JUDGMENT 1. The solitary question canvassed in this appeal arising out of judgement dated 17.4.93 passed by the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Shivpuri, relates to jurisdiction of civil Court with respect to the dispute in question. 2. The argument advanced is that the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed by the plaintiff for refund of a sum of Rs. 25,745.25 together with interest, amounting to Rs. 3,000/- and costs of notice of Rs. 100/- with the allegation that plaintiff carried on business of purchase of van upaj jadi buti from the Forest Department. The sales tax was also being realised by the Forest Department. From 8.11.80 to 27.10.81 it purchased jadi buti and paid sales tax over it. The goods purchased were tax paid and no further tax could be levied but the authorities levied Central sales tax over the goods which were held tax paid when they were taken out of Madhya Pradesh illegally. An objection was raised in this regard but the Sales Tax Officer did not agree to it. On 21.12.84 an assessment order was passed under which a sum of Rs. 25,745.80 was levied on account of Central Sales Tax and was got deposited. The amount was not refunded inspite of demand. Hence the suit. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that no suit for refund of the amount is maintainable in civil Court because it is barred by the provisions of section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon 1979 STC 444 (Sirajuddin v. The State of M.P.). It is a Division Bench decision of this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that as the amount claimed in the suit was recovered as Central Sales Tax over the goods which were already tax paid the order levying this tax was without any sanction of law and as such the civil Court has got jurisdiction. He placed reliance upon 1969 JLJ 1 (Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh), 1993 (3) SCC 161 (D.R. Chawla v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi) and AIR 1991 SC 435 (Gurbax Singh v. The Financial Commissioner). 5. No argument has been advanced before me by the learned counsel for the parties with respect to the merits of the case. He placed reliance upon 1969 JLJ 1 (Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh), 1993 (3) SCC 161 (D.R. Chawla v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi) and AIR 1991 SC 435 (Gurbax Singh v. The Financial Commissioner). 5. No argument has been advanced before me by the learned counsel for the parties with respect to the merits of the case. In order to determine the question as to whether the civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the present suit or not, it is important to mention the provisions of section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax. It runs as follows: 37. Bar to certain proceedings.-- Save as provided in section 44, no assessment order or the determination of liability to pay any tax or penalty or the recovery of any tax or penalty made under this act or the rules made thereunder by the Commissioner or any person appointed under section 3 to assist him shall be called into question in any civil Court and save as provided in section 38 and 39, no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment or order. In 1969 JLJ 1 relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent the Apex Court ruled: (i) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out, the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out, the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute create a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals. (iv) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (v) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (vi) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are fer the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. In the other case relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, referred to above, of Gurbus Singh also the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be affected where the order passed was not under the authority of law. Similarly in (1993) 3 SC 161 the Apex Court observed that civil Court's jurisdiction to go into question whether the order was a nullity being vitiated by jurisdictional error is not barred. Similarly in (1993) 3 SC 161 the Apex Court observed that civil Court's jurisdiction to go into question whether the order was a nullity being vitiated by jurisdictional error is not barred. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said authorities, it is crystal clear that jurisdiction of the civil Court is not barred when the impugned order is without any sanction of law or, in another words, is without jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction with respect to a suit for recovery of an amount on the basis of an assessment order is or is not barred u/s. 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in 1979 STC 444 (supra). In that case the plaintiff claimed himself to be a forest contractor doing business of selling timber and in this connection used to take forest coups from the Forest Department in public auctions. A suit was preferred by him for an injunction restraining the State from realising the amount of sales tax and penalty imposed on him by the Sales Tax Officer under various assessment orders under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. It was alleged that the realisation and assessment was illegal. After considering the aforesaid authority in Dhulabhai's case and other authorities on the subject, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that as there was an express bar under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act on civil Court in respect of powers conferred on sales tax officer and the revisional authority under the Act the remedy sought by the plaintiff could have been agitated before the authorities under the Act. This case has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant as said earlier. 6. In this case AIR 1965 SC 1942 (M/s. Kamla Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay) has been referred. It is a case u/s. 20 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. There, the appellant carried on business of manufacturing and sale of textile cloth. He alleged that during the period in question he sold the goods inside and outside of Bombay and general sales Tax was levied. He claimed to recover the amount from the respondent on the ground that it has been illegally levied against it. There, the appellant carried on business of manufacturing and sale of textile cloth. He alleged that during the period in question he sold the goods inside and outside of Bombay and general sales Tax was levied. He claimed to recover the amount from the respondent on the ground that it has been illegally levied against it. The contention raised was that the appellant case was not covered u/s. 20 of the Act and it did not bar the institution of that suit and in case it created a bar the section itself was ultra vires of the Constitution and void. Section 20 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act creates a bar on the jurisdiction of the civil Court. It provides as under: "20. Save as it provided in S. 23, no assessment made and no order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder by the Commissioner or any person appointed under section 3 to assist him shall be called into question in any civil Court, and save as is provided in sections 21 and 22, no appeal or application for revision shall lie against any such assessment or order." This provision is akin to the provisions of section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. While considering this provision the Apex Court held that where the bar created by section 20 itself is challenged it can be done only by a separate suit. It was specifically held that in terms section 20 is confined to cases where the validity of the assessment orders made under the Act is challenged. It was further observed that technically the appellant's suit is competent in so far as it seeks to challenge the validity of section 20. This finding, however, is of no material assistance to the appellant because even after it succeeds on this point, it has still to face the plea of the respondent that on merits, the suit is barred; and on that plea, the appellant must fail, because section 20 is a bar to the appellant's claim that the amount in question which is alleged to have been illegally recovered from it should be refunded to it. That is a matter which falls directly within the mischief of section 20. That is a matter which falls directly within the mischief of section 20. The portion underlined by me above clearly shows that the Apex Court ruled that where the plaintiff's claim was that the amount in question could not be recovered and should be refunded, it fell directly within the mischief of section 20. Similarly, in the case in hand, it is clear that the plaintiff had challenged the legality of assessment made and had prayed for its refund. This question is, therefore, hit by provisions of section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. I am conscious of the fact that under secticn 9 C.P.C. civil Courts have got jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The general rule is that civil Courts have got jurisdiction to decide questions of civil nature but the Legislature is competent to take away the jurisdiction of civil Court whether specifically or by necessary implication. The M.P. General Sales Tax Act creates new rights and liabilities and provides specific machinery. The plaintiff could take the recourse to the machinery provided under the Act itself. In the aforesaid case the Division Bench specifically ruled that the assessment order in that case was not a nullity and the suit was clearly barred u/s. 37 of that Act. The remedy of the plainitff was to avail the machinery provided by the Act to question the recovery. Similar position is here. As said above, the question of legality or illegality of the amount sought to be refunded by the plaintiff in the suit' could be raised before the competent authority under the said Act. Section 37 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act is, therefore, a complete bar upon such suits and the plaintiff cannot escape from the clutches of this section. I, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit itself was barred. The question of jurisdiction does not appear to have been dealt with by the learned trial Court in its judgement as it was perhaps not raised. As the question of jurisdiction can be raised in any proceeding or at any stage as held in AIR 1954 SC 340 it was allowed to be raised in this Court. The question of jurisdiction touches the very authority of the Court to entertain a suit and try it. As the question of jurisdiction can be raised in any proceeding or at any stage as held in AIR 1954 SC 340 it was allowed to be raised in this Court. The question of jurisdiction touches the very authority of the Court to entertain a suit and try it. 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The judgement and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed. However, under the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.