JUDGMENT (1.) PALOK Basu, J. A short but an interesting question has been raised by Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition. Can the second proviso to clause 8 of the U. P. High Speed Diesel Oil and Light Diesel Oil (Maintenance of Supplies and Distribution) Order, 1981 be attracted on the facts of the present case when the petitioner alleges to have presented an application in reply to the show cause notice said to have been filed on 15-7-1995 in the office of the District Supply Officer, Shahjahanpur. (2.) THE short facts are that the petitioner, Ram Niwas, holds a licence in Form 'c' under the U. P. High Speed Diesel Oil and Light Diesel Oil (Maintenance of Supplies and Distribution) Order, 1981, for short the order, which is valid upto 31-3-1997. On 3-6-1995 a first information report has been lodged by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jalalabad, District Shahjahanpur, which bar been registered under Sections 420, 421 and 424 IPC at Police Station Mirzapur, District Shahjahaupur. An oil tanker was found present in the business premises of the petitioner on 3-6-1995 and the driver of the tanker produced two cash memos, one for 3000 Litres and other 2000 Litres of Diesel in the name of the petitioner, the allegation therefore, in short were that the petitioner was making supply and purchase of High Speed Diesel Oil flouting the terms and conditions of the licence granted to him under the Order. Admittedly, after first information report was lodged, a case was registered at Police Station Mirzapur whereupon the petitioner had surrendered in the Court of Judicial Magistrate and has been granted bail. A criminal matter is pending and no charge sheet has yet been filed. (3.) FURTHER admitted facts are that on 24-6-1995 the District Supply Officer, Shahjahanpur issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him to explain within one week on the receipt of the notice as to why his licence be not cancelled. Simultaneously, order was passed suspending the petitioner's licence. The petitioner's case is that the aforesaid order initiating the cancellation proceedings and passing the suspension order of the licence was received by him on 29-6-1995. Simultaneously, order was passed suspending the petitioner's licence. The petitioner's case is that the aforesaid order initiating the cancellation proceedings and passing the suspension order of the licence was received by him on 29-6-1995. (4.) IN paragraph 23, the petitioner himself has pleaded that an application for time was moved on his behalf before the District Supply Officer and 15 days time was granted to him for filing a reply. Again the admitted position is that according to the petitioner, he filed his reply in the office of the District Supply Officer on 15-7-1995 and that the Area Rationing Officer who was the incharge of the District Supply Office, on 15-7-1995 told him something orally regarding the enquiry. Mr.Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioner has been beard at length in support of this writ petition which is opposed by Sri H. R. Misra, learned Standing Counsel. (5.) ON 17-7-1995 when the writ petition was filed, time was granted for filing a counter affidavit. No such affidavit has been filed. However, learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that since the petitioner's vital rights are involved inasmuch as the life of the suspension order itself has already ended, immediate disposal of this writ petition must be made. Consequently, as requested by the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the time of admission. (6.) IT may be stated here that the argument of Sri Ramendra Asthana,is based primarily on the language used in clause 8 of the Rules. The learned Standing Counsel has refused the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Before taking up the submission concerning the interpretation which should be put to the provision as is contained in clause 8, it may be mentioned that all the relevant facts in the writ petition have been extracted above. There is no averment by the petitioner that he had in fact enquired as to whether the enquiry against him was pending. He is also silent as to who was the Enquiry Officer, inasmuch as, the petitioner has himself admitted that he had initially prayed for extension of time concerning the submission of reply to the show cause notice which was allowed. He is also silent as to who was the Enquiry Officer, inasmuch as, the petitioner has himself admitted that he had initially prayed for extension of time concerning the submission of reply to the show cause notice which was allowed. Under the circumstances, it is apparent that the petitioner has not subjected himself personally to the enquiry nor had he deputed any agent or authorised person to appear on his behalf in the enquiry. (7.) HAVING thus examined the factual background, Clause 8 may be quoted here for ready reference: "suspension or cancellation and refusal to renew licence.- The Licensing Authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing suspend or cancel any licence if it is satisfied that the licensee has contravened any provisions of this Order or the conditions of the licence or any direction issued thereunder ; Provided that the licensee shall be given reasonable opportunity of submitting his explanation before his licence is cancelled or its renewal refused or suspended otherwise than by way of suspension pending enquiry ; Provided further that no order of suspension pending inquiry shall extend beyond a period of three weeks. " (8.) THE argument of Sri Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the second proviso puts a bar on the life of the suspension order beyond a period of three weeks. THE argument proceeds that this period of three weeks should commence from the date the order is passed. Reliance has been placed on two decisions. THE first one is reported in 1991 ALJ 734 Satya Prakash v. State of U. P. In the said case, a FIR was lodged on 21-2-1991 concerning some illegality committed by the petitioner while the suspension order concerning the licence of the petitioner therein was issued on 4th of March, 1991. It was said that the petitioner had no knowledge that the District Supply Officer passed the impugned order because it was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner therein. THE Bench, therefore, had proceed ed to hold as under:- "the first proviso to clause 8 of the order provides that the licensee shall be given reasonable opportunity of submitting his explanation before his licence is cancelled or its renewal refused or suspended otherwise than by way of suspension pending enquiry. ". THE Bench, therefore, had proceed ed to hold as under:- "the first proviso to clause 8 of the order provides that the licensee shall be given reasonable opportunity of submitting his explanation before his licence is cancelled or its renewal refused or suspended otherwise than by way of suspension pending enquiry. ". Apparently the enquiry contemplated in the proviso has to be held under the order while the investigation on the basis of first information report. Therefore, the meaning carved out of the proviso is not acceptable because it was imperative upon the District Supply Officer to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner of giving his explanation. This defect was vital. (9.) IN other, the case is reported in 1990 (1) EFR 210 it was a matter in which it has been held as under: "there is no enquiry pending against the petitioner for any contravention of the Control Order, condition of licence or the direction issued thereunder. Licence of the petitioner has been cancelled only on the ground that a first information report has been lodged against the petitioner. . . . " (10.) IN view of the facts involved in the two decisions cited above, both appear to be clearly distinguishable. Lastly an half hearted reliance was placed on a decision reported in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1991--Ram Gopal v. District Supply Officer Fatehpur. In this order except that the last proviso has been relied upon for saying that the suspension order pending enquiry were not to be extended beyond a period of three weeks, no other reasons appear nor even the facts are clear. This order which is not a decision, therefore, is also of no help. (11.) IT is a settled law that no proviso can be read bereft of the con tents of the main provisions. Proviso is meant to add and supplement the main provision. Consequently, main provision in the aforesaid clause has to be read alongwith the proviso. IT will be a wrong interpretation if either of the two provisos quoted above is read besides the language used in the main clause. Proviso is meant to add and supplement the main provision. Consequently, main provision in the aforesaid clause has to be read alongwith the proviso. IT will be a wrong interpretation if either of the two provisos quoted above is read besides the language used in the main clause. (12.) A close examination of the language used in Clause 8 indicates that contravention of any of the provisions of the order the conditions of the licence or any direction issued therein, may result in suspension or cancellation of any licence granted to a licensee under the Order. The first proviso makes it clear that the licensee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of submitting his explanation before his licence is cancelled. Likewise, such an opportunity will be given when renewal of the licence is refused. Similarly, a reasonable opportunity has to be given when order of suspension of licence is passed, which should be otherwise than by way of suspension pending enquiry. To this proviso follows the last proviso i. e., no order of suspension pending enquiry shall extend beyond a period of three weeks. Therefore, when a notice is issued under the second proviso calling upon the petitioner to show cause, it means participation by a licensee in the suspension/cancellation proceedings otherwise it will be permitting the petitioner/licensee to be away from the proceedings and only let three weeks period pass. In this event, he can always say that since three weeks is already over, the suspension order dies a natural death. Such an interpretation is not going to further the cause of justice. In the event of the petitioner participating in such an enquiry, the period of three weeks must begin from the date, he makes himself available for showing cause. At once, the aforesaid period of three weeks shall begin running. If for some reasons, the enquiry is not completed within a period of three weeks the order will stand automatically exhausted. It is, therefore, held that the interpretation argued. As not applicable to the second proviso in Clause 8. (13.) ON the facts of the present case, there is nothing in the writ petition, which indicates that the petitioner has participated and co-operated with the enquiry which was scheduled to begin for which show cause notice has been given to him. It is, therefore, held that the interpretation argued. As not applicable to the second proviso in Clause 8. (13.) ON the facts of the present case, there is nothing in the writ petition, which indicates that the petitioner has participated and co-operated with the enquiry which was scheduled to begin for which show cause notice has been given to him. Admittedly except filing of the reply, nothing more has been yet done by the petitioner in that regard. (14.) IT follows that the enquiry should be taken up, at once and the petitioner should cooperate with it. IT is hereby directed that the petitioner shall present himself before Enquiry Officer and submit himself for completion of the enquiry. The District Supply Officer or Enquiry Officer whosoever he may be shall maintain the order sheet and shall, in the presence of the petitioner, try to complete such enquiry within a period of three weeks. The suspension order passed against the petitioner on 24-6-1995 will seize to operate immediately on the completion of three weeks from the date of commencement of such enquiry. With the aforesaid discussions and directions, this writ petition is finally disposed of at the admission stage. Petition disposed of.