent that though a fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. It has been further held that the others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact, the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the Court to assume the role of a cost accountant. It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the cost of the services rendered etc. against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two. A broad co-relationship is all that is necessary. Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in any tax. 29. A somewhat similar controversy also arose before their lordships of the S upreme Court in Chaitanya Kumar V. State of Karnataka (AIR 1986 SC-825) , wherein it has been held that the bottling of liquor meant for sale by whosoever is without doubt regulated by the Bottling of Liquor Rules. All that is necessary is that the liquor must be meant for sale. It may be that occasionally the liquor may be bottled not for sale but for private consumption. Manufacture of liquor for private or domestic consumption may be permitted under the Excise Laws and where so permitted, the liquor may be bottled without obtaining a separate bottling licence but where the liquor which is bottled is intended to be sold whether by the bottler or by someone else at whose instance the bottling is done, the bottler must necessarily have a bottling licence without which he cannot engage himself in the business of bottling liquor. In that case, the Karnataka Excise (Bottling of Liquor) Rules, 1984 were not held to be ultravirus of the Constitution by their lordships of the Supreme Court. 30. Mr.B.P. Agrawal, the learned Advocate General drew our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s Indian Cable Co. In that case, the Karnataka Excise (Bottling of Liquor) Rules, 1984 were not held to be ultravirus of the Constitution by their lordships of the Supreme Court. 30. Mr.B.P. Agrawal, the learned Advocate General drew our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s Indian Cable Co. Ltd. V. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1995 SC-64 , wherein it has been held that the provisions of the Act mandate that a finding that the goods are marketable is a pre-requisite or sine qua non for the levy of duty. Marketability is a decisive test for dutiability. It only means saleable or suitable for sale. It need not be in fact marketed. The article should be capable of being sold or being sold, to consumers in the market, as it is without anything more. He has, therefore, contended that before the liquor becomes marketable, it must be saleable i.e. it must be fit for human consumption and that has to be ensured by the Excise authorities and therefore, the levy of bottling fee cannot be said to be ultravires of the Constitution or the Act and the Rules. 31. Mr. Agrawal has next drawn our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Khoday Distillerires Ltd. V. State. of Karnataka 1995(1) SCC-574 , wherein it has been observed that Article 19(1)(g) confers only a qualified and not an absolute right and a citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in liquor as a beverage. The activities which are res extra commercium cannot be carried on by any citizen. The State can prohibit completely trade or business in potable liquor since trade or business in liquor as a beverage is res extra commercium. It has been further observed that the State may also create monopoly in itself for trade or business in such liquor. It can further place restrictions and limitations on such trade or business in res commercium. Such restrictions and limitations under Article 19(6) can be placed by subordinate legislation as well. The State is not precluded from regulating the trade and business in potable liquor merely because it imposes tax or fee on purchase or sale and income is derived from such liquor. Such restrictions and limitations under Article 19(6) can be placed by subordinate legislation as well. The State is not precluded from regulating the trade and business in potable liquor merely because it imposes tax or fee on purchase or sale and income is derived from such liquor. In this view of the matter, we hold that the provisions of section 24 of the Act, which pertains to the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture etc. are not ultravires of the Constitution. 32. Mr.Joshi has drawn our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka V. Narayana Swamy 1991(4)SCC-268. That was a case where the Statute provided for licence fee in respect of manufacture or sale of any excisable article and the Rules framed under the Statute required payment of licence fee for premises where licensed shop is located. In those facts, it was held that the Rules are ultra vires of the Act and, therefore, they were quashed. This is not the case here. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution. 33. Chapter VIII of the Rules deals with Licences and Permit fees and r.68 provides for fees for certain lincenes. Item No.12 of r.68 of the Rules provides licence for bottling of country liquor under section 21 of the Act and sub-r. (2) of r.68 of the Rules provides that the fee for a licence to bottle, Indian Made Foreign Liquor shall be Rs. 0.25 per bottle whether quart, pint, nip or other miniature size. Although, this increase in the fee is not under challenge but keeping in view the rise in the prices, pay of the staff and other cost factors this increase in the fee cannot be held to be excessive. 34. Our attention was next drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Lilasons Breweries (Pvt.) Ltd. V. State of M.P. 1992(3) SCC-293. That was a case where the fee was made dependent upon happenings of certain contingencies. That is not the case here and therefore, it has no application to the facts of the present case. 35. That was a case where the fee was made dependent upon happenings of certain contingencies. That is not the case here and therefore, it has no application to the facts of the present case. 35. In the light of the discussion made herein above, we are firmly of the viw that the provisions of sections 16(1)(a) and (d), 21 and 24 of the Act as also r.68(2) of the Rules are not ultra vires of the Constitution and are not beyond the competence of the State legislature. Even the increase of bottling fee from 3 Paisa to 10 paisa also cannot be said to be excessive. 36. In the result, .we find no force in these writ-petitions and therefore, they are dismissed with no order as to costs.Petitions dismissed. *******