USHA MEHRA ( 1 ) THE question raised in this writ petition pertains to the interpretation of Rule 114-A of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (in short Rules ). ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein was appointed on temporary basis to the post of the T. G. T. (Science) by respondent No. 2 on 10th July,1987. His services were regularised in July,1989. He continued to work as such thereafter. On 3rd September, 1991 he submitted a conditional resignation giving three months notice as he had qualified the written test for the post of T. G. T. (Science) with respondent No. 1. In response to this conditional letter of resignation, the respondent No. 3 informed him that he would be relieved from service w. e. f. 3rd December, 1991. On 3rd December,1991, the petitioner applied for extension of notice period till 3rd March, 1992 This was acknowledged by the respondent No. 3 and the period was extended till 2nd March, 1992. The petitioner for the reason mentioned in the letter dated 30th January,1992 with drew his conditional resignation and reported for duty on 3rd March,1992. He was, however, not allowed to join by respondent No 3. Against the said action the petitioner approached respondent No. 1 and also challenged the action of respondents No. 2 and 3 by lodging a complaint in writing on 7th April, 1992. Respondent No. 1 reconsidered the approval already accorded and directed the respondents No. 2 and 3 to take back the petitioner in service. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have refused to comply with the order passed by respondent No. 1. It is this action of respondent No. 2 and 3 which is under challenge in this writ petition. ( 3 ) THE Management and the School Authorities have raised legal objection regarding the maintainability of this petition on the ground that said respondents being private bodies are not ameniable to writ jurisdiction besides they have refuted petitioner s averments on merits. It is their case that the petitioner has concealed in the petition the factum of acceptence of his resignation and approval accorded by the Director of Education thereon. Once the resignation has been accepted and approval accorded by the Director of Education under Rule 114-A, nothing survives in this writ petition. It is their case that the petitioner has concealed in the petition the factum of acceptence of his resignation and approval accorded by the Director of Education thereon. Once the resignation has been accepted and approval accorded by the Director of Education under Rule 114-A, nothing survives in this writ petition. Further the Management vide its letter dated 24th September, 1992 accepted the resignation and relieved the petitioner from service w. e. f. 2nd March, 1992. The Director of Education having accorded the approval could not review his order. Even otherwise, formal approval was not warranted for the reason that as per the provision of Rule 114-A me approval deemed to have been accorded after me expiry of 30 days of me communication to the Director of Education. The directions by the respondent No. 1 vide letter dated 8th September, 1992 are without jurisdiction having no force. Having once accorded me approval or deemed approval, the respondent No. 1 had no power to stay the relieving of the petitioner from the services. Moreover, me post has already been filled up and there is no existing vacancy with respondents 2 and 3. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT No. 1, Director of Education on the other hand took the stand mat all the facts were not brought to his notice by the Principal i. e. respondent No. 3. Therefore, on the representation of the petitioner dated 7th April, 1992 he reviewed the approval and directed the respondents No. 2 and 3 not to relieve the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 has admitted that the approval was accorded on 12th September, 1992 but this was based on incomplete facts. On reconsidering the case it was found that the letter dated 30th January, 1992 of the petitioner was not placed before the Director of Education by the school authorities. All facts were not available at the time of according the approval, hence action of respondent No. 2 and 3 in not permitting the petitioner to work is not justified. ( 5 ) SO far as the question of maintainability of the writ petition, raised by the counsel for respondent is concerned, it has no merits. In this regard support can be had from the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldip Mehta JV. Union of India and Ors. ( 5 ) SO far as the question of maintainability of the writ petition, raised by the counsel for respondent is concerned, it has no merits. In this regard support can be had from the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldip Mehta JV. Union of India and Ors. _ reported in 1993 (2) Delhi Lawyer 196, where it has been held prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution could be issued against "person or authorities" even if the authorities are not statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State. Therefore, relying on the said decision the contention of the counsel for the respondent that respondents that respondents 2 and 3 being not instrumentality of the State writ is not maintainable has noforce. This contention is accordingly rejected. ( 6 ) TO appreciate the rival contentions of the parties we must have a quick glance at Rule 114- A which reads as under:- "114-A. The resignation submitted by an employee of a recognised private school shall be accepted within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the managing committee with the approval ofthe Director: Provided that if no approval is received within 30 days, then such approval would be deemed to have been recceived after the expiry of the said period. " ( 7 ) THE reading of Rule 114-A makes it clear that complete process of acceptance of resignation has to be completed within 30 days. Mr. Vashisht drew my attention to the fact which have come on record to say that respondents No. 2 and 3 had not strictly complied to the provisions of Rule 114-A. For example, if 30 days period is to be counted from 3rd December, 1991 i. e. when the petitioner asked extention of the period then the period of 30 days expired on 2nd January, 1992. Resignation, as per the respondents own showing, was accepted by the Management on 11th January, 1992. The process of acceptance of resignation by Director of Education would start after the resignation had been accepted by the Management Committee. If 11 th January, 1992 is taken up as the cut out date for counting 30 days then the period expired on 10th February, 1992 whereas the resignation had already been withdrawn by the petitioner on 30th January, 1992. If 11 th January, 1992 is taken up as the cut out date for counting 30 days then the period expired on 10th February, 1992 whereas the resignation had already been withdrawn by the petitioner on 30th January, 1992. ( 8 ) EITHER way the provision of Rule 114-A has not been adhered by the respondents. Moreover, the resignation was conditional. This fact was not brought to the notice of the Director of Education in the absence of which he accorded the approval. This fact was realised by respondent No. 2 when the petitioner made representation. On finding that it was a conditional resignation the respondent No. l rectified its mistake and thus reviewed the order. ( 9 ) THE word resignation under this Rule would mean clear resignation without attaching any conditions. If the conditions are attached to the resignation then unless those conditions are complied the resignation cannot be said to have been accepted nor could be forwarded to respondent No. 1 under the said Rule. The word resignation as per the Concise Oxford Dictionary means "the act or an instance of resigning from one s job or office, 2. the document etc. conveying this intention, 3. the state of being resigned; the uncomplaining endurance of sorrow or difficulty. " Resignation would mean that the employee wants to severe his relation from the employer without any riders, then only it would amount to resignation. But if his intentions are not to severe his relation immediately but from a prospective date or subject to certain conditions then, to my mind, theresignation would become effective on fulfilment of these conditions. Till then it cannot be said there is a resignation in the eye of law. Resignation with a rider will come into force only when the conditions stipulated therein are complied. Hence the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 cannot by applying the deeming clause in Rule 114- A throw away the petitioner from service. Moreover, respondent No. 1in his affidavit has categorically stated mat respondent No. 3 never sent me resignation of the petitioner alongwith his letter and, therefore, me Director of Education was not aware of the term of me resignation. It is also the case of the Director of Education that had it been known that me resignation was conditional he wouldnot have accorded me approval. It is also the case of the Director of Education that had it been known that me resignation was conditional he wouldnot have accorded me approval. The fact that the conditional resignation ofthe petitioner was not forwarded to me respondent No. 1 has not been controverted by respondents No. 2 and 3. Therefore, the interpretation given to Rule 114-A and reliance placed on me said Rule by respondents No. 2 and 3 is misplaced. The conditional designation stood withdrawn by the petitioner on 30th January, 1992 i. e much before the 30 days period was over hence respondents 2 and 3 cannot take advantage of the same. Even if it is assumed that the provision of rule 1141- A are attracted still the conditional began on having been accepted by the Management on 11th January, 1992 the period of 30 days had not yet expired when the petitioner withdrew the same. It is fully established and admitted by all the parties that unless the resignation was accepted by the Management it could not take effect. It was only after the acceptance by the Management that it could be forwarded to the Director of Education for approval. Hence, the period of 30 days has to be counted from the date when approval was accorded by the Management which in this case was 11th January, 1992. The letter was written to the Director of Education for acceptence of that resignation thereafter. Therefore, the question of applying the deeming provision did not arise in the facts of this case. The Management and the school authority ought to have brought all these facts to the notice of the Director of Education. Non furnishing of complete facts by respondents No. 2 and 3 amounts to concealment of fact as deposed by the respondent No. 1. Hence the approval accorded by the Director ofeducation as stated by Mr. B. N. Bajpai, Education Officer, Zone S-17 was on the basis of incomplete facts supplied by the school authority. Thus respondent No. 1 after hearing all facts was within his right to review the order and issue direction respondents No. 2 and 3 to permit the petitioner to resume duty. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that if on the basis of half-fed facts an action was taken by the Director of Education then he become powerless to rectify or correct the same. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that if on the basis of half-fed facts an action was taken by the Director of Education then he become powerless to rectify or correct the same. In fact justice demands that once true facts came to his notice, he must undo the injustice instead of keeping indifferent and perpetuate the wrong. That is the impact of Rule 114-A. This rule impose restrictions on the powers of the Management and School Authorities in arbitrarily throwing away me services of a teacher. The Director of Education had infact the power to review his order passed under Rule 114-A once he forms an opinion that earlier order according approval was not based on full facts and correct facts. ( 10 ) RELIANCE by Mr. Gogne,counsel for the respondents No. 2 and 3 on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajkumar Vs. Union of lndia, AIR 1969sc 180 is of no help to him. In the case before the Supreme Court, the petitioner was a member of Indian Administrative Services. He resigned and his resignation was accepted but before it was communicated to him he withdrew his offer of resignation. His withdrawl was rejected and he was not allowed duty. He challenged the same. The Court opined that he had no locus paenitentiae to withdraw his offer once resignation had been accepted. Secondly there were no rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution to indicate when the resignation became effective. The Government of India Memo dated 6th May, 1958 in this regard was held to be having no statutory force. But in the case in hand mere are specific rules as to when the resignation would become effective. In this regard reference can be had to Rule 114-A which clearly stipulate that the resignation submitted by me employee of a recognised private school would become effective when the approval of the Director of Education is accorded within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the resignation. The approval of the Director of Education in this case was accorded on 24th September, 1992 whereas me resignation had already been with drawn on 30th January, 1992. If we take the alternative argument of Mr. The approval of the Director of Education in this case was accorded on 24th September, 1992 whereas me resignation had already been with drawn on 30th January, 1992. If we take the alternative argument of Mr. Gogne that the approval had deemed to be accorded within 30 days of the receipt of the resignation by the Director of Education after it was accepted by the Management on 11th January, 1992 even then the petitioner withdrew his resignation before the expiry of 30 days period. Hence Mr. Gogne cannot draw any support from the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra ). In that case there were no rules. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Gopal Chandra Mishra, AIR 197 8 SC 694 is also of no help to the respondents. In that case the Supreme Court was dealing with the resignation of a judge whereas in the present case we are dealing with the resignation of this petitioner on the basis of statutory provision of the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules made thereunder. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, it can be safely said mat me services of the petitioner could not automatically be brought to an end on the submission of the resignation (in this case conditional resignation) by the School Authorities to respondent No. 1. It cannot be said that once notice of resignation was given it became operative immediately on receipt of the same by me School Authority nor it could automatically bring to an end the contract of service. The dissolution of contract would operate after the expiry of the notice period. In fact the dissolution could be brought about only on the date communicated in the resignation as in this case 2nd March, 1992 or at best if the Rule is interpreted that on acceptence of the resignation within 30 days on the receipt by the Director of Education then from the date of approval or deemed approval as the case may be. m this case the approval was accorded on 24th September, 1992 whereas deemed approval would be somewhere on 10th February, 1992 by which date resignation had already been withdrawn. For support reliance can be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India, AIR. 1987 SC 2354. ( 12 ) MR. m this case the approval was accorded on 24th September, 1992 whereas deemed approval would be somewhere on 10th February, 1992 by which date resignation had already been withdrawn. For support reliance can be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balram Gupta Vs. Union of India, AIR. 1987 SC 2354. ( 12 ) MR. GOGNE then contended that the vacancy has already been filled up and there is no vacancy now existing. To my mind, this argument has no force. It has not been brought on record when this vacancy was filled even otherwise the matter being sub judice with respondent No. l since February, 1992 i. e. the time when the petitioner withdrew the resignation and asked the respondent No. 3 to let him resume duty the respondent No 3 could not fill up the vacancy on the permanent basis. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated above the petition is allowed. The Rule is made absolute. Directions are accordingly given to respondent No. 1 to get its order implemented. Further directions are given to respondents No. 2 and 3 to allow the petitioner to resume his duties on the post of T. G. T. (Science) with no order as to costs.