JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. This writ petition is directed against the order of the Industrial Court, Kolhapur, dated October 15, 1986, made in Appeal (IC) No. 16 of 1985 under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. The Petitioner was in the employment of the First Respondent, a Co-operative Society manufacturing sugar, from February 1, 1969. His services came to be terminated with effect from January 21, 1982 by an order dated January 16, 1982. On February 16, 1982, the Petitioner sent an approach notice to the First Respondent for reconsideration of the order of termination of his service and demanded reinstatement in service. The Petitioner's request was rejected by the First Respondent by its reply dated March 1, 1982 which was received by the Petitioner on March 3, 1982. The Petitioner then filed an application in the Labour Court at Kolhapur on June 29, 1982, u/s 79 read with section 78 of the Act. The First Respondent filed its written statement on September 14, 1982, in which it, inter alia, raised a contention that the application was barred by limitation and prayed for dismissal of the application. On June 7, 1985, the Labour Court framed a preliminary issue regarding limitation and called upon the parties to argue the matter forthwith. After hearing the parties, the Labour Court dismissed the application by an order dictated immediately in open Court. Although, the Applicant was represented by one Kate, stated to be a representative of the Applicant's Union, he made no application for condonation of delay at any point of time till the application was dismissed. The Petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the Industrial Court on July 17, 1985. By the present impugned order, the Industrial Court has dismissed the appeal firstly, by holding that the appeal itself was barred by limitation and secondly, that there was no merit in the appeal. Hence the Petition. 3. This case typically illustrates the jeopardy into which ignorant workmen are placed when they rely on Union representatives to provide them legal representation before the Industrial and Labour Courts. It is unfortunate that the Petitioner was not properly advised. Hence the Petition. 3. This case typically illustrates the jeopardy into which ignorant workmen are placed when they rely on Union representatives to provide them legal representation before the Industrial and Labour Courts. It is unfortunate that the Petitioner was not properly advised. At no stage of the proceedings in the trial Court, that is, from the time of filing of the application till it was dismissed, did he move the Labour Court for giving him an opportunity to lead evidence to show adequate reasons to condone the delay. Neither in the application, nor in the evidence, was any material pleaded or adduced to show good and adequate reasons for condonation of the delay. However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that in such proceedings it would not be proper to take a very technical approach. As pointed out by this Court in Ramasamuj Vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Limited and Others, (1980) 1 LLJ 85 , Part 12 on Page 91 "Obsession with technicalities of the law and the procedural requirements must be pushed into the background while dealing with industrial matters and in particular with the claim of an individual employee who is not represented by any Union". In my view, the situation would be no different if the Union Representative is equally ignorant. Such was the situation in the present case. I am, therefore, of the view that the ratio in Ramasamuj (Supra) applies in this case. 4. In my view, the Petitioner's case is an unfortunate one where the view taken has been unnecessarily technical, narrow and harsh. Even if the Petitioner, perhaps on account of the compounded ignorance of both himself and the Union Representative representing him failed to file an application for condonation of delay, it was the bounden duty of the Labour Court to satisfy itself on the grounds, if any, for the delay in the presentation of the application. After all, the delay was hardly of 26 days and therefore, there was all the more reason for the Labour Court to make sure that the delay was not on account of utter negligence or callousness on the part of the employee in which case alone the application could have been dismissed. After all, the delay was hardly of 26 days and therefore, there was all the more reason for the Labour Court to make sure that the delay was not on account of utter negligence or callousness on the part of the employee in which case alone the application could have been dismissed. It is true that a limitation has been prescribed by the Act for making an application to the Labour Court, but, simultaneously, the legislature has vested the powers for condonation of delay in presentation of the application in the Labour Court. The power of condonation in such matters has to be used liberally in such manner as to advance justice and not to inhibit it on rigid, technical considerations. In my view, the correct approach would have been to call upon the employee to state the circumstances under which the application came to be delayed and then to examine the said reasons for adequacy or otherwise. It is unfortunate that because of the technical approach adopted by the Labour Court, the application came to be dismissed. 5. When we turn to the order of the Industrial Court, an equally technical and unduly narrow approach is discernible. In the first place, I am unable to agree that the appeal was liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. If, under the rules, a party was entitled to a certified copy of the appeal which was to be despatched to him by post, then merely because the learned Judge chose to dictate the order in open Court, it was not possible to say that the limitation started from the date on which the judgment was dictated in open Court. Secondly, if the practice in the Court was that appeals were routinely entertained as being within limitation on being filed within one month of the date of receipt of certified copy, then there was no reason to penalise a litigant who was acting consistently with the practice, even if the learned Judge of the Industrial Court was of the view that the practice was erroneous. 6. Turning to the merits of the case, here also in my view, the order of the Industrial Court suffers from an unduly narrow and pedantic approach and causes great injustice. 6. Turning to the merits of the case, here also in my view, the order of the Industrial Court suffers from an unduly narrow and pedantic approach and causes great injustice. The Industrial Court appears to have been over - impressed by the fact that the Petitioner had failed to make an application for condonation of delay at any time and, therefore, took the view that this application had been rightly dismissed by the Labour Court. In my view, such an approach is too technical in a matter, particularly where the delay is small, the employee is ill-advised and not represented by a competent lawyer. The result is that there has been miscarriage of justice as the Petitioner' s case on merits with regard to the legality and propriety of the termination of service has remained unheard for a period of more than 16 years. This, in my view is a fit case for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, rule is made absolute and the orders of the two Courts below are hereby quashed and set aside. Application (BIR) No. 24 of 1982 is restored and remanded to the Labour Court, Kolhapur, for expeditious trial and disposal in accordance with law. However, taking into consideration that it was the failure of the Petitioner to make an application for condonation of delay and seek an opportunity to lead evidence in support of such an application, that has resulted in delay of about 8 years, the interest of justice, even if he succeeds in obtaining a direction from the Labour Court for reinstatement in service with back wages, the Petitioner shall not be entitled to back wages for the period commencing from the date of the order of the Labour Court, i.e., June 7, 1985 till today, i.e., February 7, 1995 as I see no reason why the Employer should be punished with liability of back wages for the said period. 8. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.