Judgment :- R. Jayasimha Babu, J 1. Petitioner-workman was employed in the sales yard at the respondent company's factory. On 24 February 1984 at about 4.05 p.m. he was caught carrying a hammer by the security staff. Two days later, he was suspended, and enquiry was held and the petitioner's services were terminated by way of dismissal. 2. Petitioner having raised an industrial dispute, the matter was referred for adjudication to the II Additional Labour Court, Madras, which has, by the impugned award, dated 9 March 1987, held that the non-employment of the petitioner, was justified and dismissed the claim. The points now urged before me are the same as those that were urged before the Labour Court. In addition, it was contended that the employer had a duty to serve a second show cause notice which the management has failed to do. As regards that contention, it was submitted by the counsel for the respondent-management that there is no such requirement in the Standing Orders, and that point had also not been raised by the petitioner before the labour Court. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had been allowed to work for two days after the petitioner was found by the security staff carrying the hammer; that admittedly there was no properly maintained register with regard to which the hammer can be identified; that the person who caught the petitioner, had given statement only two months later; that the hammer belonged to the company; and that the other security staff who were present at the time when the petitioner was found carrying the hammer, were not examined at the enquiry. 4. Counsel for the petitioner also made a strong plea that even if the petitioner was to be found to have committed the theft as alleged, the penalty of dismissal from service was wholly diproportionate to gravity of the alleged office; and that the penalty to be in proportion to the gravity of the offence should be any penalty other than dismissal. Unfortunately for the petitioner, all these points having been raised earlier, they have been properly considered and rejected by the Labour Court. A writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not an appeal against the findings of the enquiry officer or the award of the Labour Court. Unfortunately for the petitioner, all these points having been raised earlier, they have been properly considered and rejected by the Labour Court. A writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not an appeal against the findings of the enquiry officer or the award of the Labour Court. So long as the award made by the Labour Court has been made keeping in view the law and factors prescribed by the statutes and those laid down by the superior Courts, there is no scope for interfering with the findings recorded after due consideration of the materials that were placed before the Court.5. The Labour Court has noted that the arguments were advanced by the parties on the basis of the enquiry report. The Labour Court has recorded that the authorised representative of the petitioner had stated that he is not challenging the enquiry and that he argued the case on the basis of the materials placed before the enquiry officer. 5. The Labour Court has independently looked into the materials which were examined by the enquiry officer. The Labour Court found that M. W. 1 examined at the enquiry had stated that he took the petitioner along with the bag containing the hammer to the Chief Security Officer and entrusted the material to him with the report on 24 February 1984. That report has also been marked as Exhibit P. 7. As regards the delay in suspending the petitioner, and issuing charge-sheet, the Labour Court has found that the conduct of the assistant security officer would only show that he wanted to satisfy himself before making a report against the petitioner, that the petitioner had not taken permission to take the hammer inside the factory and that the petitioner had only removed it stealthily. The time taken in verifying the facts, before placing the petitioner under suspension and issuing charge-sheet, cannot be held against the employer. 6. It is not the case of the petitioner that the nature of the work performed by him in the factory required that the petitioner should bring with him the hammer from outside and that it should be kept with him while he was inside the factory. There is no evidence that the workman was required to bring the hammer. The finding that the hammer belonged to the employer cannot, therefore, be regarded as unreasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case. There is no evidence that the workman was required to bring the hammer. The finding that the hammer belonged to the employer cannot, therefore, be regarded as unreasonable, having regard to the circumstances of the case. The fact that there was no proper stock register was, therefore, not of much significance, as rightly held by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has found that the delay in giving the charge-sheet to the petitioner cannot loom large to suspect the version of the respondent that the petitioner was caught red-handed by the security personnel.8. The Labour Court after considering the evidence, has concluded that : "considering these materials I am of opinion that the contention of the learned authorised representative that a reappraisal of the evidence before the enquiry officer has to lead us to the inference that the charge against the petitioner has not been proved, is not a tenable one. The proceedings in a domestic enquiry need not be so strict as a criminal prosecution. It is a fact finding enquiry. The materials placed before the enquiry officer has disclosed that the petitioner had taken out a hammer belonging to the respondent-company while getting out of the factory after finishing his shift work on 24 February 1984 at about 4.05 p.m. and therefore, he has been rightly found guilty by the enquiry officer" * 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a vehement submission that the value of the hammer could only have been Rs. 10 to Rs. 15 and it was wholly unjust to have inflicted a penalty of dismissal for theft of an article of such small value. The Labour Court considered this aspect of the matter as well and had held that the nature of the charge against the petitioner was such that it also constituted an offence under the Indian Penal Code. After referring to the judgment of this Court in T. Seeralan v. Second Additional Labour Court & Ors. 1986 II CLR 210, the Court held that when a charge of theft is proved, there is very little scope for generosity to be shown, or to bring into existence minor punishment for such derelictions. The Labour Court following the judgment of this Court, held that there was little scope for interfering with the punishment imposed on the petitioner, invoking S.11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. The Labour Court following the judgment of this Court, held that there was little scope for interfering with the punishment imposed on the petitioner, invoking S.11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. It was open to the Labour Court to take the view that though the value of the article was not high, the commission of theft having been proved, the punishment of dismissal was warranted. Though the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Gujarat High Court, which seems to have taken a different view, I am not inclined to differ from the view already taken by this Court. The penalty imposed also cannot be regarded as so strikingly disproportionate as to call for interference. The punishment imposed cannot be regarded as irrational or perverse. The facts as found by the Labour Court are all findings of facts. In the circumstances. I do not find any scope for interfering with the impugned order of the Labour Court. The writ petition is dismissed.