ORDER : C.K. Thakker, J. This revision application is filed by the plaintiff against an order passed below application Exh.6, on August 16, 1993 in Regular Civil Suit No. 164 of 1991 pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Patan. 2. Gujarat Electricity Board, Patan ("plaintiff-Board" for short) filed a suit against one Valabhai Devshibhai Chaudhari of Sujanipur for recovery of electricity dues. Summons could not be served on the defendant and the plaintiff Board came to know that Valabhai had expired before three years. The plaintiff-Board, therefore, filed an application Exh.6 on June 23,1992 under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), praying therein to permit the plaintiff Board to amend the cause title of the plaint by substituting the names of present opponents Nos. 1 to 4 being heirs and legal representatives of deceased Valabhai. The said application was objected by the opponents, inter alia, on the ground that the suit as filed against dead person was not maintainable. It was contended that when the suit was filed, Valabhai was dead. It was, therefore, suit against a dead person and was not tenable at law. As the suit was legally not maintainable at the inception, it was still born and no amendment of plaint could be allowed. The suit against the opponents would be barred by limitation. The application was, therefore, liable to be rejected. 3. The trial Court, by the impugned order, upheld the contention of the opponents and observed that the suit was against a dead man and therefore, was nullity and no application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code could have been submitted by the Board. As the application was not maintainable, it was required to be rejected. It is against that order that the present revision application is filed by the plaintiff Board. 4. Mr. Pancholi, learned counsel for the plaintiff Board submitted that the date on which the suit was instituted by the Board against Valabhai, it was within the period of limitation. It was neither the contention of the heirs of deceased Valabhai nor the finding of the trial court that the suit was barred by limitation. It is no doubt true, conceded Mr. Pancholi, that the suit was against a dead person. It was neither the contention of the heirs of deceased Valabhai nor the finding of the trial court that the suit was barred by limitation. It is no doubt true, conceded Mr. Pancholi, that the suit was against a dead person. He, however, submitted that the Board was not aware of the death of Valabhai on the day on which the suit was instituted. As soon as the Board came to know about that fact, an application was made. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the application ought to have been allowed by the trial Court and the prayer of bringing heirs of deceased Valabhai ought to have been granted. By rejecting the application, the trial Court has committed jurisdictional error which requires to be corrected in exercise of powers under Section 115 of the Code. He also submitted that the impugned order has caused irreparable loss to the plaintiff-Board and has resulted into miscarriage of justice inasmuch as a public body is deprived of its legitimate dues. 5. Though served, opponents have not appeared. 6. I see considerable force in the argument of learned counsel for the Board. From the facts, it is clear that Valabhai was in arrears of electricity dues and was liable to pay them. The plaintiff Board, therefore, filed a suit against him. When it came to know that Valabhai was not alive, an application was made and notice was issued to heirs of deceased Valabhai. They appeared before the trial Court. Mr. Pancholi submitted that it was held in Rasetty Rajyalaksamma v. Rajamulu Kannaiah, AIR 1978 AP 279 , that a suit filed against a dead person, was not nullity and void ab initio and legal representatives of the deceased defendant could be impleaded even after expiry of limitation for filing a suit if the omission to implead them was due to bona fide mistake. The view expressed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the above decision was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karuppaswamy v. C. Ramamurthy, AIR 1993 SC 2324 . In that case, invoking the proviso to S: 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1962, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that such an action can be taken. 7. In the instant case, as submitted by Mr. Pancholi, at the time of filing the suit, the plaintiff-Board was not knowing that Valabhai had died. In that case, invoking the proviso to S: 21(1) of the Limitation Act, 1962, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that such an action can be taken. 7. In the instant case, as submitted by Mr. Pancholi, at the time of filing the suit, the plaintiff-Board was not knowing that Valabhai had died. As soon as it came to know about death of Valabhai, an application (Exh.6) to bring heirs and legal representatives of deceased Valabhai was made. Such application cannot be said to be mala fide. Though the trial Court has observed that application could not be said to be bona fide, no reason or ground whatsoever has been recorded for arriving at such a conclusion. The trial Court ought to have appreciated that the Board is a statutory Board and there is no apparent reason for the Board not to take appropriate steps even if it was aware of such eventuality. Thus, the so called finding recorded by the trial Court cannot be said to have been arrived at on the basis of evidence on record and on application of mind. If it were so, the application could not have been rejected on the ground that it was not bona fide. The application was required to be allowed. By rejecting the application, the trial Court has committed a jurisdictional error which requires to be corrected by exercising revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 8. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. The plaintiff is a statutory Board. Electricity was supplied by the Board to deceased Valabhai. Valabhai was, therefore, liable to pay legal dues. After his death, it was the duty of present opponents to pay the amount. Instead of making payment, they have raised technical objections depriving the Board to realise the amount. In my considered opinion, the court should be loathe to uphold such argument which may result in loss to public revenue. On the other hand, by allowing the application, Exh.6 no prejudice will be caused to opponents inasmuch as they can contest the suit on merits. Hence, in my view, on the ground of doing substantial justice also, application Exh.6 should be allowed. 9. For the above reasons, the petition is allowed, the impugned order below Exh.6 passed by the trial Court is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute by directing the trial Court to implead opponent Nos. Hence, in my view, on the ground of doing substantial justice also, application Exh.6 should be allowed. 9. For the above reasons, the petition is allowed, the impugned order below Exh.6 passed by the trial Court is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute by directing the trial Court to implead opponent Nos. 1 to 4 as defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and to decide the suit in accordance with law on merits. Rule is made absolute to the above extent with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.