Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER Raju alias Mattukara Raju has been detained as a Tgoonda under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in pursuance of an order of detention dated 30. 1. 1995 passed by the first respondent, Commissioner of Police, Madras City, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 2 ) PETITIONER had come to adverse notice in five prior crime registered by D-3 Ice House Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 324, 307, 427 and 506 (2) I. P. C. , Crimes period ranging between September, 1993 and November, 1994. It is in this background that the detenu had allegedly got himself involved in the ground crime, which had occurred on 22. 1. 1995. The ground crime was registered for offences punishable under Sections 307, 336, 332, 427 and 506 (2) I. P. C. we do not deem it necessary to narrate more details, which led to the passing of the impugned order for, the solitary contention urged on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel can be disposed of on the particulars aforestated. ( 3 ) MR. Rajasekaran, petitioners learned counsel submitted that earlier an order of detention under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 dated 13. 2. 1994, was passed against the petitioner by the same Commissioner of Police, and it was not approved by the State Government under Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. In the earlier detention order, adverse cases 1 to 4 mentioned in the impugned order, stood referred to and those cases were taken note of, for arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction, when the earlier order was passed. When that be the case, those four adverse cases could not have been referred to while passing the impugned order, for the subjective satisfaction arrived at stated vitiated due to consideration of material not approved. ( 4 ) ON this ground of challenge, we have heard Mr. I. Subramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. He submitted that if the earlier detention order was not approved on technical grounds, then the petitioner cannot take advantage of the same. ( 4 ) ON this ground of challenge, we have heard Mr. I. Subramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. He submitted that if the earlier detention order was not approved on technical grounds, then the petitioner cannot take advantage of the same. On the other hand, if the earlier order was not approved based on substantial ground or on the basis of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, it would be open to the petitioner to plead for viewing of the impugned order on that sole ground. ( 5 ) MR. I. Subramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has placed before us a communication dated 2. 3. 1994 addressed by the State Government to the first respondent, giving out reasons as to why the earlier order was not approved. It is also not in dispute that this communication was served on the detenu when he was released from the clutches of the earlier preventive order, on the foundation of its non-approval. ( 6 ) IT will be now our duty to scrutinize the cause for non-approval, and decide if such non approval was on mere technicalities or on grounds substantial. The said communication dated 2. 3. 1994 mentions certain discrepancies such as wrong postal division having been mentioned (Instead of Madras-8, Madras-8) and variation in fixing the section of the Indian Penal Code which related to the offence committed, viz. , Sec. 342 or 341 IPC or if the injury sustained was on the shoulder or on the arm. Of course, if the communication had been stopped at this point, it would have been easily possible for us to conclude that on mere technicalities the earlier order was not approved. As a matter of fact, on such grounds, approval need not have been denied, though it may not be within our province to consider the correctness of the opinion that the State Government may form for, quite often courts have held that on the basis of mere topographical errors, which do not effect the core of the subjective satisfaction arrived it, preventive orders need not have to be quashed. Be it as it may. In the communication dated 2. 3. Be it as it may. In the communication dated 2. 3. 1994 addressed to the first respondent, State Government has pointed out that the accident register relating to the ground crime seems to be a vital document and the same differs with the statement of the detaining authority in respect of injury caused to the complainant. Thereafter, the communication reads that the detaining authority had certified that there was no variation between English and Tamil versions in any of the documents served on the detenu. But it was obvious that the detaining authority had not applied his mind in perusing the records submitted by the sponsoring authority before passing the detention order. Thereafter, a request is made in that letter to ensure that such discrepancies do not recur in future. The contents of the aforestated letter, extracted by us, clearly show that the earlier order was denied approval, not merely on the foundation of technical flaw, but also on the conclusion of non-application of mind, on the part of the detaining authority to the records submitted by the sponsoring authority. On the fact situation available before us, we are constrained to hold that the earlier order was denied approval not on mere technicalities, but on substantial grounds. ( 7 ) ASSUMING for a moment that the earlier order of detention was not approved on technical grounds, it would have been easily open for the Commissioner of Police, Madras City to have passed yet another order on the same grounds for, the object of preventive law is to prohibit offenders of this nature from indulging themselves in future prejudicial activities, which would affect public order. That is one more judication that the earlier order was denied approval on technical grounds. Though the non-approval was on 2. 3. 1995, the order now challenged was passed on 30. 1. 1994 and the delay shows that there was lack of seriousness in attempting to detain the petitioner under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. ( 8 ) UNDER Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, a preventive order can cease to exist (a) in the event of non- approval by the State Government under Sec. 3 (3) of the Act (b) on the Advisory Board rendering its opinion that there was no sufficient cause to detain the detenu (under Sec. 11 of the Act) or (c) when the Courts intervene and quashes preventive orders. ( 9 ) IN Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, the following observations were made: In the case of the Ramesh v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 4 SCC 124 . an order of detention under the Act (Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985) was under challenge. The court found that referring to incident which constituted the subject matter of an earlier order of detention vitiated the impugned order. ( 10 ) IN Chhagan Bhagwan Kahar v. N. L. Kalna, S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. , speaking on behalf of the Bench, stated as hereunder: It emerges from the above authoritative judicial pronouncements that even if the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or by expiry of the period of detention there must be fresh facts for passing a subsequent order. A fortiori when a detention order is quashed by the court issuing a high prerogative writ like habeas corpus or certiorari the grounds of the said order should not be taken into consideration either as a whole or in part even along with the fresh grounds of detention for drawing the requisite subjective satisfaction to pass a fresh order because once the court strikes down an earlier order by issuing rule it nullifies the entire order. It is significant to note that the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted above, take note of such a contingency not only when the order of detention comes to an end either by revocation or even by expiry of the period of detention the can to be spertic lack of approval. . . . also should position the impugned order of detention will also certainly fall within the ambit of the observation made by the Supreme Court for, as we have set out earlier there are three ways by which preventive orders can cease to exist. Sic Paragraph. 10. In Ramesh v. State of Gujarat, referred to by the Supreme Court in the first of the cases mentioned by us earlier, it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: On a careful Scrutiny of the grounds of detention, we unreservedly held that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the two criminal cases mentioned under S. Nos. 10. In Ramesh v. State of Gujarat, referred to by the Supreme Court in the first of the cases mentioned by us earlier, it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: On a careful Scrutiny of the grounds of detention, we unreservedly held that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the two criminal cases mentioned under S. Nos. 1 and 2 of the table which were the materials in the earlier order of detention that had been quashed and that it cannot be said that those two cases are mentioned only for a limited purpose of showing the antecedents of the detenu. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the first four adverse crimes were the subject matter of the earlier preventive order and further they have passed through process of subjective satisfaction when the impugned order was damped. On the law laid down by the Supreme Court detenu is bound to succeed, on this sole ground. ( 11 ) THE impugned order of detention shall stand set aside. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is otherwise required. This habeas corpus petition is allowed: Petition allowed.