ORDER D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.--1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 20.9.1994, passed by learned Single Judge, holding that the respondent as employee of Jawahar Lal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur, for short, 'JNKV', could avail the remedy of civil suit. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, quashed the order of the Civil Court (Annexure P/10 to the writ petition) and has remanded the matter to that Court with a direction to decide the same on merits. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, in brief, are as under. The respondent was employed with the appellant Jawahar Lal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur, as a Driver. He joined service under the appointment order dated 25.9.1979. The jeep No. CPW 112 which he was driving, met with an accident on 25.1.1982 and two employees of the University who were occupants with others in the jeep, died. As the result of the said accident, the respondent employee was prosecuted for offence under section 304-A, IPC, for rash and negligent driving, in the Criminal Court, but, by judgment dated 29.12.1983, he was acquitted. The dependents of one of the deceased employees filed a claim petition in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Morena. The Claims Tribunal passed an award on 22.10.1986 granting compensation to the dependents of the deceased and in its Award, recorded a finding that the respondent was rash and negligent in driving which resulted in the accident. The case of the respondent driver before the Claims Tribunal was that because of the rain and silt on the road, the jeep slipped and he was not rash and negligent in driving. As the jeep was insured, the Insurance Company was jointly and severally held liable for payment of compensation. The appellant JNKV did not prefer any appeal against the Award. The respondent, however, preferred an appeal to this Court. The appeal preferred by him was, however, dismissed summarily by the order dated 26.3.1987 by this Court holding that since the Insurance Company has also been made liable jointly with the owner of the vehicle and the driver, the driver alone could not be held to be an aggrieved party. For the reason alone, the appeal was summarily dismissed. 3. The appeal preferred by him was, however, dismissed summarily by the order dated 26.3.1987 by this Court holding that since the Insurance Company has also been made liable jointly with the owner of the vehicle and the driver, the driver alone could not be held to be an aggrieved party. For the reason alone, the appeal was summarily dismissed. 3. On the basis of the Award of the Claims Tribunal, the respondent was served with a show-cause notice proposing to terminate his services stating that the finding of the Claims Tribunal holding him rash and negligent in driving has att.1ined finality and that is a good ground to dispense with his services. 4. The respondent employee submitted a written reply to the show-cause notice taking a plea, inter-alia, that he was acquitted by the Criminal Court and the finding of the Claims Tribunal cannot be taken as a basis for holding him guilty of any misconduct. He also claimed a right of being given an opportunity of hearing in a full-fledged enquiry as per the Rules. The University, however, by the order dated 1.4.1987 (Annexure P/8 to the writ petition), terminated his services only on the basis of the finding of rash and negligent driving, recorded by the Claims Tribunal against him in the Award. 5. The respondent challenged the order of termination of his services by a civil suit in the Court of the Fourth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior. The Civil Court, by its judgment dated 20.5.1994 (Annexure P/10 to the writ petition), dismissed the suit by allowing the preliminary objection of the JNKV as the employer that the University falls in the larger definition of "Industry" under the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, for short, the 'ID Act' and has the exclusive remedy to approach the Labour or Industrial Courts. It was also held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was impliedly barred by the provisions of the ID Act. 6. After dismissal of his civil suit, the respondent preferred writ petition (No. 829 of 1994) in this Court. From the content of the Writ Petition, it is clear to us that the petitioner did not propose to challenge in the said Writ Petition the order of the Civil Court holding that the remedy of civil suit was barred. The Writ Petition was directed against the order of termination of services. From the content of the Writ Petition, it is clear to us that the petitioner did not propose to challenge in the said Writ Petition the order of the Civil Court holding that the remedy of civil suit was barred. The Writ Petition was directed against the order of termination of services. The grounds raised were that he was a permanent employee and the Government Servants Rules were adopted by the JNKV for it employees. No enquiry was conducted and no opportunity was given to the respondent against the charge levelled. The termination was, therefore contrary to the Rules applicable to the Service. 7. The appellant University as employer, by filing a return in the Writ Petition, supported its action by taking a plea that since a finding has been recorded by a competent Court, that is, the Claims Tribunal, no enquiry was necessary as the respondent's services could be terminated on the above charge of rash and negligent driving. 8. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, passed on 30.9.1994, did not decide the Writ Petition on merits and came to the conclusion that the decision of the Civil Court holding the civil suit as barred, was erroneous in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke ( AIR 1975 SC 2238 ). The learned Single Judge held that where the right enforced was not founded on the ID Act, but was challenged in general law, he had a remedy to approach either the Civil Court or the Industrial Court. 9. Learned counsel Shri K.K. Lahoti, appearing for the JNKV in this appeal, assails the order of the learned Single Judge mainly on the ground that the order of the Civil Court dismissing the suit as barred had attained finality as no appeal was preferred against the same. It was, therefore, erroneous on the part of the learned Single Judge to have set aside that order of Civil Court and remanding the matter for decision on merit. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent employee not only supported the order of the learned Single Judge, but also made a request to this Court that instead of upholding the order of remand to Civil Court, this Court should decide the whole Writ Petition on merits. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent employee not only supported the order of the learned Single Judge, but also made a request to this Court that instead of upholding the order of remand to Civil Court, this Court should decide the whole Writ Petition on merits. The learned counsel on behalf of the employee, contended that the Letters Patent Appeal is extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It is not an appellate jurisdiction in strict sense as it is not the jurisdiction exercised over any subordinate Court. The Letters Patent Appeal is an internal remedy against decision of a Single Judge to the Two Judges of this Court and, therefore, it is competent forth is Court in Letters Patent Appeal to decide the whole case and not to relegate the poor employee to the lengthy remedy of the civil suit. Reliance is placed on Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao (AIR 1974 SC 2(48) and Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 5 ). 11. In reply to the request made on behalf of the respondent, for decision of the whole Writ Petition in Letters Patent Appeal by this Division Bench, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant University relies on a Full Bench decision of Karnataka High Court in Town House Building Co-op. Socy., Ltd. v. Spl. Deputy Commissioner (AIR 1988 Karnataka 312). On behalf of the JNKV, it is contended that in a Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the JNKV against the order of remand, it would not be a sound exercise of jurisdiction by this Court, to decide the whole Writ Petition itself by setting aside the remand order which has not been assailed by the respondent by filing any cross-appeal. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge was fully within his jurisdiction and in his discretion, could remand the case to the Civil Court after holding that the remedy of the Civil Court was not barred. It is further submitted that the course proposed by the respondent employee for decision of the whole Writ Petition in Letters Patent Appeal would deprive the learned Single Judge from applying his mind to the merits of the case which, as per the High Court Rules, is the competent Court to decide a Writ Petition. It is further submitted that the course proposed by the respondent employee for decision of the whole Writ Petition in Letters Patent Appeal would deprive the learned Single Judge from applying his mind to the merits of the case which, as per the High Court Rules, is the competent Court to decide a Writ Petition. That would also deprive the parties from one right of preferring an appeal to the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal. 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we find that there is no error in the order of the learned Single Judge by which he held that the respondent had an option to approach the Civil Court or the Industrial Court against the order of termination. We agree that the question raised was squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles, Ltd. (supra). Civil Court was dearly in error in dismissing the suit as impliedly barred by the provisions of the ID Act. We also find no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant JNKV that the order of the Civil Court having not been appealed against, in Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge was not competent to quash it. The learned Single Judge rightly held that powers of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are so extensive that it can quash an order found erroneous or in exces of jurisdiction. We are also of the view that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 empowered the High Court to set aside the order of the Civil Court which was patently erroneous. The order of Civil Court was brought to the notice of the High Court in writ proceedings and the High Court was fully competent to quash it although no remedy of appeal was availed against that order. The other alternative submission made on behalf of the respondent that the Writ Petition should have been decided by the learned Single Judge on merits appeals to us. From the body of the Writ Petition, we rind that the respondent employee never sought quashing of the order of the Civil Court and had, in fact, accepted it" correctness. The other alternative submission made on behalf of the respondent that the Writ Petition should have been decided by the learned Single Judge on merits appeals to us. From the body of the Writ Petition, we rind that the respondent employee never sought quashing of the order of the Civil Court and had, in fact, accepted it" correctness. The remedy of Writ Petition was availed and the order of Civil Court was filed only to state that the respondent availed the remedy of civil suit which did not prove efficacious. The litigation was seven years old. The learned Single Judge, in remanding the matter to the Civil Court, overlooked the fact that he was relegating the poor employee to a torturous and lengthy litigation in a Civil Court which may end after a few years only in second appeal. In sound exercise of his discretion, the learned Single Judge could have himself decided the whole Writ Petition which was founded only on document" and looking to the nature of controversy, did not require recording of any oral evidence. The learned counsel appearing for the JNKV made strenuous effort to persuade this Court not to remand the matter to learned Single Judge. It is argued that in an appeal preferred by the JNKV, the only option to this Court is either to allow the appeal or to maintain the order and at the request of the respondent, this Court cannot remand the matter to the learned Single Judge. 13. After care full consideration of the contentions advanced on behalf of the JNKV, we are of the opinion that in exercise of our powers in Letters Patent Appeal, it is open to us to uphold the decision of the learned Single Judge on the question of jurisdiction decided by him and yet, to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for his decision on merit". We find no prohibition anywhere in any law for the course that we arc adopting. We respectfully rely on the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court (supra) in adopting the course of remand of the matter to the learned Single Judge for decision of the whole Writ Petition on merit. 14. We find no prohibition anywhere in any law for the course that we arc adopting. We respectfully rely on the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court (supra) in adopting the course of remand of the matter to the learned Single Judge for decision of the whole Writ Petition on merit. 14. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the appellant is allowed partly and the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as it directs the Civil Court to decide the Civil Suit on merit" is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Single Judge for decision of the Writ Petition on merit.... In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.