Honble KHAN, J. –This petition is directed against the order passed by the Central Government on 2.5.1986 rejecting the revision petition filed by the petitioner, against an order of the State Government rejecting the application for renewal of the lease. The revision application has been rejected by the Central Government only on the ground of limitation. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. (2). The petitioner applied for third renewal of mining lease for mineral Mica, Felspar and Beryl Ore over an area of 61 Bighas 90 Biswas in Village Kalat Khera, Tehsil Beawar, District Ajmer. The petitioner had applied for renewal of the lease on 16.1.1984. As per the appropriate provisions of the Mineral Concessison Rules, 1960 (in short `the Rules of 1960), if the application is not decided by the State Government within a period of 12 months, it is deemed to have been rejected (Rule 24, sub-rules (2) and (3). However, in the case of the petitioner, no order of refusal was passed on 15.1.1985, the date on which 12 months period expired. It is an undisputed position that the order of deemed rejection was passed on file on Aug- ust 22, 1985. The petitioner filed a revision application on 4.9.1985 which was received by the Centrla Govrnment on 6.9.1985. The Central Government rejected the revision application on the ground that it was submitted after the period of ten months from the date of deemed rejection of the application. The Central Government took the date of deemed rejection to be July 16, 1984. It appears that the ame- nded provision of the Rule by which figure `6 has been substituted by `12 in rule 24(2) in the year 1968 was not brought to the notice of the appropriate authority of the Central Government. However, even so, if the date of deemed rejected is taken after the period of 12 months from the date of submission of the application, then also, the revision petition filed on 4.9.85 would be after the period of limitation pre- scribed in Rule 54 of the Rules. But there is a fallacy in calculating period of limitation in this fashion. Relevant part of Rule 54 of the Rules reads as follows :– ``54. Application for revision: (1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the State Govt. But there is a fallacy in calculating period of limitation in this fashion. Relevant part of Rule 54 of the Rules reads as follows :– ``54. Application for revision: (1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the State Govt. or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act or these rules may, within three months of the date of communication of the order to him apply to the Central Government in triplicate in Form N for revision of the order. The application should be accompanied by a Bank Draft for five hundred rupees on a Nationalised Bank in the name of `Pay and Accounts Officer, Department of Mines, payable at New Delhi or through a treasury challan for five hundred rupees under the Head of Account O853 Non-Ferrous Mining and Metallurgical Industries 102 Mineral Concession Fees, Rents and Royalties: Provided that any such application may be entertained after the said period of three months if the applicant satisfies the Central Govern- ment that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within time. Explanation : For the purposes of this rule, where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for transfer of mining lease or for the grant or renewal of a prospecting licence or a mining lease within the period specified in respect thereof in these rules, the State Government shall be deemed to have made an order refusing the transfer, grant or renewal of such licence or lease on the date on which such period expires. (3). The period of three months of limitation starts from the date of communication of the order to the applicant. In the instant case, it is an undisputed position that the order of deemed rejection of the application has not been communicated at all to the petitioner. Thereafore, when the revision application was filed on 4.9.1984, it cannot be said that the period of three months for filing revision petition had already expired. Even otherwise, the petitioner had submitted sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. No reason, whatsoever, has been assigned in the impugned order passed by the Central Government for not condoning the delay. Thereafore, when the revision application was filed on 4.9.1984, it cannot be said that the period of three months for filing revision petition had already expired. Even otherwise, the petitioner had submitted sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. No reason, whatsoever, has been assigned in the impugned order passed by the Central Government for not condoning the delay. It is, inter-alia, stated in the application that the order of deemed rejection was not communication to the petitioner; that she was a widow and she was not in a position to pursue the matter diligently and this leasehold land was the only means of livelihood for her; and it was on an enquiry made sometime in August, 1985 that she cane to know about the order of deemed rejection. In our opinion, the reasons stated in the application should have been considered as sufficient cause for condoning the delay. This is so in view of the principles laid down by Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anatnag vs. Katiji ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ). The principles laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, for construing the phrase `sufficient cause occurring in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, are as follows :– 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. ``Every days delay must be explaineddoes not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is condoned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is condoned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. (4). Thus, both from the point of view of the condonation of delay as well as from the point of view of the fact that the order of deemed rejection having not been communication to the petitioner, the revision petition ought to have been considered within time, the impugned order dated 2.5.1986 is required to be quashed and set aside. (5). In the result, the impugned order dated 2.5.86 (Annexure -14) passed by the Central Government is quashed and set aside. The Central Government is directed to consider the revision petition submitted by the petitioner, on merits in accordance with law. Having regard to the over all facts and circumstances of the case, it would be proper if the revision application is heard and decided preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. During the pendency of the revision petition, the status quo as on today as regards the possession of the mines in question shall be continued, provided the petitioner has paid the dues of the State Government and continues to pay the same as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the lease agreement. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.