MOHD. SHAMIM, J. ( 1 ) TO Adam. Paradise was home-Tothe good among his descendants, home is the Paradise. ( 2 ) REALISING thus the importance of home, the legislators intheir wisdom amended Delhi Rent Control Act for providing certainclass of people speedy and expeditious trial of their cases in order toenable them to secure possession over the tenanted accommodationand thus to have roofs over their heads. Thus they incorporated Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C, 14-D m Delhi Rent Control Act by Act No. 57 of 1988. The respondent herein who is a retired government servantavailed of the said opportunity and came forward with a petitionunder Section 14-C for recovery of possession over premises bearingno. F-8/18, Vasant Vihar; New Delhi, shown in the plan Ext. PHannexed with the petition. ( 3 ) WHILE the said petition was pending respondent/petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the respondent for the sake of brevity)moved: an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civilprocedure. The said application was allowed vide order dated 17/07/1995 and an order of eviction was passed in favour of the respondent for receovery of possession over the tenanted accommodation,alluded to above, against the petitioner/respondent (hereafter referredto as the petitioner for the sake of convenience.) ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED and dissatisfied with the said judgment and orderthe petitioner have approached this court through the present revision petition. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Mr. Mukul Rohtagi has contended with great zeal and fervour that the learned lower court fellinto a grave error by coming to the conclusion that there were clear, unequivocal, unambiguous admission on the part of the petitioner intheir written statement and other documents placed on record withregard to the case of the respondent and as such she was entitled toa decree under Order XII Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code. According to the learnedcounsel there was a serious question of law involved in the instantcase with regard to the construction which was to be placed on the lease deed dated 26/10/1979. Counsel for the petitioner hasurged that the said document came up for interpretation in betweenthe parties in a case petition No. E-1171/85 before Additional Rentcontroller, Mr. M. K. Gupta who opined that the said document wasexecuted for ths sake of convenience only in between the parties. Counsel for the petitioner hasurged that the said document came up for interpretation in betweenthe parties in a case petition No. E-1171/85 before Additional Rentcontroller, Mr. M. K. Gupta who opined that the said document wasexecuted for ths sake of convenience only in between the parties. In fact according to him there were two tenancies in respect of thstwo portions i. e. the ground floor and the. first floor and two separatelease deeds were executed in connection therewith. Hence the courthas construed amiss the aforementioned lease deed whereby he heldthat there was only one tenancy. ( 6 ) LEARND counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent filed a petition for eviction under Section 14-C of the Actagainst the petitioner. The petitioner applied for leave to defend the said petition. The leave to defend was granted to the petitioneron the ground that the petitioner have raised certain points which ifproved would dis-entitle the respondent from recovering the possession over the disputed premises (vide order dated 28/09/1992 ). What weighed with the learned Additional Rent Controllerin granting leave was that the questions with regard to the factwhether there were two tenancies or one tenancy and as to whetherthe earlier tenancies were surrendered and supersceded by a freshtenancy dated 6/10/1979 were to be gone into. ( 7 ) IN the above circunstarces the respondent was not entitled toan order of eviction as passed by the learned Rent Controller under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Prcedure. ( 8 ) LEARNED coursel for the respondent has on the other hand has vehemently argued to the country. ( 9 ) SINCE the fate of the present revision petitioner hinges on aninterpretation of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC for short) the provisions of the said Order can be adverted towith profit. It is in the following words :-"jadgement on admissions. 6. (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in thepleading or otherwise, whether erally or in writing, thecourt may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own metion and withoutwaiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IT is crystal clear from above that the Court is competent to pass such orders or judgements under the provisions of the law, alluded to above, which it thinks fit in the citcumstances of a given case. However, the condition precedent for passing such an order or judgment is that there must be admissions which should be unequivocalun-ambiguous and dear cupon the art of the party against whom thejudgment or order is made. Such admissions can be either orally orin writing, whether in the pleadings or otherwise in otherdocuments other than the pleadings which have been placed onrecord. It is also abundantly clear from above that this power top. pass a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is discretionary. ( 11 ) THIS Court is supported in the above view by the observationsof a division Bench as reported in Union of India v. M/s. Ferozeand Co. , (AIR 1962 J and K 60) (l ). . . . a judgment on admission. under O. 12 R. 6 is a matter of discretion and not a matter of rightgaud the Court would not entertain an application for such judgment when the case involves questions which cannot be conveniently dealtwith in a motion under the rule. In order tha; a judgment may bsobtained under O. 12 R 6 the adminssion must be unconditional, clearand unequivocal ". ( 12 ) TO the same effect is the view given vent to by a Single Judgeof this Court as repected in State Bank of India v. M/s. Midland Industries and others, AIR 1988 Delhi 153 (2 ). The aboveview isalso fortified from the observations of a Single Judge of the Himachalpradesh High Court, as reported in M/s. Simla Wholesale Mart v. M/s. Baishnodas Kishori Lal Bhalla and other, AIR 1977 H. P. 29 (3 ). The aboveview isalso fortified from the observations of a Single Judge of the Himachalpradesh High Court, as reported in M/s. Simla Wholesale Mart v. M/s. Baishnodas Kishori Lal Bhalla and other, AIR 1977 H. P. 29 (3 ). ( 13 ) NOW the question which comes to the tip of the tongue is asto whether the court below was justified in passing judgmentandorder under the provisions of law adverted to above in the instantcase The respondent herein field a petition under Section 14-C of the Delhi Rent Control Act which reads as under- :-" (1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Centralgovernment or of the Dehil Aministration, and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence,such employee may within one year from the date of hisretirement or within a period of one year from the dateof commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment)Act,1988 whichever is later apply to the Controller for recording the in not date posession of such premise. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) Where the landlord referred to in sub section (1) of sub-section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen byhim" ( 14 ) A close secrutiny of the relevant provision of law adverted to above, shows that a landlord in order to enable him to recover possessionover the tenanted accommodation must prove the following:he must be a retired employee of the Centeral Government or of Delhi Administration. (b) the tenanted accommodation letout by him is required for his own residence, and (e) the said employee must come forward with a petition for eviction within one yearfrom the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from. the date of commencement of the 1988 Act, whichever is later. ( 15 ) LET us now see as to how fan the respondent herein has provedthe above laid down ingredients. The respondent in para 18 (A) ofher eviction petition has stated that she retired as a Vice Principalof a Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Idgah Road, Delhi,on 28/02/1987. The petitioner have not denied the said factin the corresponding para of their written statement that the petitionerp is a retired employee of the Delhi Administration. The respondent in para 18 (A) ofher eviction petition has stated that she retired as a Vice Principalof a Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Idgah Road, Delhi,on 28/02/1987. The petitioner have not denied the said factin the corresponding para of their written statement that the petitionerp is a retired employee of the Delhi Administration. The present eviction petition was filed on 24/07/1989 i. e. within one year fromthe date of the amendment. The amendment came into force on 1/12/1988. Thus it is clearly within time. Therefore, thedefence raised. in the corresponding para of the written statementthat the respondent is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14-C (1) isnot tenable. ( 16 ) THE resuondent has alleged in para 18 (C) of the evictionpetition that she has no other residential accommodation in Delhior elsewhere. She at present is residing with her nephew at Mandakini Enclave. New Delhi per force as the petitioner are refusing toa vacate the deputed premises. She has further stated in para 18 (E)that she is forced to live in a drawing room as a refugee althoughshe is the owner of a huge house, being the tenanted accommodation. The petitioner in their reply have contended themselevs by stalingthat since the petitioner happens to be a spinster, having no familymembers or dependent she does not require the whole house for herown use and occupation bona fide. It has further been admitted thatthe respondent bad been living alone in the government accommodation consisting of one bed room, one drawing-cum-dinning roomsince 1979 on paying a rent of Rs. 114 per month only. ( 17 ) PARA II of the eviction petition deals with the rate of rent. It has been stated therein that the premises were let out on a monthlyrent of Rs. 2500 excluding water and electricity charges. The petitioner in their written statement have admitted this fact. Accordingto them, the consolidated rent for both the floors of the property isrs, 2500 p. m. Para 14 of the eviction petition relates to the execution of the lease agreement dated 26/10/1979. The execution of the said lease deed in the correspondence para of the writtenstatement has not been denied. ( 18 ) THE respondent has stated in para 8 of the eviction petitionthat the entire house i. e. the disputed premises bearing No. F-8/18,vasant Vihar, New Delhi, was let out as shown in the side planannexed with. the petition. The execution of the said lease deed in the correspondence para of the writtenstatement has not been denied. ( 18 ) THE respondent has stated in para 8 of the eviction petitionthat the entire house i. e. the disputed premises bearing No. F-8/18,vasant Vihar, New Delhi, was let out as shown in the side planannexed with. the petition. The petitioner in the corresponding paraof the written statement in reply to the said paragraph have stated that there were two separate and independent tenanties with separaterent agreed to and paid for each of the floor in the premises. ( 19 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,senior Advocate, on the basis of the above averments in the writtenstatement has contended that the defence as put forward by thepetitioner in their written statement is that there are two separatetenancies in existence and as such, the learned Rent Controller hasnot Justified in coming to the conclusion that there war, one singletenancy- Consequently, according to the learned counsel there wasno nil-equivocal and un-ambiguous admission on the part of. thepetitioner. Hence the application under Order XII Rule 6 of thecpc could not have been allowed. ( 20 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent, Mr. Amarjit Singhchandhiok, on the other hand, has led me through an applicationdated 3/05/1991 moved by the respondent under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code. 1000. The said Satpal Kapur died on 25/10/1973. He bequeathed his portion of the property i. e. the entire ground floorin favour of the respondent. The respoadent did not object to thelease deed in favour of the petitioner. Instead she executed a leasedeed in favour of the petitioner on 7/07/1975 for the un-expiredi. e. from April 1, 197 5/03/1978. The first floor wasunder the tenancy of one M/s. Waldies Ltd. , Calcutta w. e. f. 1/04/1973 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1000. The said company vacatedthe portion of the premises in their occupation and handed over thepossession to the respondent on 31/12/1975. The said portionwas then lei out by the respondent to the petitioner from 1/01/1976 on the same terms and conditions as it was let out to thesaid M/s. . Waldies Ltd. for un-expired period of the lease i. e. fora period of two years and three months on a monthly rent ofrs. 2000. The said portionwas then lei out by the respondent to the petitioner from 1/01/1976 on the same terms and conditions as it was let out to thesaid M/s. . Waldies Ltd. for un-expired period of the lease i. e. fora period of two years and three months on a monthly rent ofrs. 2000. The petitioner requested for the renewal of the lease deedin respect of the first floor for a period of one year i. e. from 1/04/1978. Similarly, a request was made for the renewal of the leasedeed of the ground floor for a period of one year from 1/04/1978. The respondent agreed for the extension of the said two lease deedsfor a period of one year. Thus the lease deed in respect of boththe portions came to an end on 31/03/1979. The learnedcounsel has argued on the basis of the said application that the petitioner have admitted therein the entire case of the respondent. Ithas been admitted therein that the petitioner is a retired governmentservant. She had been living in a tenanted accommodation at therate of Rs. 114 per month. Curiously enough the petitioner hereindo not talk of two separate tenancies though they talk that twotenancies existed in the past in regard to two separate portions ofthe said house. They further requested the court through the saidapplication that the court may pass appropriate orders to give suchportion of the tenanted accommodation to the respondent which isdeemed fit and propen in the circumstances of the present case. Thus,the learned counsel for the respondent contends, in view of theabove, that the petitioner have admitted the case of the respondentin toto and there is nothing strange that an order of eviction waspassed against the petitioner in respect of the entire house. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand,contended that there are two separate teancies. The petitionerinitially took on lease the ground floor in the disputed premisesfor a period of five years from one Satpal Kapur witheffect from 1/04/1973 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1000. . 21. A. It is manifest from above that the petitioner never surrendared the tenancy of both the premises and continued to occupy thesame. The respondent thereafter executed a fresh lease deed for aperiod of five years w. e. f. 1/04/1979 on a monthly rent ofrs. 2500. 1000. . 21. A. It is manifest from above that the petitioner never surrendared the tenancy of both the premises and continued to occupy thesame. The respondent thereafter executed a fresh lease deed for aperiod of five years w. e. f. 1/04/1979 on a monthly rent ofrs. 2500. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of theabove has argued that in fact there were two separate lease deedsin respect of the two separate portions. The lease deed dated 26/10/1979 was executed for a matter of convenience only in favourof the petitioner. The learned counsel in support of his argumenta has placed reliance on the judgment dated 14/10/1993 passedby the Additional Rent Controller who was of the view that the leasedeed dated 26/10/1973 was executed only for the sake ofconvenience. The learned counsel thus having drawn an inspirationfrom the said judgment contends that this is a serious question of law which was required to be gone into. Hence the impugned eviction order passed on the application under Order XIIRule 6 Civil Procedure Code is unwarranted, uncalled for and not justified in the circumstances of the present case. ( 22 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, hascontended that it is a well settled principle of law that once the termsof a contract in between the parties have been reduced to writing nooral evidence can be led to show to the contrary. Such evidencewould be barred by the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidenceact. ( 23 ) I find myself in perfect agreement with the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 24 ) TO the same effect is the view given vent to by a Singlejudge of this Court in Laxmi Iron and Steel Co. v. From Chana, 1993 RLR 424 (4 ). "nevertheless, Mr. Makhija has submitted that the lease deed executed between the respondent and the petitionercompany has been proved on record as Ext. AW-1/4, and there isa clear, stipulation in Clause 6 of this lease deed that the premiseswould be used for purpose of only residence of the officers of the company. In face of these written terms of the contract betweenthe parties, no oral evidence to the contrary can be admitted orentertained, in view of provisions of Section 92 of the Evidenceact" ( 25 ) THERE is another side of the picture. In face of these written terms of the contract betweenthe parties, no oral evidence to the contrary can be admitted orentertained, in view of provisions of Section 92 of the Evidenceact" ( 25 ) THERE is another side of the picture. A careful scrutiny ofthe terms of the said lease deed adverted to above reveals that therespondent herein agreed to let out to the lessee house No. F-8/18,vasant Vihar, New Delhi. There is no mention therein of theseparate portions which were proposed to be let out to the lessee. Admittedly, earlier to the lease deed in question two separate lease deeds were being executed in respect of two separate portions andthis thing continued upto 31/03/1978 and the lease deed inquestion was executed subsequently which was to come into operationfrom 1/04/1979 and was to remain in operation for a period offive years (vide para 1 of the lease deed ). It is amply clear fromthe said para that the entire house was let out through the saidlease deed for a period of five years. The house No. F-8/18, Vasantvihar, New Delhi which is the subject -matter of the said lease deedhas been referred to as the demised premises which implies therebythat there was an intention on the part of the lessor to let out theentire house. Similarly, we can gather an intention on the part ofthe petitioner to take on rent the entire house as the said lease deedbears the signatures of both i. e. the lessor and the lessee. It is truethat there is a mention in the said lease deed with regard to the extentof the accommodation which is on the ground floor and the extentof the accommodation which is on the first floor. However, a meredescription of the accommodation in a tenanted premises does notand can not lead us to the conclusion that there are two separatetenancies as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 26 ) IT is abundantly clear from above that a fresh lease deeddated 26/10/1979 was executed between the parties wherebyall the previous agreements/lease deeds were superseded. Hencethe parties were to be governed by the terms and conditions enumerated in the said lease deed. ( 26 ) IT is abundantly clear from above that a fresh lease deeddated 26/10/1979 was executed between the parties wherebyall the previous agreements/lease deeds were superseded. Hencethe parties were to be governed by the terms and conditions enumerated in the said lease deed. The petitioner herein moved an application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code where through it was prayed thatthe respondent, be given such portion of the premises in suit whichis deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the present case. ( 27 ) NOW the question which arises for determination is as towhat sort of order could have been passed by the Rent Controlleron the said application ? It has been held time and again thatcontract of tenancy, is single and indivisible. There cannot be apiecemeal termination of the tenancy. There is no such provisionin the Delhi Rent Control Act though such a provision exists in therent Control Acts which are in enforcement in other States. Thusin the above circumstances the Rent Controller was left with nooption but to pass an eviction order in respect of the entire premisesin occupation - of the petitioner. ( 28 ) THE above view was, given vent to in a catena of authorities. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court In Misss. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, AIR 1968 SC 438 , (5 ). "in the presentcase the First Appellate Court held that the house was "let out forrunning a school and for residence". The High Court held thatthere where there is a composite letting, it is open to the Court todisintegrate the contract of tenancy, and if the landlord proves hiscase of bona fide requirement for his own occupation to pass a decreein ejectment limited to that part which "is being used" by the tenantfor residential purposes. In so holding, in our judgment, the High Court erred. The jurisdiction of the Court maybe exercised undersection 13 (1) (e) of the Act only when the premises are let forresidential purposes and not when the premises being let for compositepurposes, are used in specific portions for purposes residential andnon-residential. The contract of tenancy is a single and. indivisiblecontract, and in the absence of any statutory provision. to that effectit is not open to. the Court to divide it into two contracts one of lettin to residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes,and. The contract of tenancy is a single and. indivisiblecontract, and in the absence of any statutory provision. to that effectit is not open to. the Court to divide it into two contracts one of lettin to residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes,and. to grant relief under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act limited to thea portion of the demised property which "is being used" for residentialpurposes". ( 29 ) IT was observed by a Single Judge as reported in Shri Harbhajan Das v. Shri Tilak Raj Mehta, 19 (1981) DLT 77. (6) "similariy another lacuna in Delhi Act is that there is no jurisdiction inths Rent Controller to pass a decree in respect of the part of thetenanted premises. In the absence of such a provision the order ofthe Rent Controller may have to apply rigid formulae and thus thoughtechnically and legally it may be correct it may not be ablee to dofull justice between the parties". ( 30 ) IT was next urged by Mr. Rohatgi that ths petitioner is aspinster. She is all alone with no dependents and no other familymember. The tenanted accommodation admittedly is a specioushouse with so many rooms. Thus she does not need the entireaccommodation bona fide. To my mind, the said argument is notavailable to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, atenant is the best judge of his requirement. The respondent is anold lady. She needs some member of the family to look after her. In any case it is none of the functions of the Court to assess the requirement of a landlord and to dictate his or her requirement, ( 31 ) THE above view finds support from the observations of thehon ble Supreme Court as reported in Smt. Prativa Devi v. T. V. Krishnan, JT 1987 (l) SC7 64 (7 ). It was observed. . . . . . . . "the landlord if. the best judge of his residential requirement. Hehas a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of thecourts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he shouldlive or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own". ( 32 ) I am tempted here to cite a few lines from a Division Benchjudgment of the Punjab High Court as reported in Kanwar Behari v. Smt. Vindhya Devi, AIR 1966 Pandh 481. ( 32 ) I am tempted here to cite a few lines from a Division Benchjudgment of the Punjab High Court as reported in Kanwar Behari v. Smt. Vindhya Devi, AIR 1966 Pandh 481. (18) "there may yet beanother approach to the problem. A landlord may require onlythree rooms in a premises let under a single tenancy and consistingof five or six rooms. Even in such a case, the landlord does requirethe premises and if he finds that there exist no provisions for adjustment of his rights with the tenant with respect to the remaining roomswhich may be left with the tenant he may say that herequires the entire premises, because it is only when that his bona fiderequirement can be satisfied. It is impossible to hold that landlordwho has no accommodation for his own residence, should be deprivedof his right to get possession merely on the ground that the entirepremises is too big for his requirements. . . . . . ". ( 33 ) THE above view was also reiterated in S. Mohanlal v. R. matter is still subjudice before a court of law. Hence. the learnedcounsol that the respondent does not require all the four rooms ofa the building for the purpose of carrying on his profession and it issufficient if the respondent is given one of the rooms in the groundfloor. But it is well established that the Maney cannot be spiltup as held in Jaffer Ali v. Choitram (19571 Andh. WR 348 (10)where the learned Judge, Jaganmohan Reddy. J. , as he then was,observed as follows :- "the Controller either determines the lease as a whole if heis satisfied that the landlord requires it for his occupation and has no other residential house of his own, ordismisses the application. He cannot be permitted tosplit up the tenancy, as was done by the Rent Controlappellate Authority in the instant case, viz. to directthe tenant to vacate 3/4 of the suit premises and allowing him to remain in possession of l/4th, and create anew one between the landlord and the tenant, as thatwould have the effect of creating; a tenancy for theparties. " ( 34 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has then contended thatthe respondent easier filed a petition for eviction under Section14 (1) (b), (d) and (e) of the Act in the year 1985. The saidmatter is still subjudice before a court of law. " ( 34 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has then contended thatthe respondent easier filed a petition for eviction under Section14 (1) (b), (d) and (e) of the Act in the year 1985. The saidmatter is still subjudice before a court of law. Hence the learnedrent Controller was not justified in pasting the eviction order onthe above said application under Order XII Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code. ( 35 ) THE contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any force. To my mind, mere pendency of a petition under Section 14 (1) (b), (d) and (e) of the Act would not come in the way of the Controllerin passing an order of eviction under Section 14-C (1 ). Section14-C is a separate provision of law which confers certain benefits onthe retired employees of the Goverment in order to enable them tohave their accommodation vacated on be ground that they needthe same for the residential purposes. Thus. it has got absolutelynothing to do with other grounds of eviction. ( 36 ) THE above view was expressed by their Lordships of thesupreme Court as reported to Fibre Bond (Sales) v. Chand Raniand another, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 249 (11 ). "it is claimed thatleave to defend having been granted in an earlier petition filed undersection 14 (1) (e) the Rent Control Officer was not justified in rejecting the petitioner s application. We do not find any must in the submission as the landlord under Section 14-D is a classified landlord with special rights. It was then urged that since an applicationunder Section 14 (1) (e) was pending the second application for thesame purpose could not have been entertained. The submission isagain devoid of any merit as the earlier apnlication under Section14 (1) (e) was filed under unamended Act whereas the latter application was filed after a special right was conferred on the landlord," ( 37 ) THE above view was again reiterated by the Hon blesupreme Court in Anand Swaroop Vohra v. Bhim Sen Bahri andanother, (1994) 5. SCC 372 (12 ). "moreover, the remedy undersection 14 (1) (e) is available only to landlords in general and thelandlords classified under Section 14-B to 14-D have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of therights under Section 14 (l) (e ). SCC 372 (12 ). "moreover, the remedy undersection 14 (1) (e) is available only to landlords in general and thelandlords classified under Section 14-B to 14-D have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of therights under Section 14 (l) (e ). A defence under Section 14 (l) (e)is not available to a tenant against applications made under Section14-B to 14-D. " ( 38 ) IN the above stated circumstances I do not see any force in the present petition. Dismissed.