ORDER 1. By this petition under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the petitioners seeks quashing of proceedings of Cr. Case No. 50/92 instituted against them in the Court of Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate (Economic Offences) Indore filed u/s. 276 DD of Income Tax Act, 1961 as it stood before coming into force of the Taxation Laws (Amemdment and Misc. Provision) Act, 1986. 2. The complaint in question against the petitioners has been made on the ground that the petitioners during the financial year 1986-87 (Assessment year 87-88) had taken/accepted certain deposits to the tune of Rs. 44,500/- otherwise than by account payee cheques or drafts and which was in violation of provisions of Sec. 269 SS of the Act. The sanction for prosecution u/s. 279 was accorded on 30.3.92 and the complaint to the Court was made in March, 1992. However, in the meantime the Amendment Act, 1986 was enacted whereby Sec. 276 DD was omitted and consequential changes were also made in Sec. 279. The petitioners moved an application before the learned Magistrate seeking dropping of the prosecution on the ground that on the date when the complaint was made, the penal section 276 DD did not exist on the Statute Book. The learned Magistrate, however, vide its order dated 31.8.1994 rejected the petitioners' application holding that the amendment was not retrospective in effect and that the prosecution in question was saved under provisions of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 3. The petitioners have assailed the impugned order and contended that no prosecution could be launched nor any sanction be accorded after Sec. 276 DD and 279 of the Act were omitted. 4. As against this, the learned counsel for respondent Union of India contended that Sec. 5 of the General Clauses Act did protect the prosecution. 5. The decision of this petition turns on the answer of the question as to whether or not sanction for prosecution could be accorded and the prosecution be launched in the Court for the offence committed u/s. 276 DD on a date on which the section was in existence but omitted subsequently before the sanction for prosecution was accorded and the provision was actually launched. 6. 6. The answer to the question, I may respectfully submit is found in a Supreme Court decision in M/s. Rayla Corporation Limited case ( AIR 1970 SC 494 ) wherein their Lordships clearly held that section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions. In the similar situation in which a person was sought to be prosecuted for violating a particular Rule of Defence of India Rules, 1962 which was though in force at the time of violation, but omitted before the prosecution could actually be launched, their Lordships of the Apex Court held that the complaint made for the offence under the said Rule after the same was omitted has to be held invalid. 7. In another case of T. Barai ( AIR 1983 SC 150 ), Hon'ble the Supreme Court reiterating the aforesaid principle observed: "It is only retroactive criminal legislation that is prohibited under Art. 20 (i). The prohibition contained in Art. 20 (1) is that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence prohibits nor shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. It is quite clear that insofar as the Central Amendment Act creates new offences or enhances punishment for a particular type of offence no person can be convicted by such ex post facto law nor can the enhanced punishment prescribed by the Amendment be applicable. But insofar as the central amendment Act reduce the punishment for an offence punishable u/s. 16 (1) (a) of the Act, there is no reason why the accused should not have the benefit of such reduced punishment. The rule of beneficial construction requires that even ex post facto law of such a type should be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law. The principle is based both on sound reason and commonsense." 8. In the case before us the amendment brought in force by the Act of 1986 was a beneficial legislation intended to benefit the assessee and to mitigate the rigour of law inasmuch as the law now does not make the default in question a crime but only provides for imposition of penal by in terms of money. In the case before us the amendment brought in force by the Act of 1986 was a beneficial legislation intended to benefit the assessee and to mitigate the rigour of law inasmuch as the law now does not make the default in question a crime but only provides for imposition of penal by in terms of money. In view of the matter and as observed by their Lordships in the case of T. Barai (supra), "the rule of beneficial construction requires that even ex post facto law of such a type should be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law." The petitioners/assessees cannot be, therefore, deprived of the benefit of the amendment. 9. In the result, the petition succeeds and the proceedings before the Addl. Chief Judl. Magistrate (Economic Offence) Indore in Cr. Case No. 50/92 against the petitioners' are hereby quashed.