JUDGMENT 1. The plaintiffs/appellants having lost from the two Courts below have preferred this second appeal. 2. The suit for eviction was filed against the respondent/defendant on the ground available under section 12(1) (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, on the allegation that the disputed shop was bonafidely required by plaintiff/deceased Rameshwardas for his own flourmill business, stating that he had no other suitable alternative accommodation of his own for the stated business. 3. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the requirement of the suit accommodation for his flourmills business. It was also held that the plaintiff only wanted to increase rent. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the first appellate Court was also dismissed. 4. In this Court after the death of the plaintiff/appellant Rameshwardas his legal representatives have been brought on record, but the suit allegations continue to remain as they were. The question, therefore, is whether the alleged requirement, after the death of the plaintiff Rameshwardas, who had filed the suit with the clear averments that the suit shop was required by him for his own business of flour-mill does not survive after his death? 5. To quote plaint paragraph 7 :- ^^;g fd oknh dks izfroknh }kjk vf/kokflr nqdku dh vius Lo;a ds pDdh ds dkjksckj ds fy, okLrfod :i ls ¼Bonafidely½ vko";drk gSA oknh ds ikl xquk uxj esa mä dkjksckj dks dksbZ vU; futh mi;qDr fjDr nqdku miyC/k ugha gS vr,o oknh /kkjk ¼2½ ¼,Q½ e/; izns"k ,dkseksMs"ku dUVªksy ,DV 1961 ds v/khu nqdku [kkyh djkus dk vf/kdkj gSA izfroknh dh fdjk;s nkjh fof/kor lekIr gks pqdh gSA vLrq okn izLrqr gSA It is apparent that the plaintiff had required the suit shop for himself and for his own business. When the requirement of an accommodation be of the landlord with any member of his family, the need would persist, even after the death of the landlord. The need would not cease as the requirement of the member of his family would still continue to exist. But when the need was that of the plaintiff-landlord alone and if he expired, no decree of eviction can be passed in favour of his legal representatives. The need being personal of the plaintiff, it would vanish with his death. 6. The need would not cease as the requirement of the member of his family would still continue to exist. But when the need was that of the plaintiff-landlord alone and if he expired, no decree of eviction can be passed in favour of his legal representatives. The need being personal of the plaintiff, it would vanish with his death. 6. I am fortified in my view by the authority of Bhagwandas v. Gaya Prasad (1973 JU 469). This Court observed that -- "Although after the death of the plaintiff, the nephews were substituted as legal representatives, their need to get the suit accommodation could not arise on the ground which was initially pleaded by the deceased-plaintiff as that need vanished on the plaintiff's death." 7. D.N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das ( AIR 1974 SC 1026 ), was an appeal before the Supreme Court, which involved the similar question and their Lordships found construing and giving meaning to expression 'his business' occurring in Clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, which may be reproduced with profit:- "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. -- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely; ..... (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." It was observed by the Apex Court that-- "7. ...... while cl. (e) of section 12 (1) is more hospitable to the landlord, clause (1) thereof is more protective of the tenant. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of section 12 also point to this contrast. While the tenant evicted from a residential accommodation gets a respite of 14 months, the tenant evicted from a non-residential accommodation gets not only the said respite but also the prescribed compensation. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of section 12 also point to this contrast. While the tenant evicted from a residential accommodation gets a respite of 14 months, the tenant evicted from a non-residential accommodation gets not only the said respite but also the prescribed compensation. In many cases the burden of compensation may act as a deterrent to eviction. Having regard to the rigour of clause (1) of section 12 (1), we think that the phrase "his business" should not receive a wide construction as to the class of persons who may be included in the possessive pronoun 'his' in the phrase, for it would be against legislative policy." It connotes the idea that if the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation and the need if pleaded to be personal, it would not survive after the death of plaintiff. 8. Since the requirement was for the plaintiff, after his death the stated need cannot be found to exist in the given circumstances. The appellants' counsel have cited a number of authorities to contend that after the death of the landlord, the need would still survive: It would depend on the circumstances of each case and the nature of the requirement of the plaintiff/landlord. If the requirement of the accommodation is for the plaintiff, it would not survive after his death and, therefore, the authorities, that where the residential accommodation is required for the residence of the landlord with his family, the requirement would still survive after his death as in the required accommodation the plaintiff alone was not to reside but the need was also for his family members, are of no avail since such is not the present case. As such the authorities cited by the appellants, namely, Ramswarup & another v. Prem Narain Verma ( 1973 JLJ 541 ), Mattulal v. Radhelal (1975 JLJ 1), Rajkour v. Bare Bai (1976 MPLJ Note 46), Daulal v. Indian Mill Stores Raipur (1977 JLJ 472), Shantilal Thakordas & others v. Chimanlal Maganial Telwala ( (1976) 4 SCC 417 ) and Chandrakali Bai & others v. Jagdish Singh & others (1978 JLJ 1), do not advance the case of appellants any further. Therefore, in my view after the death of Rameshwardas, who had required the suit accommodation for his own business, the need for accommodation did not survive after his death. 9. Therefore, in my view after the death of Rameshwardas, who had required the suit accommodation for his own business, the need for accommodation did not survive after his death. 9. On the above discussion, this appeal has become infructuous after the death of original plaintiff who had required the accommodation for his business, and it is, therefore, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to the costs.