Judgment :- BY THE COURT : The assessee has preferred this tax case reference under s. 256 of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Though the questions referred to us are three in number, questions Nos. 2 and 3 would be covered by the comprehensive question No. 1 itself, which runs as follows : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in upholding the penalty levied under s. 271(1)(a) amounting to Rs. 35, 569 ?" * 2. It is enough if the said question No. 1 is answered. The said question relates to the asst. yr. 1977-78. There was a delay of about two years and seven months on the part of the assessee in filing its income-tax return (sic) of the Act as it stood then. The said provision, in the abovereferred assessment year, stood as follows : "If the ITO or the AAC in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person - (a) has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of total income which he was required to furnish under sub-s. (1) of s. 139 or by notice given under sub-s. (2) of s. 139 or s. 148 or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required by sub-s. (1) of s. 139 or by such notice, as the case may be." * 3. The income-tax return was due on 31st July, 1977. But, the return was not filed till 14th Dec., 1979. Hence, notice under s. 148 of the Act was issued and in response to the said notice only the assessee filed the return on 18th Feb., 1980. Before completion of the assessment, a notice under s. 274 of the Act, which provides that no order imposing the abovesaid penalty shall be made unless the assessee has been heard, or has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, was issued to the assessee for the belated filing of the return. But, to that notice, there was no reply from the assessee. A reminder calling for the said reply was also served on the assessee. But, even for that, there was no reply. So, the ITO held that the assessee had no reasonable cause for the said delay and hence the abovesaid penalty was levied. But, to that notice, there was no reply from the assessee. A reminder calling for the said reply was also served on the assessee. But, even for that, there was no reply. So, the ITO held that the assessee had no reasonable cause for the said delay and hence the abovesaid penalty was levied. 4. But, in the first appeal filed by the assessee, the CIT(A) cancelled the levy of penalty and allowed the appeal on the ground that the assessee "did not have the cash resources required for paying the return based tax and was hence obliged to choose between, on the one hand, filing the return in time and being visited with penalty under s. 140A(3) for failing to pay the tax on self-assessment, and on the other, of delaying the return and facing the equally onerous penal consequences of such delay. 5. But, in the second appeal preferred by the Revenue, the Tribunal restored the penalty levied and allowed the appeal before it on the ground," the assessee's argument that it was restrained from filing the return because of its having to pay self-tax immediately is not a valid reason for the delay in question. It is the assessee's statutory obligation to file its income-tax return under s. 139(1) which it failed to discharge. The assessee chose to file the return only after notice under s. 148 had been served 6. Despite the argument of learned counsel for the assessee before us, it is clear to us that the reasoning of the Tribunal is perfectly correct. Even assuming that the assessee did not have the resources to pay the tax on the basis of self-assessment, that does not prevent the assessee from filing the return in time. No doubt if the assessee does not pay tax as required by law, it may face penalty for non-payment under a different provision, viz., s. 140A(3) of the Act. The alleged lack of funds for payment of tax pursuant to the return filed will not be a ground at all to hold that there was reasonable cause for failure to file the return in time. Therefore, there is no error of law at all in the order of the Tribunal. 7. No doubt, learned counsel for the assessee sought to argue that the assessee was under the belief that only if self-assessment tax is paid the return could be filed. Therefore, there is no error of law at all in the order of the Tribunal. 7. No doubt, learned counsel for the assessee sought to argue that the assessee was under the belief that only if self-assessment tax is paid the return could be filed. But, this argument has absolutely no basis since no such averment is made by the assessee at any time. In fact, as already mentioned, there was not even a reply to the notice issued under s. 274 , despite the reminder therefor also. Further, even before the Asstt. CIT, no such argument was made. It is really strange that such an argument has been made by learned counsel for the assessee in this proceeding under s. 256 of the Act. 8. Learned counsel for the assessee also made one other untenable argument. The said argument is that since in respect of the delayed return, interest has been collected by the Revenue under s. 139(8) of the Act, it should be presumed that the Department has extended the time for filing the return till the date when it was filed. No doubt, in this regard, CIT vs. M. Chandra Sekhar was relied on. But, it must be stated first of all, that from the records in the present penalty proceeding, learned counsel for the assessee could not point out that such interest payment had been made. Therefore, here also, there is absolutely no basis for his abovesaid argument. No doubt, he ventures to submit that the records relating to assessment of tax would show that such interest had been paid. But, even here, he could not assert so positively. He only makes a guess. Here again, it is indeed very strange that such an argument is made without any basis, particularly when we are exercising advisory jurisdiction. 9. In the above context, learned counsel for the assessee also contends that we should call for a supplemental statement of the case. But, learned counsel for the Revenue rightly points out, basing on Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT that, in the present case, there is no scope at all for calling for any such supplemental statement of the case since the alleged payment of the abovesaid interest is not borne out by any record in the present penalty proceeding and the abovereferred to Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT that, in the present case, there is no scope at all for calling for any such supplemental statement of the case since the alleged payment of the abovesaid interest is not borne out by any record in the present penalty proceeding and the abovereferred to Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (supra) has held that this Court has no jurisdiction to direct the Tribunal to collect additional material and make it a part of the supplementary submission. 10. All these apart, it must be stated that the abovereferred to CIT vs. Chandra Sekhar (supra) arose in a case where there was delay in filing the return prior to the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 (w.e.f. 1st April, 1971), which amended s. 139 of the Act. Prior to the said amendment only if time for extension is granted by the IT authority for filing the return pursuant to the application made therefor by the assessee, interest for delayed submission of the return is payable. It is so stated in the abovereferred to CIT vs. Chandra Sekhar (supra) itself thus :" * It is apparent also from the language of cl. (iii) of the proviso [to s. 139(1)] that interest becomes payable only upon the ITO acting on an application made by the assessee for the purpose and extending the date for furnishing the return." But, after the abovesaid amendment of 1970, that is during the period between 1st April, 1971, and 1989, the law was, whether time/extension for filing the return was granted or not, interest is payable. In such a situation, the presumption of time/extension for filing the return, based on collection of interest by the Department, as held by CIT vs. Chandra Sekhar (supra), in relation to the position prior to the abovesaid 1970 amendment, would not arise at all. It has also been held in Ravi Steel Corpn. vs. ITO that in view of the abovesaid amendment w.e.f. 1st April, 1971, the levy of interest in case of delay in filing the return is automatic. The net result is, question No. 1 referred to us, which is a comprehensive one, covering even questions Nos. 2 and 3, is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. No costs.